United States of America

During a forced landing the left wing struck a light standard pole, and the airplane came to rest inverted after colliding with a fence. The purpose of the flight was to conduct recurrent training to include emergency procedures. On the accident flight the certified flight instructor (CFI) initiated a simulated engine failure after takeoff during the initial climb out. The student advised the tower, and turned crosswind at 700 feet agl. The student set up for landing, which included lowering the landing gear and adding 10 degrees of flaps. On short final, descending through 400 feet agl, both the CFI and student realized they would not make the runway. Both pilot's advanced the throttle, to arrest the descent and perform a go-around. There was no corresponding response from the engine. During the final stages of the emergency descent, the pilot maneuvered the airplane to avoid a work crew at the airport boundary fence and the airplane collided with the light standard pole and a fence. An airframe and engine examination discovered no discrepancies with any system. Following documentation of the engine and related systems it was removed and installed in an instrumented engine test cell for a functional test. The engine started without hesitation and was operated for 44 minutes at various factory new engine acceptance test points. During acceleration response tests, technicians rapidly advanced the throttle to the full open position, and the engine accelerated with no hesitation. A second acceleration response test produced the same results. According to Textron Lycoming, there were no discrepancies that would have precluded the engine from being capable of producing power.

The Venezuelan registered Beech King Air C90 departed Caracas, Venezuela's Óscar Machado Zuloaga International Airport at 1516 eastern daylight time with a pilot and two passengers aboard, and flew to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, Florida. The route of flight filed with air traffic control was: after departure, direct to Maiquetia, thence Amber Route-315 to Bimini, thence Bahama Route 57V to Fort Lauderdale. The {planned} flight level was 220, and the pilot stated that 7 hours 15 minutes of fuel was aboard. Immigration/customs general declaration papers found aboard the wreckage stated the flight's intended destination was Nassau, and the pilot's daughter stated he always stopped at Nassau for fuel on many previous trips. After 6 hours 6 minutes, the aircraft crashed into a highway abutment about 1,700 feet short of his intended landing runway at Fort Lauderdale with total accountable onboard fuel of 3 to 4 gallons. One passenger received fatal injuries, one passenger received serious injuries, and the pilot received serious injuries. Engine factory service center disassembly examination revealed that the engines and their components exhibited no evidence of any condition that would have precluded normal operation, precrash. No precrash abnormalities with the propellers, their respective components, or any other aircraft system component were noted. Type certification data sheets for the C90 state that the unusable fuel aboard is 24 lbs., (3.6 gallons of Jet-A fuel).

During a test flight, the airplane encountered an elevator system oscillation while in a high speed dive outside the normal operating envelope. The 17 second oscillation was recorded on the cockpit voice recorder and had an average frequency of 28 Hz. The aft elevator sector clevis (p/n 2331510-32) fractured due to reverse bending fatigue caused by vibration, resulting in a complete loss of elevator control. The flight crew reported that pitch control was established by using horizontal stabilizer pitch trim. The flightcrew stated that during final approach to runway 17 (13,337 feet by 200 feet, dry/asphalt) the aircraft's nose began to drop and that the flying pilot was unable to raise the nose using a combination of horizontal stabilizer trim and engine power. The aircraft landed short of the runway, striking an airport perimeter fence and a berm. The surface winds were from the south at 23 knots, gusting to 32 knots.

The pilot was maneuvering the airplane south of the airport preparing to make a VFR approach. Witnesses observed the airplane in a right spin. NTAP data showed the airplane to be well above stall speed before disappearing from radar. Examination of the radar data revealed that in 6 seconds, ground speed dropped 31 knots, from 200 knots to 169 knots, and altitude dropped 440 feet, from 11,760 feet to 11,320 feet (4,400 feet per minute). In the next 6 seconds, ground speed dropped another 31 knots, from 169 knots to 138 knots, and altitude dropped 1,020 feet, from 11,320 feet to 10,300 feet (10,200 feet per minute). According to the manufacturer, if the throttles were to be brought back into Beta (flat pitch) range, it is possible that one propeller could go into Beta an instant before the other propeller. If this were to happen, the airplane would instantly snap roll and enter a spiral. The pilot had received an estimated 4 hours of dual instruction in the airplane.

The copilot inadvertently induced a lateral oscillation and lost control of the airplane while practicing touch-and-go landings. The pilot made the first touch-and-go. The copilot successfully made the second touch-and-go. The copilot attempted the third touch-and-go. At 50 feet, he disengaged the yaw damper and entered a pilot induced lateral oscillation. The airplane rapidly decelerated and developed a high sink rate. The airplane dragged the right tip fuel tank, which separated from the airplane, and the airplane bounced back into the air. The airplane landed hard, the main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane skidded to a stop off the right side of the runway. Both pilots and the passenger deplaned through the main entry door. The pilot-in-command had not demonstrated the handling characteristics of the airplane with the yaw damper off, and he felt he did not react quickly enough to prevent the accident.

About 20 minutes before the accident, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that he had a problem with an engine and needed to shut the engine down. The flight had just leveled at 23,000 feet. The controller told the pilot that he was near Jackson, Tennessee, and that he could descend to 7,000 feet. About 10 minutes later, the pilot reported he was at 8,000 feet and requested radar vectors for the instrument landing system approach to runway 2 at the McKellar-Sipes Regional Airport, at Jackson. The pilot told the controller he had the left engine shut down. About 5 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a propeller runaway. About 1 minute later, the pilot reported he was in visual conditions and requested radar vectors direct to the airport. About 2 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a cloud layer under him and that he had the localizer frequency for runway 2 set. About 1 minute later, the pilot was told to contact the McKellar Airport control tower. The pilot acknowledged this instruction. No further transmissions were received from the flight. Examination of the left engine at the accident site showed the left propeller control was found disconnected at the point the propeller control extension bracket attaches to the propeller governor. The propeller control cable had also pulled loose from a swaged point at the control rod and was also separated further aft due to overstress. The housing for the propeller control rod was found securely attached to the engine and the control rod was securely attached to the extension bracket. The propeller governor control arm, which was disconnected from the propeller control cable and rod, was found spring loaded into the high RPM position. Examination of the fractured left propeller bracket assembly was performed by the NTSB Materials Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The bracket assembly was fractured in the area of the outermost eyehole, at the point a bolt passes through the bracket assembly and the propeller governor arm. The fracture surface contained small amounts of dirt, grease, and minor corrosion. The fracture surface features include flat areas that lie on multiple planes separated by ratchet marks, features typically left behind by the propagation of a fatigue crack. The fatigue crack emanated from multiple origins on opposite sides of the bracket. The total area of the fatigue crack occupied approximately 85 percent of the fracture surfaces. The fatigue fractures initiated on the outer edges of the surface and propagated inward toward the center. The remaining 15% of the fracture surface had features consistent with overstress separation. Near the middle of each fatigue region were microfissures suggesting that the crack propagated under high-stress conditions. The NTSB Materials Laboratory also examined the separation point between the left propeller control flexible cable and the rigid rod that connects to the bracket assembly. The cable and the swaged part of the rigid rod were in good condition with no fractures or damage. The Piper PA-31-T2 Pilot Operating Handbook, Section 3, Emergency Procedures, does not contain a procedure for loss of propeller control. Section 3 did contain a procedure for "Over speeding Propeller", which stated that if a propellers speed should exceed 1,976 rpm, to place the power lever of the engine with the over speeding propeller to idle, feather the propeller, place the engine condition lever in the stop position, and complete the engine shutdown procedures. Pilot logbook records show the pilot completed a simulator training course for the accident model airplane about 9 days before the accident and had about 13 flight hours in the Piper PA-31-T2.

The pilot departed for the cross-country flight with 10 gallons of fuel in the left tank and 17 gallons of fuel in the right tank. He leveled off and reduced to cruise power. He said he was "preparing to make switch from left to right tank....just before I could make the switch, the engine lost power." He attempted to switch tanks and restart the engine, but could not get a restart. He performed a forced landing to a dirt road. During the landing roll, the left wing struck a tree and the airplane rotated 180 degrees. The engine was torn from the mount, both wing spars were bent, and the empennage sustained substantial damage. A salvage team member noted, during the airplanes recovery, that there were approximately 10 to 15 gallons of fuel in the left tank; he said the right fuel tank was empty.

During landing touchdown, following a stabilized approach, the right main landing gear failed. The airplane remained controllable by the pilots and came to a stop on the runway, resting on its right wing. The DFW Fire Department arrived at the accident site in 35 seconds and, following communication between the airplane's Captain and Fire Department's Incident Commander, it was decided that an emergency evacuation of the airplane was not necessary. Examination revealed that the right main gear's outer cylinder had fractured allowing the lower portion of the gear (including the wheel assembly) to separate from the airplane. Research, examination & testing of the cylinder revealed that a forging fold was introduced into the material during the first stage of its forging process. The first stage is a hand operation, therefore the quality is highly dependent on the person performing the hand operation. Following the first landing, the forging fold became a surface breaking crack, due to the normal loads imposed during landing. Although growth of the fatigue crack was suppressed by crack blunting, high load landings resulted in growth of the fatigue crack. Subsequently, the landing gear failed when the crack had reached a critical length. Additionally, the airplane's maintenance records were reviewed and no anomalies were found.

After about a 20 minute flight, while on final approach for landing, the airplane experienced a loss of engine power on both engines, and the pilot-in-command (PIC) performed a forced landing into trees about 1/2 mile from the airport. The left and right boost pumps and the left and right transfer pumps, were observed in the "OFF" position. According to the PIC, after he exited the airplane, he returned to the cockpit and "shut off the fuel panel. The fuel quantity indicator toggle switch was observed in the "TOTAL" position. Examination of the fuel system revealed both engine nacelle tanks, both wing center section tanks, and the right wing fuel tanks were not compromised. About 1 quart of fuel was drained from the left and right engine nacelle tanks, respectively. Less than a quart of fuel was drained from the right wing tanks. The left wing tanks were compromised during the accident; however there was and no evidence of a fuel spill. Examination of the left and right wing center tanks revealed approximately 27 gallons (approximately 181 lbs) of fuel present in each tank. Battery power was connected to the airplane, and when the fuel transfer pump switches were turned to the "ON" position, fuel was observed being pumped from the left and right wing center tanks to their respective nacelle tanks. The accident flight was the third flight of the day for the flight crew and airplane. According to a flight log located in the cockpit, the flight crew indicated 750 lbs of fuel remained at the time of the takeoff. According to the airplane flight manual (AFM),"Fuel for each engine is supplied from a nacelle tank and four interconnected wing tanks...The outboard wing tanks supply the center section wing tank by gravity flow. The nacelle tank draws its fuel supply from the center section tank. Since the center section tank is lower than the other wing tanks and the nacelle tank, the fuel is transferred to the nacelle tank by the fuel transfer pump in the low spot of the center section tank...." Additionally, with the transfer pumps inoperative, all wing fuel except 28 gallons from each wing will transfer to the nacelle tank through gravity feed.

The pilot was flying a pressurized airplane at 25,000 feet (cabin altitude of 10,000 feet). For approximately 43 minutes before the accident, ARTCC called the pilot approximately six times and asked him to correct his altitude. Two transmissions from the pilot, between 2305 and 2311, were made with "slurred, and unclear speech." A 2 minute period followed with over 30 hot mike transmissions in which heavy breathing could be heard in some. At 2318:20, the pilot's last transmission was "ah Charlie Hotel, we, we've a little bit of a problem here. We're in a descent, we'll straighten it out in a minute." Witnesses observed the airplane spin into ground. The pilot's autopsy revealed moderate emphysema in his lungs with the presence of air filled bullae measuring up to 3 cm. On the two flights before the accident flight, the owner of the aircraft said that the pilot slept 2 hours out of the 4.5 hours of flight. Several friends of the pilot reported that he was also observed to "easily doze" off while on the ground, but he did so more regularly and for longer time periods while flying.