United States of America

The twin-engine airplane was observed at a low altitude of approximately 1,000 feet agl performing power off stall maneuvers. The witness described the first stall maneuver initiation and recovery as "good." During the second stall maneuver, the nose rose higher than it did during the first maneuver, the right wing dropped, followed by a steep nose down attitude. The airplane rotated about one and one half revolutions before disappearing behind trees. Prior to ground impact, the witness heard the engines rev up. The purpose of the flight was to demonstrate the airplane to a prospective buyer. A radar and aircraft performance study indicated that the accident airplane departed the airport and began a series of heading, speed and altitude changes ultimately crashing 14.6 nautical miles east of the departure airport. During several time periods, calculations of the calibrated airspeed indicated a trend towards and below published stall speeds of 63 knots flaps extended and 71 knots flaps retracted. No structural or mechanical anomalies were observed during an examination of the airplane and engine.

The pilot of the twin turbo-prop airplane lost control of the aircraft during the initial takeoff climb phase while in instrument meteorological conditions. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the planned 169-nautical mile cross-country flight. The aircraft impacted terrain approximately 1.7 miles northwest of the departure airport. The 2,893-hour instrument rated private pilot, who had accumulated over 765 flight hours in the same make and model, had been cleared to his destination "as filed," and told to maintain 7,000 feet, and to expect 17,000 feet in 10 minutes. After becoming airborne, the flight was cleared for a left turn. The tower controller then cleared the flight to contact air route traffic control center. The pilot did not acknowledge the frequency change; however, he did establish radio contact with center on 133.1, and reported "climbing through 4,900 feet for assigned 7,000." The weather reported at the time of flight was winds from 010 degrees at 15 knots with 700 feet overcast and 3 miles visibility in mist. The radar controller observed the aircraft climbing through 5,500 feet and subsequently observed the airplane starting a descent. No distress calls were received from the flight. Signatures at the initial point of impact were consistent with a nose-low ground impact in a slight right bank. A post-impact fire consumed the airplane. No discrepancies or anomalies were found at the accident site that could have prevented normal operation of the airplane.

The commercial pilot was positioning the airplane from the departure airport to another airport. The flight took place on a dark night with overcast skies, and no discernible horizon. The pilot departed and climbed to a cruise altitude between 1,200 and 1,400 feet msl. About 4 miles south of the departure airport, the airplane collided with an east-west ridge at 1,200 feet msl. The ridgeline is perpendicular to the direct route of flight between the departure and destination airports, and rises from west to east with a summit elevation of 1,714 feet msl. The departure airport was a newly commissioned airport 3 miles east-northeast of the old airport. The accident flight was the pilot's second trip to the new airport, and his first night departure from either the old or new airport. Direct flight from the new airport to the destination airport requires a higher altitude to clear the ridgeline than does a direct flight from the old airport. A direct flight from the old airport crosses the same ridgeline farther to the west, where the elevation of the ridge is less than 500 feet msl.

On October 25, 2002, about 1022 central daylight time, a Raytheon (Beechcraft) King Air A100, N41BE, operated by Aviation Charter, Inc., crashed while the flight crew was attempting to execute the VOR approach to runway 27 at Eveleth-Virginia Municipal Airport, Eveleth, Minnesota. The crash site was located about 1.8 nautical miles southeast of the approach end of runway 27. The two pilots and six passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand passenger charter flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Among those on board were Paul Wellstone, Senator of Minnesota, his wife Sheila and one of his three children Marcia.

The airplane was equipped with two experimental Engine AIR Power Systems TSIVD-427, 500-horsepower, liquid-cooled, turbocharged, V8 engines. During previous flights, the right engine lost boost then overboosted intermittently, and attempted repairs were unsuccessful. The pilot elected to fly the airplane to its home base for further troubleshooting. During cruise flight, the pilot reported an engine was surging, declared an emergency, and received vectors toward the airport. The airplane collided into a field beside the airport runway and caught fire. The airplane had a total of 8 to 10 hours of flight time at the time of the accident. Records revealed that two days after the airplane's first test flight, the pilot flew the airplane from Melbourne, Florida, to an airport 336 nm miles away, then flew it to Canada to display it at a fly-in.The FAA operating limitations for the airplane restricted its operation to flight test only, which was proposed to consist of 100 flight hours, since the installation of the modified engines. No single-engine performance data was available for this airplane. Examination of the engines and accessories revealed extensive fire and impact damage. Continuity of the crankshaft, valves, rods, and pistons was established for the right engine by manually rotating the propeller reduction control unit.

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces. There was no evidence of fire. Wreckage examinations and all recovered wreckage from the impact area revealed no evidence of an inflight collisionor breakup, or of external contact by a foreign object. An examination of the engine and the propeller indicated that the engine was producing power at impact. The recovered components showed no evidence of preexisting powerplant, system, or structural failures. Wreckage examinations showed crushing and bending consistent with a moderate angle of descent and a moderate right-wing-down attitude at impact. The amount of wreckage recovered indicates that all parts of the airplane were at the crash site. The wreckage was scattered over an area of about 600 feet. An examination of radar and airplane performance data indicated that the accident airplane initiated a descent from 3,000 feet immediately after the accident pilot was given a second traffic advisory by air traffic control. The pilot reported that the traffic was above him. At the time the pilot stated that he needed to deviate, data indicate that the accident airplane was in or entering an uncontrolled descent. Radar data indicated that, after departure from the airport, the closest identified airplane to the accident airplane was a DC-10, which was at an altitude of about 4,000 feet. The horizontal distance between the two airplanes was about 1.1 nautical miles, and the vertical distance between the airplanes was about 1,600 feet. The accident airplane was never in a location at which wake turbulence from the DC-10 would have intersected the Cessna's flightpath (behind and below the DC-10's flightpath). Given the relative positions of the accident airplane and the DC-10, wake turbulence was determined to not be a factor in this accident. Although the DC-10 was left of the position given to the pilot by Mobile Terminal Radar Approach Control, air traffic controllers do not have strict angular limits when providing traffic guidance. The Safety Board's airplane performance simulation showed that, beginning about 15 seconds before the time of the pilot's last transmission ("I needed to deviate, I needed to deviate"), his view of the DC-10 moved diagonally across the windscreen from his left to straight in front of the Cessna while tripling in size. The airplane performance simulation also indicated that the airplane experienced high bank and pitch angles shortly after the pilot stated, "I needed to deviate" (about 13 seconds after the transmission, the simulation showed the airplane rolling through 90° and continuing to roll to a peak of about 150° 3 seconds later) and that the airplane appeared to have nearly recovered from these extreme attitudes at impact. Performance data indicated that the airplane would had to have been structurally/aerodynamically intact to reach the point of ground impact from the point of inflight upset. There was no evidence of any other aircraft near the accident airplane or the DC-10 at the time of the accident. Soon after the accident, U.S. Coast Guard aircraft arrived at the accident scene. The meaning of the pilot's statement that he needed to deviate could not be determined. A review of air traffic control radar and transcripts revealed no evidence of pilot impairment or incapacitation before the onset of the descent and loss of control. A sound spectrum study conducted by the Safety Board found no evidence of loud noises during the pilot's last three radio transmissions but found that background noise increased, indicating that the cockpit area was still intact and that the airspeed was increasing. The study further determined that the overspeed warning had activated, which was consistent with the performance study and extreme fragmentation of the wreckage. Radar transponder data from the accident airplane were lost below 2,400 feet. The signal loss was likely caused by unusual attitudes, which can mask transponder antenna transmissions. A garbled transponder return recorded near the DC-10 was likely caused by the accident airplane's transponder returns masking the DC-10's returns (since the accident airplane was projected to be in line between the DC-10 and the ground radar) or by other environmental phenomena. Red transfer or scuff marks were observed on many pieces of the airplane wreckage, and these marks were concentrated on the lower airframe skin forward of the main landing gear and the nose landing gear area. The Safety Board and four laboratories compared the red-marked airplane pieces to samples of red-colored items found in the wreckage. These examinations determined that most of the red marks were caused by parts of the airplane, cargo, and items encountered during the wreckage recovery. The marks exhibited random directions of motion, and none of the marks exhibited evidence of an in-flight collision with another aircraft. A small piece of black, anodized aluminum found embedded in the left wing was subsequently identified as a fragment from a cockpit lighting dimmer. The accident occurred at night, with the moon obscured by low clouds. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, although visual conditions were reported between cloud layers. The terminal aerodrome forecast reported a possible cloud layer at 3,000 feet. Weather data and observations by the DC-10 pilot indicated that, after flying about 100 to 500 feet above the cloud layer and soon after sighting the DC-10, the accident airplane would have entered clouds. A number of conditions were present on the night of the accident that would have been conducive to spatial disorientation. For example, no visible horizon references existed between the cloud layers in which the pilot was flying because of the night conditions. In addition, to initiate a visual search and visually acquire the DC-10, varying degrees of eye and head movements would have accompanied the pilot's shifting of attention outside the cockpit. Once the DC-10 was visually acquired by the pilot, it would have existed as a light source moving against an otherwise featureless background, and its relative motion across and rising in the Cessna's windscreen could have been disorienting, especially if the pilot had fixated on it for any length of time. Maneuvering the airplane during this search would likely have compounded the pilot's resultant disorientation.

The airplane crashed into rising terrain after departure from an uncontrolled public airport. The runway used by the pilot is 4,600 feet long and has a 1.8 percent upward gradient. The density altitude was 4,937 feet msl, and a slight quartering tailwind existed at the time. The pilot held in position, powered up the engines, and started his departure. The airplane was observed using most of the runway length before rotation and then it assumed a higher than normal pitch attitude in the initial climb. Witnesses watched the airplane turn left following the route of a canyon and into rising terrain. The reciprocal runway departs towards decreasing elevations. In the area of the crash, two witnesses reported the airplane was at a low altitude, nose high, and wallowing just before it descended into a drainage area 0.69 miles from the runway. Post accident examination of the engines revealed worn camshaft lobes and tappets, which would negatively affect the ability of the engines to produce full rated power. One engine exhibited severe rust on the entire crankshaft. The accident site was located in a canyon, and the wreckage and ground scars was confined to an area about the diameter of the wing span. Major portions of the airframe and most of the engine accessories were consumed by a post accident fire. Examination of the wreckage established that all major components of the airframe and powerplants were at the site.

Following maintenance at Memphis Airport facilities, a crew of two technicians was ferrying the aircraft from the hangar to the main terminal. While approaching the C2 gate, the aircraft could not be stopped in time and collided with the jet bridge. Both occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot/owner initiated a VFR approach and landing in a Cessna 525A, to a 3,009-foot long runway with a tailwind of about 7 knots. The touchdown was 642 feet past the approach end of the runway. Vref was calculated to be 108 kts; however, data from the EGPWS showed the ground speed was about 137 kts, 9 seconds before touchdown, and at touchdown, the speed was estimated to be about 130 kts. After touchdown, the pilot selected ground flaps, which moved the flaps from 35 degrees to 60 degrees, the spoilers auto-deployed, and the speed brakes were extended. The pilot said that after applying the brakes, he felt the brakes pedals pulsing, and did not think the airplane was slowing. He released the brakes for a few seconds and then reapplied them. Again, he felt the pulsing in the pedals, but the airplane was not slowing as he expected. He released the brakes, reset the flaps to takeoff, and applied power to abort the landing when he was about halfway down the runway. The airplane departed the end of the runway and traveled for about 300 feet. Skid marks revealed the initial touchdown was most like made with brakes applied, and no locked wheel crossover protection. Additional skid marks revealed the airplane became airborne after touchdown, and in the next 750 ft, touched down 3 more times, each subsequent touchdown occurring without the full weight of the airplane on the wheels. Tire marks on the last half of the runway were consistent with brakes applied and anti-skid operative. Using the approved flight manual standards, the airplane would have required 3,155 feet to stop. This was predicated on crossing the threshold at 50 feet, at Vref, and included a ground roll of 1,895 feet. However, the pilot touched down at 642 feet from the threshold, which left sufficient runway for stopping. Using the pilot's touchdown point of 642 feet, the airplane was capable of stopping on the runway with a Vref as high as 120 kts. The approach was unstabilized with 4 aural warnings, including 2 sink rate warnings on final approach, the last of which occurred with a descent rate of over 1,700 fpm down, 19 seconds prior to touchdown, and about 400 feet above the ground. The last airborne GPS position was about 2,000 ft from runway touchdown. This would have required a flight path angle of about 3.8 degrees to achieve the reported touchdown position.

The pilot attempted an ILS approach during night, instrument meteorological conditions. The inbound course was 322 degrees magnetic, and the glideslope outer marker crossing altitude was 3,333 feet msl. The decision altitude was 2,370 feet msl and the airport elevation was 2,143 feet msl. A wreckage path, about 370 feet in length, along a track 320 degrees magnetic, commenced with a tree strike about 300 feet southeast of the outer marker, at an elevation of about 2,200 feet msl. Examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical anomalies.