United States of America

The airplane veered off the runway during a rejected takeoff, overran an airport sign, and impacted a hangar. The captain stated that during the after start checklist he moved the power levers to disengage the start locks on the propellers. Post accident examination found that the left propeller was still in the start lock position, while the right propeller was in the normal operating range. The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and the second-in-command (SIC) was the non flying pilot (NFP). After receiving their clearance, the PF taxied onto the runway and initiated the takeoff sequence. The SIC did not set and monitor the engine power during takeoff, as required by the company procedures. During the takeoff acceleration when the speed was between 40 and 60 knots, the captain released the nose gear steering control switch as the rudder became aerodynamically effective. When the switch was released, the airplane began immediately veering left due to the asymmetrical thrust between the left and right engine propellers. The PIC did not advise the SIC that he had lost directional control and was aborting the takeoff, as required by company procedures. The distance between where the PIC reported that he began the takeoff roll and where the first tire marks became apparent was about 630 feet, and the distance between where the marks first became apparent and where the airplane's left main landing gear tire marks exited the left side of the runway was about 220 feet. Thereafter, marks (depressions in the dirt) were noted for a 108-foot-long distance in the field located adjacent to the runway. Medium intensity tire tread marks were apparent on the parallel taxiway and the adjacent vehicle service road. These tread marks, over a 332-foot-long distance, led directly to progressively more pronounced marks and rubber transfer, and to the accident airplane's landing gear tires. Based on an examination of tire tracks and skid marks, the PIC did not reject the takeoff until the airplane approached the runway's edge, and was continuing its divergent track away from the runway's centerline. The airplane rolled on the runway through the dirt median and across a taxiway for 850 feet prior to the PIC applying moderate brakes, and evidence of heavier brake application was apparent only a few hundred feet from the impacted hangar. No evidence of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions was found with the propeller assemblies, nose wheel steering mechanism, or brakes.

The turbo-prop airplane departed controlled flight after initiating an ATC directed turn during cruise climb. The airplane subsequently entered a rapidly descending spiral turn, impacting the terrain and exploding. A witness reported hearing an "unusually loud" engine sound prior to seeing the airplane in a nose-low descent. The witness stated the airplane was "heading straight down, and did between a quarter and half of turn, but was not spinning wildly." The witness reported the airplane disappeared behind a nearby ridgeline and was followed by a "loud sound, and an immediate large cloud of black smoke." Aircraft radar track data showed the airplane heading to the northeast, while climbing to a maximum altitude of 13,800 feet msl. The airplane then entered an increasingly tighter, right descending turn. The calculated descent rate was 7,000 feet/min. Instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions prevailed at altitude and marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions prevailed at the accident site. The instrument-rated pilot received a weather briefing prior to departure. During the briefing the pilot was told of building thunderstorm activity near the departure airport and along the route of flight. The pilot told the briefer he was going to depart shortly to keep ahead of the approaching weather. A witness at the departure airport reported that the passenger was concerned about flying in "bad weather" and the pilot told the passenger that the weather was only going to get worse and that they "needed to go to get ahead of it." A two-dimensional reconstruction determined that all primary airframe structural components, flight control surfaces, powerplant components, and propeller blades were present. Flight control continuity could not be established due to the extensive damage to all components. Inspection of the recovered flight control components did not exhibit any evidence of pre-impact malfunction. The standby attitude indicator gyro and its case showed evidence of rotational damage, consistent with the gyro rotating at the time of impact. Both solid-state Attitude & Heading Reference System (AHRS) units were destroyed during the accident, and as a result no information was available.

Shortly before landing, the crew confirmed that the hydraulic and emergency air pressures were "good", and that the circuit breakers on the "right and left" were in. In addition, the first officer reported "arming one and two." The airplane landed 1,000 - 1,500 feet from the landing threshold of runway 04, which was 7,003 feet in length. The captain utilized aerodynamic braking during part of the landing roll. About 3 seconds after touchdown, the first officer stated, "they're not deployed, they're armed only." About 6 seconds after touchdown, there was an increase in engine rpm. Shortly after that, there was an expletive from the captain. One and a half seconds later, there was another expletive. Slightly less than 2 seconds later, the captain told the first officer to "brake me," and 2.7 seconds after that, stated "emergency brake." About 4 seconds later, there was a "clunk", followed by a decrease in engine rpm 1 second later. Immediately after that, the captain stated, "we're going off the end." The airplane subsequently dropped off an embankment at the end of the runway, impacted and descended through a localizer tower, then impacted the ground and slid across a highway. The airplane had been fitted with a conversion that included thrust reversers. An examination of the wreckage revealed that the thrust reversers were out of the stowed position, but not deployed. The drag chute was also not deployed. Brake calipers were tested with compressed air, and operated normally. Brake disc pads were measured, and found to be within limits. According to an excerpt from the conversion maintenance manual, reverser deployment was hydraulically actuated and electrically controlled. There was also an accumulator which allowed deploy/stow cycling in the event of hydraulic system failure. Interlocks were provided so that the reverser doors could not be deployed until the control panel ARM switch was on, the main throttle levers were in idle position, and the airplane was on the ground with the squat switches engaged. The previous crew reported no mechanical anomalies. Runway elevation rose by approximately 35 feet during the first 2/3 of its length, then decreased until it was 8 feet lower at its departure end. Winds were reported as being from 050 degrees true at 7 knots. At the airplane's projected landing weight, without the use of thrust reversers, the estimated landing distance was about 2,850 feet with the anti-skid operative, and 3,400 feet with the anti-skid inoperative.

After an asymmetrical deployment of the thrust reversers during landing rollout deceleration, the captain failed to maintain directional control of the airplane and it veered off the runway, collapsing the nose gear and damaging the forward fuselage. Several days before the flight the #1 thrust reverser had been rendered inoperative and mechanically locked in the stowed position by maintenance personnel. In accordance with approved minimum equipment list (MEL) procedures, the airplane was allowed to continue in service with a conspicuous placard noting the inoperative status of the #1 reverser placed next to the engine's thrust lever. When this crew picked up the airplane at the departure airport, the inbound crew briefed the captain on the status of the #1 thrust reverser. The captain was the flying pilot for this leg of the flight and the airplane touched down on the centerline of the runway about 1,200 feet beyond its threshold. The captain moved both thrust levers into the reverse position and the airplane began yawing right. In an effort at maintaining directional control, the captain then moved the #1 thrust lever out of reverse and inadvertently moved it to the Take-Off/Go-Around (TOGA) position, while leaving the #2 thrust lever in the full reverse position. The thrust asymmetry created by the left engine at TOGA power with the right engine in full reverse greatly increased the right yaw forces, and they were not adequately compensated for by the crew's application of rudder and brake inputs. Upon veering off the side of the runway onto the dirt infield, the nose gear strut collapsed. The airplane slid to a stop in a nose down pitch attitude, about 7,650 feet from the threshold. There was no fire. Company procedures required the flying pilot (the captain) to give an approach and landing briefing to the non flying pilot (first officer). The captain did not brief the first officer regarding the thrust reverser's MEL'd status, nor was he specifically required to do so by the company operations manual. Also, the first officer did not remind the captain of its status, nor was there a specific requirement to do so. The operations manual did state that the approach briefing should include, among other things, "the landing flap setting...target airspeed...autobrake level (if desired) consistent with runway length, desired stopping distance, and any special problems." The airline's crew resource management procedures tasked the non flying pilot to be supportive of the flying pilot and backup his performance if pertinent items were omitted from the approach briefing. The maintenance, repair history, and functionality of various components associated with the airplane's directional control systems were evaluated, including the brake system, the nose landing gear strut and wheels, the brakes, the antiskid system, the thrust levers and reversers, and the throttle control unit. No discrepancies were found regarding these components.

The amphibious float-equipped airplane was returning to a lodge located on a remote lake after picking up supplies. The airplane departed from a paved runway on an airport. En route to the destination lake, the pilot noted the airplane would not attain its normal cruise airspeed and attitude. Believing the airplane was tail heavy, the pilot asked the aft cabin passenger to move forward. Upon touchdown on the lake, the airplane nosed down into the water. As the airplane nosed down, the supplies, which were not secured in the aft cabin, came forward, and pinned the pilot and front seat passenger against the instrument panel. The passenger in the aft cabin lifted as many of the supplies off the pilot and front seat passenger as he could, before he had to exit the sinking airplane. Both the pilot and front seat passenger exited the submerged airplane under their own power, but the pilot did not reach the surface. An autopsy of the pilot disclosed that he had drowned. A postaccident inspection of the airplane revealed the wheels had not been retracted after takeoff on the runway, consequently the airplane landed on the lake with the wheels fully extended. The front seat passenger said that the pilot did not use a checklist prior to landing.

The pilot completed a flight without incident, and seemed in good spirits before departing, by himself, on the return flight. The second flight also progressed without a incident until cleared from 8,000 feet msl to 5,000 feet msl, which the pilot acknowledged. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and radar data depicted the airplane initiate and maintain a 500-foot per-minute descent until radar contact was lost at approximately 400 feet agl. The pilot made no mention of difficulties while en route or during the descent. The airplane impacted trees at the top of a ridge in an approximate level attitude, and came to rest approximately 1,450 feet beyond, at the bottom of a ravine. Examination of the wreckage revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions. The pilot had been diagnosed with Crohn's disease (a chronic recurrent gastrointestinal disease, with no clear surgical cure) for approximately 35 years, which required him to undergo several surgeries more than 20 years before the accident. The pilot received a letter from the FAA on June 11, 1998, stating he was eligible for a first-class medical certificate. In the letter there was no requirement for a follow up gastroenterological review, but the pilot was reminded he was prohibited from operating an aircraft if new symptoms or adverse changes occurred, or anytime medication was required. His condition seemed to be stable until approximately 5 months prior to the accident. During this time frame, he experienced weight loss and blood loss, was prescribed several different medications to include intravenous meperidine, received 3 units of blood, and had a peripherally inserted central catheter placed. On the pilot's airmen medical application dated the month prior to the accident, the pilot reported he did not currently use any medications, and did not note any changes to his health. A toxicological test conducted after the accident identified meperidine in the pilot's tissue.

On a final approach to runway 26 the flight crew was advised by a flight instructor in the traffic pattern that a wind shear condition existed about one-quarter of the way down the approach end of the runway, which the flight crew acknowledged. On a three mile final approach the flight crew was advised by the instructor that the automated weather observation system (AWOS) was reporting the winds were 060 degrees at 8 knots, and that he was changing runways to runway 08. The flight crew did not acknowledge this transmission. The captain said that after landing smoothly in the touchdown zone on Runway 26, he applied normal braking without any response. He maintained brake pedal pressure and activated the engine thrust reversers without any response. The copilot said he considered the approach normal and that the captain did all he could to stop the airplane, first applying the brakes and then pulling up on the thrust reversers twice, with no sensation of slowing at all. Considering the double malfunction and the mountainous terrain surrounding the airport, the captain elected not to go around. The aircraft subsequently overran the end of the 5,860 foot runway (5,260 feet usable due to the 600 displaced threshold), went through the airport boundary fence, across the perimeter road, and came to rest upright in a dry lakebed approximately 400 feet from the departure end of the runway. With the aircraft on fire, the five passengers and two crew members safely egressed the aircraft without injuries before it was consumed. Witnesses to the landing reported the aircraft touched down at midfield, was too fast, porpoised, and was bouncing trying to get the gear on the runway. Passengers recalled a very hard landing, being thrown about the cabin, and that the speed was excessive. One passenger stated there was a hard bang and a series of smaller bangs during the landing. Federal Aviation Regulations allowed 3,150 feet of runway for a full stop landing. Under the weather conditions reported just after the mishap, and using the anticipated landing weight from the load manifest (12,172.5 pounds), the FAA approved Cessna Flight Manual does not provide landing distance information. Post-accident examination and testing of various wheel brake and antiskid/power brake components revealed no anomalies which would have precluded normal operations.

The pilot entered the left-hand traffic pattern at an uncontrolled airport on a dark moonless night. Witnesses reported observing the airplane in a left descending turn. As the airplane turned onto the base leg, its left bank angle suddenly became steep. The airplane rapidly descended until colliding with level desert terrain 1.63 nm from runway 30's threshold. There were no ground reference lights in the accident site area. An examination of the airplane structure, control systems, engines, and propellers did not reveal any evidence of preimpact malfunctions or failures. Signatures consistent with engine power were found in both the engines and the propellers. The wreckage examination revealed that the airplane descended into the terrain in a left wing and nose low attitude. Fragmentation evidence, consisting of the left navigation light lens and left propeller spinner, was found near the initial point of impact. The wreckage was found principally distributed along a 307- to 310-degree bearing, over a 617- foot-long path. The bearing between the initial point of impact and the runway threshold was 319 degrees. The pilot's total logged experience in the accident airplane was 52 hours, of which only 1.6 hours were at night. The pilot was familiar with the area, but he had made only two nighttime landings within the preceding 90 days. Review of the recorded ATC communications tapes did not reveal any evidence of pilot impairment during voice communications with the pilot.

The single-engine airplane experienced a loss of engine power during cruise flight at flight level 190 (19,000 feet) and impacted the terrain while performing a forced landing to a nearby airport. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident with clear skies and unrestricted visibilities. The pilot reported the loss of engine power about 16 minutes prior to the accident and requested clearance to the nearest airport. Air traffic control (ATC) issued vectors to the Southwest Michigan Regional Airport (BEH). About 10 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was positioned approximately 1.3 nm north of BEH at 13,500 feet. The pilot elected to follow ATC vectors verses circling down over BEH. ATC provided vectors for runway 27 at BEH. Witnesses to the accident reported seeing the airplane "spiraling down and crashing into the ground." The wreckage was located on the extended runway 27 centerline, about 1.12 nm from the runway threshold. The distribution of the wreckage was consistent with a stall/spin accident. Approximately four minutes before the accident, the airplane was on a 9.5 nm final approach at 6,700 feet. Between 9.5 and 5.3 nm the airspeed fluctuated between 119 and 155 knots, and the descent rate varied between 1,550 and 2,600 feet/min. Between 5.3 nm and the last radar return at 1.5 nm the airspeed dropped from 155 to 78 knots. According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) the accident airplane should be flown at best glide speed (92 knots) after a loss of engine power. An average engine-out descent rate of 700 feet/min is achieved when best glide speed is maintained during engine-out descents. An engine teardown inspection revealed that the crankshaft was fractured at the number five crankpin journal. Visual examination of the crankshaft (p/n 13F27738, s/n V537920968) showed a fatigue-type fracture through the cheek, aft of the number five crankpin journal. The exact cause of the crankshaft failure could not be determined, due to mechanical damage at the fatigue initiation point. The fracture features for the accident crankshaft was consistent with 14 previous failures of the same part number. The engine manufacturer determined the failures were most likely due to the overheating of the steel during the forging process.

On July 26, 2002, about 0537 eastern daylight time, Federal Express flight 1478, a Boeing 727-232F, N497FE, struck trees on short final approach and crashed short of runway 9 at the Tallahassee Regional Airport (TLH), Tallahassee, Florida. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled cargo flight from Memphis International Airport, in Memphis, Tennessee, to TLH. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer were seriously injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact and resulting fire. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.