London-Heathrow

The aircraft was on a scheduled domestic flight from Turnhouse Airport, Edinburgh to Heathrow Airport, London. The flight departed Edinburgh at 23:17 hours UTC on October 26 for an domestic flight to London. The flight was uneventful until Garston VOR, the holding point. At 00:15 the captain decided to attempt a landing on runway 28R. The co-pilot was probably making the ILS approach, monitored on PAR by the air traffic control officer, while the pilot-in-command would be seeking a visual reference to enable him if possible to take over control and land. RVR on this runway was reported as 350 m (1140 feet). At 00:23 the captain informed ATC that he was overshooting. He then decided to make a second attempt, this time on runway 28L for which the RVR was reported as 500 m (1634 feet). Since the ILS was operating on glide path only and not in azimuth, ATC provided a full taIkdown. At half a mile from touchdown the PAR Controller was not entirely satisfied with the positioning of the aircraft in azimuth and was about to give instructions to overshoot when he observed that the pilot had in fact instituted na overshoot procedure. At 00:35 hours the pilot-in-command reported that they overshot because they did not see anything. He then requested to join one of the stacks and hold for a little while. This request was granted. The pilot-in-command decided to wait for half an hour at the Garston holding point. At 00:46 another Vanguard landed successfully on runway 28R. At 01:11, although there had been no improvement in the weather conditions, the pilot-in-command probably stimulated by the other aircraft's success, asked permission to make another attempt to land on runway 28R. Meanwhile another Vanguard aircraft had overshot on 28R. However, the captain started another monitored ILS final approach on runway 28R at 01:18. At 01:22 the PAR controller passed the information that the aircraft was 3/4 of a mile from touchdown and on the centre line. Twenty-two seconds later the pilot-in-command reported they were overshooting. The copilot rotated the airplane abruptly and the captain raised the flaps. Instead of selecting the flaps to 20 degrees, he selected 5 degrees or fully up. Because the speed was not building up, the copilot relaxed pressure on the elevator. Speed increased to 137 kts and the vertical speed indicator showed a rate of climb of 850 feet/min. The copilot therefore put the aircraft's nose further down. At four seconds before impact the VSI was probably showing a substantial rate of climb and the altimeter a gain in height, although the airplane was in fact losing height. The copilot was misled into continuing his down pressure on the elevator. The vanguard had by then entered a steep dive. The aircraft hit the runway about 2600 feet from the threshold.

The aircraft took off from London Airport (Heathrow) at 1627 hours GMT on a scheduled international freight flight to Milan-Linate Airport, Italy, and the flight proceeded normally as far as the boundary of Milan TMA (Monteceneri NDB). Control of the aircraft was transferred to Milan ACC from Zurich ACC at FL 170, and after the first air- ground communication the aircraft was cleared to Linate Airport via Saronno and Linate NDB at 1844: 30 hours GMT. Before reaching Saronno VOR the pilot asked for and was given permission to make a slight diversion to the south-west in order to avoid a considerable thunderstorm formation which, as forecast, arrived over the area of Milan CTR at 1952 hours. At the pilot's request, the ATC cleared the descent with a clearance limit of 6 000 ft, confirming the previous clearance for descent. The pilot confirmed that he had received the clearance and reported that he was south-west of Saronno on a heading of 1800. At 1855 hours, the pilot reported that he was still maintaining a heading of 180° to avoid the thunderstorm area; the estimate for Linate NDB was however 1904-1905 hours. Following this communication, the control at Milan ACC amended the previous descent clearance, limiting it to FL 130 in order to safeguard other air traffic south of the CTR. At 1903 hours, the pilot unexpectedly reported that he was heading for Voghera VOR, without having been cleared for this by Control. After a few seconds he reported that he was over Voghera VOR at FL 130 and asked far further descent clearance which he was not given, in view of the unexpected and unorthodox position reported. He was asked to maintain FL 130 until he reached Linate NDB. At 1909 hours, the pilot reported that he was close to Linate NDB at FL 130-135 in a severe thunderstorm. After 30 seconds he reported his position over Linate NDB with certainty and was therefore cleared to descend to holding pattern down to 6 000 ft. At 1911 hours, Approach control gave clearance for the descent to be continued down to 2 000 f t, the minimum safe altitude over Linate NDB. At 1917 hours the pilot, speaking in a slightly agitated manner and sometimes with words which were incomprehensible, said repeatedly that he was not in fast certain of his actual position in relation to Linate NDB, that he was aligned with Linate ILS but that ha was not able to establish his exact position in relation to the radio beacon, the Latter being subject to considerable interference from the heavy electrical discharges due to the thunderstorm. The pilot also stated that he could not hear the ILS Outer Marker. At 1919 hours, the pilot confirmed his uncertainty regarding his position and asked to maintain 4 000 ft for another holding pattern; he was again given the QFE and at 1922 hours reported that he had come down to 2 000 ft, that he was inbound and that he would call over the Outer Marker. After he had been given the clearance, there were no further communications and no reply to the repeated calls from Milan Approach Control. It was subsequently found that the aircraft, which was aligned with the ILS localizer, struck the top of a hill at an altitude of 675 m, 35 NM from the threshold of runway 36, between 1923 and 1925 hours. A crew member was injured while the second was killed.

British Eagle Flight 802 departed London-Heathrow Airport at 12:04 GMT with destination Innsbruck, Austria. At 13:35 the flight contacted Munich ATC and reported over the Kempten NDB nine minutes later, changing its IFR flight plan to VFR from Kempten to Innsbruck. Two minutes later the crew contacted Innsbruck and reported descending VMC directly to Seefeld. Over the Innsbruck VOR at FL110, the airplane was still unable to break the clouds. The last message from the flight was at 14:12 when it reported at FL100. The descent was continued until the airplane collided with the steep eastern flank of the Glungezer Mountain at an altitude of 2601 m (8500 ft). An avalanche occurred, carrying most of the aircraft debris downhill for about 400 m. All 83 occupants were killed.

The airplane was performing a charter flight from London-Heathrow to Stavanger, carrying 34 British students aged 13-16 and two teachers who were flying to Norway for a week study. While descending to Stavanger, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Holteheia located 54 km northeast of the destination. The airplane was totally destroyed and there were no survivors.
Crew:
Cpt Philip Guy Watts, pilot,
F/O Reginald Leonard Murray Smaley, copilot,
Miss Susan Elizabeth Endicott, stewardess.
Passengers:
John Beacham, teacher,
George William Budd, teacher,
John Adams,
Gregory Allen,
Michael Benson,
Peter Boyes,
John Bradbury,
Geoffrey Brown,
Reginald Chapple,
Trevor Condell,
Geoffrey Crouch,
Clifford Gaskin,
Edward Gilder,
Derek Goddard,
David Gore,
Geoffrey Green,
Quentin Green,
Anthony Harrison,
David Hatchard,
David Hendley,
Peter Huggins,
Richard Lawrence,
Alan Lee,
Robert Martin,
Brian Robert Mitchell,
Edwin Murray,
John Phelps,
Edward Prosper,
Robert Roffey,
Lawrence Sims,
Colin Smith,
Peter Stacey,
Roger Taylor,
John Wells,
Martin White,
Roger White.

Upon landing at Heathrow Airport, the right main landing gear collapsed. The four engine aircraft skidded on runway before coming to rest. All six crew members were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Upon landing, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane skidded for about 500 yards before coming to rest in flames. All 59 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

The airplane departed London-Heathrow Airport at 1010LT on a test flight regarding the renewal of its Certificate of Airworthiness. After performing the necessary test, the crew requested a descent from 12,000 feet to 3,000 feet. Three minutes after starting the descent, while cruising in a visibility reduced by fog, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed in a field located in Winkton, southeast of Bournemouth-Hurn Airport. Seven occupants were killed while three others were seriously injured. The aircraft disintegrated on impact.

Following a major overhaul, the crew (pilots and engineers) left London-Heathrow Airport in the morning for a post-maintenance check flight. Ten minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 1,000 feet, the right wing failed and detached. Out of control, the airplane dove into the ground and crashed in a field located in Frimley. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all six occupants were killed.

The Viscount, en route from London to Naples, flying on Airway Amber 1, reported over Ostia at 23,500 feet at 1144 hours advising that it was continuing to Ponza, estimating arrival over this point at 1157. At 1150 it collided east of Nettuno with an Italian Air Force F-86 Sabre which was taking part in group training of aerobatic maneuvers. The 26 passengers and 5 crew aboard the Viscount were killed in the accident, and the pilot of the F-86 parachuted to safety. Both aircraft were destroyed.

The crew departed London-Heathrow Airport at 1001LT on a cargo flight to Düsseldorf, Germany. The flight proceeded normally until halfway roughly between Dover and Wulpen. At this time, at an altitude of 7,000 feet, the crew perceived some hiccups in the right engine. The boost fluctuated and the RPM varied /- 50 revolutions/min. The captain assumed that it was caused by icing, activated carburetor heaters and gave some brief shots of alcohol. After these actions the situation seemingly became normal. Just before reaching Wulpen, the right hand engine boost fell to 25". The oil pressure fell to 60 - 70 psi (normal pressure is 80 psi). The cylinder temperature was normal. The captain decided to shut down the engine and feather the prop. The crew contacted Brussels and were cleared to descend and divert to Brussels Airport. The pilot manoeuvred around some rain showers during the descent towards Brussels. At 11:55 local time the flight reported at 1500 feet, and almost at the Mackel beacon. The flight crew were not able to maintain altitude so the captain decided to restart the no. 2 engine. He instructed the copilot to carry out the restart. The copilot failed to use a checklist while performing the actions to restart the engine. A few minutes later the crew noticed that the right engine was on fire. Three fire extinguishing bottles were fired, but the fire was not contained. The captain then carried out an emergency descent. The airplane came down in a field next to the village of Kamershoek. It burst into flames after the three crew members exited the plane.
Source:
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19581017-1