London-Heathrow

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Heathrow to Gatwick. After touchdown on runway 08, the pilot selected spoilers and reverse thrust when the airplane became airborne again then landed back heavily and bounced twice. The fuselage was bent just prior to the wings, a tyre on the nose wheel burst and a wheel separated. The aircraft rolled for several hundred meters before coming to rest. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

En route from London-Heathrow to Salzburg at an altitude 19,000 feet, the rear pressure bulkhead ruptured. An explosive decompression of the fuselage occurred, causing serious interior damage and severe distortion of upper tailplane skin attachments. The tail surfaces subsequently detached, causing the airplane to enter a steep dive. The Vanguard spiraled down out of control and crashed in a field next to a highway. During the investigation corrosion was found in the lower part of the rear pressure bulkhead underneath plating that was bonded to the structure. The bond was completely delaminated in this area and the bulkhead material literally eaten away. Fluid contamination, perhaps from the lavatory, was thought to have been the root cause for the corrosion.

Shortly after takeoff from runway 28R at London-Heathrow Airport, while climbing to a height of 1,000 feet, the engine n°4 failed and caught fire. The crew declared an emergency and was cleared for an emergency landing on the same runway. For undetermined reason, the crew was unable to feather the propeller. Following a normal approach, the airplane landed and was stopped in flames after a course of several hundred yards. All 42 occupants were quickly evacuated and there were no casualties. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While cruising at an altitude of 21,000 feet south of Ingolstadt, the pilot informed ATC that a fire erupted on board, declared an emergency and requested the permission to divert to Munich Airport. The crew immediately started an emergency descent when control was lost. The airplane entered a dive, partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in flames on a highway. Debris were found in an open field and the main wreckage on the Munich - Nuremberg highway. The tail was found about three km from the main wreckage. Rescue teams were hampered in their mission and it was really difficult to reach the crash site as the highway was totally jammed by cars from people living on holidays. None of the 48 occupants survived the crash. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were considered as good despite broken clouds from 800 feet till 15,000 feet.

The aircraft left Deauville at 1535 hrs., on flight No. C.6845, and made an uneventful flight to London at flight level 70. It was cleared to land on runway 28 Right and at 1624 hrs, reported passing the outer marker inbound. The approach proceeded normally and the aircraft came into the view of air traffic control personnel in the tower when it was about 200 feet, and close to the airport boundary. It was then in a normal approach attitude. However, at a position near the threshold of runway 28 Right the port wing was seen to drop and the aircraft turned slowly to the left off the runway centerline. The bank increased and the port wing tip, followed by the port main wheels, touched the grass surface of the aerodrome. Witnesses near to the runway threshold heard engine power applied as if for an overshoot and the aircraft then became airborne again and with the bank further increasing, it flew towards the partly constructed No.I terminal building on the northeast side of the airport central area. Whilst still steeply banked it struck two British European Airways Trident aircraft, which were parked at a pier of the terminal building, and burst into flames. The aircraft then rolled on to its back and after demolishing a twelve foot high metal blast barrier came to rest against the ground floor of the terminal building between two of the embarkation piers. 27 people on the ground in the area received slight injuries, 2 people were seriously injured. Six occupants were killed while two others were killed as well as all eight horses. The Trident registered G-ARPT was also destroyed while the Trident registered G-ARPI was repaired.

While parked on apron at Heathrow Airport, the three engine airplane was struck by a BKS Air Transport Airspeed AS.57 Ambassador 2 that crashed on landing. The aircraft was empty so there were no injuries but it irreparable.

The aircraft was operating Flight BA. 712 from Heathrow Airport, London to Zurich with onward routing to Sydney, Australia. In addition to the normal crew complement, a check pilot was on the aircraft for the purpose of carrying out a route check on the pilot-in-command. The aircraft became airborne from Runway 28 Left at 1527 hours GMT and 20 seconds later, just before the time for the noise abatement power reduction, the flight crew felt and heard a combined shock and bang. The thrust lever for No. 2 engine "kicked" towards the closed position and at the same time the instruments showed that the engine was running down. The pilot-in-command ordered "Engine Failure Drill" and the flight engineer began the immediate actions of that drill. Because the undercarriage was retracted, the warning horn sounded when the flight engineer fully retarded the thrust lever; the check pilot and flight engineer simultaneously went for and pulled the horn cancel switch on the pedestal whilst the co-pilot, instinctively, but in error, pressed the fire bell cancel button in front of him. The flight engineer went for the engine fire shut-off handle but he did not pull it. The lack of a flight deck voice recorder makes it impossible to establish a second by second timing of events, but at about this time the check pilot looked out of a flight deck window on the port side and reported a serious fire in No. 2 engine, adding words to the effect that a landing should be made at the earliest possible moment. No member of the flight crew recalls hearing the fire warning bell. Nevertheless, the fire warning light in No. 2 fire shut-off handle was seen to be on and the pilot-in-command ordered an "Engine Fire Drill". The check pilot suggested, and the co-pilot with the pilot-in-command's approval broadcast, a "Mayday" call. Having initially started an engine failure drill, the flight engineer changed directly to the engine fire drill. According to his evidence, having completed Phase 1 of the engine fire drill, which is required to be done by memory, he subsequently used his own copy of the checklist to complete Phase I1 of the drill, including the operation of the fire extinguisher transfer switch and pushing the discharge button for the second shot thirty seconds after the first. When the co-pilot started to read the check list the flight engineer told him the check was already completed. During this period and subsequently, according to his evidence, the check pilot directed his attention to monitoring the state of the fire on the wing and to providing the pilot-in-command with comments intended to help him position the aircraft for the landing. ATC originally offered the pilot-in-command a landing back on Runway 28L and alerted the fire services but after the "Mayday" call he was offered Runway 05 R which was accepted as it would resulting a shorter flight path. ATC ordered other landing aircraft to overshoot in order to ensure a clear approach to Runway 05 R and to clear Runway 28R for the passage of the fire vehicles. The initial notification to the Airport Emergency Services of the expected landing on Runway 28 L was also revised. About 14 minutes after the start of the fire, No. 2 engine, together with part of its pylon, became detached and fell into a waterfilled gravel pit. This was unknown to the flight crew but because of the separation the light in the fire handle would have gone out. Nevertheless, they were aware that a serious fire continued to burn. At various places along the flight path a number of engine fragments and pieces of cowling had already fallen away, but these caused no injury to persons or damage to property. At about the time the engine fell away the undercarriage was lowered and full flap selected. The undercarriage locked down normally but the hydraulic pressure and contents were seen to fall and the flaps stopped extending at 470, that is 30 short of their full range. The approach to Runway 05 R was made from a difficult position, the aircraft being close to the runway and having reached a height of about 3 000 ft and a speed of 225 kt. There is no glide slope guidance to this runway but the approach was well judged and touchdown was achieved approximately 400 yards beyond the threshold. To add to the pilot-in-command's difficulties, during the final approach the flight engineer informed him that the instruments of No. 1 engine indicated that it might fail, although it did not do so. In order to bring the aircraft to a stop in the shortest possible distance after landing, in addition to the wheel. brakes, reverse thrust from No. 1 and No. 4 engines was used down to a very low speed. The use of reverse thrust caused the flames to be deflected in towards the fuselage. The aircraft came to a stop just to the left of the runway centre line, about 1 800 yards from the threshold, on a heading of 0350M. After the aircraft came to rest the flight engineer commenced the engine shut-down drill and closed the start levers. Almost simultaneously the pilot-in-command ordered fire drill on the remaining engines. Before this could be carried out there was an explosion from the port wing which increased the intensity of the fire and blew fragments of the wing over to the starboard side of the aircraft. The pilot-in-command then ordered immediate evacuation of the flight deck. The engine fire shut-off handies were not pulled and the fuel booster pumps and main electrical supply were not switched off. There were more explosions and fuel, which was released from the port tanks, spread underneath the aircraft and greatly enlarged the area of the fire. The cabin crew had made preparations for an emergency landing and as the aircraft came to a stop opened the emergency exits and started rigging the escape chutes. The passengers commenced evacuation from the two starboard overwing exits and shortly afterwards, when the escape chutes had been inflated, from the rear starboard galley door and then the forward starboard galley door. However, because of the spread of the fire under the rear of the fuselage the escape chute at the rear galley door soon burst and, following the first explosion, the overwing escape route also became unusable. The great majority of the survivors left the aircraft via the forward galley door escape chute. The co-pilot, who could not get into the galley to help with the evacuation, left the aircraft through the starboard flight deck window by use of the escape rope at that position. The Second Officer, who helped guide the passengers in the initial stages, followed, the pilot-in-command, having assisted the stewardess to inflate the port forward chute, also left by the flight deck window after seeing the evacuation was proceeding satisfactorily. The flight engineer saw that the port forward chute had not inflated properly so he climbed down it to straighten it. However, immediately after it inflated it became unusable from heat and burst. The evacuation of passengers had been largely completed by the time the airport fire and rescue services began to provide assistance. The fire services prevented the fuel in the starboard tanks from catching fire but the rear fuselage and port wing were burned out. Four of the passengers and one stewardess were overcome by heat and smoke at the rear of the aircraft and did not escape, whilst thirty-eight passengers sustained . injuries during the evacuation. Some hours after the accident it was not known how many had escaped alive or had been injured because some survivors were quickly removed to various treatment and rest centres whilst others left the vicinity of the airport without leaving their names.

Viscount aeroplane type 803, registration: EI-AOM departed from Cork Airport at 10.32 hours en route for London operating as Aer Lingus Flight 712. The take-off was normal. The flight was cleared by Air Traffic Control to proceed via Airways Blue 10, Green 1 at flight level 170 (17,000'). At 10.38, when the aeroplane had passed through 7,000', clearance on course to Tuskar was given. At 10.40, after the flight had reported it was by Youghal at 7,500' climbing to 17,000', ATC Cork suggested that if desired, the flight could route direct to Strumble. No direct acceptance of this suggestion was received. At 10.57.07 the flight reported "by Bannow (a reporting point on the route at 51º 68' N - 06º 12' W) level 170 (17,000') estimating Strumble at 03". The flight was instructed to change to the London Airways frequency of 131.2, and this was acknowledged by the reply "131.2". The time of this call was 10.57.29. At 10.58.02, London Radar intercepted a call (garbled and simultaneous with another call) which appeared to be, and was later confirmed as "Echo India Alpha Oscar Mike with you", and eight (8) seconds later, a call was intercepted which was interpreted as "Five thousand feet descending spinning rapidly". This call was also heard by another Aer Lingus aircraft en route Dublin-Bristol (The word "Five" was later, after repeated acoustic analysis, interpreted as more likely to be the word "twelve".) This was the last call received from the aircraft. At 11.10, London ATC advised Shannon ATC that they had no radio contact with EI-AOM. At 11.13 London advised Shannon that they had requested Aer Lingus Flight EI 362 (Dublin-Bristol) to search west of Strumble. This flight descended to 500' in good visibility, but saw nothing. Between 11.13 and 11.25, efforts were made to make radio contact with the flight, with no result, and at 11.25 a full alert was declared. At 12.36 a report from the U.K. was received by Haulbowline that wreckage had been sighted in position 51º 57' N, 06º 10' W Rosslare Lifeboat was proceeding, but two surface vessels within 4 nautical miles of this position saw nothing. At 12.52 hours the Air Corps reported that they had dispatched a Dove aeroplane and a helicopter to search. At 13.10 hours there were ten aircraft from the U.K. in the search area. At 15.30 hours the reported sighting of wreckage was cancelled. Nothing positive was discovered on this day. On 25 March 1968, at 06.15 hours, the search was resumed by aircraft and ships from the U.K., and at 12.41 hours, wreckage was sighted and bodies recovered from a position 6 nautical miles north-east of Tuskar Rock. More floating wreckage was reported scattered for a further 6 nautical miles north-west of this point. The Irish Naval Service ship, L.E. Macha, which had been on patrol off the north-west coast, joined in the search on 26 March 1968, and took over duty as Search Controller. A total of 13 bodies was eventually recovered in the search during the next few days, together with a quantity of light floating wreckage-mostly cabin furnishings, and some baggage, seat cushions, and the wheels and inner cylinder from the port main landing gear. One additional body was recovered later. The position of the main wreckage remained obscure in spite of prolonged and diligent search by sonar equipped ships of the British Navy and trawling by Irish trawlers-"Glendalough" from Kilmore Quay and "Cu na Mara" of the Irish Fisheries Board (An Bord Iascaigh Mhara). Eventually, on 5 June 1968 "Glendalough" hauled in position 1.72 nautical miles from Tuskar Rock with Tuskar bearing 280º, in 39 fathoms and brought up a quantity of positively identifiable wreckage. The "Cu na Mara" in the same location also brought up wreckage. On the following day more wreckage was brought up by these trawlers, and divers from H.M.S. Reclaim confirmed a mass of wreckage "like a scrap yard" in this position. Subsequent salvage operations confirmed that a major portion of the aircraft at least was located here. Two eyewitnesses, one a sailor on a coastal vessel, who thought he had seen an aircraft crash into the sea but did not report it at the time, and another witness on shore, who saw a splash in the sea near the Tuskar Rock, gave the time as between 11.10 and 11.15. The position lines of these two witnesses approximately cross the location where the main wreckage was eventually found. The aircraft was totally demolished by violent impact with the sea. The bulk of the wreckage was found in 39 fathoms of water with all parts lying in close proximity. About 60-65% of the aircraft (by weight) was recovered, and included the major parts of three engines, a few parts of the fourth, and all four propellers, the almost complete primary structure of the wings from tip to tip, and the fin and rudder. None of the wreckage displayed any evidence of fire or explosion. No part of the tail planes or elevators were recovered, with the exception of small portions of the spring tab and trim tab. The recovered wreckage revealed extensive damage to the whole structure, which virtually disintegrated.

Iberia flight IB062 left Málaga, Spain, at 19:30 UTC on a flight to London-Heathrow Airport, United Kingdom. The weather at the time was slightly misty with intermittent drizzle but there was reasonable visibility. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL210 after passing latitude 50 °N and was given a routing via Ibsley and Dunsfold. After passing conflicting traffic, the aircraft was recleared to FL110 and directed to turn right on to 060° for Dunsfold. Passing abeam Fawley the aircraft was further cleared to FL60 and, in acknowledging this instruction, the crew reported leaving FL145. Just under 4 minutes later the aircraft was cleared to proceed direct to Epsom on its own navigation. The flight crew acknowledgement this instruction. All the while the aircraft had been in a continuous descent, until it impacted trees on the southern slope of Blackdown Hill, approximately 48 km south-southwest of Heathrow Airport. The aircraft continued for hundreds of yards, passing across a meadow where it killed 65 grazing sheep. It then broke through a large hedge and parts of the aircraft fell off destroying a garage, and damaging parts of the roof of Upper Blackdown House as the aircraft disintegrated. None of the 37 occupants survived the crash.

Shortly after takeoff from London-Heathrow Airport, while climbing, the undercarriage wouldn't lock up after takeoff, so the crew recycled the gear a couple of times. On the third attempt, the bogie (which was not rotating in the right sequence) fouled the main hydraulic jack fracturing the attachment bolt of the shuttle valve for the main and emergency 'down' hydraulic lines. All hydraulic fluid escaped and the gear couldn't be extended anymore. In agreement with ATC, the captain decided to divert to Manston-Kent Airport where an emergency landing was carried out on a foamed runway. The airplane completed a belly landing and was damaged beyond repair while all 65 occupants escaped uninjured.