Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

The single engine aircraft departed Tartu-Ülenurme Airport on a private flight to Dresden, carrying two passengers and one pilot. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing to a height of about 300-500 metres, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a field located about 500 metres past the runway end. All three occupants were seriously injured and rescued an hour later. The aircraft was destroyed.

The single engine aircraft departed Monterrey-Del Norte Airport at 0827LT on a private flight to Acapulco, carrying six passengers and one pilot. About three hours and a half into the flight, while in cruising altitude, the pilot contacted ATC, declared an emergency and was cleared to divert to Toluca Airport. On final approach, the engine failed. The aircraft stalled, collided with a fence and eventually crashed in a deconstruction site located 1,600 metres short of runway 15. Two passengers were seriously injured while five other occupants escaped with minor injuries. The aircraft was destroyed. Few hours later, one of the survivor, the Mexican actor Pablo Santos aged 19, died from his injuries, and a second survivor passed away a day later. It was later reported by the authorities that Pablo Santos was seating on the floor and was not strapped.

The single engine aircraft was ready at 1850LT for a private flight to Vilshofen, Bavaria, carrying four passengers and one pilot. During the takeoff roll on runway 34 at Marina di Campo Airport, the tower controller informed the pilot that smoke was coming out from the airplane, but the pilot did not reply to this message and continued the takeoff procedure. After liftoff in VFR conditions, the aircraft initiated a turn to the right then a second turn to the left when it descended and crashed in a vineyard located about one km north of the runway end. Two passengers were seriously injured while three other occupants were killed. Few hours later, one of the survivors died from his injuries while the last survivor passed away the following day. The aircraft was destroyed.

The single engine aircraft departed Toussus-le-Noble Airport in the early morning on a private flight to Fairoaks with two people on board. About 40 minutes into the flight, at an altitude of 18,000 feet, the manifold pressure dropped from 30 to 28 inches of mercury. The pilot increased the engine power when the manifold pressure boosted to 33 inches of mercury then dropped again. Suddenly, a burning smell pervades the cabin. The pilot declared an emergency and elected to divert to Abbeville Airport which was at a distance of 15 NM from his position. While descending, he lowered the landing gear and reduced the engine power. Shortly before reaching FL100, the oil pressure warning light came on, the engine started to vibrate then stopped. At this time, the aircraft was 10 NM from Abbeville Airport, descending in IMC conditions. On short final, at a height of 300 feet, the pilot established a visual contact with the runway but his trajectory was too short. The aircraft crash landed in a field and came to rest 200 metres short of runway 20. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The single engine aircraft departed Don Torcuato Airport on a private flight to Punta del Este, Uruguay, carrying four passengers and one pilot. About 15 minutes into the flight, while cruising in good weather conditions, the pilot informed ATC about engine problems and elected to divert to Buenos Aires-Aeroparque-Jorge Newbury Airport. Unable to maintain a safe altitude, he eventually ditched the aircraft in the Río de la Plata, about 28 km northeast of Buenos Aires. Quickly on site, rescuers were able to evacuate all five occupants who were uninjured while the aircraft was lost.

The 641-hour private pilot and passenger were departing on a 155-nautical mile night cross country flight. Shortly after the airplane took off, the tower controller heard a weak transmission that she could not completely understand, but did hear the words "engine" and "power." The controller asked the pilot to "say again", but there was no response. She again asked, "say again" and the pilot transmitted, " I'm going down." There were no further communications from the pilot. While approximately 400 feet above ground level, the airplane's engine stopped producing power. While in a left turn, the left wingtip impacted the ground and the airplane cartwheeled. The debris field encompassed an area approximately 125 feet long and approximately 50 feet wide. Witness reports of the airplane's flight path along with the wreckage distribution path were consistent with the pilot's attempt to return to the airport. A post-impact fire consumed the fuselage and caused extensive thermal damage to the engine and wings. An examination of the wreckage revealed the landing gear and wing spoilers were in the retracted position. The position of the flaps could not be determined. No mechanical deficiencies were noted with the airframe that could have prevented normal operations. Examination of the engine revealed no preimpact anomalies. The reason for loss of engine power could not be determined.

The airplane was destroyed on impact with terrain during a forced landing following an observed in-flight loss of engine power after takeoff. A witness observed the takeoff and stated that the airplane took off from the end of runway 34. About halfway down the runway the airplane emitted a sound like a rapid misfire, a pop, and then no more audible engine sounds. The airplane was about 300 to 400 feet above ground level at that point. He said that the airplane turned right then turned left to a bank where the wing was straight down. The airplane's wings then leveled, the airplane descended, and it impacted terrain. He stated that the time from the sounds to the impact was about two to three seconds. An on-scene examination revealed no airframe pre-impact anomalies. An engine examination revealed a cracked crankshaft propeller flange. The engine without the turbochargers and with the original crankshaft was test run up to 2,100 RPM. A propeller and governor inspection revealed no anomalies. Examination of the turbocharger system's exhaust bypass valve assembly revealed its butterfly valve was stuck (bound) in the extended closed position. The engine's cracked crankshaft was removed and a serviceable crankshaft was installed. The engine was test run again with a serviceable exhaust bypass valve assembly. The engine produced rated power. The original exhaust bypass valve assembly was reinstalled. The exhaust bypass valve assembly's wastegate bound again during an engine run and a loss of engine power was observed. Sectioning of the bypass valve assembly revealed a bent wastegate shaft. The valve assembly lever arm was bent and exhibited pre-impact tool marks consistent with pliers loosening a bound wastegate shaft. The airplane's pilot operating handbook and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved airplane flight manual (POH), in part, stated, "ENGINE POWER LOSS DURING TAKEOFF If sufficient runway remains for a normal landing, leave gear down and land straight ahead." The engine manufacturer's maintenance and operator's manual stated that the wastegate is required to be checked for operation and condition during 100 hour inspections. The manual did not specify a procedure for maintenance personnel on how to check the wastegate's operation and its acceptable condition. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendation A-94-081, issued to the FAA in 1994, stated, "Require the amendment of pilot operating handbooks and airplane flight manuals applicable to aircraft equipped with engine turbochargers by including in the 'Emergency Procedures' section information regarding turbocharger failure. The information should include procedures to minimize potential hazards relating to fire in flight and/or loss of engine power." The airplane's POH latest revision was dated October 14, 2002 and review of the emergency procedures section showed that the POH did not contain information, procedures, or amplified procedures on turbocharger failures. The airplane accumulated 8.7 hours of operation since the last annual inspection.

The single engine aircraft departed Ostend Airport, Belgium, on a flight to the private airstrip of Château La Chassagne located about 21 km west of the Dijon-Longvic Airport. The flight from Ostend to Dijon was completed under IFR rules and was uneventful. After being cleared to continue under VFR to La Chassagne, the pilot cancelled the IFR flight plan and was cleared for a descent to runway 36. Visibility was 10 km, rain, ceiling at 800 feet and minimum safe altitude at 3,300 feet. The pilot informed ATC he was descending to runway 18 and left the frequency. Shortly later, at an altitude of 1,700 feet, the aircraft struck the southeast slope of Mt Afrique located in Corcelle-les-Monts. The wreckage was found in a wooded area and all four occupants were killed.

Before the flight involved in the accident, the pilot himself had loaded and prepared the aircraft. According to the statement of the official on duty, neither the pilot nor the passengers were behaving conspicuously. The flight plan envisaged a VFR-IFR-VFR flight from Egelsbach (EDFE), south of Frankfurt, to Samedan (LSZS) in the Engadine. After take-off, the flight was to proceed under VFR (visual flight rules) to the waypoint RID and then to waypoint GERSA under IFR (instrument flight rules). From GERSA it was then planned to continue flying to Samedan under VFR again. The total duration of the flight was indicated in the flight plan as 75 minutes, and the endurance was indicated as 4 hours and 30 minutes. Take-off took place in Egelsbach at 10:09 LT. At 10:37 LT, the pilot contacted Swiss Radar Lower Sector North on frequency 136.150 MHz as follows: “... level two one zero inbound Trasadingen”. He was instructed to continue flying in the direction of GERSA. At 10:45 LT, the pilot contacted Radar Lower Sector South, on frequency 128.050 MHz, and continued flying as far as LUKOM. Based on an instruction from air traffic control, the aircraft left flight level 210 and descended to flight level 170. The pilot was instructed to continue flying direct to Samedan. At 11:10 LT, the pilot changed from instrument flight rules to visual flight rules and signed off from Lower Sector South. He attempted to contact Samedan. Initially, the communication was poor. After several attempts, he made contact at 11:15 LT on the Samedan aerodrome frequency. At 11:18 LT, the pilot reported that he was over the aerodrome and wanted to fly to the east to get below the cloud ceiling. No further radiocommunication took place. Shortly afterwards, witnesses saw the aircraft fall out of the clouds in an uncontrolled attitude. The aircraft crashed into the ground in a flat spin and with practically no forward motion. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed.

The pilot received a preflight briefing from the Gainesville Automated Flight Service Station before departing on the instrument flight. The briefer advised the pilot of the potential for occasional moderate turbulence between 24,000 and 37,000 feet and on the current Convective SIGMET for embedded thunderstorms over southern Mississippi. The flight was in cruise flight at 24, 000 feet when the airplane encountered moderate to severe turbulence and heavy rain. The airplane descended from 24,000 feet to 3,100 feet in a descending right turn in 2 minutes and 10 seconds before radar contact was lost. The airplane was located 8 hours 26 minutes after the accident along a crash debris line that extended between 1.31 miles and 1.53 miles northwest of Arlington, Alabama. Airframe components recovered from the accident site were submitted to the NTSB Materials laboratory for examination. The examinations revealed all failures were consistent with overstress fracturing and there was no evidence of pre-existing conditions or fatigue damage. Examination of the airframe revealed that the airframe design limits were exceeded. The Pilot's Operating Handbook states the maximum structural cruising speed is 173 knots indicated airspeed or 170 knots calibrated airspeed. The co-pilot airspeed indicator at the crash site indicated 180 knots calibrated airspeed. The design maneuvering speed is 135 knots indicated airspeed or 133 knots calibrated airspeed.