Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

The pilot received a preflight briefing from the Gainesville Automated Flight Service Station before departing on the instrument flight. The briefer advised the pilot of the potential for occasional moderate turbulence between 24,000 and 37,000 feet and on the current Convective SIGMET for embedded thunderstorms over southern Mississippi. The flight was in cruise flight at 24, 000 feet when the airplane encountered moderate to severe turbulence and heavy rain. The airplane descended from 24,000 feet to 3,100 feet in a descending right turn in 2 minutes and 10 seconds before radar contact was lost. The airplane was located 8 hours 26 minutes after the accident along a crash debris line that extended between 1.31 miles and 1.53 miles northwest of Arlington, Alabama. Airframe components recovered from the accident site were submitted to the NTSB Materials laboratory for examination. The examinations revealed all failures were consistent with overstress fracturing and there was no evidence of pre-existing conditions or fatigue damage. Examination of the airframe revealed that the airframe design limits were exceeded. The Pilot's Operating Handbook states the maximum structural cruising speed is 173 knots indicated airspeed or 170 knots calibrated airspeed. The co-pilot airspeed indicator at the crash site indicated 180 knots calibrated airspeed. The design maneuvering speed is 135 knots indicated airspeed or 133 knots calibrated airspeed.

The airplane was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain following an in-flight loss of control during climb after takeoff. Meteorological information indicates that the cloud ceilings were between 1,200 and 1,700 feet above ground level at the time of the accident. While airborne, the accident pilot reported to another pilot that the cloud ceiling was 1,500 feet. Radar data shows that the airplane flight profile became erratic once it had climbed above about 1,700 feet pressure altitude. The final flight path sequence depicted by the radar data shows a right-hand turn of decreasing radius with an associated rapid rate of descent. The last radar return coincided with the accident location. The non-instrument rated pilot had logged 7.0 hours of simulated instrument experience. The pilot had logged 35.8 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane, of which, all but 0.3 hours was listed as crosscountry time. No records of training in the same make and model airplane were discovered. No pre-impact mechanical deficiencies were found during the post-accident examination of the wreckage.

On December 13, 2003, at approximately 1540 central standard time, a Piper PA-46 single-engine airplane, N9223X, was destroyed upon impact with a building about one mile short of the landing threshold for runway 02 at Guaymas State of Sonora, In the Republic of Mexico. The private pilot and his passenger were fatally injured. Visual meteorogical conditions prevailed for the personal cross country trip that originated in Tuscon, Arizona, at 1340, with Guaymas as his final destination.

The airplane was returning to the airport for landing. A witness reported it was flying erratically streaming a whitish "vapor trail" from the left wing. Another witness reported the airplane banked abruptly into a steep turn to the left, the nose pitched up, and the airplane sank from view behind the trees. The witness then heard a crash and saw smoke. Examination revealed no evidence of flight control, engine, or propeller malfunction. The left inboard fuel cap was absent from the filler port, and a ground search found the left inboard fuel cap in the grass beside the runway. The JetProp LLC, JetProp DLX Supplemental Flight Manual, Section 4, Normal Procedures Checklist, states, "Left Wing 4.9e, ... Inboard Fuel Tank ... CHECK Supply Visually & SECURE CAP ..." Examination of the JetProp LLC, JetProp DLX Supplemental Flight Manual and the Piper Malibu PA-46-310P Information Manual revealed the following instructions on how to secure the fuel caps: "Replace cap securely." There was no evidence of mechanical malfunction with the fuel cap or the filler port.

The single engine aircraft departed Bangkok-Don Mueang on a private flight to Chiang Mai with two passengers and one pilot on board. During climbout in marginal weather conditions, the pilot was cleared to climb to 11,000 feet when control was lost. The aircraft crashed in a cornfield located near Lop Buri. All three occupants were killed. There was some thunderstorm activity in the area at the time of the accident.

The pilot was performing a night, VFR traffic pattern, to a full stop at a non-towered airport in a turboprop aircraft. He entered the traffic pattern (6,800 feet; 1,000 feet AGL) on an extended downwind; radar data indicated that his ground-speed was 205 knots. Over the next 3 nautical miles on down wind, radar data indicated that he slowed to a ground-speed of 171 knots, lost approximately 500 feet of altitude, and reduced his parallel distance from the runway from 4,775 feet to 2,775 feet. Witnesses said that his radio transmissions on CTAF appeared normal. The two witnesses observed a bright blue flash, followed by a loss of contact with the airplane. Rescue personnel found a broken and downed static wire from a system of three sets of power transmission wires. The dark night precluded ground rescue personnel from locating the downed aircraft; a police helicopter found the airplane approximately 2 hours after the accident. The pilot had recently completed his factory approved annual flight training. His flight instructor said that the pilot was taught to fly a VFR traffic pattern at 1,500 feet AGL (or 500 feet above piston powered aircraft), enter the downwind leg from a 45 degree leg, and fly parallel to the downwind approximately 1 to 1.5 nautical miles separation from it. His speed on downwind should have been 145 to 150 knots indicated, with 90 to 95 knots on final for a stabilized approach. The flight instructor said that the base turn should be at a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees. Radar data indicates that the pilot was in a maximum descent, while turning base to final, of 1,800 to 1,900 feet per minute with an airspeed on final of 145 to 150 knots. His maximum bank angle during this turn was calculated to have been more than 70 degrees. The separated static wire was located 8,266.5 feet from the runway threshold, and was approximately 30 feet higher than the threshold. Post-accident examinations of the airplane and its engine revealed no anomalies which would have precluded normal operations prior to impact.

The pilot was carrying out an IFR flight from Chambery in France to Dunkeswell Aerodrome using Exeter Airport as his diversion. Before departure from Chambery he had checked the weather conditions at Exeter and other airfields in its vicinity from the available TAFs and METARs covering the period of the flight and he was satisfied that conditions were suitable. He had also contacted a friend who was also a commercial pilot at about 1530 hrs. This friend lived near Dunkeswell Aerodrome and had estimated the cloud base to be approximately 1,500 feet. The aircraft departed Chambery at 1605 hrs and, apart from some airframe icing on departure, it had an uneventful transit at FL270. Approaching the south coast of England, the aircraft was descended to FL60 and it left controlled airspace at Southampton in good VMC with the lights along the south coast clearly visible. The weather at Exeter at 1720 hrs was: surface wind 130°/08 kt, varying between 110° and 170°; visibility 6,000 metres; cloud SCT 005, BKN 012; temperature +9° C; dew point +8° C and QNH 1011 mb. With approximately 50 miles to run to his destination, the pilot attempted to contact Dunkeswell Radio but received no reply so he assumed the airfield had closed for the night. The lights of Dunkeswell village and the industrial site at the north-eastern edge of the aerodrome were visible but they had a milky appearance as if shining through scattered mist pockets. The aircraft was descended to 2,600 feet on the Exeter QNH and the main altimeter was set to the Dunkeswell QFE by subtracting 31 mb from the Exeter QNH to allow for the Dunkeswell elevation of 850 feet. The pilot was utilising two GPS navigation systems programmed to provide him with centreline information for Runway 23 on a CDI (Course Deviation Indicator) scale of 0.3 nm for full deflection. Whilst there was no runway lighting at Dunkeswell, the pilot had placed white reflective panels on the right edge of Runway 23. When illuminated by the aircraft landing light, these panels would show the right hand edge of the runway and also indicate the touchdown zone of the runway. The panels measured 18 cm by 9.5 cm and were mounted vertically on low, black plastic supports. The threshold for Runway 23 is displaced 290 metres from the road which runs along the northern aerodrome boundary and the first reflector was 220 metres beyond the displaced threshold. The reflectors had been positioned over a distance of 460 metres with the distances between them varying between 15 and 49 metres. The white centreline markings would also have been visible in the landing light once the aircraft was low enough. The end of the 46 metre wide runway was 280 metres from the last reflector. The pilot had carried out night approaches and landings to Runway 23 at Dunkeswell using similar visual references on many previous occasions. The pilot identified the lights of the industrial site earlier than he expected at six miles whilst maintaining 2,600 feet on the Exeter QNH. He cancelled his radar service from Exeter, which had also provided him with ranges and bearings from Dunkeswell, and made blind transmissions regarding his position and intentions on the Dunkeswell Radio frequency. Having commenced his final approach, the pilot noticed there was scattered cloud in the vicinity of the approach path. At about 2.5 nm from the runway threshold and approximately 800 feet agl, the pilot noticed a mist pocket ahead of the aircraft and so he decided to initiate a go-around and divert to Exeter. At that point the aircraft was configured with the second stage of flap lowered, the landing gear down and the airspeed reducing through 135 kt with all three aircraft landing lights selected ON. The pilot increased power and commenced a climb but he became visual with the runway once more and so he reduced power and resumed the approach. A high rate of descent developed and the radio altimeters automatic 50 feet audio warning sounded. The pilot started to increase engine power but he was too late to prevent the severe impact with terrain that followed almost immediately. The aircrafts wings were torn off as it passed between two trees and the fuselage continued across a grass field, remaining upright until it came to a stop. The passenger vacated the aircraft immediately through the normal exit in the passenger cabin and then returned to assist the pilot. Having turned off the aircraft's electrical and fuel systems the pilot also left the aircraft through the normal exit. There was a leak from the oxygen system, which had been disrupted in the accident and the pilot was unable to remove the fire extinguisher from its stowage due to the deformation of the airframe. He contacted Exeter ATC using his mobile telephone to inform them of the accident and they initiated the response of the emergency services.

The single engine airplane departed Palma de Mallorca-Son Bonet Airport at 1146LT on a flight to Sabadell with two passengers and one pilot on board. After takeoff, the pilot was instructed by ATC to proceed to the north. Seven minutes after its departure, while flying in reduced visibility due to rain falls, the aircraft struck a rocky wall located on Mt Mola de Montserra (600 metres high) located near the village of Bunyola, about 20 km north of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the ceiling was at 5,000 feet with a visibility of 8 km and rain. The mountain was shrouded in cloud and thick fog.

The single-engine airplane experienced a loss of engine power during cruise flight at flight level 190 (19,000 feet) and impacted the terrain while performing a forced landing to a nearby airport. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident with clear skies and unrestricted visibilities. The pilot reported the loss of engine power about 16 minutes prior to the accident and requested clearance to the nearest airport. Air traffic control (ATC) issued vectors to the Southwest Michigan Regional Airport (BEH). About 10 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was positioned approximately 1.3 nm north of BEH at 13,500 feet. The pilot elected to follow ATC vectors verses circling down over BEH. ATC provided vectors for runway 27 at BEH. Witnesses to the accident reported seeing the airplane "spiraling down and crashing into the ground." The wreckage was located on the extended runway 27 centerline, about 1.12 nm from the runway threshold. The distribution of the wreckage was consistent with a stall/spin accident. Approximately four minutes before the accident, the airplane was on a 9.5 nm final approach at 6,700 feet. Between 9.5 and 5.3 nm the airspeed fluctuated between 119 and 155 knots, and the descent rate varied between 1,550 and 2,600 feet/min. Between 5.3 nm and the last radar return at 1.5 nm the airspeed dropped from 155 to 78 knots. According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) the accident airplane should be flown at best glide speed (92 knots) after a loss of engine power. An average engine-out descent rate of 700 feet/min is achieved when best glide speed is maintained during engine-out descents. An engine teardown inspection revealed that the crankshaft was fractured at the number five crankpin journal. Visual examination of the crankshaft (p/n 13F27738, s/n V537920968) showed a fatigue-type fracture through the cheek, aft of the number five crankpin journal. The exact cause of the crankshaft failure could not be determined, due to mechanical damage at the fatigue initiation point. The fracture features for the accident crankshaft was consistent with 14 previous failures of the same part number. The engine manufacturer determined the failures were most likely due to the overheating of the steel during the forging process.

An annual inspection had been completed on the airplane the same day, and on its first flight after the annual inspection, as the airplane was departing from runway 05, at Naples Municipal Airport, witnesses said the engine ceased operating. They also said that the propeller was rotating either slowly or had stopped, and they then observed the airplane enter a steep turn, followed by an abrupt and uncontrolled nose-low descent and subsequent impact with the ground. The airplane came to rest in a nose-low, near vertical position, suspended at its tail section by a fence and some trees along the eastern perimeter of the airport. It had incurred substantial damage and the pilot and two passengers who were onboard the airplane were fatally injured. Postaccident examination of the airframe, flight controls and the engine did not reveal any mechanical failure or malfunction. The flaps were found to have been set to 10 degrees, and the propeller showed little or no evidence of rotation at impact. The FAA Toxicology Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological studies on specimens obtained from the pilot and the results showed that diphenhydramine was found to be present in urine, and 0.139 (ug/ml, ug/g) diphenhydramine was detected in blood. Diphenhydramine, commonly known by the trade name Benadryl, is an over-the-counter antihistamine with sedative side effects, and is commonly used to treat allergy symptoms. Published research (Weiler et. al. Effects of Fexofenadine, Diphenhydramine, and Alcohol on Driving Performance. Annals of Internal Medicine 2000; 132:354-363), has noted the effect of a maximal over the counter dose of diphenhydramine to be worse than the effect of a 0.10% blood alcohol level on certain measures of simulated driving performance. The level of diphenydramine in the blood of the pilot was consistent with recent use of more than a typical maximum single over-the-counter dose of the medication.