Albuquerque-Double Eagle II

The student pilot was enroute at an altitude about 17,700 ft mean sea level (msl) on a crosscountry flight with a passenger in his high-performance airplane. The pilot was receiving visual flight rules flight following services from air traffic control, who advised him of an area of moderate to heavy precipitation at the airplane’s 12 o’clock position. The pilot replied that he had been able to “dodge” the areas of precipitation, but that they were getting bigger. There were no further communications from the pilot. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered a left turn that continued through 180° before the airplane began a descent from its cruise altitude. The flight track ended in an area of moderate to extreme reflectivity as depicted on weather radar and indicated that the airplane was in a rapidly descending right turn at 13,900 ft when tracking information was lost. The wreckage was scattered across a debris field about 2 miles long. Examination of the wreckage revealed lateral crushing along the left side of the fuselage and the separation of both wings and the empennage. Wing spar signatures and empennage and wing impact marks suggested positive wing loading before the wing separation and in-flight breakup. The area of the accident site was included in a Convective SIGMET advisory for thunderstorms, hail, and wind gusts of up to 50 kts. A model atmospheric sounding near the accident site indicated clouds between about 15,000 ft and 27,000 ft, as well as the potential for light rime icing from 15,500 ft to 23,000 ft. Review of the pilot’s logbook revealed that he had about 47 total hours of flight experience, with about 4 hours of instruction in simulated instrument conditions. A previous flight instructor reported that the pilot displayed attitudes of “anti-authority” and “impulsivity.” Ethanol was detected in two postmortem tissue specimens; however, based on the distribution and amount detected, the ethanol may have been from postmortem production, and it is unlikely to have contributed to the crash. Fluoxetine, trazodone, and phentermine were also detected in the pilot’s postmortem toxicology specimens. The pilot had reported his use of fluoxetine for anger and irritability. Anger and irritability are nonspecific symptoms that may or may not be associated with mental health conditions, including depression, certain personality disorders, and bipolar disorder. These conditions may be associated with impulsive behavior, increased risk taking, lack of planning, not appreciating consequences of actions, and substance use disorders. Both trazodone and phentermine have the potential for impairing effects; however, an unimpaired pilot with the pilot’s relative inexperience would have been likely to lose aircraft control during an encounter with instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). It is therefore unlikely that the pilot’s use of trazodone and phentermine affected his handling of the airplane in a way that contributed to the crash. Based on review of the pilot’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certification file, no specific conclusion can be drawn regarding any underlying psychiatric condition that may have contributed to his decision to attempt and continue the flight into IMC, as that decision was consistent with his previous pattern of risk-tolerant behavior. The pilot had not formally been diagnosed with a mental health disorder in his personal medical records reviewed other than substance use disorders. The psychological and psychiatric evaluations reviewed were not for diagnostic and treatment purposes, but for evaluation for FAA medical certification, and therefore did not generate diagnoses. There is evidence that the pilot had a pattern of poor decision-making, high-risk tolerance, and impulsive behavior. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the student pilot’s decision to continue into an area of deteriorating weather conditions, his encounter with instrument meteorological conditions and convective activity, and loss of visual references, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a loss of aircraft control. During the descent, the airplane exceeded its design limitations, resulting in structural failure and an in-flight breakup.

Several witnesses observed the airplane before and during its takeoff roll on the morning of the accident. One witness observed the airplane for the entire event and stated that the run-up of the engines sounded normal. During the takeoff roll, the acceleration of the airplane appeared a little slower but the engines continued to sound normal. Directional control was maintained, and at midfield, the airplane had still not rotated. As the airplane continued down the 5,132-foot-long runway, it did not appear to be accelerating, and, about 100 yards from the end of the runway, it appeared that it was not going to stop. The airplane maintained contact with the runway and turned slightly right before it overran the end of the runway. The airplane was subsequently destroyed by impact forces and a postaccident fire. The wreckage was located at the bottom of a deep gully off the end of the runway. Postaccident examination of the area at the end of the runway revealed two distinct tire tracks, both of which crossed the asphalt and dirt overrun of 175 feet. A review of the airplane's weight and balance and performance data revealed that it was within its maximum gross takeoff weight and center of gravity limits. At the time of the accident, the density altitude was calculated to be 7,100 feet; the airport's elevation is 4,830 feet. For the weight of the airplane and density altitude at the time of the accident, it should have lifted off 2,805 feet down the runway; the distance to accelerate to takeoff speed and then to safely abort the takeoff and stop the airplane was calculated to be 4,900 feet. It is unknown whether the pilot completed performance calculations accounting for the density altitude. All flight control components were accounted for at the accident site. Although three witnesses indicated that the engines did not sound right at some point during the runup or takeoff, examination of the engine and airframe revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Propeller signatures were consistent with rotational forces being applied at the time of impact. No conclusive evidence was found to explain why the airplane did not rotate or why the pilot did not abort the takeoff once reaching the point to safely stop the airplane.

The pilot was performing a night, VFR traffic pattern, to a full stop at a non-towered airport in a turboprop aircraft. He entered the traffic pattern (6,800 feet; 1,000 feet AGL) on an extended downwind; radar data indicated that his ground-speed was 205 knots. Over the next 3 nautical miles on down wind, radar data indicated that he slowed to a ground-speed of 171 knots, lost approximately 500 feet of altitude, and reduced his parallel distance from the runway from 4,775 feet to 2,775 feet. Witnesses said that his radio transmissions on CTAF appeared normal. The two witnesses observed a bright blue flash, followed by a loss of contact with the airplane. Rescue personnel found a broken and downed static wire from a system of three sets of power transmission wires. The dark night precluded ground rescue personnel from locating the downed aircraft; a police helicopter found the airplane approximately 2 hours after the accident. The pilot had recently completed his factory approved annual flight training. His flight instructor said that the pilot was taught to fly a VFR traffic pattern at 1,500 feet AGL (or 500 feet above piston powered aircraft), enter the downwind leg from a 45 degree leg, and fly parallel to the downwind approximately 1 to 1.5 nautical miles separation from it. His speed on downwind should have been 145 to 150 knots indicated, with 90 to 95 knots on final for a stabilized approach. The flight instructor said that the base turn should be at a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees. Radar data indicates that the pilot was in a maximum descent, while turning base to final, of 1,800 to 1,900 feet per minute with an airspeed on final of 145 to 150 knots. His maximum bank angle during this turn was calculated to have been more than 70 degrees. The separated static wire was located 8,266.5 feet from the runway threshold, and was approximately 30 feet higher than the threshold. Post-accident examinations of the airplane and its engine revealed no anomalies which would have precluded normal operations prior to impact.

The pilot, a heart transplant surgeon, was advised of a donor in Las Cruces, NM. He and a physician's assistant were to fly to Las Cruces, retrieve the donor heart, and return to Albuquerque, where the transplant was to be performed. The pilot obtained a weather briefing (VMC was forecast) and filed an IFR flight plan. He fueled the jet aircraft to capacity and took off into a dark, clear, moonless night towards open, flat terrain with few ground lights. The aircraft crashed seconds later. It impacted the ground in a left wing/nose slightly low attitude at high speed. There was no evidence of preimpact failure/malfunction of the airframe, engines, instruments, or controls. The pilot had been awake for 22 hours with little or no rest. He was not current for night flight. His IFR currency could not be determined. Both occupants were killed.