Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

The pilot of N9143B had asked the controller if he could deviate about 12 miles west, because he thought he saw "a hole" in the weather. The radar ground track plot showed the pilot had observed a 3 to 5 mile gap between two thunderstorm clusters and attempted to fly through an area of light radar echoes between the two large areas of heavier echoes. N9143B departed level flight, and radar showed that a cluster of thunderstorms, level three to four were present in the vicinity of N9143B's ground track position. Radar data showed that N9143B started an uncontrolled descent from FL260 (about 27,500 feet msl). Witnesses reported hearing the engine make a winding noise, then observed the airplane come out of the clouds about 300 feet above the ground, in a nose low spiral, and the right wing was missing. The right wing was not found at the crash site, but was located 1.62 miles from the main wreckage. The pilot of N9143B had requested and received a weather briefing. He was advised that the weather data indicated that an area forecast for his route of flight predicted thunderstorm activity and cumulonimbus clouds with tops as high as FL450 (flight level 45,000 feet), and a weather system impacting the Florida Gulf Coast, consisted of "looming thunderstorms" in that area. The pilot had contacted the Enroute Flight Advisory Service (EFAS, commonly known as "Flight Watch") for enroute weather advisories, and advised of "cells" east of St. Augustine, advised of convective SIGMET 05E in effect for southern Florida, and was advised that a routing toward the Tampa/St. Petersburg area and then southward, would avoid an area of thunderstorms.

The flight was cleared for the ILS approach to runway 5R. The flight was at mid runway, at 2,100 feet, heading 049 degrees, at a speed of 163 knots, when the pilot stated "...missed approach." He was instructed to maintain 2,000, and to fly runway heading. Radar showed N41003 started a right turn, was flying away from the airport/VOR, descending. At a point 0.57 miles from the airport/VOR, the flight had descended to 1,500 feet, was turning right, and increasing speed. The flight had descended 400 feet, and had traveled about 0.32 miles in 10 seconds. When radio and radar contact were lost, the flight was 2.35 miles from the airport/VOR, level at 1,600 feet, on a heading of 123 degrees, and at a speed of 169 knots. The published decision height (DH) was 620 feet mean sea level (msl). The published minimum visibility was 1/2 mile. The published Missed Approach in use at the time of the accident was; "Climb to 1,000 [feet], then climbing right turn to 2,500 [feet] via heading 130 degrees, and RDU R-087 [087 degree radial] to ZEBUL Int [intersection] and hold." A witness stated that the aircraft was flying low, power seemed to be in a cruise configuration, and maintaining the same sound up until the crash. The reported weather at the time was: Winds 050 at 5 knots, visibility 1/2 statute mile, obscuration fog and drizzle, ceiling overcast 100, temperature and dew point 11 C, altimeter 30.30 in HG. At the time of the accident the pilot had 10 total flight hours in this make and model airplane; 33 total night flight hours; and 59 total instrument flight hours.

The airplane's fuel tanks were fueled from a self serve fuel pump with 63 gallons of fuel prior to departure. The pilot initiated the takeoff roll from runway 30 with a 10 knot tailwind. The airplane was reported to have used the entire length of the runway during the takeoff roll. The airplane became airborne, attained a height approximately 100 feet agl, entered a descent, and subsequently, impacted the ground. A post accident fire consumed the airplane. Immediately following the accident, the pilot reported to local authorities that "he was leaving the airstrip and the plane stalled due to lack of airspeed." The 3,000-foot runway rises rapidly at its north end, such that the departure end of runway 30 was 50 feet higher than the approach end. At the time of the accident, the wind was from 130 degrees at 10 knots and the density altitude was 4,136 feet. Examination of the engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded its operation prior to the accident.

After a normal cross country flight, the airplane was on final approach for landing to runway 20, when the air traffic controller instructed the pilot to "go-around" because a preceding airplane had not cleared the runway. The airplane was observed to pitch up and enter a steep, almost 90 degree left bank. The passenger in the rear seat described the flights from and to BAF as "smooth." She stated she thought that the airplane would be landing; however, then realized the airplane was in a left turn. The airplane impacted on the roof of a commercial building, and came to rest upright on a heading of 020 degrees, in a parking lot, about 1/4 mile east of the approach end the runway. Examination of the airplane, which included a teardown of the engine, did not reveal evidence of any pre-impact malfunctions. Weather reported at the airport about the time of the accident included winds from 240 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 10 status miles and few clouds at 6,500 feet. The pilot owned the airplane and had accumulated about 1,660 hours of total flight experience.

The pilot had left the airplane at Asheville on the day before the accident due to low cloud ceilings and visibility at Mountain Air Airport, his destination, and completed the trip by rental car. On the day of the accident the pilot returned the rental car and at 1656 departed Asheville in N396PM, enroute to Mountain Air Airport, 27 miles north of Asheville. The last radio contact with the pilot was at 1701:44, when the pilot told controllers at Asheville that he was in visual flight rule conditions, at 4,000 feet. The last radar contact with the flight was by FAA Atlanta Center, at 1704:00, when the flight was about 5 miles south of the accident site at 3,800 feet. The flight did not arrive at the destination, an emergency locator transmitter signal was received by satellite, and search and rescue operations were begun. The pilot and the wreckage of the airplane was located the next day about 1400. The airplane had collided with 75-foot tall trees, at about the 4,800-foot msl level on the side of Bullhead Mountain, while in a wings level attitude, while on a 170 degree heading. After the initial impact the airplane continued for another 300 feet, causing general breakup of the airplane. The main wreckage came to rest on a northerly heading. All components of the airplane were located at the crash site and there was no evidence of precrash failure or malfunction of the airplane structure, flight controls, airplane systems, engine, or propeller. A witness reported that the weather near the time of the accident on the Blue Ridge Parkway, located about 3/4 mile to the west of the crash site, was very foggy. Satellite images show clouds were present at the crash site and the Asheville airport, located 20 miles south-southwest of the crash site, reported overcast clouds 2,600 feet agl or 4,765 feet msl, and visibility 4 miles in haze, at the time of the accident. An Airmet for mountain obscuration due to clouds, mist, and haze was in effect at the time the pilot departed and the at the time of the accident. No record to show that the pilot received a weather briefing from a FAA Flight Service Station was found.

Witnesses reported hearing an airplane engine at night, at high power for about 5 seconds followed by impact. They went to the scene and found the airplane on the left side of the approach end of runway 03, on fire. The pilot was removed and the fire was extinguished. The airplane had struck a runway threshold light located about 25 feet to the left side of the runway, and slid about 100 feet into trees, angling away from the runway on a heading of 360 degrees. The outboard 5 feet of the left wing was bent up about 20 degrees. Ground scars were found corresponding to the positions of the left, right, and nose landing gears, all of which had collapsed. The inboard section of the left wing came to rest on the nose of the airplane. The propeller blades were deformed with "S" bending and leading edge gouges. Flight control continuity was verified to the rudder and elevator. The aileron control cables had separated with puffed ends. All separations occurred at other than attach points. The pilot had received head injuries and has no memory of the accident.

During a forced landing the left wing struck a light standard pole, and the airplane came to rest inverted after colliding with a fence. The purpose of the flight was to conduct recurrent training to include emergency procedures. On the accident flight the certified flight instructor (CFI) initiated a simulated engine failure after takeoff during the initial climb out. The student advised the tower, and turned crosswind at 700 feet agl. The student set up for landing, which included lowering the landing gear and adding 10 degrees of flaps. On short final, descending through 400 feet agl, both the CFI and student realized they would not make the runway. Both pilot's advanced the throttle, to arrest the descent and perform a go-around. There was no corresponding response from the engine. During the final stages of the emergency descent, the pilot maneuvered the airplane to avoid a work crew at the airport boundary fence and the airplane collided with the light standard pole and a fence. An airframe and engine examination discovered no discrepancies with any system. Following documentation of the engine and related systems it was removed and installed in an instrumented engine test cell for a functional test. The engine started without hesitation and was operated for 44 minutes at various factory new engine acceptance test points. During acceleration response tests, technicians rapidly advanced the throttle to the full open position, and the engine accelerated with no hesitation. A second acceleration response test produced the same results. According to Textron Lycoming, there were no discrepancies that would have precluded the engine from being capable of producing power.

Witnesses observed N262MM taxi to runway 29 left and the pilot perform what appeared to be a normal engine runup. The airplane then taxied onto runway 29 left for takeoff. The wind was from the east, making the takeoff with a tail wind. During the takeoff, the engine seemed to operate at a steady level, but appeared to be low on power. The flight lifted off about halfway down the runway and the landing gear was retracted. The airplane climbed slowly and turned slowly to the left. The airplane then entered a 60-80 degree left bank followed by the airplane rolling level and the wings rocking back and forth. The airplane was now on a southerly heading and the nose dropped. The airplane then collided with trees about 15-20 feet above the ground, fell to the ground, and burst into flames. Witnesses stated they saw no smoke or flames coming from the airplane prior to impact with the trees. At the time of the accident the landing gear was retracted and the engine was running. Transcripts of recorded communications show that at 1205:40, the local controller instructed the flight to taxi into position and hold on runway 29 left. At 1206:43, N262MM was cleared for takeoff and a north bound departure was approved. At 1208:03, the passenger transmitted "we need to land we have to turn around". The local controller cleared the flight to return to the airport when able. At 1208:20, the passenger transmitted "two mike mike we're going down we're going down", followed by "over the golf (unintelligible)". The local controller responded "copy over the golf course". No further transmissions were received from the flight. Analysis of background noise contained on the ATC recordings show that at the time the passenger on N262MM transmitted to controllers that they were ready for takeoff and when he acknowledged the takeoff clearance, the propeller was rotating at 1,261 and 1,255 respectively. When the passenger transmitted to controllers after takeoff, that they needed to land, the propeller was rotating at 1,980 rpm. When the passenger transmitted we have to turn around, shortly after the above transmission, the propeller was rotating at 2,017 rpm. When the passenger made his last transmission stating they were going down, the propeller rpm was 1,965. The maximum propeller speed at takeoff is 2,000 rpm. Additional evidence was found indicating electrical arcing and progressive fatigue cracking in the engine’s P3 line, which could result in a rapid rollback of engine power. Simulator testing showed that a P3 line failure would result in the engine decelerating from full takeoff power (2,000 propeller rpm) and stabilizing at an idle power setting in less than 9 seconds. However, the sound spectrum analysis of the first radio transmission indicated the propeller rpm was 1,980, and two subsequent radio transmissions, the last of which was made 17 seconds after the initial transmission, detected the propeller rpm at near takeoff speed. Thus, there was no evidence of dramatic rpm loss, making the P3 line failure an unlikely cause of the accident. Postcrash examination of the aircraft structure, flight controls, engine, and propeller, showed no evidence of failure or malfunction. Witnesses indicated the flight used about 3,650 feet of runway for takeoff or about half of the 7,296 foot long runway. Charts contained in the Piper PA-46-500TP, Pilot's Operating Handbook, indicated that for the conditions at the time of the accident, the airplane should have used about 2,000 feet of runway for the ground roll during the takeoff with no wing flaps extended. The charts also show that the airplane indicated stall speed at 60 degrees of bank angle with the landing gear and wing flaps retracted is 111 knots.

The accident occurred during a dark night departure from a private unlighted airstrip. The pilot had landed, assisted by the headlights of a car, on the landing strip/road about 1830. After dropping off a passenger, he departed about 1900. The departure direction was towards a sparsely populated area of rolling hills. Local area residents reported hearing a plane depart, followed by a loss of engine sound, and an impact in a grape vineyard. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane impacted the ground in a nose down attitude. According to maintenance records, the last recorded annual inspection occurred 12 months and about 299.5 flight hours prior to the accident. Approximately 5 months before the accident, the FAA Certified Repair Station (CRS) that performed the maintenance on the airplane had given the pilot/owner a 15-item list of "grounding discrepancies." The discrepancies were: Cracked nose cowling; fraying seat belts; LH mag switch broken; LH window cracked; LH windshield crazed; stall warning inoperative; turbine inlet temperature inoperative; door latch safety inoperative; several hydraulic components leaking; main gear trunion pins worn; several cracks in wing lower skins; fuel leaks; loose rivets on RH flap; wing spar bolts loose; and elevator trim cable frayed. According to the CRS manager, the only item that had been repaired prior to the accident was the cracked nose cowling. However, an engine log entry indicated the TIT gage had also been replaced. Additionally, several witnesses reported that the pilot had been flying the airplane with an inoperative landing gear retract system for about 4 months. During post accident examination of the wreckage, investigators were able to verify that many of the listed discrepancies still existed; however, none of these discrepancies could be directly linked to the accident.

The airplane took off from the airport on a left downwind departure and after reaching an altitude of approximately 300 feet, banked steeply and dove into the ground. Witness statements indicated that the takeoff ground roll extended to midfield of the runway, a distance of 4,850 feet before the airplane lifted off. According to the Airplane Flight Manual performance charts, the normal ground roll should have been about 2,100 feet. While turning crosswind, the airplane steepened its bank and continued toward the downwind. As the angle of bank approached 90 degrees, the nose dropped and the airplane descended to impact with trees and the ground. Several trees were struck before the airplane came to rest on the underlying terrain in the backyard of a residence. The airplane was thermally destroyed in the impact sequence and post crash fire. Calculations of the airplane weight and balance data put it at least 251 pounds over maximum allowable gross takeoff weight. Remaining wreckage not consumed in the ground fire was examined and the engine was sent to the manufacturer for inspection. No discrepancies were found. Cockpit instrumentation and all autopilot components were thermally destroyed. Flaps and landing gear were found in the retracted position and the elevator trim surface was slightly nose up from the takeoff setting. The autopilot had a reported history of malfunction and the electric elevator trim system was scheduled for repair a week before the accident, but the owner took the airplane prior to the work being performed. The airplane had been modified with the addition of several Supplemental Type Certificates, one of which was a wing spoiler system. The controls and
many of the actuating linkages for the spoiler system were destroyed in the fire.