Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

Witness's reported that the airplane took off from runway 05, which has an up slope of 1.2 degrees. The airplane was observed at approximately 10 feet above ground level, in a nose high attitude traveling parallel to the ground and not climbing. The airplane narrowly cleared a 6- foot fence off the departure end of runway 05. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted a utility pole, the roof of a bus stop, which was followed by a brick wall. At the time of the accident runway 23, which has a 1.2-degree down slope and has a clear-cut area on the departure end, was available for use. The basic empty weight for this airplane is 3,097 pounds; the useful load is 1,201.7 pounds. The actual load at the time of the accident was in excess of the useful load. There is no record of the pilot completing a weight and balance computation prior to take-off. The toxicology examinations were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, drugs and alcohol. The toxicology examination revealed that 1175(mg/dl) glucose was detected in the urine. Examination of the airplane and subsystems failed to disclose any mechanical or component failures.

The aircraft was undergoing a shakedown flight after having completed a 100 hr maintenance inspection and other engineering work at Bournemouth Airport. The pilot was not the owner of the aircraft, but had been requested to carry out the shakedown flight. There was no technical log available prior to the flight which could have indicated the quantity of fuel remaining on board, or when the aircraft was previously refuelled and the subsequent flight times. The pilot recalled that the fuel tank gauges showed the aircraft had 22 gall US in the left wing and 40 gall US in the right wing, a total fuel contents of 62 gall US. The Aircraft Flight Manual indicates that the maximum allowable lateral fuel imbalance is 10 gall US. The aircraft started up at 1448 hrs and taxied for departure from Runway 26. The right tank was selected for take off and the first part of the flight. The aircraft climbed to FL180 and the required engine checks were carried out satisfactorily. As the aircraft was being turned around in order to return to Bournemouth, the pilot recalled that the right fuel quantity indicator steadily dropped to zero. This caused him little concern at the time as the left fuel tank had only been selected for part of the taxi out. The aircraft was also fitted with a digital 'fuel endurance remaining' indicator, which apparently indicated 'one hour' fuel endurance. Descent was commenced and the aircraft was transferred to Bournemouth Approach control in order to position it on radar for an ILS approach to Runway 08. At this time, the pilot recalled that the fuel flow and rpm indicators began to fluctuate, so he selected the left fuel tank to feed to the engine. The aircraft was given radar vectoring and the pilot requested a turn to avoid a cloud build up before becoming established on the ILS. The radar controller indicated that the aircraft had become established on the localiser at a range of 25 nm, in the descent to 3,000 feet amsl. At about ten miles from touchdown the engine fuel flow and RPM again fluctuated. The pilot reselected the right fuel tank but the engine did not recover. Reselecting the left tank restored power briefly but then the engine failed again. The pilot turned the aircraft to the left off the ILS and attempted to identify suitable sites for a forced landing. An open field with an uphill gradient was selected, the landing gear and full flap were selected. However, the aircraft touched down further into the field than the pilot would have wished. The touchdown was smooth but the pilot could not stop the aircraft before it ran into the far boundary hedge. The left wing was severely damaged during the impact sequence. There was no fire and the three occupants vacated the aircraft by the normal means, having sustained only minor injuries.

The single engine airplane, owned by a German company based in Allendorf, departed Jersey Island on a flight to Allendorf-Eder Airport. While in cruising altitude over the east part of Paris in poor weather conditions, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a colza field located in Thury-en-Valois. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces but did not catch fire. All six occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the airplane was flying in very poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity.

The aircraft collided with the ground in a steep nose down descent angle while maneuvering to return to the runway during the takeoff initial climb from the airport. Pilot and mechanic witnesses on the airport described the engine sounds during the takeoff as abnormal. The takeoff ground roll was over 3,000 feet in length, and the airplane's climb out angle was much shallower than usual. Two other witnesses said the engine sounded "like a radial engine," and both believed that the power output was lower than normal. One mechanic witness said the engine was surging and not developing full power; he believed the symptoms could be associated with a fuel feed problem, a turbocharger surge, or an excessively lean running condition. The ground witnesses located near the impact site said the airplane began a steep left turn between 1/4- and 1/2-mile from the runway's end at a lower than normal altitude. The bank angle was estimated by the witnesses as 45 degrees or greater. The turn continued until the nose suddenly dropped and the airplane entered a spiraling descent to ground impact. The majority of these witnesses stated that they heard "sputtering" or "popping" noises coming from the airplane. Engineering personnel from the manufacturer developed a performance profile for a normal takeoff and climb under the ambient conditions of the accident and at gross weight. The profile was compared to the actual aircraft performance derived from recorded radar data and the witness observations. The ground roll was 1,300 feet longer than it should have been, and the speed/acceleration and climb performance were consistently well below the profile's predictions. Based on the radar data and factoring in the winds, the airplane's estimated indicated airspeed during the final turn was 82 knots; the stall speed at 45 degrees of bank is 82 knots and it increases linearly to 96 knots at 60 degrees of bank. No evidence was found that the pilot flew the airplane from December until the date of the accident. The airplane sat outside during the rainy season with only 10 gallons of fuel in each tank. Comparison of the time the fueling began and the communications transcripts disclosed that the pilot had 17 minutes 41 seconds to refuel the airplane with 120 gallons, reboard the airplane, and start the engine for taxi; the maximum nozzle discharge flow rate of the pump he used is 24 gallons per minute. Review of the communications transcripts found that a time interval of 3 minutes 35 seconds elapsed from the time the pilot asked for a taxi clearance from the fuel facility until he reported ready for takeoff following a taxi distance of at least 2,000 feet. During the 8 seconds following the pilot's acknowledgment of his takeoff clearance, he and the local controller carried on a non pertinent personal exchange. The aircraft was almost completely consumed in the post crash fire; however, extensive investigation of the remains failed to identify a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure in the engine or airframe systems. The pistons, cylinder interiors, and spark plugs from all six cylinders were clean without combustion deposits. The cockpit fuel selector lever, the intermediate linkages, and the valve itself were found in the OFF position; however, an engineering analysis established that insufficient fuel was available in the lines forward of the selector to start, taxi, and perform a takeoff with the selector in the OFF position.

On October 17, 1999, about 20:25 Mountain Daylight Time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N90D, was substantially damaged while descending to the Cranbrook Airport (CYXC), Cranbrook, British Columbia. The certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight that originated near Lynn Lake (CYYL), Manitoba. The ferry flight was conducted under Canadian flight rules. According to a Transportation Safety Board of Canada Investigator, the airplane was being ferried from England to Spokane, Washington. At the last departure point, CYYL, the airplane was refueled and the pilot filed an IFR flight plan. During the flight, the pilot was in contact with Vancouver Area Control Center. While approaching CYXC, the pilot contacted Cranbrook Flight Service Station (FSS) and was provided the latest airport information. The pilot did not report any difficulties with the airplane or flight at that time. The pilot's last transmission with the FSS was about 10 miles from the airport. After attempting to contact the airplane, FSS contacted the Rescue Coordination Center, and notified them that the airplane was overdue. An emergency locator transmitter signal was received about 21:55, but the airplane was not found until the following morning. The airplane was located on the eastern side of Lakit Mountain at the 6,500-foot level, 9 miles northeast of CYXC. The weather reported by CYXC, at 20:00 was, wind from 300 degrees at 4 knots, scattered clouds at 10,000 feet, and a broken cloud layer at 24,000 feet. The pilot (sole person on board) was killed.

The single engine aircraft departed Niederstetten Airport, Baden-Wurttemberg, at 0915LT with two passengers and one pilot on board. The flight was completed under VFR mode until Würzburg then the pilot was cleared to continue under IFR mode to the destination. On approach to Paderborn-Lippstadt Airport, after passing 5,000 feet, the pilot was cleared for an ILS approach to runway 24. At an altitude of 3,700 feet, while trying to establish on the ILS, the pilot momentarily lost control of the airplane. He elected to regain control when the aircraft climbed to 4'000 feet, entered a left turn then an uncontrolled descent until it crashed in a field located in Borchen, about 8 km short of runway 24. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

While in cruise flight at 24,000 feet msl, the pilot of the Piper Malibu Mirage advised Memphis Center that he had encountered icing conditions and was experiencing a fuel imbalance. The pilot requested and was cleared to deviate to the north. Subsequently, radio and radar contact were lost. A witness reported hearing the sound of the airplane's engine stop running and observed the airplane descending from the dark clouds in a nose down attitude and rotating clockwise. Residents of the area reported that the weather at the time of the accident was high ceilings with heavy rain just before and after the accident. There were thunderstorms with lightning in the area at the time of the accident. The wreckage of the airplane was scattered along an area of about four miles. The airplane was equipped with an autopilot, weather radar, and an ice protection system. The pilot had recently purchased the 1999 model airplane and had completed a Mirage initial training course. At the time of the accident the pilot had accumulated a total of 21.4 hours in the make and model of the accident aircraft. No anomalies were found with the airframe or engine that would have prevented normal operation.

The airplane was on an IFR flight plan, level at 16,000 feet, when radar and radio contact was lost. The tops of the clouds in the area of the accident were reported to be at 18,000 feet. A pilot who was flying in the area of the accident site at the time of the accident stated that the cloud tops of 'the buildups' were from 16,000 to 20,000 feet. The pilot additionally stated that moderate unexpected turbulence was encountered and 'Obviously, the updrafts in the area were very strong.' Satellite imagery data revealed that an east-west cloud band, about 10 miles wide, was located in the area of the accident. The ground track of the airplane was traversing the cloud band during the minutes prior to and around the accident time. The onboard weather radar was found in the off position. According to Advisory Circular -00-6A, 'Do avoid by at least 20 miles any thunderstorm identified as severe or giving an intense radar echo. Do clear the top of a known or suspected severe thunderstorm by at least 1,000 feet altitude for each 10 knots of wind speed at the cloud top.' The airplanes calibrated airspeed (KCAS) was calculated at 141 knots, and the indicated airspeed (KIAS) was 139 knots. According to the POH, the maneuvering speed at gross weight was 135 KCAS and 133 KIAS.