Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

The aircraft disappeared from ATC radar immediately after being cleared to descend from 12,000 feet to 10,000 feet. ATC radar data showed the aircraft at 11,900 to 12,000 feet for approximately the last 6 minutes prior to the disappearance, with the last Mode C altitude and discrete transponder code 2402 (at 0221:03) reported as 11,800 feet. The last three returns, 12,000, 11,900, and 11,800, are consistent with the start of a descent from 12,000 feet. Due to construction at the radar antenna site, the area where the aircraft disappeared was blocked from radar coverage. Subsequent attempts by the controller to contact the aircraft were unsuccessful. A 7,000- to 7,500-foot overcast was reported at the destination, along with lower clouds and precipitation. Documentation at the accident site indicated an approximate level flight path from the broken treetops to the area of ground impact into a northwest-facing 60-degree mountain slope at approximately the 5,600-foot level. The wreckage was not located for approximately two months. Post-accident examinations of the aircraft's Bendix/King KEA130A (United Instruments 5035PB-P57) encoding altimeter revealed needle impressions on the indicator face and pointers consistent with an altitude indication of 12,620 feet. The internal components of the unit were severely damaged and a functional test was not possible. The aircraft was equipped with a copilot's altimeter. Only the faceplate was recovered and examined. One impression on the main faceplate revealed a needle impression by the 100-foot pointer consistent with 560 feet. The position of the 1,000-foot pointer could not be determined. The pilot's 4-day activity history showed that he was returning from a demanding 3-day work assignment, that his recent sleeping schedule was irregular, and that he had been awake about 20 hours at the time of the accident. There was no evidence found of a mechanical failure or malfunction at the time of the accident.

Following a three hours IFR flight, the pilot, also owner of the aerodrome, made a left hand visual circuit at an altitude of 600 feet for runway 26. On final with flaps down two notches, the right side of the airframe and the wing root struck the top of a tree about 80 metres from the runway threshold and 30 metres to the right of its extended centerline. The aircraft struck the ground hard, went out of control and came to rest in a grassy area parallel to the runway. All five occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed.

The pilot reported that he performed a rolling takeoff from the 2315 ft runway. He said that as soon as the airplane broke ground on the takeoff roll, he experienced a loss of engine power. The pilot said that he retracted the gear to help clear a 42 ft dike at the departure end of the runway. Also, he reported that after clearing the dike, he turned gradually to the left, and the left wing stalled. Two witnesses reported hearing loud, steady sounds from the airplane's engine and propeller. They said they saw the airplane in a high nose-up attitude, and watched the airplane descend behind the dike. The engine could be heard until the airplane contacted the river. During an operational check after the accident, the engine performed at recommended levels. According to performance data provided by the FAA, at the given takeoff weight, with a zero degree flap setting, the airplane required 2850 feet of runway to clear a 50 ft obstacle. The charts were based on full power before brake release.

The airplane was in cruise flight at 17,000 feet msl when the pilot told Minneapolis ARTCC 'We're picking up some ice and rain, and we're going to turn around.' ARTCC approved the request. Two minutes later the pilot told ARTCC that 'We're looking for some help to get around this weather southbound.' ARTCC told the pilot that he could turn either east or west. The pilot turned west, then 4 minutes later turned back to the south. The pilot then told ARTCC that they were still encountering weather. ARTCC directed the pilot to turn north and then east whenever he could. Approximately 1 minute later ARTCC radar showed the airplane in a rapid descent. The pilot then told ARTCC 'Minneapolis center, N9114Q is out of control.' The pilot had received a FSS briefing prior to takeoff, and was advised of convective conditions and precipitation building to the south along his intended route of flight. The airplane was approximately 548 pounds over maximum takeoff weight.

On February 15, 1996, about 0554 universal time, a Piper PA-46, N2514Q (serial number 46-8508098), registered to a partnership in Canby, Oregon, crashed near Kitwe, Zambia. The airplane was destroyed and all five persons on the airplane were fatally injured. The weather conditions at the accident site are unknown. It is not known if a flight plan had been filed for the flight.

The pilot was conducting an approach to runway 8, during which the left wing contacted the ground approximately 75 feet from the approach end of the runway. The airplane came to rest about 160 feet down the runway, and off the right side. A pilot who landed on runway 26, about 30 minutes prior to the accident flight, stated that the winds were out of the northwest at 15 knots with gusts, and he experienced plus and minus 10 knots on the airspeed while on final approach. The winds 19 miles to the east, at 1045 eastern standard time, were reported from 310 degrees at 15 knots with gusts up to 20 knots. An AIRMET was issued at 0345, with an advisory for occasional moderate turbulence below 8,000 feet. The AIRMET was reissued at 0945, with the added advisory of, 'Low level wind shear potential over the Boston Area Forecast area east of an Erie-Bristol line due to gusty northwesterly surface winds. Conditions ending by 1600.' An FAA Inspector examined the wreckage and found no preimpact anomalies with the airplane.

During flight, the airplane was cruising at flight level 210 in IFR conditions with turbulence and with the wind from about 255 degrees at 70 knots. The airplane drifted off course at about 1600 cst. At 1610:09, after about ten minutes of unrecognized heading changes, the pilot stated '. . . I've lost my gyro.' At 1610:15, the controller issued a no-gyro vector. At 1611:29, as the airplane was still turning (to a heading that would intercept the original course), the pilot stated 'we've lost aLL our instruments . . . please direct me towards VFR.' He was cleared to descend to 14,000 feet. At about that same time, he stated 'we're in trouble' and 'we've lost all vacuum,' then there was no further radio transmission from the airplane. The airplane entered a steep, downward spiraling, right turn. The left outer wing panel separated up and aft (in flight) from overload and impacted the left stabilizer. The airplane crashed, and parts that separated from the airplane were found over a four mile area. Investigation revealed evidence that the HSI heading card can fail without the HDG flag appearing. Although the pilot had reported the loss of instruments and vacuum, examination of the airplane revealed that the engine, flight controls, electrical system, pitot/static system and vacuum systems exhibited continuity. No malfunction was found that would have led to loss of pressurization or hypoxia.

During the preflight briefing, the pilot was informed of reduced visibility and low ceiling in the vicinity of the destination airport, at the approximate time of the planned arrival. Upon arriving in the Atlanta area, the pilot was issued radar vectors to a final for the localizer runway 31 approach. The pilot was also given the current Atlanta altimeter setting, and was cleared for the localizer runway 31 approach. The airplane collided with a 60-foot tall light pole at a nearby baseball complex 2 miles short of the runway. The weather observation from the Hartsfield International Airport indicated that visual weather conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. However, according to a witness at the accident site, the weather conditions were foggy with reduced visibility. The wreckage distribution path was 2,467 feet right of the localizer course. The minimum descent altitude for this approach, using Atlanta's altimeter setting, was 1260 feet. The ground check of the localizer and DME facility was within normal operating range. Examination of the aircraft navigational radios also tested within normal ranges. The average field elevation in the vicinity of the accident site is 800 feet. The pilot's toxicological examinations detected pseudoephedrine (decongestant), phenylpropanolamine (decongestant), and chlorpheniramine (antihistamine). No samples were available to quantify the blood levels of these medications.

The single engine aircraft departed Essen-Mülheim Airport on a private flight to Westerland-Sylt Airport, carrying one passenger and one pilot. While descending to Westerland-Sylt Airport, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with limited visibility due to fog and snow falls. On approach, the aircraft crashed few km from the airfield, killing both occupants.

Following an uneventful flight from Bern, the pilot started the descent to Zurich-Kloten Airport in relative good weather conditions (scattered 7,000 feet, visibility 5 km, wind from 340° at 4 knots and OAT 20° C). On short final to runway 14, the single engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent, struck the ground, lost its left wing and came to rest about 500 metres short of runway threshold. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.