Douglas DC-4

For unknown reason, the four engine aircraft crash landed and came to rest in flames. All 12 occupants were rescued while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

On final approach to runway 23, while at a height of 500 meters and with an indicated speed of 160 km/h about 500 meters from the runway threshold, the flight engineer reported to the captain that flaps were selected to 3/4 and that the speed was a bit low. The captain did not react and continued the approach in such configuration. Once the aircraft passed over the perimeter road, the captain ordered full flaps and throttle down. The engineer then selected full flaps and slowly retarded the power lever when the aircraft lost height, hit tree tops and hit the ground 175 meters short of the runway threshold. It rolled for several yards and hit a ditch before coming to rest. While all 27 occupants were evacuated safely, the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair due to severe structural damages.

The four engine aircraft left Léopoldville Airport at 0805LT bound for Libenge. About three hours later, as he started the descent to Libenge, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls, low clouds and turbulence. While descending at an altitude of 700 feet, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in a wooded area located near the village of Magazini, some 27 km south of Libenge. A passenger was seriously injured while 31 other occupants were killed.

Following the failure of the starter on engine number one, the crew was unable to restart this engine and received the authorization to perform an empty leg back to Paris for maintenance purposes. During the takeoff roll in Kano Airport, the aircraft went out of control and veered off runway before colliding with a BOAC technical hangar. A crew member was killed while five others were injured. The aircraft was destroyed. Pilots : Mr. Salvetat & Marchandise.

The takeoff roll and the first part of the climb appeared to be normal until the aircraft and progressed three-quarters of the way down the runway, at which time it had reached an altitude between 150 and 200 feet. Then, while still within the airport boundaries, it assumed a very steep, near vertical, climbing attitude. Airport, tower, and flight personal observing from the ground believed the flight to be in difficulty, and though no distress signal was received from the airplane, the tower promptly telephoned the crash and fire facilities on the field. At an altitude between 500 and 800 feet the airplane appeared to stall, and the nose and right wing dropped. A partial recovery from the stall was made before the aircraft crashed to the ground and burst into flames. A passenger was seriously injured while 12 other occupants were killed.

While descending to Athens-Hassani Airport, the crew was contacted by ATC and instructed to stack for a while due to poor weather conditions (thunderstorm activity) at destination. Few minutes later, the four engine aircraft christened 'Sunnan' hit the slope of Mt Hymettus located northeast of the airport. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and all 44 occupants were killed. The crew was unable to distinguish the mountain due to poor visibility caused by low clouds. It is believed that the crew was not aware of his exact position at the time of the accident.

Flight 923 departed at 1030 October 26, 1947, from Seattle, Washington, for Juneau, Alaska, with an intermediate stop scheduled at Annette Island Captain Alf N. Monsen flew as pilot and First Officer Laurence A Foster as copilot. The airplane carried 13 passengers including an infant, a crew of five, 2,500 gallons of fuel, and 822 pounds of cargo. This load was within the allowable airplane weight and was properly distributed in respect to the center of gravity. Company weather information given to Captain Monsen before departure was to the effect that there would be unlimited ceiling from Seattle to Comox, British Columbia. Then at the cruising altitude of 9,000 feet, instrument conditions, light icing, and light to moderate turbulence was expected over the route. Winds were forecasted to be from 200 to 230 degrees at 30 to 40 knots. It was also forecasted that at the time of the flight's arrival over Annette there would be an 800-foot overcast, lower broken clouds, visibility of 2 miles, light rain, and a surface wind from the south-southeast at 18 knots. A cold type occlusion or front which was moving toward Annette Island from a point about 375 miles west of there was expected to pass Annette Island before the flight arrived. Proceeding en route in accordance with an instrument clearance to fly at 9,000 feet, the flight arrived over Annette Island at 1338 after a routine trip. Earlier, at 1326, the company radio at Annette Island had transmitted a weather observation which reported an indefinite 1,400-foot ceiling, overcast, lower broken clouds, visibility of 3 miles, rain, wind southeast at 28 miles per hour, with gusts to 40 miles per hour. The flight acknowledged receipt of this information. Airway Traffic Control cleared the flight to pass over the radio range station located 1 5 mile northwest of the airport at 7,000 feet and then to proceed with a normal instrument letdown and approach to the field. The flight acknowledged this clearance, and reported its position over the radio range station at 7,000 feet at 1338. The normal instrument procedure for Annette Island was established with regard to the mountainous terrain east and northeast of the airport, which rises to an elevation of 3,596 feet on Tamgas Mountain. This procedure required the flight, after approaching from the south at 7,000 feet and reporting over the radio station, to remain west of the south course of the range while on instruments. Five minutes after the flight reported over the range station, at 1343 it advised Annette Radio that it was proceeding to Juneau, approximately 250 miles north-northwest of Annette Island, because of extreme turbulence. This was the first indication that the flight was encountering any difficulty in accomplishing a normal letdown and approach to the airport. In response, Annette Radio asked the flight to report its altitude, but there was no reply. After repeated calls to the flight Annette Radio issued an alert at 1401. It was estimated that the flight at the time of its last radio contact had aboard 9 hours and 16 minutes of fuel. At approximately 1430 the Civil Aeronautics Board was notified, and a search by air, land, and sea was immediately begun. However, adverse weather conditions retarded the search to such a degree that the wreckage was not located until 5 days after the accident October 31, 1947. It was found that the airplane had crashed on the north slope of Tamgas Mountain, approximately 8 miles east of Annette Island Airport and 8 miles east of the south course of the Annette radio range.

Pan American's Flight 131 departed from Bermuda at 1358, September 20, 1947, with 36 passengers and a crew of 5. The take-off and climb to the cruising altitude of 8,000 feet were normal, and the flight proceeded on course to La Guardia Field, New York, for a period of 3 hours without incident Between 1650 and 1655, about 225 statute miles from destination, Warren Robinson, the first officer, noticed a fluctuation in fuel pressure for engines 1 and 2 Seconds later, the left auxiliary fuel tank quantity gauge dropped to zero, the fuel pressure warning light flashed on, and the No 1 engine faltered To insure a positive fuel supply for all engines Mr Robinson immediately turned the fuel selector valves for all engines to their respective main tanks, 2 following which all engines operated normally. Mr Robinson then transferred fuel from the right auxiliary tank to the left auxiliary tank so that they would contain equal amounts, which was 40 gallons each according to the fuel quantity gauges after completion of the operation A few minutes later Mr Robinson noticed that the right auxiliary fuel gauge indicated not 40 gallons, but 100, and that it was visibly increasing even though no fuel was at that time being transferred The No. 3 main fuel tank gauge then dropped to zero, and the fuel pressure for the No 4 engine started to fluctuate. Alarmed by what now appeared to be a serious malfunction in the right side of the fuel system, Mr Robinson operated all engines from the left main tanks (1 and 2), turning on all the cross feed valves, and the booster pumps for main tanks 1 and 2. The flight had by this time reached position "Baker," a point on course and a distance of 212 statue miles from La Guardia This check point was regularly used by Pan American on the route from Bermuda to La Guardia, and was established by reference to precomputed radio bearings Flight Radio Officer Rea was instructed to call Captain Carl Gregg, who was eating lunch in the passengers cabin, to the cockpit. The captain, unable to account for what appeared to be a total loss of fuel in the right main tanks, tried to operate engines 3 and 4 from their respective mains. Shortly after, the fuel pressure for both these engines dropped, the fuel pressure warning lights came on, and engines 3 and 4 lost power. Other combinations of fuel valve settings were tried during the next few minutes, but power could not be restored to engines 3 and 4 The "fasten seat belt" sign was turned on, rated power was applied to engines 1 and 2, and a descent of 200 to 300 feet per minute started. Two minutes later the fire warning light flashed on for engine 4 The flight radio officer was sent to the passengers cabin to see if any signs of fire from this engine were visible He saw none from engine 4, but he did see smoke trailing from engine 3. By the time Mr Rea returned to the cockpit, Captain Gregg noticed the smell of burning rubber, and furthermore, that the fire warning light for engine 3 was also on. No flames from either engine, however, were visible. Standard fire fighting methods were followed to control the fire in the No. 3 nacelle. The propeller was feathered, all fluids into the engine were closed at the emergency shutoff valves, and the C02 gas bottle was discharged. The fire warning light then went out. Since there was no visible indication of fire in engine 4, the C02 gas bottle was not discharged. As a precautionary measure, however, the shutoff valves for all fluids into the engine were closed, and an attempt made to feather the propeller But, the propeller would not feather, and continued to windmill. At 1712, shortly after Mr. Rea transmitted to the company the flight's position as "Baker", a loud noise from the right side of the airplane was heard, and simultaneously the green right landing gear light came on. Through the drift sight the crew could see the right outboard tire burning, and a landing gear bungee cable hanging slack. All attempts to raise the right gear were unsuccessful, and it was found that with the right gear down, and with both right engines "out" that an air speed of 125 miles per hour was required to maintain directional control. At 1730, engine 4 stopped windmilling, having seized from lack of lubrication By 1745, altitude had been lost to about 1,000 feet, and over 100 statute miles remained to destination. Full take-off power was applied to engines 1 and 2 in an attempt to hold the remaining altitude. A report had been transmitted to the company at 1729 that the fires in engines 3 and 4 were believed to be out, and at 1740, the company had been advised that the flight was at 2,000 feet still descending All radio contacts with Pan American at La Guardia throughout the course of this emergency were accomplished through Eastern Air Lines' radio on the frequency 8565 kcs. Mr. Rea attempted to secure a fix on "CW" 3 from the U. S. Coast Guard, using the distress frequency of 8280 kcs. Because of an extreme amount of "CW" interference on this frequency only one station was actually contacted. This was NMR, the Coast Guard station in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Even this contact was not entirely satisfactory, and no radio bearing from it was ever received. The radio equipment was accordingly returned to the frequency of 8565 kcs, the established channel of communication, for further radiophone contact with New York. No call was ever made on the international distress frequency of 500 kcs., or over any of the "VHF" equipment on board. By 1800, altitude had been lost to 800 feet, and still over 50 statute miles remained to destination. Preparations were made for "ditching". The passengers were instructed in the use of life jackets, and in emergency water landing procedures. The life rafts were moved so as to be easily accessible from the main cabin door. Celluloid protective coverings were removed from all the emergency exit handles Clothing was loosened, and seat belts tightened. Flight Radio Officer Rea broadcasted "blind" on the frequency 8280 kcs., reporting the position of the flight to be 40-00 degrees north and 73-10 degrees west. From this point on only a small gradual loss of altitude was experienced. Captain Gregg decided to attempt to reach and land at Floyd Bennett Field, and was advised through Eastern Air Lines' radio that runway one would be available. New York Air Traffic Control had been alerted through Eastern Air Lines' radio of the emergency, and they in turn had called Coast Guard search and rescue. Coast Guard, Army, and Navy rescue equipment was dispatched, and as Flight 131 approached the coast, the crew observed other aircraft and surface vessels proceeding out to meet them. At 1815, approximately 15 statute miles from Floyd Bennett Field, the flight had descended to an altitude of 400 feet. Full available power was now applied to engines 1 and 2, and the flight was able to not only hold, but even gain a slight amount of altitude, Four to five minutes later, 1820, throttles were retarded to take-off power and the aircraft maneuvered into a position for a straight-in landing approach on runway one. The aircraft was set down 775 feet from the south end of runway one, wheels up. During the course of the crash landing the No. 1 propeller was torn from the engine, the propeller dome becoming embedded in the No. 2 main fuel tank. The spilled gasoline was ignited by sparks generated as the aircraft skidded 2,167 feet on the concrete runway to a stop U. S. Navy fire and crash equipment had been previously deployed along runway one which allowed the Navy's crash personnel to bring the fire quickly under control, and to assist the passengers and crew to deplane without injury.

Flight 521 taxied from its parked position, rolled onto Runway 18, and without pause or hesitation accelerated for take-off. The throttles were advanced. Air speed increased to above 90 miles per hour. Captain Baldwin applied back pressure to the control column, but the "feel" of the controls was "heavy," and the aircraft did not respond. As the aircraft raced toward the boundary of the field, Captain Baldwin decided to discontinue his take-off. About 1,000 feet from the south and of the runway he applied brakes, ordering the co-pilot at the same time to cut the engines. A ground-loop was attempted by heavy application of left brake. The aircraft, however, proceeded to roll straight ahead. Then, in the both brakes locked it continued over the remainder of the runway, crashed through the fence at the airport boundary, and half-bounced, half-flew across the Grand Central Parkway. The aircraft finally came to rest immediately east of the Casey Jones School of Aeronautics, a distance of 800 feet from the end of Runway 18 and 1,700 feet from the point at which brakes were first applied. It was almost immediate enveloped in flames. The captain, another crew member and three passengers were rescued while 43 other occupants were killed.

The crew started the descent to Bogotá-Techo in poor weather conditions with clouds and fog. At an altitude of 10,500 feet, the four engine aircraft hit the slope of Mt El Tablazo en Supatá located about 42 km north of Bogotá. The aircraft crashed and disintegrated. All 53 occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the mountain was shrouded in clouds and the aircraft hit the mountain about two meters below the summit. Up to date, this accident was the worst in civil aviation history.