Douglas C-47 Skytrain (DC-3)

The captain/operator, the first officer and one passenger, departed on a cross-country positioning flight. The airplane contained about 300 gallons of fuel. After 3.9 hours en route, the flight was cleared for a visual approach to the destination airport. During the approach, both engines lost power about 2,000 feet mean sea level. The pilot stated the right fuel tank was empty. He estimated that 50 to 60 gallons of fuel remained in the left fuel tank. While the airplane was descending toward an area of open water, he attempted to restart the engines without success. He then lowered the landing gear, and made a right turn toward a small airstrip, located about 5 miles northwest of the destination airport. The airplane touched down in an area of soft, marsh covered, terrain. During the landing roll, the airplane nosed down and received damage to the forward, lower portion of the fuselage. An inspection of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed the left fuel tank contained about 1 inch of fuel. The right fuel selector was positioned on the right auxiliary fuel tank. The left fuel selector was positioned between the left main, and the left auxiliary fuel tanks.

On February 3, 1998 at about 1200 eastern standard time, a Douglas DC3C, N200MF, registered to Missionary Flights International, as a 14 CFR Part 91 passenger flight experienced a total loss of engine power on both engines and made a forced landing 1 mile from the Greater Exuma Airport, Moss Town, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an IFR flight plan was filed. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airline transport pilot-in-command (PIC), commercial pilot first officer, and 24 passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from Moss Town about 1 hour 52 minutes before the accident.

Shortly after takeoff from Guerrero Negro Airport, while climbing, the aircraft nosed down and crashed in the San Jose estuary, few hundred metres offshore. All five occupants were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The DC-3C took off on runway 10L and immediately executed a right turn followed by a left turn back toward the airport declaring a fire aboard. Dark night visual meteorological conditions existed. Witnesses observed 'flames' or an 'orange glow' coming from the right engine. A small number of aluminum fragments identified from the aft edge of the right engine accessory cowling were found along the ground just short of the ground impact site. These fragments displayed signs of heat distress but no significant melting. An examination of the right engine and accessory section revealed no evidence of a preimpact fire, and sooting and metal splatter on the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer was minimal. Spectral analysis of radio transmissions revealed no evidence of significant divergence of engine RPM between the two engines. Postcrash propeller examination revealed approximate blade pitch angles of 18-19° and 30-32° for the right and left propellers respectively upon impact. Propeller slash mark dimensions associated with the right propeller resulted in propeller RPM of approximately 1,750 to 2,570 over a range of 68 to 100 knots respectively. The first officer advised the PIC (broadcasting over the tower frequency) 'we're gonna stall' approximately 10 seconds before the impact. The aircraft was in a left turn back toward runways 28 left and right when the right wing struck the ground and the aircraft cartwheeled to a stop. A postcrash fire destroyed the cockpit area and inboard right wing.

The aircraft took off at 14.28 from Texel International Airport for the return flight to Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport. Before take-off the airport manager of Texel International Airport requested the crew of PH-DDA to squawk transponder-code 0060. The take-off was considered normal by several witnesses, including the Airport Manager, without deviations from what they had seen during previous take-offs from Texel. Several witnesses observed the aircraft passing outbound over the east coast of the island of Texel. One witness reported a short-lived orange colored fire streak emanating from the underside of the left engine, another mentioned a shrieking noise on one engine. The weather situation over the Waddenzee was : a visibility of about 1 .5 km in haze without a distinct horizon. The sun was obscured. There was a glassy smooth water surface without any references. At approximately 14.33, the crew reported to Texel Radio that they had problems with an engine. They were advised to switch over to De Kooy Approach. There is no radio telephony (RT) recording available of this phase of the flight. Naval Air Station (NAS) De Kooy is not equipped with primary radar. No primary radar recordings from other sources were available. The aircraft became visible on the secondary radar of NAS De Kooy at 14.34:33, squawking 0060 and flying at an altitude of 800 feet on a heading of 155°, which changed gradually to 175°. Most likely the transponder had been switched on at that time. Refer to the radar plot in Appendix 1. At 14.35:32 the flight crew reported to De Kooy Approach : "Uh, PDA is uh..., at 600 feet and approaching uh..., De Kooy, we want to make an emergency landing on De Kooy". The position of the aircraft at that moment was approximately 11 mn northeast of NAS De Kooy. Shortly thereafter the aircraft made a sudden left turn to a heading of 110°. The aircraft was then at an altitude of 700 feet. The flight crew reported that they had feathered the left engine. De Kooy Approach instructed to set Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) code 4321 instead of the then used VFR code 0060, gave QNH and reported that runway 22 was in use ; the pilot did not respond to this message. De Kooy Approach twice repeated the advise to squawk and advised to proceed inbound runway 22. During the transmission of this message the aircraft was turning to approximately the required heading of 225°, at an altitude of 500 feet. The aircraft maintained heading 225° at 500 feet and the airspeed decreased. After several inquiring calls concerning the correct squawk, at 14.36:52 the pilot confirmed squawking 4321 and asked for a heading. Some parts of the radio communication were hindered by a whistle tone. In response to the question, De Kooy Approach requested the position ; the pilot reported 11 nm out to the northeast. Seven seconds later De Kooy Approach confirmed radar contact and advised a heading of 240° . During this conversation the aircraft turned left to a heading of 180°. At that time the altitude was still 500 feet and the airspeed had further decreased. The crew confirmed the advised heading of 240°, but the aircraft did not turn to this direction. This was the last message from the aircraft. The radar recording showed that at 14.37:28 the aircraft started to turn to the left at an increasing rate. At 14.37:47 the last radar echo showed an altitude of 200 feet. The approach controller stated that the aircraft disappeared from the radar screen. There was no reply on repeated calls from De Kooy Approach, upon which the controller initiated an emergency status. The aircraft crashed onto a flooded sand bank in the Waddenzee, where at that time the water had a depth of about 1.2 meter. Forty seconds after the aircraft had disappeared from the radar, the controller contacted a KLM ERA helicopter, approaching NAS De Kooy, informed the pilot of the situation with the PHDDA and requested the pilot to have a look at the approximate position ; about seven minutes later the helicopter reported the wreckage in sight. That started an extensive rescue action; one severely injured passenger was taken to a hospital by a Naval helicopter, but died the same evening. The other 31 occupants to all probability died instantaneously in the crash. There was no fire.

After takeoff from Villavicencio-La Vanguardia Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 1,900 feet, the captain reported severe vibrations with the left engine and was cleared to return. The crew shut down the left engine and started the approach to runway 22. But on final, he realized he could reach the airport so he completed a belly landing one km short of runway threshold. The aircraft came to rest in a field and was damaged beyond repair. All 20 occupants escaped uninjured.

The DC-3 aircraft, with the captain, first officer, and an apprentice aircraft maintenance engineer on board, was to be ferried from Vancouver, British Columbia, to Whitehorse, Yukon. Just after take-off from runway 08, as the first officer was setting the engine power, the right propeller began to over-speed. The captain told the first officer to shut down and feather the right engine. The first officer did as instructed, and advised the Vancouver tower controller of the engine problem and that they would return to the airport to land on runway 08. The captain turned the aircraft to the right, onto downwind for runway 08; however, because the aircraft's altitude and airspeed were decreasing, the first officer advised the tower controller that they would land on runway 30. The aircraft continued to lose height, narrowly avoiding buildings in its path, and crashed to the ground, one mile short of runway 30. The three occupants were seriously injured during the impact and the post-crash fire; the captain died of his injuries eight days after the accident.

The new owner/co-pilot of the 50-year-old airplane and another pilot, who was typed rated in the airplane, departed on a 1,700 mile ferry flight. After the first 250 mile leg, the airplane was landed at another airport with a right engine problem. The owner replaced the right engine and continued the ferry flight. Twenty minutes into the second flight, the replacement right engine lost power. The owner stated that they applied maximum power to the left engine, were unable to feather the right propeller, and performed a forced landing to a field. However, the airplane collided with trees before reaching the field, then burned after impact. Investigation revealed that during the past 5 years, the airplane had neither flown nor had an annual inspection, except for 3 recent maintenance flights, totaling 1.5 Hours. The right propeller blades had chordwise scratches. The left propeller blades had no chordwise scratches. Examination of the wreckage revealed three propeller strikes in the ground, near the right engine ground scar, and no propeller strikes in the ground, near the left engine ground scar. The right engine mixture was locked in the auto-cruise position, while the left was locked in the emergency position. Airplane charts listed the single-engine rate of climb with a feathered propeller to be 350 feet per minute, and 10 feet per minute with a windmilling propeller.

On final approach to Antananarivo-Ivato Airport, the aircraft suffered a double engine failure, stalled and crashed 500 metres short of runway 11 threshold. Two passengers were seriously injured while 34 other occupants were killed. The day after the accident, both survivors died from their injuries. All occupants, except the military crew, were doctors, dentists and nurses coming from the island of La Réunion. There were returning to Antananarivo after taking part to a humanitarian mission at Maintirano. The aircraft had the dual registration 5R-MMG (civil) and 525 (military).

Upon landing, one of the ski struck an ice ridge on the ground and cartwheeled. All three crew members escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.