Beechcraft 100 King Air

The Thunder Airlines Limited Beech A100 King Air aircraft, serial number B108, took off at 1034 eastern daylight saving time (EDT) on a charter flight from Thunder Bay, Ontario, for Red Lake, Ontario, with two pilots and three passengers on board. After getting airborne, the aircraft pitched up to approximately 70 degrees, reaching a height estimated to be between 500 and 700 feet above ground level. It then rolled to the left, pitched steeply nose-down, and descended to the ground within the confines of the airport. The aircraft contacted the soft, level ground in a relatively level attitude and covered a distance of about 500 feet before coming to rest in a wooded area immediately beyond an elevated railroad bed and track. The cabin remained intact during the crash sequence, and all occupants escaped without any injuries. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. An ensuing fuel-fed fire was rapidly extinguished by airport emergency response services (ERS)
personnel.

The crew departed Foz do Iguaçu Airport at 2215LT on a ferry flight to Curitiba. About 55 minutes into the flight, while in cruising altitude by night, the right engine failed, followed few seconds later by the left engine. The crew reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in a grassy area near Irati. While the copilot escaped uninjured, the captain was injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

On final approach to Muskoka Airport, while on a cargo flight from Kitchener-Waterloo Airport, the twin engine aircraft descended too low in a slight nose down attitude when it collided with trees and crashed on the ground. Both occupants were seriously injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, ceiling was at 1,000 feet with 10 km visibility and wind from 140 at 2 knots.

The pilot was cleared for an ILS DME approach to runway 17L. During the final stage of the approach, the aircraft entered fog and disappeared from view of the control tower personnel. Radar and radio communications were lost also. After searching for 31 minutes, the aircraft was found by airport operations personnel over half way down the runway and 600 feet east of the runway. There was no evidence the aircraft touched down on the runway. The aircraft was configured with the landing gear up and the flaps deployed. Missed approach procedures require the flaps and landing gear to be retracted after initiating the procedure. The decision
height for the approach is 6,384 feet msl (200 feet above ground level) and the required RVR for a 14 CFR Part 135 flight to commence and approach is 2400 (1/2 mile). When on the glide slope, the decision height is 0.4 miles from the runway touchdown zone. Examination of the airplane did not disclose evidence of mechanical malfunction.

Following a missed approach at the destination, the pilot requested weather information for two nearby airports. One airport was 53 miles northeast with a cloud ceiling of 900 feet, and visibility 6 miles. The pilot opted for the accident airport, 21 miles southwest, with an indefinite ceiling of zero, and visibility 1/4 mile. After completing the second missed approach, the flight proceeded to the accident airport. Radar vectors were provided to the ILS runway 36L. On the final approach, the flight veered to the right of the localizer and descended abruptly. Last recorded altitude for the flight was below the decision height. Investigation revealed no anomalies with the airport navigational aids for the approach, and the airplane's navigation receivers were found to be operational. Postmortem examinations of the pilot did not reveal any pre-existing diseases, and toxicological examinations were negative for alcohol and other drugs.

A Voyageur Airways Beechcraft A100 aircraft, C-GILM, was on a flight from Winnipeg International Airport Winnipeg International Airport, MB (YWG) to Sioux Lookout Airport, ON (YXL). The crew of two pilots and two paramedics had completed a medevac flight and were returning to Sioux Lookout without a patient on board. The weather was reported to be: wind 060 degrees at two knots, visibility three statute miles in freezing drizzle, and ceiling overcast at 400 feet AGL. The First Officer was at the controls as they attempted two full NDB approaches for runway 34, each of which resulted in a missed approach. The captain then took control of the aircraft and conducted a full NDB approach for runway 34. On final approach, the crew had the runway in sight and the aircraft was lined up, but the aircraft was high on the approach. The captain called for full flap and pushed the props up to help slow the aircraft down. The aircraft developed a high rate of descent that was not fully countered before the aircraft contacted the runway firmly with the left main landing gear. The aircraft was taxied part way to the company ramp before the aircraft began pulling to the left very noticeably. The scissors had failed and the main wheels were turned slightly off-line. While conducting a heavy-landing inspection, company maintenance and operational personnel determined that in addition to the damage to the scissors for the left main landing gear, the rear spar of the left wing had failed in the vicinity of a pass-through hole for the flap actuator. The damage is reported to be overload in nature and consistent with the effects of landing hard on the left main wheel. During the approaches, the aircraft was above cloud during the penetration turns and was only in cloud during the final approach phases. A small amount of ice accumulated on the aircraft while in cloud (about 1/8th to 1/4 inch on the spinner remained after landing) but the de-ice equipment was working and was used.

During an IFR arrival, vectors were provided for an ILS runway 16L approach. While on assigned heading and altitude of 270 degrees and 3,000 feet, about 8 miles north of the final approach fix, the pilot was told to turn left to 185 degrees and maintain 2,200 feet until established on the localizer, then he was cleared for the approach. The pilot acknowledged the instructions. About 1 minute later, communication and radar contact with the airplane were lost. Eye witnesses near the accident site observed the airplane as it descended below the cloud layer. The airplane was described as being in a steep left bank with the nose down. Witnesses also stated that the engines were revving. Within seconds of the visual sighting, the airplane crashed. Examination of the airframe failed to disclose a mechanical problem. No fire or smoke was seen coming from the airplane before it crashed. The pilot did not report experiencing a problem with the airplane to the tower controller. Toxicology tests of the pilot indicated O.323 mcg/ml chlorpheniramine (a sedating antihistamine) in liver fluid and 0.073 mcg/ml chlorpheniramine in kidney fluid. Also, unspecified levels of dextromethorphan (a cough suppressant), pseudoephedrine (a decibgestabt), and phenylpropanolamine (a decongestant) were reported in kidney and liver fluids. All medications are available in over-the-counter cold remedies.

After touchdown at San Jose Airport, the aircraft collided with a dog. On impact, the right main gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest on its belly. The right engine struck the ground and caught fire. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The dog was killed.

The pilots obtained a complete weather briefing for their IFR flight. Before landing at their destination, they attempted to obtain an airport advisory on Unicom, but received no response. They landed on the runway in low visibility with the runway lights visible. After touchdown, the left main landing gear contacted a berm or snowbank on the left side of the plowed area, and the pilots were unable to maintain directional control. The aircraft drifted off the left side of the runway and came to rest on a reverse heading. The runway, which was 100 feet in width, had been plowed to about 45.5 feet width along the centerline. No notams had been filed concerning the partially plowed condition of the runway. The second officer (commercial pilot) noted that during the weather briefing, the pilot-in-command had been advised of thin, loose snow on the runway.