Wisconsin

Pilot was cleared for an ILS approach at his destination, and requested to report altitude of 3,000 feet on the approach. This was the last radio transmission received from the pilot. Aircraft was found in soft field six miles from the airport. Landing gear was up, flaps were down. Fisherman nearby reported hearing the aircraft maneuvering at low altitude. He reported that the engines sounded fine, but the sound was changing in pitch and intensity. He reported that got quiet just a few seconds before he heard the impact. The investigation revealed that there was evidence of a fire in the nose baggage compartment. The cabin heater is located in the nose baggage compartment, and had a recent history of discrepancies. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot was flying the twin engine airplane in the traffic pattern for a fly-by event at an air show. Two fly-by circuits had been completed, and the airplane was on the third downwind leg at an estimated altitude of 600 to 800 feet agl when the right engine lost power. The main landing gear had been previously extended, and the pilot elected not to retract the landing gear in anticipation of landing on the runway. The pilot reported that he performed emergency procedures by pushing the throttles forward and attempting to restart the right engine. The right engine did not restart, and the airplane collided with terrain short of the runway. The pilot did not claim to have feathered the inoperative right engine's propellers. Postaccident inspection of the right engine revealed no evidence of preimpact anomaly. The right engine's magnetos and carburetor were damaged and not functionally tested. The propeller of the right engine was found in an unfeathered, fine pitch position. All five occupants were injured, four seriously.

The on-demand air taxi airplane collided with trees and terrain during a third attempt at an ILS approach. The airplane crashed approximately two miles beyond the airport on the extended centerline of the landing runway. In an interview the pilot related that on his first approach to the airport he saw the runway and observed vehicles on the taxiway as he performed his missed approach. When he was asked the reason for the second missed approach he said it was because of instrument fluctuations on his course direction indicator. During this period he asked that the lights be set to high intensity because he could not see them. The lights were verified as being set for high intensity. He did not remember anything of the third approach after he passed the outer marker. Snow removal operations were in progress during the period the accident airplane was making approaches to the airport.

The pilot received numerous weather briefings/updates before takeoff, which included two pilot reports of windshear by aircraft on the approach into Appleton. Shortly after takeoff convective sigmet 1E was transmitted by the radar controller on the same frequency he was working N87163. This sigmet called for embedded thunderstorms. About 10 minutes later, while being vectored for the approach into Appleton, the pilot was given heading deviations because of weather. The aircraft crashed 1/2 mile from the approach end of the runway. A witness whose residence is located between the OM and MM for the ILS approach reported a 'huge downpour' with 'very strong winds' at the time of the accident. Wreckage examination revealed that all power controls for both engines were in the full forward position, and that the left and right main landing gear mounting trunnions were displaced upward into the wing fuel tanks. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

While cruising above freezing level at 12,000 feet, the flight was cleared to descend and maintain 9,000 feet. About 1-1/2 minute later, the flight declared a mayday (emergency). Radio and radar contacts were lost and the aircraft crashed in a near vertical descent. Radar data showed that after starting a descent, the aircraft entered a left/descending maneuver. Subsequently, the left outboard wing panel and both engines separated in flight. The last transponder reply was at 2,800 feet. An exam revealed the left wing panel had separated from positive overload. No fatigue or pre-existing crack was found on any fracture area. Also, damage was found on the left engine's inboard cowling that matched damage on the vertical and right horizontal stabilizers; however, sequence of cowling separation was not verified. The separated wing panel and parts of the engine cowling were found about 3/4 mile from the main wreckage. An NTSB trajectory study indicated an inflight separation occurred at an altitude of approximately 5,600 feet as aircraft was heading southeast in a 50 to 70° dive. Elevation trim indicator was found with a full nose up indication. Both pilots were instrument rated. All eight occupants were killed.

The aircraft impacted the ground about 1,000 feet to the left of the runway. The pilot stated that he did not have visual contact with the ground and remembers attempting to make a missed approach. Conditions were IMC. The pilot was seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Midwest Express Airlines Flight 206, DC-9 N100ME arrived at Milwaukee (MKE) at 13:15 on September 6, 1985. It departed Milwaukee at 13:36 and arrived in Madison at 13:55 after an uneventful flight. At Madison, N100ME was designated as flight 105 to Atlanta (ATL), with an intermediate stop in Milwaukee. Flight 105 departed Madison at 14:25 and arrived at Milwaukee, on time and without incident, at 14:41. About 14:49, the first officer of flight 105 contacted Milwaukee Tower to request an instrument flight rule (IFR) clearance to Atlanta. The clearance was received. The Atlanta forecast included a 1,000-foot ceiling, visibility 2 miles, thunderstorms and rain showers. At 15:12, the Before Engine Start Checklist was read and accomplished in accordance with Midwest Express operating procedures. Engine start was commenced at 15:14 and the After Start Checklist was accomplished. The first officer requested clearance to taxi to runway 19R for departure. About 15:17:50, the Taxi Checklist was completed, and the engine pressure ratio (EPR) and airspeed reference bugs were set to 1.91 and 133 knots, respectively. Both indications were correct for the departure conditions applicable to flight 105. At the conclusion of the Taxi Checklist, the captain advised the first officer "Standard briefing ..." At 15:19:15, the first officer reported to the tower local controller, "Milwaukee, Midex 105, ready on 19R." Flight 105 was cleared to "position and hold" on runway 19R. The captain called for the Before Takeoff Checklist, which was completed in accordance with the COM. Flight 105 was cleared for takeoff at 15:20:28; the first officer acknowledged the clearance. The captain operated the flight controls, and the first officer handled radio communications and other copilot responsibilities during the takeoff. The Midwest Express DC-9 Flight Operations Manual required the use of standard noise abatement takeoff procedures during all line operations, unless precluded by safety considerations or special noise abatement procedures. At the time flight 105 departed, noise abatement procedures were in effect. Midwest Express also utilized "reduced thrust" takeoff procedures (at the captain's discretion) to extend engine life. The flightcrew was complying with the reduced thrust and standard noise abatement takeoff procedures. The takeoff roll and liftoff were normal, with liftoff occurring near the intersection of the midfield taxiway and runway 19R, about 4,200 feet from the start of the takeoff roll. Rotation to the takeoff attitude occurred at 140 knots. The DC-9 accelerated to 168 knots with a rate of climb of about 3,000 feet/minute, indicating a normal two-engine initial takeoff flightpath. At 15:21:26 N100ME was about 7,600 feet down the runway, reaching a height of 450 feet above the ground. At that moment there was a loud noise and a noticeable decrease in engine sound. The captain then remarked "What the # was that?" The first officer did not respond. At 15:21:29, the local controller transmitted, "Midex 105, turn left heading 175." At the time of his transmission he observed smoke and flame emanating from the right airplane engine. The captain asked the first officer, "What do we got here, Bill?" The first officer did not respond to the captain but advised the local controller, "Midex 105, roger, we've got an emergency here." Two seconds later, the captain said, "Here"; again there was no response. Neither pilot made the call outs for "Max Power" or "Ignition Override-Check Fuel System," which were part of the Midwest Express "Engine Failure after V1" emergency procedure. Meanwhile the airplane began to deviate substantially to the right and the heading changed from 194 degrees to 260 degrees in eight seconds. The vertical acceleration dropped sharply to about 0.3 G and increased to a value of 1.8 G. At that point the airplane stalled. This accelerated stall occurred at a KIAS of about 156 kts.

High sink rate developed on short final. Acft touched down 13 feet prior to runway before sink rate could be arrested. Landing gear collapsed after contacting edge of runway which is 7 inches higher than surrounding terrain. Tail section of aircraft caught fire just prior to coming to a complete stop 2,900 feet down the runway. Pilots who frequently fly in and out of the airport stated, wind shifts near the runway are common in gusty conditions because of hilly terrain.

During flight, the pilot transmitted to ARTCC 'we've got a problem, we're losing altitude.' The controller provided a vector to the nearest airport, but shortly after that, the pilot stated that he would not be able to reach the airport. The pilot did not inform ARTCC of his specific problem, except to say that the aircraft was descending rapidly. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed in a wooded area about 1/2 mile from an open area. During the investigation, about 1 quart of fuel was found remaining in the left inboard (aux) fuel tank. All of the other tanks were ruptured from impact. No evidence of fuel spillage was found at the accident site. The left prop was found in the feathered position and the right prop was found partially feathered. No preimpact part failure or malfunction was found. Both engines were started and both operated satisfactorily, after fuel was supplied by temporary tanks. The pilot and two passengers were killed while a fourth occupant was seriously injured.

After takeoff, the aircrew flew to the southern end of Lake winnebago where they made several uneventful water landings. They estimated that the wind was from the northeast at 5 to 6 knots. The water was described as smooth with only small ripples. On the 6th approach, the gear handle was checked in the up position and the amber gear up indicator light was illuminated. The amphibious aircraft touched down on the water with no bounce or porpoise. About 2 or 3 seconds after touchdown, the aircraft yawed violently to the right and rolled left. The left float and wing tip hit the water and the left wing separated. The hull rolled over, but the occupants egresed before the aircraft sank. A diver noted that the right gear was extended. After the aircraft was recovered, the right main gear actuator rod clevis was found to have fractured. The fracture surface had signs of overload failure. The lock nut had been screwed tightly against the clevis and the lock nut threads had produced gouge marks on the unthreaded portion of the shank of the clevis.