Paraná

The following findings were identified:
- The approach was considered stabilized;
- The required landing distance of 6,431t (1,960m) was compatible for the operation, since the LDA of runway 32 at SBFI was 7,201ft (2,195m);
- There was no evidence of malfunction of the aircraft brake system that could have caused the runway excursion;
- At the time of landing, the runway was wet with a significant amount of water on the pavement;
- The estimated deceleration corresponded to what would be expected on a very wet runway (> 3mm of water) with hydroplaning of the tires at higher speeds;
- The friction and macrotexture measurements had normal parameters and did not contribute to the aircraft's poor deceleration;
- The characteristics of the precipitation over threshold 14 associated with the large variations in wind direction and intensity were consistent with the windshear phenomenon, resulting from a microburst;
- The PR-TLZ sensors did not detect the occurrence of windshear during the landing approach;
- A sudden increase in the calibrated speed that peaked at 32kt altered the aircraft's lift and, consequently, reduced the tires' grip on the ground, resulting in poor braking in the parts where the ground speed was lower;
- The speedbrakes were not extended during the run after landing, contrary to what was prevised in the AFM;
- The aircraft ran the full length of the runway, overpassed its limits and crashed into a ravine;
- There was a windshear alert issued about 30 seconds after the landing of the PRTLZ by an aircraft that was at the threshold 32;
- The aircraft had substantial damage; and
- The crewmembers and the passenger left unharmed.
Contributing factors:
- Control skills – undetermined
Despite the low contribution of the speedbrakes to the reduction of the landing distance, this device represents a deceleration resource through aerodynamic drag that should not be neglected, especially during landing on wet runways, and could have contributed to avoiding runway excursion.
- Adverse meteorological conditions – a contributor
The large variation in wind intensity peaked at 32 kt. This variation lasted 13 seconds and raised the indicated speed from 76 kt to 108 kt. Considering that the speed of 108 kt was very close to the VREF (111 KCAS), it can be stated that this phenomenon altered the aircraft's lift and, consequently, reduced the tires' grip on the ground, leading to poor braking.

Contributing factors.
- Communication – undetermined
It is possible that difficulties for the dialogue between pilots on matters related to the operation of the aircraft have favored a prejudicial scenario to the expression of assertiveness in the communication in the cabin, interfering in the effective management of the presented abnormal condition.
- Team dynamics – undetermined
It is possible that a more passive posture of the copilot combined with the commander's decisions and actions from the presentation of the abnormal condition in flight interfered with the quality of the team's integration and in the efficiency of the cabin dynamics during the occurrence, bringing losses to the emergency management presented.
- Emotional state – undetermined
It is not possible to discard the hypothesis that a more anxious emotional state of the pilots contributed to an inaccurate evaluation of the operational context experienced, favoring ineffective judgments, decisions and actions to manage the abnormal condition presented.
- Aircraft maintenance – a contributor
On the right engine, it was found that the fuel tube fixing nut that left the distributor for No. 3 cylinder was loose, favoring the fuel leakage, as well as the bypass valve clamp of the turbocharger that was bad adjusted, providing leakage of gases from the exhaust that would be directed to the compressor and, later to the engine, to equalize its power. On the left engine, impurity composed of an agglomerate of soil and fuel were found on the side of the nozzles n° 2, 4 and 6, which migrated to the inside of these nozzles, causing them to become clogged. It was not possible to determine the origin of this material, but there is a possibility that it may have been deposited during the long period the aircraft spent in the maintenance shop, undergoing general overhaul and the revitalization of its interior (13DEC2012 until 29APR2016).
- Insufficient pilot’s experience – undetermined
The pilots had little experience with the GARMIN GTN 650 navigation system. The lack of familiarity with this equipment may have favored the misidentification of the approach fixes for Londrina. This way, it is possible that they have calculated their descent to the final approach fix (waypoint LO013), believing that it was the position relative to threshold 13 (waypoint RWY13).
- Decision-making process – undetermined
The decision to take off from Cuiabá to Londrina without the identification of the reason for the warning light to be ON in the alarm panel and the possible late declaration of the emergency condition showed little adequate decisions that may have increased the level of criticality of the occurrence.
- Support systems – undetermined
The similarity of the waypoints names in the RNAV procedure, associated with the lack of familiarity of the pilots with the new navigation system installed in the aircraft, may have confused the pilots as to their real position in relation to the runway.

The following findings were identified:
- Fatigue is likely to have occurred, since there are reports of high workload, capable of affecting the perception, judgment, and decision making of the crew.
- In view of the fact that the captain displayed an attitude of gratefulness toward the company which hired him, working for consecutive hours and many times more than was prescribed for his daily routine, it is possible that such high motivation may have been present in the accident flight, harming his capacity to evaluate the conditions required for a safe flight.
- The crew neither gathered nor properly evaluated the available pieces of information for the correct refueling of the aircraft, something that led to their decision of not refueling the aircraft in SBDO.
- The company crews did not usually keep fuel records, and made approximate calculations based on the fuel remaining from previous flights, whose control parameters were not dependable. Such attitudes reflected a work-group culture that became apparent in this accident.
- The pilots were presumably undergoing a condition of stress on account of the company flight routine, in which they flew every day, with little time dedicated to rest or even holidays. Under such condition, the pilots may have had their cognitive processes affected, weakening their performance in flight.
- The flights had the objective of transporting valuables, causing concern in relation to security issues involving the aircraft on the ground. Thus, it is suspected that decisions made by the pilots may have been affected by this complexity, such as, for example, deciding not to refuel the aircraft on certain locations.
- The way the work was structured in the company was giving rise to overload due to the routine of many flights and few periods of rest or holidays. This situation may have affected the crew’s performance, interfering in the analysis of the conditions necessary for a safe flight.
- The company did not monitor the performance of its pilots for the identification of contingent deviations from standard procedures, such as non-compliance with the MGO.
- Failures in the application of operational norms, as well as in the communication between the crew members, may have occurred on account of inadequate management of tasks by each individual, such as, for example, the use of the checklist and the filling out of control forms relative to fuel consumption contained in the company MGO.
- The crew judged that the amount of fuel existing in the aircraft was sufficient for the flight in question.
- The fact that the fuel gauges were not indicating the correct quantity of fuel had direct influence on the flight outcome, since the planning factors and the pilots’ situational awareness were affected.
- The crew did not analyze appropriately the amount of fuel necessary for the flight leg between SBDO and SBBI. The Mission Order did not establish the minimum amount of fuel necessary for the flight legs, and the crew had to take responsibility for the decision.
- The company was not rigorous with the filling out of aircraft logbooks and cargo manifestos, resulting that it did not have control over the operational procedures performed by the crews, and this may have contributed to the aircraft taking off with an amount of fuel that was insufficient for the flight. Although the MGO had parameters established for calculating the endurance necessary for VFR/IFR flights, the company did not define the fuel necessary in the Mission Orders, transferring the responsibility for the decision to the aircraft captain.

Controlled flight into terrain after the crew descended too low in IMC conditions. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Visibility was below minimums,
- The crew continued the descent until the aircraft impacted ground and failed to initiate a go-around procedure,
- A probable crew fatigue,
- It is possible that the crew suffered optical illusions,
- Overconfidence on part of the captain,
- The captain did not request any assistance from the copilot during the approach procedure,
- Inexperienced, the copilot did not interfere despite dangerous flight conditions,
- Poor organizational culture,
- Deficiencies in crew training,
- Lack of crew discipline,
- Poor flight planning,
- Lack of supervision on part of the operator,
- The copilot was inexperienced on this type of aircraft.

Loss of control during initial climb in IMC conditions after the crew suffered a spatial disorientation. The following factors were identified:
- Weather conditions were not suitable for the completion of the flight,
- The crew failed to prepare the flight according to published procedures,
- The crew failed to follow the pre-takeoff checklist,
- The copilot did not have adequate training for this type of operation,
- The captain had emotional conditions that compromised flight operations,
- The relationship between both pilots was incompatible,
- The main attitude indicator was out of service since a week and the crew referred to the emergency attitude indicator,
- Because of poor flight preparation and non observation of the pre-takeoff checklist, the captain forgot to switch on the emergency attitude indicator prior to takeoff,
- At the time of the accident, the captain had accumulated 15 hours and 22 minutes of work without rest, which is against the law,
- The captain showed overconfidence and inflexibility which weakened his performances,
- Both pilots disagreed on operations,
- The visibility was poor due to the night and the ceiling at 300 feet above ground,
- The state of complacency of the organization was characterized by a culture adaptable to internal processes, without the adoption of formal rules for the operations division and the acceptance of operating conditions incompatible with security rules and protocols, which allowed the newly hired crew to feel free to act in disagreement with the standards and regulations in force at the time of the accident,
- Performing a sharp turn to the right in IMC conditions associated with a long working day and a lack of rest,
- The level of stress of the captain due to intense fatigue generated by a high workload and an insufficient rest period,
- Poor crew discipline,
- Poor judgment of the situation,
- Poor flight planning,
- Failures in the operator's organizational processes and lack of supervision of flight operations.

Double engine failure caused by a fuel exhaustion. It was determined that the crew did not prepare the flight according to procedures and took off with an insufficient fuel quantity on board.

The decision of the crew to land at Curitiba-Bacacheri Airport was not appropriate due to poor weather conditions. The crew underestimated the weather conditions at destination and should take the decision to divert to a more suitable terrain.

Failure of both engines in flight due to fuel exhaustion. The following findings were identified:
- The crew failed to prepare the flight according to published procedures,
- The crew failed to check there was sufficient fuel in tanks prior to departure,
- The crew failed to follow the pre takeoff checklist,
- The captain showed excessive self confidence
- The captain exercised pressure on the copilot,
- The crew suffered fatigue due to an excessive period of work. At the time of the accident, the crew was overduty by three hours,
- The crew consumed alcohol beverages the night before the flight.