New York

On IFR arrival, flight 4821 was cleared to intersection 17 northeast of airport at 6,000 feet, then for ILS runway 23 approach. Radar service was terminated 6.5 east of intersection. Radar data showed that flight crossed and then bracketed localizer. Flight intercepted glide slope from below about 7 miles outside of outer marker and thence deviated above glide slope. About 2 miles outside of marker, flight was at a full fly down deflection when it entered a descent varying from 1,200 to 2,000 fpm. Aircraft struck wooded mountain top 2.0 miles inside of outer marker (3.9 miles from runway) at elevation of 2,280 feet. Minimum altitude at marker was 3,600 feet. Glide slope elevation at point of impact was approximately 2,900 feet. Evidence was found of inadequate electrical ground path between radome and fuselage which, when combined with existing weather conditions, may have produced electrostatic discharge (precipitation static). Although post-accident tests were not conclusive, the safety board believes that the glide slope indications might have been unreliable due to precipitation static interference. Two occupants survived while two others (one pilot and one passenger) were killed.

The pilot was on a personal trip that he had flown many times. On the day of the accident, additional fuel was not available at the departure airport. As he neared his destination, the pilot left one of his engines in a fuel crossfeed configuration causing a partial power loss. The airplane has the capability to climb at more than 500 feet per minute using only one engine. After declaring his emergency to the control tower, radio contact was lost. The aircraft was observed flying 90° to the ILS final approach course at very low altitude banking side to side. The airplane crashed in a 70° nose down position. Heavy snow had started falling just before the accident. A post crash fire destroyed much of the airplane. Both occupants were killed.

Before flight, the flight engineer (f/e) had calculated 'v' speeds and horizontal stabilizer trim setting for takeoff, but neither the captain nor the 1st officer (f/o) had verified them. During rotation for takeoff, the captain noted that the forced needed to pull the yoke aft was greater than normal and that the aircraft would not fly (at that speed). Subsequently, he aborted the attempted takeoff. Realizing the aircraft would not stop on the remaining runway, he elected to steer it to the right to avoid hitting traffic on a highway near the departure end. The aircraft struck ILS equipment; the landing gear collapsed and all 4 engines tore away. Subsequently, the aircraft was destroyed by fire. Investigations revealed the f/e had improperly computed the takeoff data. He had calculated the 'v' speeds and horizontal stabilizer trim setting for 242,000 lbs; however, the actual takeoff wt was 342,000 lbs. Rotation speed (Vr) for this weight was 28 knots above the speed that was used. Investigations revealed shortcomings in the operator's flightcrew training program and questionable scheduling of qualified (but marginally experienced) crew members for the accident flight.

During an IFR flight the pilot executed a forced landing in a reservoir after the engines quit due to fuel exhaustion. The pilot reported that the airplane was fueled, topped off, the night before departure from Charleston. Examination of the airplane showed the outboard fuel filler port cap on the left wing was not present. The majority of the liquid drained from the main fuel sump was water. The inboard and outboard fuel filler caps were present on the right wing. All six occupants were rescued.

The Cessna 208B made a takeoff with light wet snow falling, at night. The airplane reached an altitude of 700 feet agl prior to making a steep descent, striking trees and impacting inverted. Radar data showed the aircraft lift off point and initial climb rate approached that shown in the flight manual for short field technique. Two other Cessna 208's preceded the accident aircraft from the same airport, one 13 minutes prior and the other 3 minutes prior. Radar data showed they climbed at a slower rate. The accident airplane had come from a hangar and was not deiced prior to departure. A pilot flying a identical airplane with a similar load commented that his climb rate was lower than normal. Another pilot commented that this was the first wet snow of the year and it was sticking to his engine cowling. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Avianca flight 052 (AV052), a Boeing 707-321B with Colombian registration HK-2016, crashed in a wooded residential area in Cove Neck, Long Island, NY. AV052 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Bogotá, Colombia, to New York-JFK Intl Airport, NY, with an intermediate stop at Jose Maria Cordova Airport, near Medellín, Columbia. Of the 158 persons aboard, 73 were fatally injured. Because of poor weather conditions in the northeastern part of the United States, the flightcrew was placed in holding 3 times by ATC for a total of about 1 hour and 17 minutes. During the 3rd period of holding, the flightcrew reported that the aircraft could not hold longer than 5 minutes, that it was running out of fuel, and that it could not reach its alternate airport, Boston-Logan Intl. Subsequently, the flightcrew executed a missed approach to JFK Intl Airport. While trying to return to the airport, the aircraft experienced a loss of power to all 4 engines and crashed approximately 21 miles northeast of JFK Airport.

During a preflight weather briefing, the instrument rated pilot was told by the AFSS specialist that marginal VFR and IFR conditions would prevail along the route of flight. The pilot did not file a flight plan. The airplane was last depicted on radar at 2,500 feet msl and heading towards high terrain. A NY state trooper leaving his office about the time the accident occurred stated snow was falling very hard and visibility was low. The state trooper's office was about 5 miles from the crash site. The airplane hit a 3,400 foot mountain at an elevation of 2,500 feet. The airplane was missing 4 days and was found by the crew of a NY state police helicopter. All six occupants were killed.

A USAir Boeing 737-401, registration N416US, was scheduled to depart from Baltimore/Washington (BWI) as flight 1846 at 15:10, but air traffic inbound to New York-LaGuardia (LGA) delayed the takeoff until 19:35. Holding on the taxiway at BWI for 1.5 hours required the flight to return to the terminal area for fuel. The Boeing 737-400 left BWI uneventfully and arrived at LGA's Gate 15 at 20:40. Weather and air traffic in the LGA terminal area had caused cancellations and delayed most flights for several hours. The USAir dispatcher decided to cancel the Norfolk leg of Flight 1846, unload the passengers, and send the flight to Charlotte (CLT) without passengers. Several minutes later, the dispatcher told the captain that his airplane would not be flown empty but would carry passengers to Charlotte as USAir flight 5050. This seemed to upset the captain. He expressed concern for the passengers because more delays would cause him and the first officer to exceed crew duty time limitations before the end of the trip. While passengers were boarding, the captain visited USAir's ground movement control tower to ask about how decisions were made about flights and passengers. The captain returned to the cockpit as the last of the passengers were boarding, and the entry door was closed. After the jetway was retracted, the passenger service representative told the captain through the open cockpit window that he wanted to open the door again to board more passengers. The captain refused, and flight 5050 left Gate 15 at 22:52. The 737 taxied out to runway 31. Two minutes after push-back, the ground controller told the crew to hold short of taxiway Golf Golf. However, the captain failed to hold short of that taxiway and received modified taxi instructions from the ground controller at 22:56. The captain then briefed takeoff speeds as V1: 125 knots, VR: 128 knots, and V2: 139 knots. The first officer was to be the flying pilot. He was conducting his first non supervised line takeoff in a Boeing 737. About 2 minutes later, the first officer announced "stabilizer and trim" as part of the before-takeoff checklist. The captain responded with "set" and then corrected himself by saying: "Stabilizer trim, I forgot the answer. Set for takeoff." Flight 5050 was cleared into position to hold at the end of the runway at 23:18:26 and received takeoff clearance at 23:20:05. The first officer pressed the autothrottle disengage and then pressed the TO/GA button, but noted no throttle movement. He then advanced the throttles manually to a "rough" takeoff-power setting. The captain then said: "Okay, that's the wrong button pushed" and 9 seconds later said: "All right, I'll set your power." During the takeoff roll the airplane began tracking to the left. The captain initially used the nosewheel steering tiller to maintain directional control. About 18 seconds after beginning the roll a "bang" was heard followed shortly by a loud rumble, which was due to the cocked nosewheel as a result of using the nosewheel steering during the takeoff roll. At 23:20:53, the captain said "got the steering." The captain later testified that he had said, "You've got the steering." The first officer testified that he thought the captain had said: "I've got the steering." When the first officer heard the captain, he said "Watch it then" and began releasing force on the right rudder pedal but kept his hands on the yoke in anticipation of the V1 and rotation callouts. At 23:20:58.1, the captain said: "Let's take it back then" which he later testified meant that he was aborting the takeoff. According to the captain, he rejected the takeoff because of the continuing left drift and the rumbling noise. He used differential braking and nose wheel steering to return toward the centerline and stop. The throttle levers were brought back to their idle stops at 23:20:58.4. The indicated airspeed at that time was 130 knots. Increasing engine sound indicating employment of reverse thrust was heard on the CVR almost 9 seconds after the abort maneuver began. The airplane did not stop on the runway but crossed the end of the runway at 34 knots ground speed. The aircraft dropped onto the wooden approach light pier, which collapsed causing the aircraft break in three and drop into 7-12 m deep East River. The accident was not survivable for the occupants of seats 21A and 21B because of the massive upward crush of the cabin floor.

Witnesses reported aircraft was high during approach and landed nosewheel 1st about 1,600 feet beyond threshold, then became airborne and bounced 2 times. Pilot stated that before touchdown, he started to 'spool up' engines, but noted lack of response, then retarded throttles and landed. He said he applied brakes and selected 'full reverse' and noted no response. Reportedly, nosewheel 'skipped into air' while aircraft still had flying speed. With insufficient runway remaining to stop, he elected to stow reversers and began go-around. He noted no response from engines, tho aircraft had became airborne. Aircraft then settled beyond departure end of runway and crashed on rough terrain. Examination revealed engines had ingested twigs, grass and dirt. Reverse load limiters (l/l) on both engines were found in tripped position. Flight man stated that to avoid actuation of l/l, do not advance primary throttle after returning reverse thrust lever to stow until unlock light is out; maint required to reset actuated l/l. L/l was incorporated on thrust reverser to reduce engine power to idle, if inadvertently deployed in flight. During post-accident check, both engines were operated to 85% after l/l reset.

During arrival, the cargo flight (reliant 232) contacted Binghamton approach control and received vectors for an ILS runway 16 approach. At that time, the atis had information (information kilo) that there was light freezing rain, that all paved surfaces had a thin layer of ice, and that braking action was poor. The copilot made the approach and landing. The captain reported that touchdown was normal in the 1st 1,000 feet of the runway and that the airbrake was used, but they did not know that braking action was nil until they were on the landing roll. By the time they realized braking was nil, there was insufficient runway remaining for a safe go-around. The captain reported he deployed the drag chute, but a witness who saw the chute, reported it did not open. Subsequently, the aircraft continued off the departure end of the 6,298 feet runway, went down a steep embankment and was extensively damaged. The required distance to stop on an icy runway was estimated to be 5,344 feet.