New York

While descending from 5,000 feet to 3,000 feet, the pilot informed ATC that the left engine had failed and the engine cowling was open. The crew said that after feathering the left propeller, and with the right engine at full power, they could not arrest a 300-500 fpm rate of descent. The crew informed ATC that they would be landing in the water. All the occupants exited the airplane from the left front pilot's emergency door. The victims were in the water for approximately 30 minutes before being rescued. One of the passengers was in cardiac arrest when he was retrieved from the water. Examination of the left engine revealed that the #2 cylinder had separated from the engine in flight as a result of high stress fatigue cracking of the cylinder hold down studs and the #3 main bearing thru-studs. The fatigue in the studs occurred as a result of the cylinder fastener preload forces either initially inadequate or lost during service. Maintenance records indicated that the thru-stud was replaced 80 service hours prior to the accident. Examination of the cylinder hold down studs and the #3 main bearing thru-studs revealed that they were improperly torqued, resulting in low initial preload on the fasteners. Incorrect installation of the oversize thru-studs, per existing service information, could have also been a factor in the improper torquing of the studs. The locations of the fatigue origins and the edge worn into the deck indicate that the upper studs were probably the first to fail, allowing the cylinder to rock on the lower rear corner of the cylinder flange.

The new owner/co-pilot of the 50-year-old airplane and another pilot, who was typed rated in the airplane, departed on a 1,700 mile ferry flight. After the first 250 mile leg, the airplane was landed at another airport with a right engine problem. The owner replaced the right engine and continued the ferry flight. Twenty minutes into the second flight, the replacement right engine lost power. The owner stated that they applied maximum power to the left engine, were unable to feather the right propeller, and performed a forced landing to a field. However, the airplane collided with trees before reaching the field, then burned after impact. Investigation revealed that during the past 5 years, the airplane had neither flown nor had an annual inspection, except for 3 recent maintenance flights, totaling 1.5 Hours. The right propeller blades had chordwise scratches. The left propeller blades had no chordwise scratches. Examination of the wreckage revealed three propeller strikes in the ground, near the right engine ground scar, and no propeller strikes in the ground, near the left engine ground scar. The right engine mixture was locked in the auto-cruise position, while the left was locked in the emergency position. Airplane charts listed the single-engine rate of climb with a feathered propeller to be 350 feet per minute, and 10 feet per minute with a windmilling propeller.

The airplane was on a positioning flight at night, cruising at 6,000 feet. Also, the pilot was operating on an IFR flight plan and was on his 6th flight after reporting for duty at 1530 est. During a frequency change and radio check at 0207 est, the pilot's response was normal. Radar data revealed that about 16 minutes later, the airplane entered a right turn, then disappeared from radar at about 0222 est after about 255° of turn. It impacted the ground in a steep nose down descent; debris from the airplane was found down to 6 feet below the surface. During the final 15 minutes of flight, there were no radio transmissions on the assigned frequency. No preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction was found. The propeller blades had s-curves or were bent forward; they also had leading edge impact damage and Rotational scoring. The pilot had flown in excess of 120 hours (110 hrs at night) in the preceding 30 days. There was evidence that he may have lacked crew rest during the day(s) before the accident.

During an aborted takeoff, the airplane overran the 4,451 foot long runway, went down a hill, and struck a fence. According to the pilot, 'during the takeoff roll, the indicated airspeed needle climbed to approximately 60 knots, but then would go no further... My attempts to dislodge it by tapping on the face of the gauge were futile...I pulled back the throttles and applied full brakes...' The pilot reported that based on the existing conditions 'the airplane can accelerate from rest to rotation speed and back to rest in less than 3,500 feet.' The examination of the airplane revealed the pitot tube was internally obstructed with an insect and mud.

Air traffic control had cleared the airplane for the ILS approach to runway 24, circle to land on runway 06. The airplane broke off the approach to runway 24, and was observed by a witness at a low altitude, on a left downwind for runway 06, flying in and out of clouds. On the base leg, the airplane turned to the left, and a witness saw the left wing make contact with the ground. One witness said that before the crash, the engine sounded 'like they were at full rpm. Several pilots from the air national guard (ang) at the airport went to the crash site minutes after the crash, and observed ice on the airplane's wings and empennage. One of the ang pilot reported his observation of the ice on the aircraft: 'It appeared to be approximately 1/8 inch in thickness throughout the left and right wing surfaces and the rear empennage sections . . .' Another ang pilot described the weather at the time of the accident as, visibility less then one mile with 'freezing rain and sleet.' The examination of the airplane did not disclose evidence of mechanical malfunction. Both occupants were killed.

Immediately after liftoff the stick shaker activated, and the first officer, who was making the takeoff, said 'you got it.' The captain took control, closed the thrust levers, and landed. He applied full reverse thrust and maximum braking, and turned the airplane off the runway to avoid a barrier at the end. A system design deficiency permitted a malfunctioning aoa sensor to cause a false stall warning. The sensor had experienced 9 previous malfunctions, and was inspected and returned to service without a determination on the reason for the intermittent malfunction. The first officer had incorrectly perceived that the airplane was stalling and gave control to the captain without proper coordination of the transfer of control. All 292 occupants were rescued, among them 10 were injured, one seriously.