New York

On December 16, 1960, at 1033 e.s.t., a collision between Trans World Airlines Model 1049A Constellation, N6907C, and a United Air Lines DC-8, N8013U, occurred near Miller Army Air Field, Staten Island, New York. Trans World Airlines Flight 266 originated at Dayton, Ohio. The destination was LaGuardia Airport, New York, with one en route stop at Columbus, Ohio United Air Lines Flight 826 was a non-stop service originating at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, with its destination New York International Airport, New York. Both aircraft were operating under Instrument Flight Rules. Following the collision the Constellation fell on Miller Army Field, and the DC-8 continued in a northeasterly direction, crashing into Sterling place near Seventh Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Both aircraft were totally destroyed. All 128 occupants of both aircraft and 6 persons on the ground in Brooklyn were fatally injured. There was considerable damage to property in the area of the ground impact of the DC-8. TWA Flight 266 departed Port Columbus Airport at 0900, operating routinely under Air Traffic Control into the New York area The New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) subsequently advised that radar contact had been established and cleared the flight to the Linden. Intersection, Control of the flight was subsequently transferred to LaGuardia Approach Control. When the flight was about over the Linden Intersection, LaGuardia Approach Control began vectoring TWA 266 by radar to the final approach course for a landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia. Shortly thereafter TWA 266 was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, and was twice advised of traffic in the vicinity on a northeasterly heading. Following the transmission of this information the radar targets appeared to merge on the LaGuardia Approach Control radar scope, and communications with TWA 266 were lost. United Air Lines Flight 826 operated routinely between Chicago and the New York area, contacting the New York ARTCC at 1012 Shortly thereafter the New York Center cleared UAL 826 to proceed from the Allentown, Pa., very high frequency omni directional radio range station (VOR) direct to the Robbinsville, New Jersey, VOR, and thence to the Preston Intersection via Victor Airway 123. At approximately 1021, UAL 826 contacted Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) to advise their company that the No. 2 receiver accessory unit was inoperative, which would indicate that one of the aircraft's two VHF radio navigational receivers was not functioning. A "fix" is established by the intersection of two radials from two separate radio range stations. With one unit inoperative the cross-bearings necessary can be taken by tuning the remaining receiver from one station to the other. This process consumes considerable time, however, and is not as accurate as the simultaneous display of information on two separate position deviation indicators While UAL 826 advised the company that one unit was inoperative, Air Traffic Control was not advised. At 1025 the New York ARTCC issued a clearance for a new routing which shortened the distance to Preston by approximately 11 miles. As a result, this reduced the amount of time available to the crew to retune the single radio receiver to either the Colt' s Neck, New Jersey, or Solberg, New Jersey, VOR in order to establish the cross-bearing with Victor 123, which would identify the Preston Intersection. In the event the crew would not attempt to retune the single VOR receiver, crossbearings on the Scotland Low Frequency Radiobeacon could be taken with the aircraft direction finding (ADF) equipment. This would be a means of identifying the Preston Intersection but, under the circumstances, would require rapid mental calculation in the interpretation of a display which could be easily misread. Several factors support the conclusion that this occurred. Instructions had been issued to UAL 826 for holding at the Preston Intersection the clearance limit, should holding be necessary. Clearance beyond Preston for an approach to Idlewild Airport would be received from Idlewild Approach Control and the transfer of control of the flight from the New York Center to Idlewild Approach Control would normally take place as the aircraft was approaching Preston. UAL 826 was not receiving radar vectors, but was providing its own navigation. After the flight reported passing through 6,000 feet the New York Center advised that radar service was terminated and instructed the flight to contact Idlewild Approach Control. UAL 826 then called Idlewild Approach Control, stating "United 826 approaching Preston at 5,000." This was the last known transmission from UAL 826. At the time UAL 826 advised it was approaching Preston it had in fact gone on by this clearance limit several seconds before and was several miles past the point at which it should have turned into the holding pattern. This is confirmed by the data obtained from the flight recorder which had been installed in the UAL DC-8, as well as by analysis of the communication tapes At a point approximately 11 miles past the Preston Intersection a collision occurred between TWA 266 and UAL 826. Weather at the altitude of the collision and at the time of the accident was such as to preclude flight by visual means.

On December 16, 1960, at 1033 e.s.t., a collision between Trans World Airlines Model 1049A Constellation, N 6907C, and a United Air Lines DC-8, N 8013U, occurred near Miller Army Air Field, Staten Island, New York. Trans World Airlines Flight 266 originated at Dayton, Ohio. The destination was LaGuardia Airport, New York, with one en route stop at Columbus, Ohio United Air Lines Flight 826 was a non-stop service originating at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, with its destination New York International Airport, New York. Both aircraft were operating under Instrument Flight Rules. Following the collision the Constellation fell on Miller Army Field, and the DC-8 continued in a northeasterly direction, crashing into Sterling place near Seventh Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Both aircraft were totally destroyed. All 128 occupants of both aircraft and 6 persons on the ground in Brooklyn were fatally injured. There was considerable damage to property in the area of the ground impact of the DC-8. TWA Flight 266 departed Port Columbus Airport at 0900, operating routinely under Air Traffic Control into the New York area The New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) subsequently advised that radar contact had been established and cleared the flight to the Linden. Intersection, Control of the flight was subsequently transferred to LaGuardia Approach Control. When the flight was about over the Linden Intersection, LaGuardia Approach Control began vectoring TWA 266 by radar to the final approach course for a landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia. Shortly thereafter TWA 266 was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, and was twice advised of traffic in the vicinity on a northeasterly heading. Following the transmission of this information the radar targets appeared to merge on the LaGuardia Approach Control radar scope, and communications with TWA 266 were lost.United Air Lines Flight 826 operated routinely between Chicago and the New York area, contacting the New York ARTCC at 1012 Shortly thereafter the New York Center cleared UAL 826 to proceed from the Allentown, Pa., very high frequency omni directional radio range station (VOR) direct to the Robbinsville, New Jersey, VOR, and thence to the Preston Intersection via Victor Airway 123. At approximately 1021, UAL 826 contacted Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) to advise their company that the No. 2 receiver accessory unit was inoperative, which would indicate that one of the aircraft's two VHF radio navigational receivers was not functioning. A "fix" is established by the intersection of two radials from two separate radio range stations. With one unit inoperative the cross-bearings necessary can be taken by tuning the remaining receiver from one station to the other. This process consumes considerable time, however, and is not as accurate as the simultaneous display of information on two separate position deviation indicators While UAL 826 advised the company that one unit was inoperative, Air Traffic Control was not advised. At 1025 the New York ARTCC issued a clearance for a new routing which shortened the distance to Preston by approximately 11 miles. As a result, this reduced the amount of time available to the crew to retune the single radio receiver to either the Colt' s Neck, New Jersey, or Solberg, New Jersey, VOR in order to establish the cross-bearing with Victor 123, which would identify the Preston Intersection. In the event the crew would not attempt to retune the single VOR receiver, crossbearings on the Scotland Low Frequency Radiobeacon could be taken with the aircraft direction finding (ADF) equipment. This would be a means of identifying the Preston Intersection but, under the circumstances, would require rapid mental calculation in the interpretation of a display which could be easily misread. Several factors support the conclusion that this occurred. Instructions had been issued to UAL 826 for holding at the Preston Intersection the clearance limit, should holding be necessary. Clearance beyond Preston for an approach to Idlewild Airport would be received from Idlewild Approach Control and the transfer of control of the flight from the New York Center to Idlewild Approach Control would normally take place as the aircraft was approaching Preston. UAL 826 was not receiving radar vectors, but was providing its own navigation. After the flight reported passing through 6,000 feet the New York Center advised that radar service was terminated and instructed the flight to contact Idlewild Approach Control. UAL 826 then called Idlewild Approach Control, stating "United 826 approaching Preston at 5,000." This was the last known transmission from UAL 826. At the time UAL 826 advised it was approaching Preston it had in fact gone on by this clearance limit several seconds before and was several miles past the point at which it should have turned into the holding pattern. This is confirmed by the data obtained from the flight recorder which had been installed in the UAL DC-8, as well as by analysis of the communication tapes At a point approximately 11 miles past the Preston Intersection a collision occurred between TWA 266 and UAL 826. Weather at the altitude of the collision and at the time of the accident was such as to preclude flight by visual means.

The Electra scheduled as Flight 361 departed Boston at 0716LT with its destination St Louis, Missouri, and with a planned intermediate stop at LaGuardia Airport. About ten minutes prior to departure a crew change was made when a check pilot boarded the aircraft to flight-check the flight engineer. This check pilot, by mutual agreement with the crew and in accordance with existing company policy, took over the left or pilot-in-command seat with the previously assigned captain moving to the jump seat. The trip was routine until final approach at LaGuardia. On final approach, the airplane aircraft was too low and struck a dyke with its main landing gear and crash landed. Approximately half of the 76 persons on board suffered minor injuries or shock; no one was killed. The aircraft was severely damaged by impact forces and fire.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Calverton-Peconic River Airport, Long Island, New York. While approaching runway 23 at an altitude of 1,000 feet, the airplane yawed to the right, stalled and crashed in a field located three miles from the airport. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all five crew members were killed.

At approximately 2356LT, the aircraft crashed into the East River while attempting an instrument approach to runway 22 at LaGuardia Airport. There were 73 persons on board, including one infant. The captain and one stewardess were killed; the first officer, flight engineer, and the remaining stewardess survived. Of the 68 passengers, 5 survived. The Board believes that a premature descent below landing minimums was the result of preoccupation of the crew on particular aspects of the aircraft and its environment to the neglect of essential flight instrument references for attitude and height above the approach surface. Contributing factors were found to be: limited experience of the crew with the aircraft type, fealty approach technique in which the autopilot was used in the heading mode to or almost to the surface, erroneous setting of the captain's altimeter, marginal weather in the approach area, possible misinterpretation of altimeter and rate of descent indicator, and sensory illusion with respect to height and attitude resulting from visual reference to the few lights existing in the approach area.

The Viscount was parked at gate to board passengers when it was struck by a Seaboard & Western Airlines' Lockheed L-1049D Super Constellation which was performing training flight LN800 at Idlewild Airport. The Constellation began its takeoff run on runway 31R of the New York International Airport at 1100. When an airspeed of 117 knots (V 2) was reached, the aircraft became airborne and climbed to an altitude of approximately 25 feet. At this altitude severe control difficulty was encountered, causing the aircraft to veer suddenly to the left and the left wing to lower 20 to 30 degrees. This wing struck the runway and from this point on directional control of the aircraft was lost. The aircraft skidded In a westerly direction into a temporary terminal area and came to rest after striking the Viscount. All five crew members from the Constellation were injured while the Viscount was empty. Both aircraft were totally destroyed by fire.

Seaboard & Western's Flight LN-800, a training flight, began its takeoff run on runway 31R of the New York International Airport at 1100. When an airspeed of 117 knots (V 2) was reached, the aircraft became airborne and climbed to an altitude of approximately 25 feet. At this altitude severe control difficulty was encountered, causing the aircraft to veer suddenly to the left and the left wing to lower 20 to 30 degrees. This wing struck the runway and from this point on directional control of the aircraft was lost. The aircraft skidded In a westerly direction into a temporary terminal area and came to rest after striking a parked Trans Canada Air Lines Vickers 724 Viscount. All five crew members were injured while the Viscount was empty.

The crew as completing a local night training mission at Mitchel AFB. After touchdown, the airplane encountered difficulties to stop within the remaining distance, overran, went through a fence and a road, colliding with three cars before coming to rest. All four crew members were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. On the ground, one driver was killed while four other people were also injured.

Eastern Air Lines Flight 18 is a scheduled operation serving the carrier's route between New York City and Massena, New York, and its intermediate stops at Albany, Plattsburg, and Malone, New York. On November 14, at 1245, the flight originated on schedule, its flight crew consisting of Captain Joseph W. Harpham, First Officer Robert Casper and Flight Attendant Nancy A. Price. The flight followed routine preparation and was in accordance with an IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) flight plan. The general weather conditions over most of the route were forecast to be good. The flight proceeded through the intermediate stops in a routine manner, with most passengers deplaning at Albany and Flattsburg. Just prior to reaching Malone the instrument flight plan was canceled in good weather conditions. The flight landed at Malone at 1502. Continuing uneventfully, Flight 18 departed Malone at 1510. The gross takeoff weight of the Martin 404 was 35,977 pounds, 8,923 pounds under the maximum allowable. According to the load manifest the load was properly distributed within the center of gravity limitations. The first officer made the takeoff, climbed the aircraft approximately 2,500 feet, and flew it to Massena. Captain Harpham from his left seat, supervised the flight and performed the duties of copilot. At 1516, when about eight miles east of Richards Field, Captain Harpham reported the flight's position, then asked for and received landing information, which included the surface wind as “northeast 5 to 10 knots," and the active runway 4 (150 feet wide and 4,000 feet long). First Officer Casper established a downwind leg at 1,200 feet to execute a rectangular left-hand pattern for landing on runway 4. The flight was viewed briefly by ground observers during the pattern before reaching the final landing approach and it seemed entirely normal. As the aircraft drew closer to the threshold it seemed high and thereafter assumed an abnormally steep descent. As it approached the runway surface the aircraft assumed a flareout attitude, however, the rate of descent continued with little visible abatement. Consequently, N492A contacted the runway surface with great force at which time the right powerplant separated from the aircraft. The aircraft rebounded and again contacted with great force. It then rolled forward and gradually off the runway to the right. Before stopping it crossed a taxiway and the left powerplant fell free, accompanied by a small fire in the engine and the empty nacelle area. As the aircraft stopped Captain Harpham shut off the fuel and electrical services and ordered the loading ramp lowered. The passengers and crew quickly evacuated by this exit without difficulty or reported injury. At 1522, two minutes after the accident, weather conditions were reported as: Ceiling 4,000 feet broken, 10,000 feet, overcast; visibility 3 miles; haze; wind northeast 6 knots.

The approach to Binghamton Airport was completed at an insufficient altitude. On short final, the aircraft struck a concrete wall. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft crash landed. There were no casualties but the aircraft was written off.