New York

PAA 212 departed Dulles Airport at 2221 with the same crew of 9 and 136 passengers. The flight was conducted under instrument conditions and was routine until arrival in the New York area. At 2239 the New York Center controller transmitted the JFK weather to PAA 212. The runway visual range (RVR) on runway 4R at JFK was reported to be 1,600 feet. At 2250 JFK Approach Control established radar and radio contact with PAA 212 and advised: "Depart Colts Neck heading zero nine zero for vectors to the final approach course, Kennedy weather is three hundred thin broken, measured ceiling one thousand five hundred overcast, visibility one and one-half miles fog, and the runway visual range runway four right more than one thousand feet, standby." FAA 212 acknowledged the transmission. N779PA was restricted to landing Minimums of 300-foot ceiling and 3/4 mile visibility. The flight reported over the Colts Neck VOR at 2253 35 and was cleared to descend from 6,000 to 1,500 feet. Several vectors were given to position FAA 212 on the inbound heading to the Outer Marker (OM). At 2256.15 while on a heading of 040 degree, the crew reported reaching 1,500 feet, airspeed 180. Several delaying vectors were given to position the aircraft three and one-half miles behind a DC-8 which was landing ahead. At 2259.45 the JFK local controller transmitted to FAA 212: "Clipper two one two this is Kennedy Tower, report passing outer marker, straight in four right, wind calm, runway visual range, all aircraft copy, four right is more than six thousand." Prevailing visibility at the JFK Airport was less than three miles, therefore the Precision Approach Radar (PAR) Controller was monitoring all ILS approaches to runway 4R as prescribed by procedures. At 2301.10 the PAR controller advised, "Clipper two twelve, Kennedy radar on localizer one mile from outer marker course and glidepath OK." At 2301:40, PAA 212 reported passing the outer marker and the PAR controller advised, "Clipper two twelve two miles from touchdown." The local controller transmitted at 2301 45 "Clipper two one two, Kennedy Tower cleared to land four right, traffic will be clear in five seconds." PAR at 2302-10 advised "Clipper two twelve, Kennedy radar, execute a missed approach if you do not have the runway in sight." Immediately following this transmission, PAA 212 acknowledged "Uh. . . Roger two one two." The next radio transmission was at 2303:10 when the local controller called the flight but was unable to establish radio contact. After touchdown the aircraft continued down and off the runway across the asphalt overrun and through a sandy area before coming to rest in the shallow water of Thurston Basin approximately 800 feet from the far end of runway 4R. When the aircraft came to rest the crew proceeded aft to assist the passengers. The main forward (left) cabin door was opened and the passengers in this section of the aircraft left through this door. The passengers in the aft section left through the overwing exits onto the wings; and others left through the two rear doors and got into two life rafts that had been launched. Evacuation of the aft section of the aircraft was completed in approximately five minutes. After seats and debris had been removed from the first-class compartment aisle, some of the persons who had been in the aft section of the aircraft reentered the aircraft and left through the main forward cabin door. The aircraft broke in two and was written off. Among the 145 occupants, 40 were injured, seven of them seriously, and 105 other occupants were unhurt.

The four engine aircraft was performing a flight from Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, carrying eight crew members and aircraft equipment. On final approach to Calverton-Peconic River Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with rain showers and cross winds. By night, the airplane struck trees and crashed in flames in a wooded area located about a mile short of runway. Two crew members were seriously injured while six others were killed.
Those killed were:
Cpt Kyle Morris,
Cdr Robert Baker,
Lt Allen Able,
LT Ralph Stevens,
N. R. Seitz,
R. W. Caldwell.

A Mohawk Airlines, Inc., Martin 404, N449A, operating as Flight 112 from Rochester, New York, to Newark, New Jersey, crashed on the Rochester-Monroe County Airport July 2, 1963, at approximately 1649 e d t. Seven of the forty-three persons aboard, including both pilots, were fatally injured. Flight 112 commenced a takeoff on runway 28 as a thunderstorm approaching from the west-northwest, moved over the takeoff runway. After becoming airborne and almost immediately after entering heavy rain and shifting wind conditions, the left wing of the aircraft made contact with the ground. In the ensuing Cartwheel to a stop, the aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire.

Eastern Air Lines Flight 512, a Douglas DD-7B, N815D, crashed during an attempted go-around following an instrument approach to runway 4R at New York International Airport, at 2145 e.s.t., on November 30, 1962 Of the 51 persons aboard, 21 passengers, 3 crew members and an additional crew member occupying the jump seat did not survive. Flight 512, regularly scheduled from Charlotte, North Carolina, non-stop to New York International Airport, entered a fog condition near the threshold of runway 4R. A go-around was initiated; however, the aircraft struck the ground in a slightly nose-high attitude and was virtually destroyed by impact and subsequent fire.

Flight One was cleared for takeoff from Runway 31L on a regularly scheduled nonstop flight to Los Angeles, California, and became airborne at 1007 e.s.t. The takeoff and initial climb appeared to be normal and a gentle turn to the left was started about 8,000 feet down the runway near taxiway AA, at an altitude of about 100 feet. Straightening out from this turn the aircraft continued to climb for several seconds on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees, and started a second turn to the left, apparently in compliance with radar vector directions given by Departure Control. In the second turn the airplane continued to climb. After initiation of the second turn the angle of bank increased until the airplane rolled through 90 degrees of bank at a peak altitude of about 1,600 feet m.s.1. It then entered an inverted, nose-low attitude and plunged earthward in a nearly vertical dive. The airplane struck the shallow waters of Pumpkin Patch Channel of Jamaica Bay approximately three miles southwest of the Idlewild Control Tower at 1008:49 Floating debris and fuel ignited a few minutes later and burned fiercely. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and there were no survivors among the 95 occupants.

While taxiing at Idlewild Airport, preparing for a cargo flight to San Juan, one of the main gear collapsed. The aircraft sank on its belly and came to rest in flames. All three crew members were uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

The four engine aircraft departed Idlewild Airport at 1157LT with a crew of six and climbed along the shore of Long Island on a training mission. 23 minutes later, the airplane christened 'Flagship Oklahoma' banked left, entered a dive and eventually crashed into the ocean five miles off shore. Few debris were found off Montauk Point and all six crew members have been killed.

The first approximate 6,200 feet of takeoff roll was observed by control tower personnel, visually, until the aircraft was lost to view by obscuring snow, approximately 3,800 feet from the control tower. They stated that at that time the aircraft had not taken off or rotated. Another tower controller observed the aircraft by airport surface-detection *** radar from the start of its roll to the eastern end of runway 7R, where it disappeared from view. A few seconds later he observed a bright orange flash on the sky northeast of the airport. He could not tell if the aircraft left the runway. Emergency procedures were started immediately by the controllers and an unsuccessful attempt was made to contact the flight on the departure radio frequency. Captain Poe was the only survivor of the four cockpit occupants. He stated as follows: The checklist was accomplished normally. The runway condition was good and everything apparently occurred in a routine manner through the 100-knot time check when the first officer called out "***" (Spanish for 100). Upon reaching approximately 130 knots (the V1 speed) the first officer called out V1 and VR rapid succession. The aircraft was then rotated quickly and somewhat excessively. Poe did not see the airspeed go over 130 knots and as rotation started he saw the airspeed start to drop back quite rapidly to about 110 knots. At this time the Aeronaves captain called or pointed to the airspeed indicator. Poe felt that the aircraft could not become airborne under these conditions and that the runway remaining was not long enough to put the nose back down to start the takeoff again from that speed. His only choice, so he stated, was to try to get the aircraft stopped on the runway. Poe unfastened his safety belt, stood to gauge progress down the runway, moved forward, shoved the throttles forward briefly, noted a normal and uniform response from the engine instruments (the EPR gauges were reading normally from 2.52 to 2.54), and then pulled the throttles full back. Captain Gonzales "immediately" pulled the reverse throttles back into reverse thrust and used wheel brakes. Poe extended the spoilers and then sat down on the jump seat without refastening his seat belt. He believes that the aircraft did not take off Whether it did or not wall be discussed later in this report. Poe's actions would have taken about three seconds, an shown by later test. The aircraft continued ahead the full length of the 10,000-foot runway, beyond it, through a blast fence, 3 catching on fire, through the airport boundary fence, and across Rockaway Boulevard where it struck an automobile injuring the driver and sole occupant. After going through the blast fence, many parts were shed before the aircraft came to rest in flames 830 feet beyond the end of the runway. Emergency vehicles from the airport and of the New York Fire Department were quickly started for the scene. Although impeded somewhat by weather conditions, they reached it within about six minutes and extinguished the fire. Evacuation and rescue of the occupants had already been effected in a total time of about five minutes, although most persons were out of the wreckage and away from the fire site in half this time. Many of the survivors were taken to hospital in privately owned vehicles. Destruction of the aircraft was extensive.

On December 16, 1960, at 1033 e.s.t., a collision between Trans World Airlines Model 1049A Constellation, N6907C, and a United Air Lines DC-8, N8013U, occurred near Miller Army Air Field, Staten Island, New York. Trans World Airlines Flight 266 originated at Dayton, Ohio. The destination was LaGuardia Airport, New York, with one en route stop at Columbus, Ohio United Air Lines Flight 826 was a non-stop service originating at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, with its destination New York International Airport, New York. Both aircraft were operating under Instrument Flight Rules. Following the collision the Constellation fell on Miller Army Field, and the DC-8 continued in a northeasterly direction, crashing into Sterling place near Seventh Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Both aircraft were totally destroyed. All 128 occupants of both aircraft and 6 persons on the ground in Brooklyn were fatally injured. There was considerable damage to property in the area of the ground impact of the DC-8. TWA Flight 266 departed Port Columbus Airport at 0900, operating routinely under Air Traffic Control into the New York area The New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) subsequently advised that radar contact had been established and cleared the flight to the Linden. Intersection, Control of the flight was subsequently transferred to LaGuardia Approach Control. When the flight was about over the Linden Intersection, LaGuardia Approach Control began vectoring TWA 266 by radar to the final approach course for a landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia. Shortly thereafter TWA 266 was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, and was twice advised of traffic in the vicinity on a northeasterly heading. Following the transmission of this information the radar targets appeared to merge on the LaGuardia Approach Control radar scope, and communications with TWA 266 were lost. United Air Lines Flight 826 operated routinely between Chicago and the New York area, contacting the New York ARTCC at 1012 Shortly thereafter the New York Center cleared UAL 826 to proceed from the Allentown, Pa., very high frequency omni directional radio range station (VOR) direct to the Robbinsville, New Jersey, VOR, and thence to the Preston Intersection via Victor Airway 123. At approximately 1021, UAL 826 contacted Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) to advise their company that the No. 2 receiver accessory unit was inoperative, which would indicate that one of the aircraft's two VHF radio navigational receivers was not functioning. A "fix" is established by the intersection of two radials from two separate radio range stations. With one unit inoperative the cross-bearings necessary can be taken by tuning the remaining receiver from one station to the other. This process consumes considerable time, however, and is not as accurate as the simultaneous display of information on two separate position deviation indicators While UAL 826 advised the company that one unit was inoperative, Air Traffic Control was not advised. At 1025 the New York ARTCC issued a clearance for a new routing which shortened the distance to Preston by approximately 11 miles. As a result, this reduced the amount of time available to the crew to retune the single radio receiver to either the Colt' s Neck, New Jersey, or Solberg, New Jersey, VOR in order to establish the cross-bearing with Victor 123, which would identify the Preston Intersection. In the event the crew would not attempt to retune the single VOR receiver, crossbearings on the Scotland Low Frequency Radiobeacon could be taken with the aircraft direction finding (ADF) equipment. This would be a means of identifying the Preston Intersection but, under the circumstances, would require rapid mental calculation in the interpretation of a display which could be easily misread. Several factors support the conclusion that this occurred. Instructions had been issued to UAL 826 for holding at the Preston Intersection the clearance limit, should holding be necessary. Clearance beyond Preston for an approach to Idlewild Airport would be received from Idlewild Approach Control and the transfer of control of the flight from the New York Center to Idlewild Approach Control would normally take place as the aircraft was approaching Preston. UAL 826 was not receiving radar vectors, but was providing its own navigation. After the flight reported passing through 6,000 feet the New York Center advised that radar service was terminated and instructed the flight to contact Idlewild Approach Control. UAL 826 then called Idlewild Approach Control, stating "United 826 approaching Preston at 5,000." This was the last known transmission from UAL 826. At the time UAL 826 advised it was approaching Preston it had in fact gone on by this clearance limit several seconds before and was several miles past the point at which it should have turned into the holding pattern. This is confirmed by the data obtained from the flight recorder which had been installed in the UAL DC-8, as well as by analysis of the communication tapes At a point approximately 11 miles past the Preston Intersection a collision occurred between TWA 266 and UAL 826. Weather at the altitude of the collision and at the time of the accident was such as to preclude flight by visual means.

On December 16, 1960, at 1033 e.s.t., a collision between Trans World Airlines Model 1049A Constellation, N 6907C, and a United Air Lines DC-8, N 8013U, occurred near Miller Army Air Field, Staten Island, New York. Trans World Airlines Flight 266 originated at Dayton, Ohio. The destination was LaGuardia Airport, New York, with one en route stop at Columbus, Ohio United Air Lines Flight 826 was a non-stop service originating at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, with its destination New York International Airport, New York. Both aircraft were operating under Instrument Flight Rules. Following the collision the Constellation fell on Miller Army Field, and the DC-8 continued in a northeasterly direction, crashing into Sterling place near Seventh Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Both aircraft were totally destroyed. All 128 occupants of both aircraft and 6 persons on the ground in Brooklyn were fatally injured. There was considerable damage to property in the area of the ground impact of the DC-8. TWA Flight 266 departed Port Columbus Airport at 0900, operating routinely under Air Traffic Control into the New York area The New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) subsequently advised that radar contact had been established and cleared the flight to the Linden. Intersection, Control of the flight was subsequently transferred to LaGuardia Approach Control. When the flight was about over the Linden Intersection, LaGuardia Approach Control began vectoring TWA 266 by radar to the final approach course for a landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia. Shortly thereafter TWA 266 was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, and was twice advised of traffic in the vicinity on a northeasterly heading. Following the transmission of this information the radar targets appeared to merge on the LaGuardia Approach Control radar scope, and communications with TWA 266 were lost.United Air Lines Flight 826 operated routinely between Chicago and the New York area, contacting the New York ARTCC at 1012 Shortly thereafter the New York Center cleared UAL 826 to proceed from the Allentown, Pa., very high frequency omni directional radio range station (VOR) direct to the Robbinsville, New Jersey, VOR, and thence to the Preston Intersection via Victor Airway 123. At approximately 1021, UAL 826 contacted Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) to advise their company that the No. 2 receiver accessory unit was inoperative, which would indicate that one of the aircraft's two VHF radio navigational receivers was not functioning. A "fix" is established by the intersection of two radials from two separate radio range stations. With one unit inoperative the cross-bearings necessary can be taken by tuning the remaining receiver from one station to the other. This process consumes considerable time, however, and is not as accurate as the simultaneous display of information on two separate position deviation indicators While UAL 826 advised the company that one unit was inoperative, Air Traffic Control was not advised. At 1025 the New York ARTCC issued a clearance for a new routing which shortened the distance to Preston by approximately 11 miles. As a result, this reduced the amount of time available to the crew to retune the single radio receiver to either the Colt' s Neck, New Jersey, or Solberg, New Jersey, VOR in order to establish the cross-bearing with Victor 123, which would identify the Preston Intersection. In the event the crew would not attempt to retune the single VOR receiver, crossbearings on the Scotland Low Frequency Radiobeacon could be taken with the aircraft direction finding (ADF) equipment. This would be a means of identifying the Preston Intersection but, under the circumstances, would require rapid mental calculation in the interpretation of a display which could be easily misread. Several factors support the conclusion that this occurred. Instructions had been issued to UAL 826 for holding at the Preston Intersection the clearance limit, should holding be necessary. Clearance beyond Preston for an approach to Idlewild Airport would be received from Idlewild Approach Control and the transfer of control of the flight from the New York Center to Idlewild Approach Control would normally take place as the aircraft was approaching Preston. UAL 826 was not receiving radar vectors, but was providing its own navigation. After the flight reported passing through 6,000 feet the New York Center advised that radar service was terminated and instructed the flight to contact Idlewild Approach Control. UAL 826 then called Idlewild Approach Control, stating "United 826 approaching Preston at 5,000." This was the last known transmission from UAL 826. At the time UAL 826 advised it was approaching Preston it had in fact gone on by this clearance limit several seconds before and was several miles past the point at which it should have turned into the holding pattern. This is confirmed by the data obtained from the flight recorder which had been installed in the UAL DC-8, as well as by analysis of the communication tapes At a point approximately 11 miles past the Preston Intersection a collision occurred between TWA 266 and UAL 826. Weather at the altitude of the collision and at the time of the accident was such as to preclude flight by visual means.