New York

Eastern Air Lines, Flight EA 663 was a scheduled passenger flight originating at Boston, MA (BOS), and terminating at Atlanta, GA (ATL) with intermediate stops at New York (JFK), Richmond, VA (RIC), Charlotte, NC (CLT), and Greenville-Spartanburg, SC (GSP). The DC-7B took off from runway 31L at New York-JFK at 18:20 on an IFR clearance to the Richmond Airport. The crew flew a Dutch 7 Standard Instrument Departure. About 18:24 EAL 663 was further cleared to 8,000 feet and instructed to turn right to a heading of 150 degrees. The flight acknowledged this clearance and reported leaving 3,000 feet. Shortly thereafter the crew reported leaving 3,500 feet at which time the flight was instructed to turn left to a heading of 090 degrees. At 18:25, while climbing through 3700 feet Departure Control instructed the flight to "... turn right now, heading one seven zero to Victor one thirty nine, traffic 2 o'clock five miles northeast bound below you." The flight responded, "OK we have the traffic, turning one seven zero..." The other traffic was Pan American flight 212 arriving from San Juan. The Boeing 707 was being vectored to intercept the final approach course to runway 31R. At approximately 18:24 Approach Control had instructed the PA212 to turn right to a heading of 020 degrees and inquired if the flight had as yet, reached 3,000 feet. Approach Control then instructed the flight to report leaving each 500-foot level down to 3,000 feet and advised the flight of " ...Traffic at 11 O'clock, six miles southeast bound just climbing out of three (3,000 feet)." As the Eastern DC-7 was turning from 090 to 170 degrees, the airplane was in a 35-degree banked nearly level turn. With PA212 approx. 700 feet lower and four miles away at 3 o'clock, PA212 would not be visible to the captain of EA663 until he was nearly around the turn and on the rollout. Upon completion of the turn, they were on a nearly head-on, converging course with PA212. At that moment, PA212 started a left turn to the assigned heading of 360 degrees. The results of this turn would be to produce an illusion of an apparent collision track. Also, EA663 was turning away from the background lights of the Long Island shore into a black area, so there was no horizon available to assist in the determination of the relative altitude of the target airplane. Under these circumstances, it is likely that the Eastern pilot started a descent, initially as a precautionary measure, which would give him a longer time to observe the other aircraft, and provide him with a measure of vertical separation. Afraid of a collision, PA212 rolled rapidly to the right and also initiated a descent. The Eastern pilot also made a rapid roll to the right and/or a pull up. In this circumstance the DC-7 was placed in an unusual attitude, resulting in spatial disorientation of the crew. They were not able to recover from the vertical bank. The DC-7 struck the sea and disintegrated.

En route, control was lost. The twin engine aircraft went into a dive and crashed in a pasture. Both occupants were killed.

PAA 212 departed Dulles Airport at 2221 with the same crew of 9 and 136 passengers. The flight was conducted under instrument conditions and was routine until arrival in the New York area. At 2239 the New York Center controller transmitted the JFK weather to PAA 212. The runway visual range (RVR) on runway 4R at JFK was reported to be 1,600 feet. At 2250 JFK Approach Control established radar and radio contact with PAA 212 and advised: "Depart Colts Neck heading zero nine zero for vectors to the final approach course, Kennedy weather is three hundred thin broken, measured ceiling one thousand five hundred overcast, visibility one and one-half miles fog, and the runway visual range runway four right more than one thousand feet, standby." FAA 212 acknowledged the transmission. N779PA was restricted to landing Minimums of 300-foot ceiling and 3/4 mile visibility. The flight reported over the Colts Neck VOR at 2253 35 and was cleared to descend from 6,000 to 1,500 feet. Several vectors were given to position FAA 212 on the inbound heading to the Outer Marker (OM). At 2256.15 while on a heading of 040 degree, the crew reported reaching 1,500 feet, airspeed 180. Several delaying vectors were given to position the aircraft three and one-half miles behind a DC-8 which was landing ahead. At 2259.45 the JFK local controller transmitted to FAA 212: "Clipper two one two this is Kennedy Tower, report passing outer marker, straight in four right, wind calm, runway visual range, all aircraft copy, four right is more than six thousand." Prevailing visibility at the JFK Airport was less than three miles, therefore the Precision Approach Radar (PAR) Controller was monitoring all ILS approaches to runway 4R as prescribed by procedures. At 2301.10 the PAR controller advised, "Clipper two twelve, Kennedy radar on localizer one mile from outer marker course and glidepath OK." At 2301:40, PAA 212 reported passing the outer marker and the PAR controller advised, "Clipper two twelve two miles from touchdown." The local controller transmitted at 2301 45 "Clipper two one two, Kennedy Tower cleared to land four right, traffic will be clear in five seconds." PAR at 2302-10 advised "Clipper two twelve, Kennedy radar, execute a missed approach if you do not have the runway in sight." Immediately following this transmission, PAA 212 acknowledged "Uh. . . Roger two one two." The next radio transmission was at 2303:10 when the local controller called the flight but was unable to establish radio contact. After touchdown the aircraft continued down and off the runway across the asphalt overrun and through a sandy area before coming to rest in the shallow water of Thurston Basin approximately 800 feet from the far end of runway 4R. When the aircraft came to rest the crew proceeded aft to assist the passengers. The main forward (left) cabin door was opened and the passengers in this section of the aircraft left through this door. The passengers in the aft section left through the overwing exits onto the wings; and others left through the two rear doors and got into two life rafts that had been launched. Evacuation of the aft section of the aircraft was completed in approximately five minutes. After seats and debris had been removed from the first-class compartment aisle, some of the persons who had been in the aft section of the aircraft reentered the aircraft and left through the main forward cabin door. The aircraft broke in two and was written off. Among the 145 occupants, 40 were injured, seven of them seriously, and 105 other occupants were unhurt.

The four engine aircraft was performing a flight from Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, carrying eight crew members and aircraft equipment. On final approach to Calverton-Peconic River Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with rain showers and cross winds. By night, the airplane struck trees and crashed in flames in a wooded area located about a mile short of runway. Two crew members were seriously injured while six others were killed.
Those killed were:
Cpt Kyle Morris,
Cdr Robert Baker,
Lt Allen Able,
LT Ralph Stevens,
N. R. Seitz,
R. W. Caldwell.

A Mohawk Airlines, Inc., Martin 404, N449A, operating as Flight 112 from Rochester, New York, to Newark, New Jersey, crashed on the Rochester-Monroe County Airport July 2, 1963, at approximately 1649 e d t. Seven of the forty-three persons aboard, including both pilots, were fatally injured. Flight 112 commenced a takeoff on runway 28 as a thunderstorm approaching from the west-northwest, moved over the takeoff runway. After becoming airborne and almost immediately after entering heavy rain and shifting wind conditions, the left wing of the aircraft made contact with the ground. In the ensuing Cartwheel to a stop, the aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire.

Eastern Air Lines Flight 512, a Douglas DD-7B, N815D, crashed during an attempted go-around following an instrument approach to runway 4R at New York International Airport, at 2145 e.s.t., on November 30, 1962 Of the 51 persons aboard, 21 passengers, 3 crew members and an additional crew member occupying the jump seat did not survive. Flight 512, regularly scheduled from Charlotte, North Carolina, non-stop to New York International Airport, entered a fog condition near the threshold of runway 4R. A go-around was initiated; however, the aircraft struck the ground in a slightly nose-high attitude and was virtually destroyed by impact and subsequent fire.

Flight One was cleared for takeoff from Runway 31L on a regularly scheduled nonstop flight to Los Angeles, California, and became airborne at 1007 e.s.t. The takeoff and initial climb appeared to be normal and a gentle turn to the left was started about 8,000 feet down the runway near taxiway AA, at an altitude of about 100 feet. Straightening out from this turn the aircraft continued to climb for several seconds on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees, and started a second turn to the left, apparently in compliance with radar vector directions given by Departure Control. In the second turn the airplane continued to climb. After initiation of the second turn the angle of bank increased until the airplane rolled through 90 degrees of bank at a peak altitude of about 1,600 feet m.s.1. It then entered an inverted, nose-low attitude and plunged earthward in a nearly vertical dive. The airplane struck the shallow waters of Pumpkin Patch Channel of Jamaica Bay approximately three miles southwest of the Idlewild Control Tower at 1008:49 Floating debris and fuel ignited a few minutes later and burned fiercely. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and there were no survivors among the 95 occupants.

While taxiing at Idlewild Airport, preparing for a cargo flight to San Juan, one of the main gear collapsed. The aircraft sank on its belly and came to rest in flames. All three crew members were uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

The four engine aircraft departed Idlewild Airport at 1157LT with a crew of six and climbed along the shore of Long Island on a training mission. 23 minutes later, the airplane christened 'Flagship Oklahoma' banked left, entered a dive and eventually crashed into the ocean five miles off shore. Few debris were found off Montauk Point and all six crew members have been killed.

The first approximate 6,200 feet of takeoff roll was observed by control tower personnel, visually, until the aircraft was lost to view by obscuring snow, approximately 3,800 feet from the control tower. They stated that at that time the aircraft had not taken off or rotated. Another tower controller observed the aircraft by airport surface-detection *** radar from the start of its roll to the eastern end of runway 7R, where it disappeared from view. A few seconds later he observed a bright orange flash on the sky northeast of the airport. He could not tell if the aircraft left the runway. Emergency procedures were started immediately by the controllers and an unsuccessful attempt was made to contact the flight on the departure radio frequency. Captain Poe was the only survivor of the four cockpit occupants. He stated as follows: The checklist was accomplished normally. The runway condition was good and everything apparently occurred in a routine manner through the 100-knot time check when the first officer called out "***" (Spanish for 100). Upon reaching approximately 130 knots (the V1 speed) the first officer called out V1 and VR rapid succession. The aircraft was then rotated quickly and somewhat excessively. Poe did not see the airspeed go over 130 knots and as rotation started he saw the airspeed start to drop back quite rapidly to about 110 knots. At this time the Aeronaves captain called or pointed to the airspeed indicator. Poe felt that the aircraft could not become airborne under these conditions and that the runway remaining was not long enough to put the nose back down to start the takeoff again from that speed. His only choice, so he stated, was to try to get the aircraft stopped on the runway. Poe unfastened his safety belt, stood to gauge progress down the runway, moved forward, shoved the throttles forward briefly, noted a normal and uniform response from the engine instruments (the EPR gauges were reading normally from 2.52 to 2.54), and then pulled the throttles full back. Captain Gonzales "immediately" pulled the reverse throttles back into reverse thrust and used wheel brakes. Poe extended the spoilers and then sat down on the jump seat without refastening his seat belt. He believes that the aircraft did not take off Whether it did or not wall be discussed later in this report. Poe's actions would have taken about three seconds, an shown by later test. The aircraft continued ahead the full length of the 10,000-foot runway, beyond it, through a blast fence, 3 catching on fire, through the airport boundary fence, and across Rockaway Boulevard where it struck an automobile injuring the driver and sole occupant. After going through the blast fence, many parts were shed before the aircraft came to rest in flames 830 feet beyond the end of the runway. Emergency vehicles from the airport and of the New York Fire Department were quickly started for the scene. Although impeded somewhat by weather conditions, they reached it within about six minutes and extinguished the fire. Evacuation and rescue of the occupants had already been effected in a total time of about five minutes, although most persons were out of the wreckage and away from the fire site in half this time. Many of the survivors were taken to hospital in privately owned vehicles. Destruction of the aircraft was extensive.