Missouri

The instrument-rated pilot departed Springfield, MO, at night on a VFR flight to Mt Vernon, MO. After taking off from runway 20, a right turn was made for a climb to 3,000 feet. Shortly thereafter, tower personnel lost radar contact with the aircraft and notified the FAA regional operation center. The aircraft crashed about 7 miles southwest of the airport. A witness reported seeing an aircraft descend out of low clouds in the area, but did not see the actual crash. An investigation revealed the aircraft crashed on an easterly heading, while at a high rate of speed. Impact occurred in a left wing down, nose low attitude. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of the aircraft was found. Also, no record of a preflight weather briefing was found. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was en route at 31,000 feet, when the low pressure fuel filter warning light illuminated. The pilot diverted toward Columbia, MO, but before reaching Columbia, both engines lost power. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed about 2 miles east of the airport. An investigation revealed the fuel was contaminated with water. The fuel filter deicing system was operational, but a post-accident examination revealed the deicing tank was empty. This was the 2nd flight since the deice tank had been serviced. The manufacturer's info indicated the supply tank should have provided about 3 to 4 hours of filter deicing operation. One of the pilots was killed.

The cargo flight departed Cincinnati en route to Wichita, KS with an intermediate stop at Kansas City Downtown Airport. The flight progressed normally to a VOR runway 03 instrument approach, circling to runway 01. The pic had been cleared to commence the approach. Tower personnel subsequently advised the pic of a low altitude alert, to which the pic responded he had ground contact. The pic subsequently declared a missed approach, then said, 'I got it all right,' and he requested a 360° turn and landing on runway 01. Witnesses observed the aircraft approach from the west at a low altitude. Then, while over airport property, the aircraft turned sharply. The left wing dropped quickly as the aircraft banked nearly 90°. The aircraft impacted the ramp area 400 feet right of runway 01, in front of a fixed base operator and burst into flames. The aircraft slid about 200 feet before coming to a stop. The company chief pilot stated that the pic was deficient in VOR approaches. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot received a weather briefing before starting a night cargo operation in known icing conditions. Before the flight, a line serviceman noticed ice on the aircraft's wings and suggested its removal, but the pilot declined. Approximately 45 minutes after takeoff, the pilot reported to ARTCC that a de-ice boot had 'blown' and he was having difficulty controlling the aircraft. He said the boot was 'going back and forth' and that full right aileron was required to keep the wings level. Also, he reported a continuous loss of altitude and said that full right aileron would not keep the aircraft from turning to the left. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed on descending terrain while in a slightly nose down, left wing low attitude. Much of the aircraft (including much of the left wing) was demolished by impact and fire. Prop slash marks indicated the engines were providing power. Maintenance records had no information of replacement, repair or modification of the de-ice boots in the previous 10 years. The pilot's wife indicated he had previously been pressured to fly aircraft with discrepancies. Sigmets golf 3 and 4 warned of occasional severe mixed icing in clouds and precipitations. Both occupants were killed.

The passenger said that the approach appeared normal until the pilot turned on the landing lights while in the overcast. Seconds after, the aircraft impacted trees, careening out of control, and snapping power lines; then striking a house roof before coming to rest on the ground. The airplane began to burn as it went through the power lines. The weather at the time was at or above IFR landing minimums. The flight had been in a holding pattern for forty five minutes prior to commencing the approach. All of the aircraft's systems and powerplants, as well as the FAA approach facilities, were determined to be in working order. The pilot was killed and all three passengers were seriously injured.

The captain stated that he had planned the approach at a higher-than-normal airspeed and altitude due to a reported low level windshear. At 400 feet agl the aircraft entered a light downdraft but the crew corrected the descent profile with power. At 200 feet agl the aircraft suddenly, according to the captain, pitched down before impacting the runway. Witnesses stated that the aircraft pitched down on short final, leveled off, then slammed onto the runway on all wheels. It then bounced, pitched down again and impacted the runway nose-first. A subsequent inspection, operational test, and teardown of the airplane's stall protection system found it to be functioning satisfactorily. The two powerplants also tested within normal parameters.

Buffalo Airways flight 721, a regularly scheduled cargo flight, was operating between Oklahoma City, OK, and Fort Wayne, IN (FWA), with en route stops at Wichita, KS (ICT), and Kansas City, MO (MCI). The flight to Wichita was routine. En route to Kansas City, the crew deviated from course to avoid thunderstorms, but the descent into the terminal area was routine. At 21:42 flight 721 contacted the TRACON arrival radar controller. The controller directed the flight to turn to 060 degrees and told the flightcrew that they were being vectored to the ILS localizer for the ILS approach to runway 1. About 21:47 while the airplane was descending through about 6,500 feet, the first officer, who had been flying the airplane, turned the controls over to the captain. Buffalo Airways' regulations required captains to make all the approaches and landings whenever the ceilings and visibilities were less than 400 feet and 1 mile, respectively. At 21:50, after several intermediate descent clearances, flight 721 was cleared to descend to 2,400 feet. At 21:51, the controller told flight 721 that it was "five miles from DOTTE (the LOM), turn left zero four zero, maintain two thousand four hundred until established, cleared ILS runway one approach." The crew had completed the before-landing checklist, the landing gear was down and locked, and the flaps had been extended to 25 degrees, as required, for landing. At 21:52:40, the local controller advised flight 721 that it was No. 2 to land and that the winds were zero four zero at eight knots, and that the RVR on runway 1 was more than 6,000 feet. At 21:52:47, the first officer stated, "Localizer alive." The first office reported the airplane's altitude during the descent in 100-foot increments above "minimums (DH)" until the airplane reached the decision height. At 21:53:07, the first officer called, "Marker inbound." The flightcrew then received ATIS information "Sierra" which stated that the weather at the airport was in part: ceiling--100 feet, overcast; visibility 1/2 mile, fog; wind 40° at 8 knots. At 21:53:24, the captain remarked, "Already started the approach." At 21:53:32, 4 seconds after reporting that the airplane was 200 feet above minimums, the first officer told the local controller that, "Seven twenty-one is the marker inbound." The local controller acknowledged receipt of the message. At 21:53:41, after receiving a low-altitude alert generated by the Automated Radar Tracking System III (ARTS III) computer's Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) function, the local controller warned flight 721 to "check altitude immediately should be two thousand four hundred, altimeter two nine six one." Flight 721 did not respond. However, the captain said "Call the radar (radio) altimeter please." At 21:53:46, the first officer responded, "Okay, there's twelve hundred on the (radio) altimeter." At 21:53:50, the local controller again called the flight and warned, "I have a low altitude alert, climb and maintain two thousand four hundred." Again, the flightcrew did not acknowledge receipt of the warning. At 21:53:51, a crewmember called out "pull it up," and at 2153:52, the captain applied power followed almost simultaneously by sounds of initial impact. Flight 721 struck the tops of trees on a 950-foot-high ridge about 3 nmi short of the approach end of runway 1. The airplane cut a relatively level 750- to 800-foot-long swath through the tree tops about 20 to 30 feet above the ground. The swath ended as the ridge and tree tops sloped downward. The airplane then rolled and turned to the right as it descended into the main impact area 2,000 feet beyond the initial impact site. All four occupants were killed.

The two aircraft, a Beech U-21A and a Piper PA-31-350, collided nearly head on at 7,000 feet msl over Independence, MO. In daylight VMC conditions with a visibility of 20 miles. The U-21 was in level cruise and the PA-31 was climbing eastbound to an undisclosed altitude enroute to Saint Louis. Both aircraft were equipped with operating mode-c transponders but the controller in contact with the U-21 did not observe the conflict and traffic advisories were not provided. The PA-31 was operating in accordance with visual flight rules. The U-21 was operating in accordance with instrument flight rules. After the collision both aircraft crashed in uncontrolled descent. There was no indication that either aircraft took any evasive action. The conflict alert subprogram of the ARTS III tracking system was not programmed to alert the controllers to the impending collision and the two controllers did not observe any target in the vicinity of the data block representing the U-21. All six occupants in both aircraft were killed.

The two aircraft, a Beech U-21A and a Piper PA-31-350, collided nearly head on at 7,000 feet msl over Independence, MO. In daylight VMC conditions with a visibility of 20 miles. The U-21 was in level cruise and the PA-31 was climbing eastbound to an undisclosed altitude enroute to Saint Louis. Both aircraft were equipped with operating mode-c transponders but the controller in contact with the U-21 did not observe the conflict and traffic advisories were not provided. The PA-31 was operating in accordance with visual flight rules. The U-21 was operating in accordance with instrument flight rules. After the collision both aircraft crashed in uncontrolled descent. There was no indication that either aircraft took any evasive action. The conflict alert subprogram of the ARTS III tracking system was not programmed to alert the controllers to the impending collision and the two controllers did not observe any target in the vicinity of the data block representing the U-21. All six occupants in both aircraft were killed.

The aircraft was on a night instructional flight with 2 multi-engine instructor pilots at the controls and a rated pilot occupying a rear passenger seat. The right front seat occupant was an experienced multi-engine pilot with 110 hours in this make and model; however, his 2nd class medical certificate was issued in January 1983. The left front seat occupant had just received his multi-engine instructor rating and had only 3 hours in this make and model. He had a current medical certificate and was presumed to be the pilot-in-command. The aircrew made 2 passes over runway 18, then maneuvered onto a downwind leg of the pattern. According to witnesses, the aircraft was northeast of the airport at approximately 300 to 400 feet agl and maneuvering back toward the runway when it entered a steep descent, crashed and burned. The aircraft crashed northeast of the airport in a wooded area. Impact occurred on a southerly heading in about an 18° dive. No preimpact part failure/malfunction was found; however, the aircraft was extensively damaged during impact. Toxicological checks of the passenger and right front seat occupants showed each had an alcohol level of 1,17‰. No alcohol found in the left front seat occupant's blood. All three occupants were killed.