Colorado

The pilot and two mechanics were on a maintenance test flight. As the aircraft was on a straight-in approach to runway 11 from the west, the pilot was advised of traffic ahead and told to slow his speed as much as possible. The pilot acknowledged. About 15 seconds later, the controller told the pilot (of N63XL) to make a 360° turn to the left for spacing. Shortly hereafter, witnesses observed the aircraft enter a steep bank (turn), then go into a steep spiraling, nose down, descent and crash. No preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure of the aircraft or engines was found. All three occupants were killed.

During flight, crew shut down the right engine when warning light for gearbox oil pressure illuminated and pressure was noted below minimum limit of 130 psi. Shortly after securing right engine, left engine lost power (fuel tank shutoff valve switch and fuel crossfeed valve switch were located near each other). Attempts to restart left engine were unsuccessful. With lack of alternative current electrical power, captain could not unfeather right engine for restart. During emergency landing, aircraft was damaged on uneven terrain. Operational check of right engine (at ground level) revealed no malfunction that would have prevented normal operation. Examination of left engine revealed turbine section had overheated and turbine blades had severe heat damage. Captain said that when he tried to restart left engine, fuel valves were in normal position and power lever was 1' above idle. He recalled an engine rpm of 8000, but didn't recall if he had used feather button to reduce rpm to 3000 (as directed by checklist). He verified fuel switches were 'on' and he tried to crossfeed fuel (in event of blockage). Cross feeding of fuel was not part of restart procedure. Flight manual cautioned about importance of reducing power to flight idle, to decrease fuel flow to engine and minimize possible overheating.

Pilot said he encountered severe to extreme turbulence upon reaching missed approach point and felt aircraft might stall if he began immediate right turn as called for in missed approach procedure. Pilot said he made left turn at 15 DME (missed approach point is at 11.5 DME) because there was higher terrain to right. Aircraft collided with trees on mountain 3 miles east of airport. Weather analysis indicated potential for light to moderate turbulence but not severe to extreme turbulence. Pilots landing and departing airport prior to and after accident reported light to moderate chop. Radar showed aircraft speed at 183.1 kts between iaf and faf. Between faf and missed approach point, aircraft speed was 95.7 kts. Pilot said he referred to current commercial instrument approach chart while executing approach. Only obsolete government instrument approach book was found in aircraft. Radios were not tuned to missed approach navaids. Pilot-rated passenger said pilot panicked after encountering turbulence.

The pilot was on a flight from Greeley to Denver, Colorado to obtain minor maintenance on a cargo door. As the aircraft was being vectored on final approach, the pilot reported that he believed the aircraft had fuel starvation. Subsequently, the aircraft was observed to make a complete roll and crash in a residential area. Only about 1.5 gallon of fuel was found in the right wing tank. The left wing and fuel tank were destroyed, but no odor of fuel was noted on the ground around the left wing. Also, a lack of fuel was noted in the fuel lines. The aircraft had not been refueled after the previous flight. The pilot that had flown the aircraft on a previous flight estimated there was 100 lbs of fuel remaining in each tank after his flight.

After making an IFR approach, the pilot made a go-around because he was blinded by the reflection of the landing/taxi lights against the falling snow. The pilot landed the aircraft after the second approach. The pilot said he sensed the aircraft drifting to the left and he tried to correct, but it collided with a snow bank. The investigation disclosed no evidence of aircraft hydroplaning or skidding. Airport management elected to delay plowing the runway for fear of it freezing over. Passengers claimed there was 2-3 inches of snow on top of a 3/4- inch layer of slush. Further investigation revealed that the runway lights were of various intensities because some unapproved light bulbs of different amperage were used. The runway was not equipped with centerline lighting. The painted white centerline stripe was covered by snow and slush.

The aircraft was operating as Continental Express flight 2286. During the approach in IFR conditions, the aircraft went below the minimum descent altitude then struck the terrain at 7,180 feet msl. Examination of the aircraft did not disclose any pre-impact failures or system malfunctions. The evidence indicated that the copilot was flying the airplane during the approach. Evaluation of the radar data showed an excessive rate of descent before the collision with terrain. Postmortem toxicological examination showed that the captain had used cocaine prior to this flight. The safety board concluded that this use had adversely affected his ability to monitor the unstabilized approach flown by the copilot. Records of both crewmembers revealed prior traffic violations and accidents, and, in the case of the captain, a previous aircraft accident. Evaluation of the weather conditions indicated that a 10 to 15 knot tailwind condition existed throughout the approach.

The pilot obtained two weather briefings and filed an IFR flight plan to El Paso, TX. He was not instrument rated. The aircraft departed Englewood at 1959 and disappeared from radar at 2010. The crash site was 11- 1/2 miles southeast of the Kiowa vortac and 36 miles southeast of Englewood. Radar showed a 15-miles wide band of snow showers southeast of the Kiowa vortac. Ground witnesses reported blizzard conditions. Pilot medical certificate stated, 'not valid for night flight or by color control.' Pilot autopsy also disclosed 'myxomatous alteration of the mitral valve, consistent with mitral valve prolapse (floppy mitral valve).' Both occupants were killed.

During a visual approach, the pilot said he encountered 2,000 fpm downdrafts. The pilot stated he added power and executed a normal approach at 120 knots, compensating for downdrafts/crosswinds. After touchdown, the pilot said he did not get a beta light on the right engine. He stated he brought the power levers 'behind the gate into reverse.' The aircraft drifted left. The pilot said he corrected with brakes and nosewheel steering. He applied takeoff power and the aircraft veered right, and ran off the right side of the runway. The aircraft collided with a dirt bank and then trees. Three tire skid marks were observed on the right side of the runway. A pilot-witness said winds were gusting 22-25 knots, variable from 130-220°. He said the aircraft landed fast and long. Examination of the engines and props revealed no evidence of malfunction. The engine manufacturer recommends prop reverse not be used on icy runway or when beta light on one engine does not illuminate. The aircraft manufacturer advises that nosewheel steering should not be used at speeds below 40 knots. All six occupants were injured, two seriously.

Weather conditions were moderate snow and freezing temperatures. Following a 27 minute delay between deicing and departure, on takeoff the aircraft was over-rotated by the first officer. Aircraft control was lost, the aircraft stalled and impacted off the right side of the runway. Company procedures called for repeat deicing when in icing conditions if a delay exceeds 20 minutes. Confusion between the tower and the flight crew due to procedural errors resulted in the delayed takeoff clearance. Both pilots were inexperienced in their respective crew positions. The captain had 33 hours experience as a DC-9 captain. The first officer had 36 hours jet experience, all in the DC-9. First officer demonstrated weak scan in training and had pilot performance problems with previous employers. First officer was on reserve, and had not flown for 24 days. The trip was assigned to the first officer for proficiency. Flight was first officer's 2nd trip as DC-9 first officer. Wing vortices from a landing aircraft on a parallel runway were not a factor in the accident.

The aircraft crashed on the side of a mountain during visual meteorological conditions. The pilot had been in voice and radar contact with air traffic control until the aircraft disappeared from radar. The pilot reported severe turbulence and a rough running engine to ATC as he was nearing a mountain pass. The pilot stated that he thought the rough running engine was due to fuel contamination. A witness reported that the pilot had said the fuel had contained a lot of water. The pilot reported to ATC that he had just lost the engine and he was attempting to make it through a saddle. A sigmet had been issued for that region and the severe turbulence was confirmed by another pilot. Engine teardown revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical failure/malfunction.