Telluride

The pilots were conducting an international chartered flight in the small, twin-engine jet with five passengers onboard. Since the weather at the destination was marginal, the flight crew had discussed an alternate airport in case weather conditions required a missed approach at their destination. As the airplane neared the non-towered destination airport, the flight crew received updated weather information, which indicated that conditions had improved. Upon contacting the center controller, the crew was asked if they had the weather and NOTAMS for the destination airport. The crew reported that they received the current weather information, but did not state if they had NOTAM information. The controller responded by giving the flight a heading for the descent and sequence into the airport. The controller did not provide NOTAM information to the pilots. About 2 minutes later, airport personnel entered a NOTAM via computer closing the runway, effective immediately, for snow removal. Although the NOTAM was electronically routed to the controller, the controller's system was not designed to automatically alert the controller of a new NOTAM; the controller needed to select a display screen on the equipment that contained the information. At the time of the accident, the controller's workload was considered heavy. About 8 minutes after the runway closure NOTAM was issued, the controller cleared the airplane for the approach. The flight crew then canceled their instrument flight plan with the airport in sight, but did not subsequently transmit on or monitor the airport's common traffic advisory frequency, which was reportedly being monitored by airport personnel and the snow removal equipment operator. The airplane landed on the runway and collided with a snow removal vehicle about halfway down the runway. The flight crew reported they did not see the snow removal equipment. The accident scenario is consistent with the controllers not recognizing new NOTAM information in a timely manner due to equipment limitations, and the pilots not transmitting or monitoring the common traffic advisory frequency. Additionally, the accident identifies a potential problem for flight crews when information critical to inflight decision-making changes while en route, and problems when controller workload interferes with information monitoring and dissemination.

The airplane and two-person crew departed on a positioning flight. The pilot-in-command was not flying the airplane and sat in the right seat. The second-in-command was the pilot flying and sat in the left seat. The accident occurred on the second attempt to land at the destination airport on a snow-covered runway. While descending for the airport, the pilot not flying the airplane called the runway in sight. After assessing that they were too high the pilot not flying convinced the pilot flying to circle the airplane down to land on the runway. Circling at speeds greater than allowed by the approach categories, the crew performed a 360-degree turn to align themselves with the runway. The pilot flying did not have the runway in sight, and was verbally assisted by the pilot not flying. Both pilots stated that they were aligned with the center of the runway. During the flare to touchdown the pilot flying reported an unexpected gust of wind from the left requiring a correction. The airplane touched down about 20 feet off and to the right of the runway edge. Substantial damage was sustained to the airplane's wing and fuselage.

The non-instrument rated private pilot departed Montrose, Colorado, southbound in a Cessna 421B. According to radar data, the airplane climbed from 14,300 to 16,600 feet msl at a rate of 1,792 fpm. The data shows that 19 seconds later, the airplane lost 4,000 feet of altitude, or descended at a rate of 12,631 fpm. The airplane then climbed back to 13,300 feet msl at a rate of 1,448 fpm, and then disappeared from radar. The airplane crashed in snow covered mountainous terrain. Snowmobilers, who were in the vicinity of the impact site at the time of the accident, said that snow showers made visibility less than 1/2 sm. A pilot departing Telluride Regional Airport (located 33 nm at 045 degrees from the crash site), on a heading of 300 degrees, at approximately 1015 said that it was clear right over Telluride. He said that as he climbed out, he got into weather at 12,000 feet msl, and didn't break out until 22,000 feet msl. He also said that he experienced no icing or turbulence during his climb out.

During a visual approach, the pilot said he encountered 2,000 fpm downdrafts. The pilot stated he added power and executed a normal approach at 120 knots, compensating for downdrafts/crosswinds. After touchdown, the pilot said he did not get a beta light on the right engine. He stated he brought the power levers 'behind the gate into reverse.' The aircraft drifted left. The pilot said he corrected with brakes and nosewheel steering. He applied takeoff power and the aircraft veered right, and ran off the right side of the runway. The aircraft collided with a dirt bank and then trees. Three tire skid marks were observed on the right side of the runway. A pilot-witness said winds were gusting 22-25 knots, variable from 130-220°. He said the aircraft landed fast and long. Examination of the engines and props revealed no evidence of malfunction. The engine manufacturer recommends prop reverse not be used on icy runway or when beta light on one engine does not illuminate. The aircraft manufacturer advises that nosewheel steering should not be used at speeds below 40 knots. All six occupants were injured, two seriously.