Alaska

The mechanic in charge of taxiing the Boeing 727 allowed an unauthorized avionics technician to occupy the pilot seat. They inadvertently deactivated the brake pressurization system and struck a passenger jetway at the terminal gate. An ensuing fire destroyed the airplane and a company ground vehicle and extensively damaged the jetway. The terminal gate was also damaged. A total of 11 persons were injured.

The airplane was destabilized by a slight vertical air movement on approach. The pilot touched the airplane down short of the runway proper, collapsing the landing gear before sliding off the strip into adjacent tundra. All five occupants escaped uninjured.

The aircraft was destroyed when the aircraft struck a 350 foot high hill along its route. This flight was a part 135 on-demand air taxi cargo flight. Several other air taxi operators and company aircraft elected to cancel their flights. Both ground reports and pilot reports stated the weather in the area of the accident was ceilings below 500 feet and visibility less than one mile. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was on the last leg of a scheduled commuter flight, when it crashed in a heavily wooded area while making a VFR approach to Merrill Field, Anchorage, AK. The captain and his sole passenger were killed in the crash when the airplane struck the ground upside-down in a near vertical attitude. The airplane's copilot, who had deplaned minutes before the accident flight, said he did not see the captain use the aircraft's auxiliary fuel tanks at any time during that evening's earlier flights. The airplane's main fuel tanks hold 100 gallons of useable fuel; it is estimated that the airplane would have consumed slightly more than 100 gallons of fuel at the time of the accident. Ample fuel remained in the auxiliary tanks, but an engine restart cannot be readily accomplished if the auxiliary tanks are not selected prior to the engine's quitting. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft crashed one mile short of the runway. The accident occurred during an ILS approach in instrument meteorological conditions. During a post accident interview with the pilot he stated that he did not recognize and react in a timely manner to the gross deviation of the decision height. He continued down until striking the ground short of the runway.

Weather conditions on the day of the accident were reported to be extremely variable. Initially, when the pilot obtained a weather briefing, VFR flight was not recommended. Later, the weather improved and the pilot elected to proceed on the flight. While en route, he encountered snow showers and descended to 500 feet agl to insure best visibility. The pilot stated that without warning, he encountered a snow squall and whiteout conditions while he was flying over a ridge immediately west of the Kustatan River. He attempted a 180 turn, but the aircraft crashed on snow covered terrain. One occupant, an infant, died from impact injuries. The survivors were located about 21 hours after the accident. The ELT switch was found in the 'off' position; no ELT signal was heard by other pilots. Another pilot who encountered weather at about the same time and place diverted to another airport.

The pilot stalled the airplane while making a steep turn to avoid high voltage power lines. The airplane caught fire on impact and the air taxi pilot subsequently died of extensive thermal injuries. The pilot was flying in formation with another aircraft at low altitude. When the power lines were sighted the other aircraft successfully pulled up and avoided the wires. The accident pilot turned steeply and lost control of the aircraft before crashing.

Witnesses observed the aircraft on final approach with its gear down then the nose pitched up. The aircraft rolled left and crashed into trees. The aircraft's cockpit, cabin, engine nacelles, cargo and portions of the wings were destroyed by post-impact fire. Post accident examination of the aircraft revealed the landing gear was in the up and locked position and the flaps were at 30°. This is consistent with a go-around configuration. No mechanical malfunction/failure could be determined. The aircraft had a restricted category airworthiness certificate. The cargo area contained two fuel tanks and assorted items (oil stove, tools, 55 gallon drum and hoses). The pilot was type rated in this aircraft. The runway length listed in the Alaska supplement was 1,000 feet longer than the actual runway length. The runway was glazed with ice. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft departed during a break in the weather after having waited for a special VFR departure. His departure radio call was the last communication from the flight. The weather remained marginal with icing in the clouds and freezing drizzle. The aircraft was on a flight to transport a dentist and a technical assistant to area villages for US Health Dpt clinical work. There was no pressing or urgent need to adhere to a schedule if the weather dictated a postponement. Aircraft wreckage was located on the side of a mountain at 650 feet above msl. It had collided with an upgrade while in a descending turn. The aircraft broke apart and left wreckage for a distance of 493 feet before coming to rest. The pilot and one passenger remained in the wreckage. The right front passenger was ejected and located near the wreckage. Witnesses at the crash site noted ice 1/8 to 3/4 inches thick on the broken wings and airframe parts during the recovery.

A total loss of power was experienced on takeoff due to the fuel selector being in the off position. The pilot attempted to restart the engine during which time the aircraft entered a stall and collided with the terrain. According to passengers the pilot did not use a checklist nor where the passengers briefed before the flight. The wreckage was visible from the airport control tower but was not located until several hours after the accident by air search. Two passengers were seriously injured while a third passenger and the pilot were killed.