Alaska

While on a flight from Sitka to Rowan Bay, Alaska, the pilot flew up a valley intending to cross a pass whose elevation was 2,745 feet msl. Upon approaching the pass the pilot encountered clouds which prevented his transit. The pilot then executed a 180° right course reversal and at some point near the completion of the maneuver and in close proximity to the steep terrain along the western edge of the pass the pilot allowed the aircraft to enter a stall condition. The aircraft impacted the 40° sloped terrain in a steep nose down, near wings level attitude and with a steep flight path. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The on-demand-charter flight was to originally pickup passengers and cargo but a landing gear problem forced another airplane with a mechanic to be dispatched. The other airplane returned with the passengers and the accident airplane was repaired by the mechanic and departed at a later time with the cargo on board. The airplane was not on a flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed from 7,000 feet msl to 12,500 feet msl as reported by the other company airplane. The aircraft was found on the side of Mt Torbert at the 10,570 foot level. The pilot-in-command was found in the right pilot seat with a non-aviation related book in his lap. The mechanic was found in the left pilot seat with a world aeronautical chart, cd-11 open on his lap. The mechanic held a commercial pilots certificate but no instrument rating. The investigation revealed weaknesses in company operations.

The pilot-in-command, a certified mechanic, performed his own maintenance on the aircraft. This maintenance required the removal, reinstallation and rigging of the ailerons. As the pilot was taking off on the first flight after maintenance, the aircraft entered a roll after lift-off and crashed. The pilot, sole on board, was killed. An investigation revealed the controls to the left aileron were connected in reverse.

The airplane had undergone extensive maintenance which included work on the control column. The upper half of the control column was replaced with a throw-over yoke and the aileron system was rerigged. The pilot-in-command picked up the airplane after it was tied down outside for three months. According to a witness, the airplane lifted off the water and started a left bank which increased until the airplane struck the ground. Post accident examination revealed the control cables at the base of the control column operated in reverse of the description in the maintenance manual. Complete control continuity could not be concluded because of the extensive post impact fire which destroyed the overhead bellcrank, pulley, and interconnect system. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot had just departed the runway when he reported to the flight service station that he had engine problems. The aircraft was observed by witnesses to be about 300 feet on a descending downwind. The pilot stated that he was circling for runway 01. Surviving passengers described the engines as running rough and uneven. The investigation revealed that the aircraft's weight was more than the pilot had calculated and the CofG was 3.4 inches further aft than was calculated. However, the weight and CofG were within limits. Examination of the engine disclosed that the right engine had an extensive cylinder head crack, a partially disconnected intake pipe, and was capable of producing 55% of rated power. The left engine had seven severely worn cam lobes. The rudder trim was deflected full left at impact. The evidence indicated that the pilot had retarded the throttle for the left engine and was using only the right engine to sustain flight. Exam of company checklist usage revealed several different improper versions. The pilot and five passengers were killed. Two others passengers and two people on the ground were injured.

The pilot of the air taxi cargo flight was operating at night in marginal VFR conditions when the aircraft struck rising terrain. The aircraft was found the next day at approximately 1000 ast, some 15 miles off the intended route. The pilot was unconscious and suffering from hypothermia and other injuries. He was taken to a hospital, but died later that day. An investigation revealed the aircraft struck the south side of Bismark mountain at approximately 2,100 feet msl while in level flight. Another pilot, who was flying in the area about 2-1/2 hours after the accident, reported that classic white-out conditions existed with moderate snow fall and ice crystals reducing forward visibility to less than 1/2 mile. The pilot (of N9979M) had been recently hired by Bering Air and had only about 23 hours of known flight time in the general area. At the time of employment, he indicated he had approximately 1,536 hours of flight time; however, only 446 hours of flight time was verified by his logbook and other sources. Minimum flight time to act as a pic in the air taxi operation was 500 hours.

During arrival in heavy traffic, Reeve flight 726 (Boeing 727) and Wilburs flight 304 (Cessna 402B, N969JW) received radar advisories for visual approaches to runways 06L and 06R, respectively. Subsequently, both flights were cleared to land. At 1555:04, the local tower controller transmitted that the wind at the approach end of runway 06R was from 340° at 9 knots and the midfield wind was 330° at 7 knots. At approximately 1557, flight 726 landed on runway 06L. Approximately 69 seconds later, as flight 304 was crossing the threshold (thr) of runway 06R at about 100 feet agl, the aircraft encountered wake turbulences (w/t) and rolled sharply to the right, byd 90°. The pilot corrected with aileron and power, but the aircraft lost altitude and hit the ground before recovery. The wind during the 1601 weather observation was 020° at 5 kts. Runway centerlines were 700 feet apart, threshold of runway 06L was 4,600 feet byd the threshold of runway 06R. The approach control did not advise either flight of the other's position, nor did the tower controller give a w/t advisory to flight 304. Calculations showed vortices could have drifted from runway 06L to runway 06R in as little as 28 seconds. FAA handbook addressed w/t advisory for parallel runway options with less than 2,500 feet separation, but did not address offset thresholds. All five occupants were injured.

During arrival, the aircraft (Ryan flight 103) crashed short of runway 03. The fuselage stayed intact during impact, but the belly structure was compressed and vertical deceleration forces exceeded the design capability of the seats. Rescue personnel had difficulty shutting off the aircraft's electrical power which delayed removal of the 1st officer (f/o) from the aircraft. An investigation revealed the aircraft was loaded with approximately 600 lbs more cargo than the f/o had requested. The center-of-gravity (cg) was 8 to 11 inches behind the allowable aft limit and the flight crew did not comply with company and FAA procedures in computing the cg. During flight, up to 3/8 inches of ice accumulated on the aircraft's leading edges. There was evidence the crew lost control of the aircraft as the flaps were lowered. The right flap actuator was found in the 7 to 12° position and the stabilizer trim was found at the full nose down position. Flight tests showed there would be no significant difficulty in controlling the aircraft with up to 1.5 inch of ice on the leading edges and that static stability would deteriorate during flap extension with the aft cg configuration. Three passengers survived while 18 other occupants were killed.

The flight was cleared on an IFR flight from Whitehorse to Juneau, via V-428 to Chill intersection, then direct to Juneau. Chill intersection was located on V-428, 36 miles south of Haines NDB on a bearing of 146°. On reaching Haines NDB, the pilot cancelled his IFR clearance and continued under visual flight rules (VFR). Subsequently, the aircraft crashed on a glacier between Haines and Juneau, approximately 15 miles southeast of Haines NDB at an elevation of about 4,500 feet. A pilot, flying about 5 miles southwest of the crash site at the time of the accident, reported a broken to overcast ceiling at 2,500 feet to 3,000 feet msl. The accident site was near the Haines transition of the Barlo 4 departure (sid). In that area, the minimum en route altitude for flight on the Haines transition was 9,000 feet under instrument flight rules.

The aircraft overflew the destination due to fog. The station manager stated that after transmitting to the pilot that the weather was 'zero zero', the pilot stated that he would continue on to Red Devil and she heard it fly overhead. The first pieces of aircraft debris were found 9 miles south of crooked creek along the western shore of the Kuskokwin River at a point where it widened and the surface of the water smoothed out. No impact marks were found along either shore of the river. Other pilots in the area stated that the fog was down to the ground and extended approx 12 miles south of Crooked Creek. The engine, pilot's seat, and aircraft were not recovered.