Plain, Valley

The company pilot and two employees had departed on an aerial imagery survey flight of forest vegetation. The airplane began to level off at an altitude of about 16,100 ft mean sea level (msl) and accelerated to a maximum recorded groundspeed of 209 knots. Less than 2 minutes later, the groundspeed decreased to about 93 knots, and the airplane descended about 500 ft while on a steady heading. The airplane subsequently entered a rapid descent and a right turn, and “mayday, mayday, mayday” and “we’re in a spin” transmissions were broadcast to air traffic control (ATC). A witness, who was located near the accident site, noticed the airplane nose down at high rate of speed and then saw the airplane spinning rapidly about its longitudinal axis. The airplane wreckage was located in remote wetlands and wooded terrain. Postaccident examination revealed that the airplane impacted the ground in a nose-low vertical attitude and at high speed. All major components of the airplane were located at the accident site. Examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. According to the aircraft performance study for this accident, when the airplane pitched down, the normal load factor decreased rapidly from about 1.6 to less than 1 G. A rapid decrease in normal load factor is consistent with a stall when the wing exceeds its critical angle of attack. At that point, the air flow becomes separated at the wing, and the wing can no longer generate the necessary lift. If the airplane is in uncoordinated flight at the stall, a spin can result. Thus, the pilot likely did not maintain adequate airspeed, causing the airplane to exceed its critical angle of attack and enter a stall and spin. An important but unknown factor before and during the initial stall was the behavior of the pilot regarding his flight control inputs, including his possible attempt to recover. The airplane’s Pilot Operating Handbook states that spins are not authorized and does not include a procedure for inadvertent spin recovery.

The pilot was performing a short cross-country flight, which was his third solo flight in the high-performance single-engine airplane. The airplane departed and climbed to 20,000 ft mean sea level (msl) before beginning to descend. About 8 minutes before the accident, the airplane was southbound, descending to 11,000 ft, and the pilot established communications with air traffic control (ATC). About 4 minutes later, the controller cleared the pilot to descend to 10,000 ft msl and proceed direct to his destination; the pilot acknowledged the clearance. While descending through 13,000 ft msl, the airplane entered a descending left turn. The controller observed the left turn and asked the pilot if everything was alright; there was no response from the pilot. The controller’s further attempts to establish communications were unsuccessful. Following the descending left turn, the airplane entered a high speed, nose-down descent toward terrain. A witness observed the airplane at a high altitude in a steep nose-down descent toward the terrain. The witness noted no signs of distress, such as smoke, fire, or parts coming off the airplane, and he heard the airplane’s engine operating at full throttle. The airplane impacted two powerlines, trees, and the terrain in a shallow descent with a slightly left-wing low attitude. Examination of the accident site revealed a long debris field that was consistent with an impact at a high speed and relatively shallow flightpath angle. All major components of the airplane were located in the debris field at the accident site. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. A performance study indicated the airplane entered a left roll and dive during which the airplane exceeded the airspeed, load factor, and bank angle limitations published in the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH). An important but unknown factor during these maneuvers was the behavior of the pilot and his activity on the flight controls during the initial roll and dive. The pilot responded normally to ATC communications only 98 seconds before the left roll started. It is difficult to reconcile an alert and attentive pilot with the roll and descent that occurred, but there is insufficient information available to determine whether the pilot was incapacitated or distracted during any part of the roll and dive maneuver. Although all the available toxicological specimens contained ethanol (the alcohol contained in alcoholic drinks such as beer and wine), the levels were very low and below the allowable level for flight (0.04 gm/dl). While it is possible that some of the identified ethanol had been ingested, it is also possible that all or most of the identified ethanol was from sources other than ingestion (such as postmortem production). In either case, the levels were too low to have caused incapacitation. It is therefore unlikely that any effects from ethanol contributed to the circumstances of the accident. There was minimal available autopsy evidence to support any determination of incapacitation. As a result, it could not be determined from the available evidence whether medical incapacitation contributed to the accident.

The single engine aircraft departed Jigjiga Airport on a humanitarian mission to Dire Dawa, carrying two pilots and two employees of the World Food Program. En route, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. Upon landing, the aircraft came to rest on its nose in a near vertical position with its right wing partially torn off. All four occupants escaped with minor injuries.

En route from Kedrovy to Tomsk, while cruising at an altitude of 12,000 feet in icing conditions, both engines failed simultaneously. The crew tried to restart both engines, without success. In such conditions, the crew reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing in the taiga. Upon impact, the flipped over and came to rest upside down. The wreckage was found around 1430LT some 52 km southeast of Kedrovy. All 17 occupants were found alive, among them few were injured. The captain broke one of his leg. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 12 July 2021 at about 1245 (1545) a Viking Air Ltd DHC-2 Beaver MK1A aircraft registration 5Y-BCL operated by the Desert Locust Control Organization of Eastern Africa (DLCO-EA) with three on board crashed at Kosovo area of Ndabibi in Naivasha, Nakuru County. The accident site is located near the edge of the hilly eastern side of Eburru forest manned by the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). The flight originated from Wilson airport, Nairobi County and was enroute to Lodwar airport, Turkana County. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and largely consumed by the ensuing fire. A passenger suffered fatal injuries while the pilot and the other passenger suffered serious injuries requiring more than 48 hours of hospitalization. At the time of the accident the area in the vicinity of the accident site had near overcast cloudy conditions.

Crashed in unknown circumstances, killing the pilot, sole on board.

The pilot was conducting a personal flight and was descending the airplane to the destination airport. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that the airplane accomplished several turning maneuvers near the airport. These turns occurred from an elevation of 6,000 to 4,950 ft mean sea level, at which time the data ended. The airplane was 80 ft above ground level at the time. Witnesses reported seeing a low-flying airplane perform a turn and then veer toward the ground. The airplane came to rest about 4 miles east of the destination airport and 70 ft from the last data target. A postcrash fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines found no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the left engine revealed that the engine was likely producing power. The right engine examination revealed damage consistent with low or no rotation at the time of the accident, including distinct, localized contact marks on the rotating propeller shaft. In addition, no metal spray was found in the turbine section, and no dirt was found within the combustor section. The examination of the right propeller blades showed chordwise scoring with the blades bent aft and twisted toward a low-pitch setting. Examination of the fuel system noted no anomalies. The airplane was equipped with a single redline (SRL) autostart computer. Examination of the right (R) SRL-OFF annunciator panel light bulb showed signatures of hot filament stretch, which was consistent with illumination of the light at the time of the accident. The SRL light normally extinguishes above an engine speed of 80% rpm. Given the low rotational signatures on the right engine and the illuminated “R SRL-OFF” warning light, it is likely that the right engine lost engine power during the flight for reasons that could not be determined.

The pilot was planning to perform a functional test of the airplane’s newly upgraded autopilot system. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data showed that, after takeoff, the airplane turned east and climbed to 2,750 ft. Air traffic control information indicated that the controller cleared the pilot to operate under visual flight rules to the east of the airport. Communications between ground control, tower control, and the pilot were normal during the ground taxi, takeoff, and climb. Radio and radar communications were lost 6 minutes after takeoff, and no radio distress calls were received from the pilot. The airplane impacted wooded terrain about 3/4 mile to the east of the last recorded radar data point. Groundspeeds and headings were consistent throughout the flight with no abrupt deviations. The airplane impacted the wooded terrain in a nose-down, near-vertical flight attitude. Most of the airplane, including the fuselage, wings, and empennage, were consumed by a postimpact fire. Both engines and propellers separated from the airplane at impact with the ground. Examination of the engines revealed no preaccident failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operations. Both propellers showed signs of normal operation. Flight control continuity was confirmed. The elevator trim cables stop blocks were secured to the cables and undamaged. They were found against the forward stop meaning the trim tab was at full down travel (elevator leading edge full down) which indicated that the airplane was trimmed full nose up at impact. The airplane’s cabin sustained fragmentation from impact and was consumed by fire; as a result, the autopilot system could not be examined. The investigation was unable to determine why the pilot lost control of the airplane.

The twin engine aircraft entered the Dominican airspace without clearance while probably being involved in an illegal mission (contraband). After being traced by an A-29B Super Tucano, it crashed in unknown circumstances in a sugar cane field located in Batey Palo Bonito. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and both occupants were killed.

The pilot was approaching Chetumal Airport when he reported engine problems. He elected to make an amergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in an open field located in Sergio Butrón Casas, about 25 km west of Chetumal Airport. Both occupants were slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.