Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The private pilot reported that he was approaching the airport for landing in the multi-engine airplane when both engines began to surge. The pilot attempted to switch to the auxiliary fuel tanks, but inadvertently switched the left engine fuel selector to the off position. The left engine subsequently experienced a total loss of engine power. On final approach for landing, the airplane impacted terrain and was subsequently consumed by a postimpact fire; the fuel onboard the airplane at the time of the accident could not be determined. An examination of the airplane's engines and systems revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The private pilot, who was experienced flying the accident airplane, was conducting a personal flight with three passengers on board the single-engine turboprop airplane. Earlier that day, the pilot flew uneventfully from his home airport to an airport about 1 hour away. During takeoff for the return flight, the airplane impacted wooded terrain about 0.5 mile northwest of the departure end of the runway. There were no witnesses to the accident, but the pilot's radio communications with flight service and on the common traffic advisory frequency were routine, and no distress calls were received. A postcrash fire consumed a majority of the wreckage, but no preimpact mechanical malfunctions were observed in the remaining wreckage. Examination of the propeller revealed that the propeller reversing lever guide pin had been installed backward. Without the guide pin installed correctly, the reversing lever and carbon block could dislodge from the beta ring and result in the propeller blades traveling to an uncommanded feathered position. However, examination of the propeller components indicated that the carbon block was in place and that the propeller was in the normal operating range at the time of impact. Additionally, the airplane had been operated for about 9 months and 100 flight hours since the most recent annual inspection had been completed, which was the last time the propeller was removed from and reinstalled on the engine. Therefore, the improper installation of the propeller reversing lever guide pin likely did not cause the accident. Review of the pilot's autopsy report revealed that he had severe coronary artery disease with 70 to 80 percent stenosis of the right coronary artery, 80 percent stenosis of the left anterior descending artery, and mitral annular calcification. The severe coronary artery disease combined with the mitral annular calcification placed the pilot at high risk for an acute cardiac event such as angina, a heart attack, or an arrhythmia. Such an event would have caused sudden symptoms such as chest pain, shortness of breath, palpitations, or fainting/loss of consciousness and would not have left any specific evidence to be found during the autopsy. It is likely that the pilot was acutely impaired or incapacitated at the time of the accident due to an acute cardiac event, which resulted in his loss of airplane control.

The airplane was fueled with 140 gallons of fuel before the second of three flight segments. The pilot reported that, while en route on the third segment, a fuel crossfeed light illuminated. He reset the indicator and decided to land the airplane to troubleshoot. He requested to divert to the nearest airport, which was directly beneath the airplane. Subsequently, the right engine lost power, and the autofeather system feathered the right engine propeller. He reduced power on the left engine, lowered the nose, and extended the landing gear while entering the traffic pattern. The pilot indicated that, after the landing gear was extended, the electrical system "failed," and shortly after, the left engine would not respond to power lever inputs. As the flight was on a base leg approach, the airplane was below the intended flightpath to reach the runway. The pilot stated that he pulled "gently on the control wheel"; however, the airplane impacted an embankment and came to rest on airport property, which resulted in substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage. Postaccident examination of the engines and airframe revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation. Signatures on the left propeller indicated that the engine was likely producing power at the time of impact; however, actual power settings could not be conclusively determined. Signatures on the right propeller indicated that little or no power was being produced. The quantity of fuel in the airplane's fuel system, as well as the configuration of the fuel system at the time of the accident, could not be determined based on the available evidence. Although the position of the master switch (which includes the battery, generator 1, and generator 2) was found in the OFF position, the airplane had been operating for about 30 minutes when the electrical power was lost; thus, it is likely that the airplane had been operating on battery power throughout the flight. This could have been the result of the pilot's failure to activate, or his inadvertent deactivation of, the generator 1 and 2 switch. If the flight were operating on battery power, it would explain what the pilot described as an electrical system failure after the landing gear extension due to the exhaustion of the airplane's battery. The postaccident examination of the left engine and propeller revealed that the engine was likely producing some power at the time of impact, and an explanation for why the engine reportedly did not respond to the pilot's throttle movements could not be determined. Additionally, given the available evidence, the reason for the loss of power to the right engine could not be determined.

Following an uneventful flight from Ulyanovsk, the crew started the descent to Moscow-Domodedovo Airport. While following the approach checklist, the crew realized that the nose gear failed to deploy and remained stuck in its wheel well. Several attempts to lower the gear manually failed and the crew eventually decided to carry out a nose gear-up landing on runway 32L. After a holding circuit of about 45 minutes, the aircraft landed then slid on its nose for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 31 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft had positioned to Milan earlier in the day, flown by the same pilot, and was returning to Blackbushe with the pilot and three passengers on board. After descending through the London Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) it was handed over from London Control to Farnborough Approach. Its descent continued towards Blackbushe and, having reported that he had the airfield in sight, the pilot was instructed to descend at his own discretion. When the aircraft was approximately four miles south of its destination, he was instructed to contact Blackbushe Information. The weather at Blackbushe was fine with light and variable winds, visibility in excess of ten kilometres, and no low cloud. HZ-IBN entered the left-hand circuit for Runway 25 via the crosswind leg. Towards the end of the downwind leg, it overtook an Ikarus C42 microlight aircraft, climbing to pass ahead of and above that aircraft. As the climb began, at approximately 1,000 ft aal, the TCAS of HZ-IBN generated a ‘descend’ RA alert to resolve a conflict with the microlight. The TCAS RA changed to ‘maintain vertical speed’ and then ‘adjust vertical speed’, possibly to resolve a second conflict with a light aircraft which was above HZ-IBN and to the east of the aerodrome. Neither the microlight nor the light aircraft was equipped with TCAS. Following this climb, HZ-IBN then flew a curving base leg, descending at up to 3,000 feet per minute towards the threshold of Runway 25. The aircraft’s TCAS annunciated ‘clear of conflict’ when HZ-IBN was 1.1 nm from the runway threshold, at 1,200 ft aal, and at a speed of 146 KIAS, with the landing gear down and flap 3 selected. The aircraft continued its approach at approximately 150 KIAS. Between 1,200 and 500 ft aal the rate of descent averaged approximately 3,000 fpm, and at 500 ft aal the descent rate was 2,500 fpm. The aircraft’s TAWS generated six ‘pull up’ warnings on final approach. The aircraft crossed the Runway 25 threshold at approximately 50 ft aal at 151 KIAS. The aircraft manufacturer calculated that the appropriate target threshold speed for the aircraft’s mass and configuration was 108 KIAS. The AFISO initiated a full emergency as the aircraft touched down, because “it was clear at this time that the aircraft was not going to stop”. Tyre marks made by the aircraft at touchdown indicated that it landed 710 m beyond the Runway 25 threshold. The Runway 25 declared Landing Distance Available (LDA) was 1,059 m; therefore the aircraft touched down 349 m before the end of the declared LDA. The paved runway surface extended 89 m beyond the end of the LDA. The aircraft continued along the runway, decelerating, but departed the end of the paved surface at a groundspeed of 83 kt (84 KIAS airspeed) and struck an earth bank, which caused the aircraft to become airborne again. It then struck cars in a car park, part of a large commercial site adjacent to the aerodrome. The wing separated from the fuselage, and the fuselage rolled left through 350° before coming to rest on top of the detached wing, on a heading of 064°(M), 30° right side down and in an approximately level pitch attitude. A fire broke out in the underside of the aft fuselage and burned with increasing intensity. The aerodrome’s RFFS responded to the crash alarm but their path to the accident site was blocked by a locked gate between the aerodrome and commercial site. The first two RFFS vehicles arrived at the gate 1 minute and 34 seconds after the aircraft left the runway end. The third RFFS vehicle, which carried a key for the gate, arrived approximately one minute later, and the three RFFS vehicles proceeded through the gate 2 minutes and 46 seconds after the aircraft left the runway. As the aircraft was located in an area of the car park surrounded by a 2.4 m tall wire mesh fence, the RFFS vehicles had to drive approximately 400 m to gain access to the accident site. Despite applying all their available media, the RFFS was unable to bring the fire under control. The intensity of the fire meant that it was not possible to approach the aircraft to save life. All four occupants of the aircraft survived the impact and subsequently died from the effects of fire. Subsequently, local authority fire appliances arrived and the fire was extinguished.

The airline transport pilot was landing at the destination airport after a cross-country flight in visual meteorological conditions. The tower controller stated that the airplane's landing gear appeared to be extended during final approach and that the airplane landed within the runway's touchdown zone. The tower controller stated that, although the airplane made a normal landing, he heard a squealing noise that continued longer than what he believed was typical. The pilot subsequently transmitted "go-around." The tower controller acknowledged the go-around and cleared the pilot to enter a left traffic pattern. The tower controller stated that he heard the engine speed accelerate while the airplane maintained a level attitude over the runway until it passed midfield. He then saw the airplane pitch up and enter a climbing left turn. The tower controller stated that the airplane appeared to enter an aerodynamic stall before it descended into terrain in a left-wing-down attitude. Another witness reported that he saw the airplane, with its landing gear extended, in a steep left turn before it descended rapidly into terrain. A postaccident examination did not reveal any evidence of flight control, landing gear, or engine malfunction. An examination of the runway revealed numerous propeller slash marks that began about 215 ft past the runway's touchdown zone; however, there was no evidence that any portion of the airframe had impacted the runway during the landing. Additionally, measurement of the landing gear actuators confirmed that all three landing gear were fully extended at the accident site. Therefore, the pilot likely did not adequately control the airplane's pitch during the landing, which allowed the propeller to contact the runway. Due to the propeller strikes, the propeller was likely damaged and unable to provide adequate thrust during the go-around. Further, based on the witness accounts, the pilot likely did not maintain adequate airspeed during the climbing left turn, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.

The crew was conducting a training mission at Lagoa Santa AFB, consisting of touch-and-go maneuvers. During the takeoff roll, the pilot-in-command pulled on the control column to initiate the rotation but the aircraft did not respond. It went out of control, veered off runway to the right, struck an embankment, lost its undercarriage and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest in a grassy area. All three occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The route of the aircraft on that day was MDL- MYT- PBU- MYT- MDL- RGN. From Mandalay (MDL) on the way back to Yangon International Airport, the plane took off at 17:20.On the way the weather was not significant. For weather reason, seat belt sign was turned on the way to Yangon International Airport only one time. From Mandalay Airport up to landing phase to Yangon International Airport, first officer took control of the aircraft. At 1730 visibility was 6Km as per ATC verbal information. About 4 Km to Mingaladon Tower, clearance was obtained "Air Bagan 424 ,wind calm ,runway 21,clear to land, caution landing Runway wet, after landed vacate via Charlie" At decision height (250ft), runway was insight, runway lightings were able to be seen so the aircraft continued though there was light rain. At about 50 ft, more rain was falling suddenly consequently visibility became poor. So the pilot took over control of the aircraft. A few seconds later the aircraft made hard landing and skidded and veered off the left side of the runway to the muddy strip, came to rest about 2800ft from the threshold and 75ft from the runway edge.

The pilot was landing at a large fly-in/airshow and following the airshow arrival procedures that were in use. While descending on the downwind leg for runway 27, the pilot was cleared by a controller to turn right onto the base leg abeam the runway numbers and to land on the green dot (located about 2,500 ft from the runway's displaced threshold). About the time the pilot turned onto the base leg, he observed an airplane taxi onto the runway and start its takeoff roll. The controller instructed the pilot to continue the approach and land on the orange dot (located about 1,000 ft from the runway's displaced threshold) instead of the green dot. The pilot reported that he considered performing a go-around but decided to continue the approach. As the pilot reduced power, the airplane entered a stall and impacted the runway in a right-wing-low, nose-down attitude. Witnesses estimated that the bank angle before impact was greater than 60 degrees. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
Analysis of a video recording of the accident showed that the airplane was about 180 ft above ground level (agl) when the turn onto the base leg began, and it descended to about 140 ft agl during the turn. The airplane's total inertial speed (the calculated vector sums of the airplane's ground speeds and vertical speeds) decreased from 98 knots (kts) to 80 kts during the turn. During the last 8 seconds of flight, the speed decreased below 70 kts, and the airplane descended from about 130 ft agl to ground impact. The wings-level stall speed of the airplane at maximum gross weight with landing gear and flaps down was 59 kts. In the same configuration at 60 degrees of bank, the stall speed was 86 kts and would have been higher at a bank angle greater than 60 degrees. Reduced runway separation standards for airplanes were in effect due to the airshow. When the accident airplane reached the runway threshold, the minimum distance required by the standards between the arriving accident airplane and the departing airplane was 1,500 ft. The video analysis indicated that it was likely that a minimum of 1,500 ft of separation was maintained during the accident sequence. Although the pilot was familiar with the procedures for flying into the airshow, the departing airplane
and the modified landing clearance during a period of typically high workload likely interfered with the pilot's ability to adequately monitor his airspeed and altitude. As a result, the airplane entered an accelerated stall when the pilot turned the airplane at a steep bank angle and a low airspeed in an attempt to make the landing spot, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack. At such a low altitude, recovery from the stall was not possible. Although the airshow arrival procedures stated that pilots have the option to go around if necessary, and the pilot considered going around, he instead continued the unstable landing approach and lost control of the airplane.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft completed a belly landing at Panana City-Tocument Airport. Both occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.