Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

During the takeoff roll on runway 23 at Douala Airport, at a speed of 110 knots, the crew noted a loud bang and decided to abort. The crew initiated an emergency braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and both engines before coming to rest 130 metres further, bursting into flames. All 114 occupants were evacuated, among them 20 were slightly injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft was on a private flight from Elstree to Shobdon in Herefordshire. The meteorological forecast indicated that a warm front was approaching Southern England from the south-west and conditions were generally deteriorating. The visibility on departure from Elstree at 1437 hrs was greater than 10 km with a broken cloud base at 2,500 feet. When the aircraft arrived at Shobdon the visibility was estimated to be 3 to 4 km in light drizzle with a cloud base at approximately 1,200 feet, and the surface wind was 090_/5 kt. The first radio contact between the aircraft and Shobdon was made at about 1502 hrs when the pilot called to say that he was inbound from Elstree. In response to this call he was passed the airfield details. The pilot later called when approaching Leominster and subsequently called downwind for Runway 09 which has a right-hand circuit. The operator of the ground to air radio facility at Shobdon saw the aircraft on the downwind leg abeam the tower at what appeared to be a normal circuit height. He did not observe the aircraft downwind but shortly afterward she heard a brief and indecipherable radio transmission which sounded like a scream. This same transmission was heard by an aircraft enthusiast who was monitoring the radio transmissions on his 'airband' radio. The radio operator repeatedly attempted to make contact with the aircraft but to no avail and so he instructed an aircraft refueller to inform the emergency services that an aircraft had crashed. Analysis of recorded radar data from the radar head at Clee Hill,Shropshire, indicates that the aircraft joined the downwind leg from the east at a height of 1,100 feet. This radar data shows that the aircraft then followed a normal ground track until towards the end of the downwind leg when there was an alteration of track to the left of about 20_ before the aircraft entered a right turn onto the base leg. At the same time as the aircraft altered track to the left it began a slow descent, at about 350 ft/min, from 1,100 feet to 600 feet, at which stage it disappeared below radar coverage. The average ground speed on the downwind leg was 112kt and this reduced to 100 kt as the aircraft descended. Two witnesses saw the aircraft in a position that equates to the base leg. The witness to the east of the aircraft track first heard the sound of an aircraft engine that was unusually loud and then saw the aircraft at an estimated height of 150 to 200 feet, it was descending slowly with the wings level. A loud "cough"from one of the engines was heard "as if it had backfired"followed by a puff of white smoke and then the sound of an engine increasing in RPM. The wings were then seen to rock from side to side as the aircraft went out of sight. The second witness,to the west of the aircraft track, described the aircraft flying very low, between 50 and 100 feet, and slowly descending. He saw that the wings were "wavering", the left wing then suddenly dropped until it achieved a bank angle of about 90_ at which stage the nose dropped and the aircraft disappeared behind some low trees and was heard to hit the ground. Some local farmers immediately went to the crash site. Initially there was no fire or smoke, but a small fire soon developed in the area of the right wing and this was quickly extinguished by the farmers.

The aircraft crashed while landing on runway 22R at Newark International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. The regularly scheduled cargo flight originated in Singapore on July 30 with intermediate stops in Penang, Malaysia; Taipei, Taiwan; and Anchorage, Alaska. The flight from Anchorage International Airport (ANC), Anchorage, Alaska, to EWR was conducted on an instrument flight rules flight plan and operated under provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. On board were the captain and first officer, who had taken over the flight in Anchorage for the final leg to EWR, one jumpseat passenger, and two cabin passengers. All five occupants received minor injuries in the crash and during subsequent egress through a cockpit window. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a post crash fire. According to flight plan and release documents, the airplane was dispatched to ANC with the No. 1 (left engine) thrust reverser inoperative. The flight plan time from ANC to EWR was 5 hours and 51 minutes—47 minutes shorter than the scheduled time of 6 hours and 38 minutes because of 45-knot tailwinds en route. The flight crew stated that at flight level (FL) 330 (about 33,000 feet mean sea level [msl]), the flight from ANC to EWR was routine and uneventful. At 0102:11, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center air traffic controller instructed flight 14 to descend and maintain FL180, according to the airplane’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR). About 0103, the captain and first officer discussed the approach and landing to runway 22R and the airplane’s landing performance. Using the airport performance laptop computer (APLC), the first officer determined that the airplane’s runway stopping distance would be approximately 6,080 feet using medium (MED) autobrakes. According to the CVR, at 0103:33, the flight crew then compared the APLC approximate landing distance for MED braking (6,080 feet) to the after-glideslope touchdown distance (6,860 feet) provided on the instrument approach plate. Based on the flight crew's calculation (6,860 – 6,080), MED braking provided a 780-foot margin after stopping. The flight crew then compared the APLC approximate landing distance for maximum (MAX) braking (5,030 feet) to the same 6,860-foot after-glideslope touchdown distance provided on the instrument approach plate. Based on the flight crew's calculation (6,860 – 5,030), MAX braking provided a 1,830-foot margin after stopping. On the basis of these calculations, the first officer suggested using MAX autobrakes. The captain agreed, stating “we got a lot of stuff going against us here so we’ll…start with max.” The first officer added, “I mean…I mean if we don’t have the reverser.” At 0114:22, the captain asked the first officer to advise the passengers that “we’re gonna have a pretty abrupt stop because of those brakes and the thrust reversers and all that stuff.” Twice during the approach, the captain asked the first officer to remind him to only use the No. 2 and No. 3 thrust reversers. At 0116:16, the captain noted that the left landing light was inoperative, adding “… just the right’s working.” The EWR tower controller cleared flight 14 to land at 0129:45 and advised the flight crew “winds two five zero at five.” At 0130:02, the first officer stated “max brakes” during the before-landing checklist. The captain replied “max brakes will be fine,” and the first officer responded “if they work.” At 0130:34, the captain stated “[landing gear] down in four green” and called for “flaps fifty.” At 0130:45, the captain disengaged the autopilot at an altitude of 1,200 feet during the approach and “hand flew” the airplane to touchdown. The autothrottles were engaged, as recommended by McDonnell Douglas and FedEx procedures. According to information from the airplane’s flight data recorder (FDR), the approach was flown on the glideslope and localizer until touchdown, and the airplane’s approach airspeed was about 158 knots until the flare. According to the CVR, the pilots had selected an approach reference speed of 157 knots, or Vref plus 5 knots. Altitude callouts were made by the on board central aural warning system (CAWS) at 1,000 feet and 500 feet, and the first officer called out minimums (211 feet) at 0132:03. At 0132:09, the first officer stated “brakes on max,” and CAWS callouts followed for 100, 50, 40, 30, 20, and 10 feet until the sound of initial touchdown at 0132:18.75. One-half second later, the CVR recorded an expletive by the captain. At 0132:20.26, the CVR recorded increasing high-frequency tones consistent with engine spool-up (accelerating engine rpms), and at 0132:21.06, the CVR recorded a decrease in high-frequency tones consistent with engine spool-down. The sound of a “loud thump” consistent with another touchdown was recorded at 0132:21.62. A series of expletives by the captain and first officer followed until sounds of “metallic breakup” were recorded at 0132:27. FDR data indicated that after the airplane’s initial touchdown, it became airborne and rolled to the right as it touched down again (see section 1.1.1 for a detailed description of the airplane’s performance during the landing sequence). The airplane continued to roll as it slid down the runway, coming to rest inverted about 5,126 feet beyond the runway threshold and about 580 feet to the right of the runway centerline. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The twin engine aircraft departed Nice-Côte d'Azur Airport on a regular schedule service to Florence, carrying 14 passengers and three crew members. On approach to Florence-Peretola Airport runway 23, the aircraft' speed was too high and after touchdown, it bounced several times and landed firmly 350 metres from the runway end. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, it overran, went through fences and eventually collided with an embankment and came to rest on the emergency lane of the motorway Florence - Pisa. The aircraft broke in two and the cockpit was destroyed on impact. All 15 people seating in the main cabin (14 passengers and the stewardess) were evacuated with minor injuries while both pilots were seriously injured. Two days later, one of them died from his injuries.

The approach to Calabar Airport runway 03 was completed in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls, turbulences, clouds down to 240 metres and a visibility limited to 2,800 metres. On final, the aircraft was unstable and not properly aligned with the runway centerline. Upon touchdown, the left main gear landed on the grassy area to the left of the runway. The captain attempted to correct when the aircraft veered to the right back onto the runway and overran. It struck a ditch and came to rest 1,500 metres further, bursting into flames. A crew member was killed and 10 other occupants were injured.

Witnesses near the airport saw the flight approach on a left base to runway 4, touchdown on the runway, and takeoff again. One witness, a pilot, said the airplane turned onto final to the 'south' (right) of the runway centerline.' The airplane made a 'sharp' turn to the left to realign with the runway center, slightly overshot the runway to the left, turned to the right 'sharply,' and touched down on the runway. The witness further stated, '...by the time the pilot was on the runway he had wasted approximately 1,200 to 1,500 feet of runway 4, they hit reverse thrusters [sic] and were on full bore till they crossed runway 27 and 9.' The witness saw heat come out of both engine thrust reversers, the nose gear touched down and then came up again. He then saw the airplane come off the ground about 30 to 40 feet, wobble left and right at a 'slow airspeed,' crossover a highway at a low altitude, right wing low, strike some wires, go into a field, and catch fire. The pilot said, when he touched down on the runway, the airplane seemed to 'lurch' to the side. He said at this point his airspeed was 126 knots. He elected to abort the landing, and applied full power. He said the engines would not develop thrust and he elected to land in a field less than 1/4 mile in front of him. Examination of the left thrust reverser revealed that the translator was in the deployed position, with the blocker doors fully open. Both the left and right pneumatic latches were found in the unlocked position. Examination of the right thrust reverser revealed that the translator was in the deployed position, with the blocker doors fully closed. The left pneumatic latch was found in the locked position. The right pneumatic latch was found in the unlocked position. The inboard sequence latches were found about 2 inches forward of full aft travel. The thrust reverser switch was found in the 'NORMAL' position. According to Gates Lear Jet Airworthiness Directive (AD) 79-08-01, '...to preclude inadvertent thrust reverser deployment and possible loss of aircraft control....,' the following limitations apply to all gates Lear Jet Model 35, 36, 35A, 36A, aircraft equipped with Aeronca Thrust reversers. According to the AD, Section I-LIMITATION; '....Thrust Reversers must not be operated prior to takeoff...Thrust Reversers must not be used for touch and go landings...After Thrust Reversers have been deployed, a visual check of proper door stowing must be made prior to takeoff...Operational Procedures in this Thrust Reverser Supplement are mandatory.' According to Lear Jet and FlightSafety International, the procedures that are taught to Lear Jet pilots in the use of thrust reverse and spoilers during landings are; '...pilots [are] to use thrust reverse only on full stop Lear Jet landings. Pilot are trained not to deploy spoilers or thrust reverse during touch and go's or during balked landings.' The pilot-in-command of N19LH at the time of the accident, told the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) that he was 'aware' of the limitations on the Aeronca Thrust Reverser and he knew that once the Thrust Reverser was deployed that he was 'committed' to land. The pilot told the IIC that he knew of the limitations and that he was committed to land.

The aircraft ran off the runway and collided with a ditch at Great Harbour Airport, Great Harbour Cay, Bahamas, while on a foreign air taxi flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft was destroyed. The commercial-rated pilot and seven passengers received minor injuries. One passenger received serious injuries. The flight originated from Nassau, Bahamas, the same day, about 1630. The pilot reported the brakes failed during the landing roll. While approaching the end of the runway he elected to steer the aircraft off the left side of the runway to avoid a steep drop off at the end of the runway. The aircraft collided with a ditch and a post crash fire erupted and destroyed the aircraft.

The departure from Langgur was delayed for few hours due to technical problems with the right engine, so it was decided to ferry the airplane to Ambon for repairs. On final approach to Ambon-Pattimura Airport in light rain and mist, the aircraft stalled and crashed 270 metres short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

While on a cargo flight from La Rioja to Buenos Aires, the pilot encountered engine problems and decided to divert to Córdoba-Ambrosio Taravella Airport. On final approach, both engines failed and the pilot attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in a field located 1,200 metres short of runway. It slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest in a grassy area. All four occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On approach to White Plains-Westchester County Airport, the crew noted a left main gear unsafe light. The gear was recycled and the crew agreed with ATC to perform a low pass to check the gear. Few minutes later, upon landing, the left main gear collapsed. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.