Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The B737-200 aircraft which night-stopped at Calabar on Saturday the 28th of October, 2006, departed for Lagos in the morning of the 29th of October, 2006, and landed in Lagos at 0825 hrs. While on ground in Lagos, it uplifted some fuel. There was only cabin crew change. The aircraft departed Lagos on scheduled passenger service as ADK 063 at 0929 hrs and landed in Abuja at 1020 hrs. The aircraft uplifted 5000 litres of fuel and had 11000kg fuel for departure as ADK 053, a scheduled service to Sokoto. After boarding, it started raining and this compelled the crew to close the aircraft doors. Shortly after the rain had subsided, the doors were opened for the ground personnel to disembark. The crew then requested for start-up clearance. At 1115 hrs the aircraft was given a start up clearance for Sokoto. At 1121 hrs, the aircraft was given taxi clearance to holding position Runway 22. The pilot immediately requested for the wind, which was given as “210 variable at 8 kts”. Shortly after, the Control Tower transmitted the wind as south-westerly at 15 kts. While taxiing, the control tower advised Flight ADK 053 of gusty wind. The wind was initially given as 35 kts and then changed to 28 kts within 1 minute. At 1125 hrs while the aircraft was at the holding point, the crew was again advised of South-Westerly wind at 15 kts. At this juncture, the pilot of Virgin Nigeria 042 was heard on the radio saying “it looks like 35 kts to me” and then stated that he was going to wait for improvement in the weather, which he did. Thereafter, the ADK 053 crew requested for takeoff clearance and was cleared with right turn-out on course. Flight ADK 053 was airborne at 1129 hrs and was transferred to the Approach Control on 119.8MHZ but there was no acknowledgement from the crew. After three unsuccessful attempts to contact the aircraft, the Tower advised the Approach Control to call ADK 053. Other aircraft on the apron (Virgin Nigeria 042 and Trade Wings 2401), which were on that frequency were also asked to assist in contacting the aircraft but all attempts were unsuccessful. Kano and Lagos Area Controls were requested to contact ADK 053, but there was no response from the aircraft. Abuja Flight Communication Centre was then advised to inform National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in Kano about the loss of contact with the aircraft. At 1138 hrs, Flight Communication Centre called the Control Tower that someone came from a nearby village (Tungar Madaki) near the radar site and reported that a plane had crashed in their village. A search party from the airport was dispatched and they found and confirmed that the plane had crashed shortly after takeoff. The accident resulted in 96 fatalities out of 105 persons on board (POB). The accident occured at latitude N 08 59.691’ longitude E 007 14.772’ on an elevation of 1123 ft (ASL). The time of the accident was 1130 hrs during daylight and in rain.

The twin engine aircraft was performing an on-demand taxi flight from Toliara to the capital city Antananarivo with 4 pax and a two pilots on behalf of the company Magrama (Marbres & Granites de Madagascar). Less than two minutes after takeoff, while in initial climb, the aircraft suffered an engine failure and crashed about 1,500 metres from the runway end, bursting into flames. All 6 occupants were killed, among them 4 Italians and 2 Madagascar citizens.

The single engine aircraft was engaged in a military training exercise with 2 pilots and 13 soldiers (paratroopers from the Special Forces) for a routine local paratroop flight. Few minutes after takeoff, the crew decided to return to Aranchi Airport because weather conditions deteriorated. On final approach, the crew encountered local patches of fog and in a reduced visibility, the aircraft descended too low and impacted ground few hundred metres short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all 15 occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in an ambulance flight from Besançon to Amiens with 2 surgeons, one pilot and one operator agent. Following a course of 950 metres on runway 23 at Besançon-La Vèze Airport by night, the aircraft lifted off. With a low climb gradient, the aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area located 250 metres past the runway end, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all four occupants were killed. Both surgeons were en route to Amiens in order to a lever harvesting.

The commercial certificated pilot was attempting to land on a remote runway during a Title 14, CFR Part 135, cargo flight. The approach end of the runway is located at the edge of a river. During the pilot's fourth attempt to land, the airplane collided with the river embankment, and sustained structural damage. The director of operations for the operator reported that he interviewed several witnesses to the accident. They told him that the weather conditions in the area had been good VFR, but as the pilot was attempting to land, rain and mist moved over the area, reducing the visibility to about 1/4 mile. Within 30 minutes of the accident, the weather conditions were once again VFR. The pilot told an FAA inspector that the weather conditions consisted of a 500 foot ceiling and 2 miles of visibility. The pilot reported that he made 3 passes over the runway before attempting to land. On the last landing approach, while maintaining 80 knots airspeed, the pilot said the nose of the airplane dropped, he applied full power and tried to raise the nose, but the airplane collided with the river bank.

With all cockpit indications showing the landing gear was down and locked, the airplane touched down on the runway. Immediately after touchdown, the pilots heard the landing gear warning horn sound intermittently for several seconds, and then the right main landing gear collapsed. The airplane veered to the right, exited the runway, and came to rest. A post crash fire ensued, and the crew exited without injury. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the collapsed right main landing gear had penetrated the right main fuel tank and the majority of the right side of the fuselage had been consumed by fire. Examination of the left and right main landing gear assemblies revealed, that both downlock plates had been installed backwards, providing only a fraction of the design contact area between the plate and throat of the downlock hook. Examination of the manufacturer's component maintenance manual, which was used for the assembly and installation of the left and right main landing gear, revealed no guidance regarding downlock plate orientation during installation.

After landing on wet gravel runway 11/29, the aircraft veered off runway and came to rest in a wooded area, broken in two. All five occupants escaped uninjured.

At 0724 hours, Flesland approach gave clearance for FLI670 to start to descend to 4,000 feet. Three minutes later, it was cleared to leave controlled airspace and transfer to Sørstokken's frequency. In the meantime, the AFIS duty officer at Stord airport had visual contact with the plane and obtained confirmation of its position from Flesland approach. Based on aerodrome data, wind direction and wind speed, temperature and the aircraft's landing weight, the crew found it acceptable to plan for a visual approach and landing on runway 33. This would shorten the approach. They assumed that landing on runway 33 would involve a small tailwind component. The AFIS duty officer was informed of the decision to land on runway 33. The AFIS duty officer confirmed that the wind was 110° 6 kt. When asked, the crew also stated that there were 12 passengers on board. 1.1.6 The approach proceeded as normal. The landing gear was extended and the flaps were extended stepwise. At 07:31:12 hours, the aircraft was 2 NM from the threshold for runway 33 at a height of 800 ft and with a ground speed of 150 kt. The flaps were then extended to 33° and, according to radar data, the ground speed dropped to 130 kt. At 07:31:27 hours, the AFIS duty officer repeated the 'runway free' message and described the wind as 120° 6 kt. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) tells us that at 07:31:43 hours the first officer then confirmed that the plane was stabilised and held a speed of plus 5 (kt). Six seconds later, the first officer announced that the speed was plus 3 (kt). At 07:31:51 hours, the CVR recorded that a warning sound (ping) was emitted by the aircraft's audible warning Accident Investigation Board Norway system. The commander later told AIBN that he aimed for three red and one white on the PAPI (Precision approach path indicator). The first officer then announced twice that the speed was correct (bug speed). From the aircraft cockpit voice recorder (CVR) it is documented that the pilots kept a speed over threshold at Vref. According to the aircraft flight manual (AFM) correct airspeed is Vref =112 kt. According to data from the ground radar the aircraft's ground speed was 120 kt on passing the threshold for runway 33. The flight commander has stated that when the aircraft was approximately 50 ft above the runway, he lowered the thrust levers as normal to the 'Flight Idle' position. At 07:32:14 hours, sounds from the CVR indicated that the wheels touched the runway. Both pilots have stated that the landing took place a few metres beyond the standard landing point, and that it was a ‘soft’ landing. Next, the following occurred (times are stated in seconds
after nose wheel touchdown):
- 1 second: 'and spoilers' announced by first officer
- 1.5 seconds: sound of spoiler lever being moved to aft position (LIFT SPLR)
- 4 seconds: 'no spoilers' announced by first officer (standard phrase in accordance with the airline's standard operating procedures (SOP) when spoiler indicator lights does not come on)
- 6.6 seconds: sound of brake selector switch being turned
- 7.9 seconds: audio signal (single chime) from the aircraft's warning system
- 12.8 seconds: The first screeching noises from the tyres are audible
- 12.8 – 22.8 seconds: Varying degrees of screeching noises from the tyres can be heard
- 22.8 seconds: The aircraft leaves the runway, at the same time as the AFIS duty officer activates the crash alarm.
- 26 seconds: The cockpit voice recorder stops recording sound.
The first officer has informed the AIBN that, after landing, he verified that the commander moved the thrust levers from 'Flight Idle' to 'Ground Idle', at the same time as the nose of the aircraft was lowered. He also saw that the commander moved the spoiler lever from 'AIR BRAKE' (air brake fully engaged) to 'LIFT SPLR' (spoilers deployed). The first officer expected the two spoiler indicator lights (SPLR Y and SPLR G, see section 1.6.6.3) to come on after approximately three seconds. He was therefore surprised when this did not happen. In accordance with the airline's procedures, the first officer then verified, among other things, that hydraulic pressure and other instruments showed normal values and that the switches in question were set to the correct positions. The commander has explained to the AIBN that, when the speed had dropped to approximately 80 kt, he kept his left hand on the nose wheel steering and his right hand on the thrust levers. The first officer then took over the control wheel. The commander has stated that he felt that the brakes were working until they were about half way down the runway, after which the expected retardation did not occur. The aircraft had then got so far down the runway that it was too late to abort the landing. The commander applied full force on both brake pedals, without achieving a normal braking action. In an attempt to improve retardation he moved the brake selector lever from the 'Green' position to the 'Yellow' position, but this did not help. He then moved the lever to the 'Emergency Brake' position, whereby the aircraft's anti-skid system was disconnected. At that point the commander realised that it was impossible to stop the aircraft, even by continuously applying full pressure on the brake pedals, and that the aircraft would probably run off the runway. He considered that it was not advisable to let the aircraft run off the runway towards the steep area to the left of the aircraft or towards the rocks on the right. His local knowledge told him that the best alternative was therefore to steer the aircraft towards the end of the runway. In a last attempt to stop the aircraft, he steered it towards the right half of the runway and then manoeuvred it with the intent to skid sideways towards the left. The commander hoped that skidding would increase friction and hopefully help to reduce the speed of the aircraft. The aircraft left the runway in a skid a few metres to the left of the centerline. The commander believed that he would have been able to stop the aircraft had the runway been longer by approximately 50-100 metres. The first officer believed that the aircraft had a speed of approximately 5-10 km/h when it left the edge and that they would have been able to stop had the runway been 10-15 metres longer. The AFIS duty officer has stated that he followed OY-CRG visually during parts of the approach and landing. He believed that the aircraft may have flown a little higher and faster than normal during the final approach. The duty officer was not quite sure about where the aircraft touched down, but he estimated that it was within the first third of the runway. For a moment during the rollout OY-CRG was obscured for the AFIS duty officer behind an aircraft of the same type (OY-RCW) from Atlantic Airways that was parked at the apron (see Figure 2). When the AFIS duty officer again got the aircraft in sight, he realised that something was not right. The aircraft had a greater speed than normal. He saw that the aircraft towards the end turned into the right half and then turned back towards the left half of the runway. The duty officer observed the plane leave the runway in a skid at approximately 45° in relation to the runway direction. The duty officer immediately triggered the crash alarm. The AFIS duty officer has stated that the speed of the aircraft was moderate enough for him to hope for a while that it would be able to stop before reaching the end of the runway. He suggested that the aircraft would perhaps have been able to stop had the runway been another 50 metres long. He felt that it was unreal when the aircraft's tail fin moved high into the air and he witnessed the aircraft disappear off the end of the runway. The AFIS duty officer had previously seen blue smoke coming from the main wheels of other aircraft of the same type during braking. He observed a great deal of dampness and smoke emanating from the back of the main wheels of OY-CRG during rollout. The spray, which was about 30% higher than the top of the main wheels, appeared to form a triangle behind the wheels. The spray was of a white colour, extended considerably higher than during previous landings and continued along the length of the runway. He did not register whether the aircraft's spoilers were deployed or not, but he saw that the aircraft continued to produce wake vortices during rollout. When smoke started rising from the crash site, he saw that the fire crews were already on their way. In accordance with procedure, the fire and rescue service at Stord airport are on standby beside the fire engines when aircraft take off and land at the airport. The duty officer and three firemen were therefore in position at the fire station and observed the landing. The duty officer believed that the aircraft touched down in the standard place, possibly a little further along the runway than usual. Everything appeared to be normal until an estimated five to ten seconds after touchdown, when they noticed that the speed of the aircraft was higher than usual. When OY-CRG passed the taxiway to the south, the duty officer and firefighter n°1 both heard that the aircraft was beginning to brake heavy, because of the extremely loud noises emitted by the aircraft’s tyres and brakes. The duty officer had heard similar noises on some other occasions, but only for a second or two as aircraft were brought to a full stop or passed painted areas of the runway. In the case of OY-CRG the noises were persistent. They also observed that the wings continued to produce wake vortices during rollout, something they had not seen before. They realised that the aircraft would need assistance and prepared to respond. The last that the duty officer saw of the aircraft was when it skidded with its nose pointing an estimated 45° towards the left and banked violently to the right as it left the runway. In his opinion, the speed of the aircraft at that point was approximately 30-70 km/h (16-38 kt). When the aircraft disappeared over the edge of the runway and the crash alarm was activated, the airport's two fire engines were on their way to the site. The passengers interviewed by the AIBN provided varying descriptions of the approach and landing, but none of them noticed any braking action after touchdown. All the passengers have confirmed that the aircraft swayed from side to side when nearing the end of the runway. They heard the 'screeching' of brakes and the aircraft turned leftwards. One person observed blue smoke coming from the wheels. One person believed that one of the engines on the left increased its speed. Most passengers felt that the speed was relatively low when the aircraft tipped over the edge of the runway. The cabin crew seated at the back of the cabin have stated that the flight proceeded as usual until the landing at Stord airport, apart from the fact that, shortly before landing, she heard a relatively loud whistling noise. She said that she has heard similar noises during other flights, but not so loud. She assumed that the noise came from the seal around the door to her left. She did not otherwise register anything out of the ordinary until the aircraft left the runway.

On approach to Tarakan-Juwata Airport, the crew was informed of the poor visibility due smoke emanating from forest fire. After touchdown on runway 06/24 which is 1,845 metres long, the aircraft went out of control, veered off runway, lost its undercarriage and one engine and came to rest. All 110 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reported to be about 400 metres, below minimums.

The crew was performing a local training flight at Decatur Airport, consisting of touch-and-go maneuvers. On final approach to runway 24, the instructor elected to simulate a failure of the right engine. Anticipating the touch-and-go procedure, the instructor deactivated the yaw damper system while the aircraft was about 10-20 feet above the runway. As the speed increased, the instructor called out 'speed' twice when the copilot reduced the power on the left engine. The aircraft rolled to the right, causing the right wingtip to struck the ground. The aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest, bursting into flames. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was destroyed.