Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

It seems that a tyre on the right main gear burst after touchdown, causing the gear to collapse. A fire erupted, caused by the rubbing of the engine nacelle on ground.

Late use of the normal brake systems on part of the crew after landing, causing the aircraft to overran. The captain had the habit of braking the aircraft while using the reverse thrust systems only in order to save the braking systems. Doing so, the use of the normal brakes was delayed.

The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control during the approach after encountering a gusty crosswind, which resulted in an accelerated stall and uncontrolled descent.

No investigation was conducted by the NTSB.

The improper installation of the nose landing gear strut and subsequent collapse of the nose landing gear during landing.

The accident investigators, taking into account the characteristics of the accident and the evidence collected in the course of the investigation, considered the Human Factor as the reason for this accident, being able to demonstrate convincingly the following causes:
- There was a breach of the provisions in Chapter 4 (flight operations policies), paragraph 6 (sterile cabin) of the Operations Manual of the airline due to carrying out activities that were not related to the conduct of the flight.
- Lack of situational awareness of the Flight Instructor, the observer pilot and the first officer.
- The captain performed other duties, adding to the duties already being accomplished in his role as a flight instructor.

The Accident Investigation Commission assigned by Nepal's Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation have submitted their report to the Ministry. The investigators said in a media briefing, that human factors, mainly fatigue by the captain of the flight, led to the crash. The aircraft was flown by the first officer and was on approach to Kathmandu at 5,000 feet MSL instead of 6,000 feet MSL as required, when it entered a cloud. While inside the cloud in low visibility the aircraft descended, hit tree tops and broke up. The captain had flown another aircraft the previous day and had been assigned to the accident flight on short notice in the morning of the accident day, but did not have sufficient rest. The commission analyzed that due to the resulting fatigue the captain assigned pilot flying duties to the first officer although she wasn't yet ready to cope with the task in demanding conditions. The newly assigned first officer had only 18 hours experience on the aircraft type. The mountain view round trip had to turn back about midway due to weather conditions. While on a visual approach to Kathmandu at 5,000 instead of 6,000 feet MSL the aircraft entered a cloud and started to descend until impact with tree tops. The crew did not follow standard operating procedures, that amongst other details required the aircraft to fly at or above 6,000 feet MSL in the accident area, the interaction between the crew members did not follow standard operating procedures, for example the captain distracted the first officer with frequent advice instead of explaining the/adhering to procedures. The commission said as result of the investigation they released a safety recommendation requiring all operators to install Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS) in addition to eight other safety recommendations regarding pilot training, installation of visual aids, safety audit and fleet policies.

The pilot's failure to obtain a proper touchdown point, which resulted in a runway undershoot.

The Board of Inquiry estimated that the probable cause of this accident was the crew's decision to continue the approach and landing without carrying out the procedures (ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES) established by Embraer in the Quick Reference Handbook when a malfunction occurred with the slat/flap system, resulting in a wrong approach configuration.
The following findings were identified:
- The slats were inoperative during the approach and the crew performed five trouble shooting without success,
- Despite this situation, the crew decided to continue the approach, failed to follow the approach checklist and failed to input the reference speed and distance for landing according to circumstances,
- The aircraft landed too far down the runway, about 880 metres past the runway 35 threshold,
- The braking action was low because the runway surface was wet,
- In normal conditions, with flaps down in second position and slats out, the landing reference speed was 119 knots with a landing distance of 880 metres,
- Because the slats were inoperative, the landing reference speed should be 149 knots and a landing distance of 1,940 metres was needed,
- The aircraft passed over the runway threshold at a height of 50 feet and at an excessive speed of 163,8 knots,
- Spoilers were activated 9 seconds after touchdown, 950 metres after the runway threshold,
- Reverse thrust systems were activated 1,280 metres after the runway threshold,
- The crew started to use brakes 2,300 metres after the runway threshold (runway 35 is 3,125 metres long), with the antiskid system activated,
- Due to an excessive approach speed (15 knots above Vref), a too long flare and a too late application of the brake systems, the aircraft could not be stopped within the remaining distance,
- The slats malfunction was the consequence of the failure of several actuators which did not support negative temperatures met during the last flight,
- Since last July 19, the slats failed 53 times on this aircraft, six times during the approach and 47 times in flight,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure.