Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo Chieftain in Mount Isa

Date & Time: Jul 17, 2008 at 0915 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-IHR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Century Mine - Mount Isa
MSN:
31-8012077
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
469
Captain / Total hours on type:
30.00
Circumstances:
On 17 July 2008, at approximately 0915 Eastern Standard Time1, the pilot of a Piper Navajo PA-31 aircraft, registered VH-IHR, was en route from Century Mine, Qld to Mt Isa, Qld when the left engine lost power. The pilot transmitted an urgency broadcast (PAN) to air traffic control (ATC). A short time later, the right engine also lost power. The pilot then transmitted a distress signal (MAYDAY) to ATC stating his intention to carry out an off-field emergency landing. The aircraft impacted terrain 22 km north of Mt Isa, about 4 km from the Barkly Highway, in relatively flat, sparsely wooded bushland (Figure 1). The pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries.
Probable cause:
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the fuel starvation event and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.
- The pilot did not monitor outboard fuel tank quantity during the flight.
- The pilot incorrectly diagnosed the engine power losses.
- The aircraft was not in the correct configuration for the forced landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fletcher FU-24-950 in Kaihoka

Date & Time: Apr 26, 2008 at 1115 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZK-DZC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
205
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3500
Captain / Total hours on type:
1928.00
Circumstances:
During takeoff the topdressing aircraft collided with a low hill. The pilot lost control soon after the collision. During the ensuing crash he was seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Cause factors reported by pilot were a possible tailwind component, and the aircraft may have been overloaded for the conditions.

Crash of a Swearingen SA227AC Metro III off Sydney: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 9, 2008 at 2327 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-OZA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sydney – Brisbane
MSN:
AC-600
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
4873
Captain / Total hours on type:
175.00
Aircraft flight hours:
32339
Aircraft flight cycles:
46710
Circumstances:
On 9 April 2008, at 2325 Eastern Standard Time, a Fairchild Industries Inc. SA227-AC (Metro III) aircraft, registered VH-OZA, departed Sydney Airport, New South Wales on a freight charter flight to Brisbane, Queensland with one pilot on board. The aircraft was subsequently observed on radar to be turning right, contrary to air traffic control instructions to turn left to an easterly heading. The pilot reported that he had a ‘slight technical fault’ and no other transmissions were heard from the pilot. Recorded radar data showed the aircraft turning right and then left, followed by a descent and climb, a second right turn and a second descent before radar returns were lost when the aircraft was at an altitude of 3,740 ft above mean sea level and descending at over 10,000 ft/min. Air traffic control initiated search actions and search vessels later recovered a small amount of aircraft wreckage floating in the ocean, south of the last recorded radar position. The pilot was presumed to be fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. Both of the aircraft’s on-board flight recorders were subsequently recovered from the ocean floor. They contained data from a number of previous flights, but not for the accident flight. There was no evidence of a midair breakup of the aircraft.
Probable cause:
Contributing Safety Factors:
- It was very likely that the aircraft’s alternating current electrical power system was not energised at any time during the flight.
- It was very likely that the aircraft became airborne without a functioning primary attitude reference or autopilot that, combined with the added workload of managing the ‘slight technical fault’, led to pilot spatial disorientation and subsequent loss of control.
Other Safety Factors:
- The pilot’s Metro III endorsement training was not conducted in accordance with the operator’s approved training and checking manual, with the result that the pilot’s competence and ultimately, safety of the operation could not be assured. [Significant safety issue].
- The chief pilot was performing the duties and responsibilities of several key positions in the operator’s organisational structure, increasing the risk of omissions in the operator’s training and checking requirements.
- The conduct of the flight single-pilot increased the risk of errors of omission, such as not turning on or noticing the failure of aircraft items and systems, or complying with directions.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fletcher FU-24-954 in Raglan

Date & Time: Jan 31, 2008 at 0630 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZK-JNX
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
275
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from a remote terrain located in Te Uku, near Raglan, the pilot lost control of the aircraft that collided with a fence and crashed, bursting into flames. The pilot escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Crash of a Fletcher FU-24-950EX in Opotiki: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 10, 2007 at 1320 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZK-EGV
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
244
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5243
Captain / Total hours on type:
4889.00
Circumstances:
On the afternoon of Friday 9 November 2007, the pilot of ZK-EGV, a specialised agricultural aeroplane powered by a turbine engine, began a task to sow 80 tonnes of superphosphate over a farm situated in low hills 5 km south of Opotiki township and 4 km from the Opotiki aerodrome. The pilot was familiar with the farm’s airstrip where he loaded the product, and with the farm. After 6 or 7 loads, the wind was too strong for top-dressing, so the pilot and loader-driver flew back to their base at the Whakatane aerodrome, about 40 km away. At Whakatane, the aeroplane’s fuel tanks were filled. Later that day, the pilot replaced the display for the aeroplane’s precision sowing guidance system, which had a software fault. The next morning, 10 November 2007, the pilot bicycled about 6 km from his house to the Whakatane aerodrome. The loader-driver said that the pilot looked “pretty tired” from the effort when he arrived at the aerodrome at about 0545. After the aeroplane had been started using its internal batteries, the pilot and loader-driver flew to complete a task at a farm west of Whakatane. The pilot’s notebook recorded that he began the task at 0610 and took 45 loads to spread the remaining 68 tonnes of product, an average load of 1511 kilograms (kg). The loader-driver said that the pilot had determined about 2 months earlier that the scales on the loader used at that airstrip were “weighing light” by about 200 kg, so the loader-driver allowed for that difference. After that task, the pilot and loader-driver flew back to the farm south of Opotiki where they had been the previous afternoon. A different loader at that airstrip had accurate scales, and the loader-driver said that he loaded 1500 kg each time, as requested by the pilot. The fertiliser that remained in the farm airstrip storage bin after the accident was found to be dry and free flowing. The sowing task at this farm began at 1010 and the pilot stopped after every hour to uplift 180 litres (L) of fuel, which weighed 144 kg. During the last refuel stop, between 1226 and 1245, he had a snack and a drink. Sowing recommenced at 1245 with about 3 minutes between each load, the last load being put on at about 1316. The loader-driver said the wind at the airstrip was light and the pilot did not report any problem with the aeroplane. After the last refuel, the top-dressing had been mostly out of sight of the loader-driver. When the aeroplane did not return when expected for the next load, the loader driver tried 3 or 4 times to call the cellphone installed in the aeroplane. This was unsuccessful, so at 1338 he followed the operator’s emergency procedure and called 111 to report that the aeroplane was overdue. Telephone records showed that on 10 November 2007 the aeroplane cellphone had been connected for a total of more than 90 minutes on 14 voice calls, and had been used to send or receive 10 text messages. Correlation of the call times with the job details recorded by the pilot suggested he sent most of his messages while the aeroplane was on the ground. Nearly all of the calls and messages involved a female work colleague who was a friend. The pilot initiated most calls by sending a message, but each time that the signal was lost during a call, the friend would stop the call and immediately re-dial the aeroplane phone; so, in some cases, consecutive connections were parts of one long conversation. The longest session exceeded 35 minutes. The nature of the calls could not be determined, but the friend claimed the content of the last phone call was not acrimonious or likely to have agitated the pilot. The friend advised that the pilot had said he often made the phone calls to help himself stay alert. At 1153, in a phone call to his home, the pilot indicated that the job was going well and he might be home by about 1400. In one call to the friend, the pilot said that he was a bit tired and that he hoped the wind would increase enough that afternoon to force him to cancel the next job. At 1308:45, the friend called the aeroplane phone and talked with the pilot until the call was disconnected at 1320:14. The friend said that while the pilot had been talking, the volume of his voice decreased slightly then there was a “static” sound. Apart from the reduced volume, the pilot’s voice had sounded normal and he had not suggested anything untoward regarding the job or the aeroplane. The friend immediately called back, but got the answerphone message from the aeroplane phone. Two further attempts to contact the pilot were unsuccessful, but the friend did not consider that anything untoward might have happened. An orchardist who was working approximately 3 km from the farm being top-dressed had heard an aeroplane flying nearby for some hours before he heard a loud sound that led him to fear that there had been an accident. He noted that the time was 1320 and immediately began to search the surrounding area. After the loader-driver’s emergency call, the Police organised an aerial search, which found the wreckage of the aeroplane at 1435 on the edge of a grove of native trees, approximately 600 metres (m) northwest of the area being top-dressed. The pilot had been killed. His body was not removed until 26 hours after the accident, because of a Police concern not to disturb the wreckage until aviation accident investigators were present. The CAA began an investigation that day into the accident and the Commission sent an investigator to help determine whether there were any similarities with another Fletcher accident that the Commission was then investigating. On 19 November 2007, because of potential issues that concerned regulatory oversight, the Commission started its own inquiry.
Probable cause:
Findings are listed in order of development and not in order of priority.
- The reason for the aeroplane colliding with trees was not conclusively determined. However, the pilot was affected by a number of fatigue-inducing factors, none of which should have been significant on its own. The combination of these factors and the added distractions of a prolonged cell phone call and a minor equipment failure were considered likely to have diverted the pilot’s attention from his primary task of monitoring the aeroplane’s flight path.
- Although pilot incapacitation could not be ruled out entirely, it was considered that the pilot’s state of health had not directly contributed to the accident.
- The potential distraction of cellphones during critical phases of flight under VFR was not specifically addressed by CARs.
- Apart from the probable failure of the GPS sowing guidance equipment, no evidence was found to suggest that the aeroplane was unserviceable at the time of the accident, but its airworthiness certificate was invalid because there was no record that the mandatory post-flight checks of the vertical tail fin had been completed in the previous 3 days.
- The installation of a powerful turbine engine without an effective means of de-rating the power created the potential for excessive power demands and possible structural overload, but this was not considered to have contributed to the accident.
- The pilot was an experienced agricultural pilot in current practice. Although he had met the operator’s continued competency requirements, the operator’s method of conducting his last 2 competency checks was likely to have made them invalid in terms of the CAR requirements.
- Although the aeroplane was grossly overloaded and the hopper load exceeded the structural limit on the take-off prior to the accident, neither exceedance contributed to the accident, and the aeroplane was not overloaded at the time of the accident.
- The emergency locator transmitter did not radiate a useful signal because of damage to the antenna socket on the unit. The installation was also not in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or the recommended practice.
Final Report:

Crash of a PAC Cresco 08-600 near Tully: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 16, 2007 at 1513 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-XMN
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Ingham - Tully
MSN:
036
YOM:
2002
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
397
Captain / Total hours on type:
138.00
Circumstances:
The pilot was ferrying the aircraft under the visual flight rules (VFR) from the operator’s base at Tully, Qld to Ingham and return. The flights, conducted in the private category without passengers, were to allow aircraft maintenance to be conducted at Ingham. The flight from Tully to Ingham was conducted in the morning, with no reported difficulties. At 1454 Eastern Standard Time, the pilot departed Ingham on the return flight to Tully. The aircraft did not arrive at Tully. It was not until the next day that the pilot and aircraft were reported missing. Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR) was notified and a search, based on the last air traffic control radar observed position of an unidentified aircraft from a replay of recorded radar data together with witness reports from the area, was initiated. Searchers located the aircraft wreckage on the morning of 18 August. The aircraft had impacted mountainous terrain in a state forest 24 km south of Tully. The pilot was fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Contributing safety factors:
• The aircraft probably entered an area of weather that deteriorated below visual meteorological conditions and for which the pilot was not experienced or qualified.
• The pilot probably became unsure of his position in poor visibility, leading to controlled flight into terrain, fatally injuring the pilot and destroying the aircraft.
Other safety factors:
• The aircraft had not been configured for poor visibility operations, possibly increasing the pilot’s difficulty in navigating.
• The pilot did not submit any form of flight notification such as a SARTIME or Flight Note, as required for a flight in a designated remote area, resulting in a delay to the search and rescue response.
• The operator did not have procedures to provide assurance that a search and rescue would be initiated in a timely way if one of their aircraft did not arrive at the planned destination. [Safety issue]
• As a result of damage to the emergency locator beacon antenna, the beacon did not alert search and rescue organisations to the aircraft accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 off Moorea: 20 killed

Date & Time: Aug 9, 2007 at 1201 LT
Operator:
Registration:
F-OIQI
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Moorea – Papeete
MSN:
608
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
QE1121
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
19
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
20
Captain / Total flying hours:
3514
Captain / Total hours on type:
298.00
Aircraft flight hours:
30833
Aircraft flight cycles:
55044
Circumstances:
On Thursday 9 August 2007, the DHC-6 aeroplane registered F-OIQI was scheduled to fly a public transport flight (QE1121) between Moorea and Tahiti Faa’a with a pilot and 19 passengers on board. The flight, with an average duration of 7 minutes, is performed under VFR at a planned cruise altitude of 600 feet. The following information is derived from the on-board audio recording and witness statements. At 21 h 53 min 22, startup was authorised. The pilot made the safety announcement in English and in French: “Ladies and Gentlemen, hello and welcome on board. Please fasten your seatbelts”. At 21 h 57 min 19, the air traffic controller cleared the aeroplane to taxi towards holding point Bravo on runway 12. At 21 h 58 min 10, the aeroplane was cleared to line up. It taxied up the runway and lined up at the level of the second taxiway. At 22 h 00 min 06, the aeroplane was cleared for takeoff. Six seconds later the engines were powered up. At 22 h 00 min 58, the pilot retracted the flaps. At 22 h 01 min 07, propeller speed was reduced. At 22 h 01 min 09 the pilot uttered an expression of surprise. Two GPWS warnings sounded, propeller speed increased and four further GPWS warnings sounded. The aeroplane struck the surface of the sea at 22 h 01 min 20. One minute and eight seconds elapsed between engine power-up and the end of the audio recording. Fourteen bodies were recovered during the rescue operations. Some aeroplane debris, including parts of the right main gear and seat cushions were recovered by fishermen and the rescue team. Some days later, at a depth of seven hundred metres, a fifteenth body was recovered during operations to recover the flight recorder, both engines, the instrument panel, the front part of the cockpit including engine and flaps controls, the flaps jackscrews and the tail section. It was noted that the rudder and elevator control cables were broken off in their forward parts and that the elevator pitch-up control cable had, in its aft part, a second failure whose appearance was different from that observed on the other failures that were examined.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the loss of airplane pitch control following the failure, at a low height, of the elevator pitch-up control cable at the time the flaps were retracted. This failure was due to the following series of phenomena:
- Significant wear on the cable in line with a cable guide;
- An external phenomenon, most likely jet blast, which caused the failure of several strands;
- The failure of the last strand or strands under in-flight loads on the elevator control system.
The following factors may have contributed to the accident:
- The absence of information and training for pilots on a loss of pitch control;
- The operator’s failure to carry out some special inspections;
- The failure by the manufacturer and the airworthiness authority to fully take into account the wear phenomenon;
- The failure by the airworthiness authorities, airport authorities and operators to fully take into account the risks associated with jet blast;
- The rules for replacement of stainless steel cables on a calendar basis, without taking into account the activity of the airplane in relation to its type of operation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Shrike Commander 500S in Clonbinane: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 31, 2007 at 2000 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-YJB
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Melbourne – Shepparton
MSN:
500-3299
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2342
Captain / Total hours on type:
970.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4558
Circumstances:
At 1946 Eastern Standard Time on 31 July 2007, a Rockwell International Aero Commander 500S, registered VH-YJB (YJB), departed Essendon Airport, Vic. on a business flight to Shepparton that was conducted at night under the instrument flight rules (IFR). On board were the pilot and one passenger. At 1958, while in the cruise at 7,000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) in Class C controlled airspace, radar and radio contact with the aircraft was lost simultaneously by air traffic control when it was about 25 NM (46 km) north-north-east of Essendon. The air traffic controller declared a distress phase after a number of unsuccessful attempts to contact the pilot. At 2003, the Operations Director at Melbourne Centre declared the aircraft as probably lost and advised AusSAR. A search was commenced using a helicopter and an aeroplane in addition to ground search parties. No emergency locator transmitter signal was reported. At 2147, aircraft wreckage was located by a searching aircraft in timbered ranges near Clonbinane, approximately 50 km north of Melbourne. At about 2200, a ground search party confirmed that the wreckage was that of YJB and that there were no survivors. The flight was arranged to take the company owner, who was also a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer (LAME), to Shepparton to replace an unserviceable starter motor in another of the operator‟s aircraft. The pilot, who had landed at Essendon at 1915 from a previous flight in another of the operator‟s aircraft, was tasked to fly the owner to Shepparton. The pilot transferred to YJB, which had previously been prepared for flight by another company pilot. At 1938, while taxiing for takeoff, the pilot advised the aerodrome controller of the intention to conduct the IFR flight, adding, „…and request a big favour for a submission of a flight plan, with an urgent departure Essendon [to] Shepparton [and] return‟. The aerodrome controller did not have the facilities for processing flight notifications and sought the assistance of a controller in the Melbourne air traffic control centre. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident. Residents living in the vicinity of the accident site were inside their homes and reported difficulty hearing anything above the noise made by the wind and the foliage being blown about. One of the residents reported hearing a brief, loud engine noise. Another resident thought the noise was that of a noisy vehicle on the road. The noise was described as being constant, „…not spluttering or misfiring‟ and lasted for only a few seconds. Some of those residents near the accident site reported hearing and feeling an impact only moments after the engine noise ceased. The aircraft was seriously damaged by excessive in-flight aerodynamic forces and impact with the terrain. The vegetation in the immediate vicinity of the main aircraft wreckage was slightly damaged as the aircraft descended, nearly vertically, through the trees. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
Structural failure and damage:
From the detailed examination and study of the aircraft wreckage undertaken by ATSB investigation staff, it was evident that all principal structural failures had occurred under gross overstress conditions i.e. stresses significantly in excess of the physical strength of the respective structures. The examination found no evidence of pre-existing cracking, damage or material degradation that could have appreciably reduced the strength of the failed sections, nor was there any indication that the original manufacture, maintenance or repair processes carried out on the aircraft were in any way contributory to the failures sustained.

Breakup sequence:
From the localised deformation associated with the spar failures, it was evident that the aircraft had sustained a large negative (downward) loading on the wing structure. That downward load resulted in the localised bending failure of the wing around the station 145 position (145” outboard of the aircraft centreline). The symmetry of both wing failures and the absence of axial twisting within the fuselage section suggested that the load encountered was sudden and well in excess of the ultimate strength of the wing structure. Based upon the witness marks on both wing under-surfaces and the crushing and paint transfer along the leading edges of the horizontal stabilisers, it was concluded that after separating from the inboard structure, both wings had moved aft in an axial twisting and rotating fashion; simultaneously impacting the leading edges of both horizontal tailplanes. Forces imparted into the empennage structure from that impact subsequently produced the rearward separation of the complete empennage from the fuselage. The loss of the left engine nacelle fairing was likely brought about through an impact with a section of wing leading edge as it rotated under and to the rear. The damage sustained by all of the aircraft‟s control surfaces was consistent with failure and separation from their respective primary structure under overstress conditions associated with the breakup of the aircraft. There was no evidence of cyclic or oscillatory movement of the surfaces before separation that might have suggested the contribution of an aerodynamic flutter effects.

Findings
The following statements are a summary of the verified findings made during the progress of the aircraft wreckage structural examination and analysis:
- All principal failures within the aircraft wings, tailplanes and empennage had occurred as a result of exposure to gross overstress conditions.
- The damage sustained by the aircraft wreckage was consistent with the aircraft having sustained multiple in-flight structural failures.
- The damage sustained by the aircraft wreckage was consistent with the structural failure sequence being initiated by the symmetric, downward bending failure of both wing sections, outboard of the engine nacelles.
- Breakup and separation of the empennage was consistent with having been initiated by impact of the separated outboard wings with the leading edges of the horizontal stabilisers.
- There was no evidence of material or manufacturing abnormalities within the aircraft structure that could be implicated in the failures and breakup sustained.
- There was no evidence of service-related degradation mechanisms (such as corrosion, fatigue cracking or environmental cracking) having affected the aircraft structure in the areas of failure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 404 Titan II in Goroka

Date & Time: May 19, 2007
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
P2-ALK
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
404-0222
YOM:
1978
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight, the pilot started the approach to Goroka Airport in poor weather conditions. After landing on runway 17R, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest few dozen metres further. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Perth

Date & Time: Apr 9, 2007 at 1703 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-SGT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Perth - Mount Hale
MSN:
BB-73
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On 9 April 2007, at 1703 Western Standard Time (WST), the main landing gear from a Beech Super King Air 200 aircraft, registered VH-SGT, collapsed on landing at Perth airport. Approximately two hours earlier, the aircraft was chartered to fly from Perth to Mount Hale, WA when shortly after takeoff from Perth the aircraft experienced a malfunction of the landing gear system. The main wheels and nose gear had become jammed and were unable to fully retract when selected up by the pilot. The pilot completed the emergency checklist actions contained in the Aircraft Flight Manual, but was unable to retract or extend the gear using either the automated control or the manual emergency system. The pilot then requested assistance from a passenger to operate the manual emergency extension system. The landing gear remained jammed despite the additional force applied to the lever from the passenger. The pilot contacted air traffic services and requested further assistance from company engineering personnel to visually assess the extension state of the landing gear. Two aerodrome passes were completed throughout the troubleshooting exercise and the pilot remained in radio contact with both groups during this phase. Following the flyovers and after holding over Rottnest Island at 5,000 ft for a period of approximately two hours, the pilot flew the King Air back to Perth airport. With the gear still jammed in the partially retracted position, both the left and right main landing gear assemblies collapsed after the aircraft touched down on Runway 24. The aircraft was substantially damaged as a result of the collapse (Figure 1). The airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF) services and other relevant agencies had been alerted and were waiting in response when the King Air landed. No injuries were sustained by the pilot or any of the nine passengers on board.
Probable cause:
From the evidence available, the investigation revealed that two major system components had failed which could have prevented the Beechcraft Super King Air 200 landing gear from properly retracting after takeoff. The following findings with respect to those failed landing gear system components should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.
Contributing safety factors:
• The left torque tube support bearing had not been lubricated and had seized due to the accumulation of dirt and grit contaminants that had migrated from the external service environment and into the bearing.
• The geared components within the right main landing gear actuator prematurely failed.
Other safety factors:
• The aircraft manufacturer’s maintenance manual contained insufficient instruction or guidance for operators and maintainers of Super King Air 200 aircraft for the lubrication of the landing gear torque tube support bearings.
Other key findings:
• Both component assemblies were integral to the function and normal operation of the Super King Air 200 mechanical landing gear system. A break down of either component assembly would have prevented any attempt by the pilot to retract or extend the aircraft’s main landing gear. However, while either failure could have produced the landing gear difficulties sustained, the investigation was not able to determine which mechanism was the principal contributor to the event.
• The investigation was unable to conclusively establish why the geared components within the right main landing gear actuator had prematurely failed.
• The lower thrust bearing within the right main landing gear actuator had been correctly installed.
Final Report: