North America

The pilot reported that while enroute, a low fuel level annunciation occurred. The pilot subsequently prepared to divert to a nearby airport due to low fuel. Within 2 minutes the left engine shut down, followed by the right. The pilot asked air traffic control for vectors to the nearest airport. The sky conditions were clear with no moon, no horizon and no terrain feature visible. While approaching the airport at approximately 2,000 feet above the runway, the airport runway lighting turned off. The pilot was unable to turn the lights back on and subsequently used the terminal and ramp lights to maneuver the airplane to the runway. The airplane touched down and veered off the runway, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported to a first responder that there were no pre accident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation and that he ran out of gas.

The airplane sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Thedford, Nebraska. The pilot and passenger were uninjured. The airplane was being operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that during landing, when the nose wheel made contact with the runway, the airplane began to veer right. He attempted to use left rudder and brake to keep the airplane on the runway, but as the airspeed decreased, directional control became harder to maintain and the airplane subsequently departed the right side of the runway. During the runway excursion, the airplane impacted a runway light, spun left and the landing gear collapsed. During a post accident examination, it was determined that the airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing.

On 28 February 2023, the Cessna 208B Caravan (208B) aircraft (registration C-GMVB) operated by 1401380 Ontario Limited, doing business as Wilderness North Air (WNA), was scheduled for 2 cargo flights from Nakina Airport (CYQN), Ontario, to Fort Hope Airport (CYFH), Ontario. The occurrence pilot, who had recently been promoted to pilot-in-command (PIC) on the 208B aircraft, was scheduled to fly alone in daytime visual flight rules (VFR) conditions. After reviewing the weather information with his colleagues at their morning briefing, he assessed that the weather was satisfactory for the flight and noted that the winds were forecast to be gusty. A pilot who was present at the briefing but was not scheduled for flight duty that day offered to accompany him. For all flights that day, the occurrence pilot would be the PIC and occupy the left seat, and the 2nd pilot went along as an extra crew member without any assigned duties, occupying the right seat. The cargo was loaded onto the aircraft, and the 1st flight of the day departed CYQN at 1020 and landed in CYFH at 1055. After unloading the cargo, they departed CYFH at 1120 and returned to CYQN at 1156. The pilots loaded the aircraft with cargo for their 2nd flight to CYFH. According to the load sheet, there were 3320 pounds of groceries and household goods on board. The pilots refuelled the aircraft and departed from Runway 27 at approximately 1245. A few minutes after departure, it was reported that they made a radio call on the aerodrome traffic frequency, indicating their location and an estimated time of arrival at CYFH of 1330. Approximately 30 minutes after the occurrence flight departed, a 2nd 208B aircraft (registration C-FUYC) operated by WNA departed also from CYQN to CYFH, with cargo for a different customer. The flight crew encountered snow showers en route, and shortly after they arrived at CYFH at 1400, there was a snow squall, which significantly reduced visibility. At that time, 2 customers were waiting at CYFH for their cargo, and it soon became apparent that the occurrence aircraft had not yet arrived. At approximately 1430, WNA personnel at CYQN were informed that the occurrence aircraft had not arrived at 1330 as expected. At 1445, management at WNA notified the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC), in Trenton, Ontario, that the aircraft was overdue. WNA began its own aerial search along the flight path using C-FUYC, which departed CYFH at 1510 with 2 crew members on board, flew along the direct route of flight of the missing aircraft, and returned to CYQN at 1546. They refuelled the aircraft and departed on another search flight at 1620, with 2 additional pilots in the back to act as spotters. They searched along the route of flight until 1840 and returned to CYQN. JRCC had initiated its response at 1500, and the first tasked aircraft arrived in the search area at 1700. The search continued over the following 4 days. The occurrence aircraft was found on 04 March 2023, 30.8 nautical miles north-northwest of CYQN along the direct track to CYFH. Both pilots were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. There was no post-crash fire. There was no emergency locator transmitter (ELT) on the occurrence aircraft because it had been removed for recertification.

The single engine airplane departed Reno-Tahoe Airport Runway 16L at 2058LT on an ambulance flight to Salt Lake City, carrying four passengers and one pilot. During initial climb, the pilot made two successive turns to the left according to the procedure then continued to the northeast. At 2113LT, at an altitude of 19,400 feet and at a speed of 191 knots, the airplane initiated a right turn then entered a spiraled descent and crashed one minute later in a snow covered prairie located southwest of Stagecoach. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and all five occupants were killed, a pilot, a flight nurse, a flight paramedic, a patient and a patient’s family member.

Shortly after takeoff from runway 18 at Little Rock-Bill & Hillary Clinton (Adams Field) Airport, while in initial climb in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a wooded area located about 1,500 metres past the runway end, near a stone quarry, bursting into flames. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all five occupants were killed. Employees of the CTEH Company, they were en route to Columbus responding to an emergency response plan. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with a visibility of 2 SM due to rain. Four minutes prior to the accident, the wind was 19 knots gusting to 27 knots and five minutes after the accident, the wind was gusting to 40 knots.

The pilot was landing at the destination airport with a gusting crosswind. Upon touchdown, he established the aileron controls for the crosswind and applied the brakes; however, no braking action was observed. The airplane subsequently drifted left and departed the runway pavement. It came to rest upright in the grass infield area adjacent to the runway. The outboard portion of the right wing separated which resulted in substantial damage. Data indicated that the airplane was 14 knots or more above the published landing reference speed when it crossed the runway threshold, and it touched down about 2,000 ft from the threshold. The left and right weight-on-wheels (WOW) parameters transitioned from air to ground consistent with initial touchdown; however, the left WOW parameter transitioned back to air about 2 seconds later. The right WOW parameter remained on ground until the airplane departed the runway pavement. A detailed review of the Central Maintenance Function (CMF) data files did not reveal any record of airplane system anomalies from the time the airplane lifted off until it touched down. Multiple system anomalies were recorded after the runway excursion consistent with airframe damage sustained during the accident sequence. The brake system touchdown protection is designed to prevent brake application until wheel spin-up occurs to avoid the possibility of inadvertently landing with a locked wheel due to brake application. After weight-on-wheels has been true for three seconds, power braking is enabled. It is likely that the lack of positive weight-on-wheel parameters inhibited brake application due to the touchdown protection function and resulted in the pilot not observing any braking action. The excess airspeed, extended touchdown, and transient weight-on-wheels parameters were consistent with the airplane floating during the landing flare and with the application of aileron controls for the crosswind conditions. The airplane was not equipped with wing-mounted speed brakes which would have assisted in maintaining weight-on-wheels during the initial portion of the landing. The most recent wind report, transmitted by the tower controller when the airplane was on a 3- mile final, presented a 70° crosswind at 15 knots, gusting to 25 knots. The corresponding crosswind gust component was about 24 knots. The airplane flight manual specified a crosswind limitation of 20 kts for takeoff and landing; therefore, the crosswind at the time of the accident exceeded the airframe crosswind limitation and would have made control during touchdown difficult. The pilot reported that he had made two requests with the approach controller to land on a different runway, but those requests were denied. The investigation was unable to make any determination regarding a pilot request for an alternate runway. Federal Aviation Regulations stated that the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft. The regulations also stated that no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations. The pilot’s ultimate acceptance of the runway assignment which likely exceeded the crosswind limitation of the airplane was contrary to the regulations and to the safe operation of the airplane.

The pilot reported, and airport security video confirmed, that during a takeoff attempt, the right wing contacted the runway and the pilot pulled back excessively on the yoke. The airplane pitched up, stalled, and descended back on to the runway. It subsequently traveled off the end of the runway and impacted trees, before coming to rest on its side. The pilot added that in retrospect, he should have rejected the takeoff when the right wing contacted the runway. Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions, nor did the pilot report any. The inspector noted that both wings separated, and the fuselage was substantially damaged.

The pilot was taking the airplane on a flight to another airport for maintenance. During the preflight inspection, the pilot turned on the electrical power and noticed that the fuel gauge was indicating 80 gallons of fuel. The pilot reported the airplane holds a maximum of 156 gallons of fuel and he calculated that he needed 113 gallons of fuel to legally complete the flight. He informed the fixed base operator (FBO) that he wanted the fuel tanks topped off, but was informed by the ramp technician that the fuel tanks were full and he did not need fuel. The pilot went back to the airplane and removed the fuel cap. He noticed fuel in the filler neck and assumed the fuel tanks were full. He did not push open the anti-siphon fuel valve to see if the tanks were full or if residual fuel was pooled on top of the anti-siphon fuel valve. When the pilot started the engines, he noticed the fuel gauge was flickering and thought it was malfunctioning. He proceeded to depart for the maintenance base. After about 2 hours of flight time both engines lost power. Unable to reach the closest airport, the pilot executed an off field landing in a cotton field. After landing, the airplane rolled into the trees and the left wing separated from the fuselage. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left and right wings. According to the fueler at the FBO, she drove out to the airplane to fuel it on the morning of the accident and, after removing the single fuel cap, saw fuel on top of the anti-siphon valve. She used her finger to push down the valve and felt fuel, so she believed the airplane was full of fuel and it did not need additional fuel. Both wing fuel bladders were breached during the accident and a minor amount of fuel was leaked onto the ground. Personnel from the company who recovered the wreckage stated that there was no fuel in the fuel tanks when the airplane was recovered. The fuel quantity transmitter was sent to the manufacturer for examination. Testing of the transmitter revealed no anomalies with the unit. Based on this information, it is likely that the pilot erred in his assessment of the airplane’s fuel quantity prior to departing on the accident flight and that the available quantity of fuel was exhausted, which resulted in the total loss of engine power and the subsequent forced landing.

Shortly after taking off, the pilot was instructed to change from the airport tower frequency to the departure control frequency. Numerous radio transmissions followed between tower personnel and the pilot that indicated the airplane’s radio was operating normally on the tower frequency, but the pilot could not change frequencies to departure control as directed. The pilot subsequently requested and received approval to return to the departure airport. During the flight back to the airport, the pilot made radio transmissions that indicated he continued to troubleshoot the radio problems. The airplane’s flight track showed the pilot flew directly toward the runway aimpoint about 1,000 ft from, and perpendicular to, the runway during the left base turn to final and allowed the airplane to descend as low as 200 ft pressure altitude (PA). The pilot then made a right turn about .5 miles from the runway followed by a left turn towards the runway. A pilot witness near the accident location observed the airplane maneuvering and predicted the airplane was going to stall. The airplane’s airspeed decreased to about 53 knots (kts) during the left turn and video showed the airplane’s bank angle increased before the airplane aerodynamically stalled and impacted terrain. Post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and review of recorded engine monitoring data revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Toxicology testing showed the pilot had diphenhydramine, a sedating antihistamine, in his liver and muscle tissue. While therapeutic levels could not be determined, side effects such as diminished psychomotor performance from his use of diphenhydramine were not evident from operational evidence. Thus, the effects of the pilot’s use of diphenhydramine was not a factor in this accident. The accident is consistent with the pilot becoming distracted by the reported non-critical radio anomaly and turning base leg of the traffic pattern too early during his return to the airport. The pilot then failed to maintain adequate airspeed and proper bank angle while maneuvering from base leg to final approach, resulting in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain.

While enroute in instrument meteorological (IMC) conditions, the pilot of the twin-engine, piston-powered airplane declared an emergency following a loss of power to the right engine. The pilot secured the engine and was provided vectors by air traffic control for an instrument approach procedure at the nearest airport, which he successfully completed. The pilot reported that he flew the approach and landing with the wing flaps retracted and visually acquired the runway about 500 ft above the ground. The airplane touched down on the first third of the runway at 120 knots. The pilot knew he would not be able to stop the airplane on the 3,500-ft long runway but committed to the landing rather than risking a single-engine go-around in IMC. After landing, the airplane continued beyond the departure end of the runway and impacted a berm, collapsing the landing gear and resulting in substantial damage to the airplane. Examination of the engine revealed catastrophic damage consistent with detonation and oil starvation. The damage to the No. 5 cylinder was consistent with a subsequent over pressurization of the crankcase, which likely expelled the crankshaft nose seal and the oil supply. Detonation of the cylinder(s) can create excessive crankcase pressures capable of expelling the crankshaft nose seal. The crankshaft nose seal displacement likely created a rapid loss of oil and the resulting oil starvation of the engine. The fractured connecting rod and high-temperature signatures were consistent with oil starvation. No source or anomaly that would result in engine detonation was identified. According to the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) for the accident airplane, during a single engine inoperative approach, the pilot should maintain an airspeed of 116 kts indicated (KIAS) or above until landing is assured. Once landing is assured, the pilot should extend the gear and flaps, slowly retard the power on the operative engine, and land normally. The airplane’s best single-engine rate of climb speed (blue line) was 106 KIAS, and its minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative (Vmca) was 76 KIAS. The maximum speed for full flap extension (40°) was 132 KIAS. The POH also stated that a single-engine go-around should be avoided if at all possible. The pilot’s decision to commit to the landing was reasonable given the circumstances and the guidance provided by the POH; however, it is likely that his decision to conduct the landing without flaps and the airplane’s excessive airspeed at touchdown resulted in the runway overrun.