Takeoff (climb)

The weekend before the accident, a fuel leak was identified. The fuel leak was subsequently repaired, and a final inspection the morning of the accident flight reportedly did not reveal any evidence of a continued fuel leak. Shortly after takeoff, the flight crew noticed a faint odor in the cockpit and a small amount of smoke near the radio room. The flight crew immediately initiated a turn with the intention of returning to the departure airport. About that time, they received a radio call from the pilot of the accompanying airplane advising that there was a fire visible on the left wing. The accident pilot subsequently executed an emergency landing to a corn field. Emergency crews were hampered by the muddy field conditions, and the fire ultimately consumed significant portions airframe. In-flight photographs showed the presence of fire on the aft lower portion of the left wing between the inboard and outboard engines. Located in the same area of the fire were fuel tanks feeding the left-side engines. After landing, heavy fire conditions were present on the left side of the airplane, and the fire spread to the fuselage. A postaccident examination noted that the C-channel installed as part of the No. 1 main fuel tank repair earlier in the week was partially separated. During the examination, the tank was filled with a small amount of water, which then leaked from the aft section of the repair area in the vicinity of the partially separated channel. Metallurgical examination of the repair area revealed a longitudinal fatigue crack along the weld seam. The fatigue nature of the crack was consistent with a progressive failure along the fuel tank seam that existed before the accident flight and was separate from the damage sustained in the emergency landing and postlanding fire. The repair earlier in the week attempted to seal the leak but did not address the existing crack itself. In fact, the length of the crack observed at the time of the repair was about one-half the length of the crack noted during the postaccident examination, suggesting that the crack progressed rapidly during the course of the accident flight. Because the repaired fuel tank was positioned within the open wing structure, a fuel leak of significant volume would have readily vaporized, producing a flammable fuel vapor/air mixture. Although the exact ignition source could not be determined due to the fire damage, it is likely that the fuel vapor and liquid fuel encountered hot surfaces from nearby engine components, which initiated the in-flight fire.

Crew was performing a local flight at Melun-Villaroche Airport. Few minutes after takeoff, while flying at low height, the engine caught fire. The pilot elected to return to the airport but was eventually forced to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft collided with power cables then crashed on its belly in a field, coming to rest in flames. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 24th May, 2011 at 11:54 h, a Beechcraft C90 aircraft with nationality and registration marks N364UZ, operated by Shoreline Energy International Limited (SEIL), departed Old Kaduna (Military) airport on a test flight with a pilot and another person onboard with three hours fuel endurance. The test flight was on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. According to an eye witness, the aircraft sound was unusual and the aircraft seemed not to be gaining altitude after takeoff. Another eye witness (a local farmer), stated that he saw the aircraft moving up and down with increasing and decreasing engine sound. Thereafter, the aircraft impacted a mango tree, turned and crashed. The local farmer further stated that he and some military personnel tried all they could to rescue the occupants inside the aircraft but their efforts were not successful. At 11:59 h, the aircraft crashed on a farm-land 878 meters short of RWY 23 (military) and engulfed into flames. The two occupants were fatally injured. Dornier Aviation Nigeria AIEP (DANA) and Nigerian Air Force (NAF) fire-fighting personnel were dispatched immediately. There was no direct access between the runway and the accident site, which delayed the fire trucks from reaching the aircraft at accident site on time. The accident occurred in day light, in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).

The pilot, sole on board, departed Barra do Vento Airport on a ferry flight to Boa Vista-Atlas Brasil-Cantanhede Airport, Roraima. Shortly after rotation, he noticed abnormal vibrations. At the same time, the 'door warning' light came ON on the instrument panel. He decided to land back but lost control of the airplane that veered off runway to the right and collided with an earth mound, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and the pilot was seriously injured.

On May 18, 2011, about 1727 Pacific daylight time, a modified Boeing 707, registration N707AR, operating as Omega Aerial Refueling Services (Omega) flight 70 crashed on takeoff from runway 21 at Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California (KNTD). The airplane collided with a marsh area to the left side beyond the departure end of the runway and was substantially damaged by postimpact fire. The three flight crewmembers sustained minor injuries. The flight was conducted under the provisions of a contract between Omega and the US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) to provide aerial refueling of Navy F/A-18s in offshore warning area airspace. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Omega, and the US Navy, the airplane was operating as a nonmilitary public aircraft under the provisions of 49 United States Code Sections 40102 and 40125. The accident flight crew consisted of a captain, first officer, and flight engineer who had flown with each other many times previously. The crewmembers reported conducting a normal preflight inspection. As the airplane taxied toward the runway, the reported wind was from 280º magnetic at 24 knots, gusting to 34 knots; the flight crew reported that the windsock showed very little change in the wind direction and a slight amount of gust. The crew had calculated a takeoff decision speed (V1) of 141 knots and a rotation speed (Vr) of 147 knots. The crew elected to add 5 knots to the rotation speed to compensate for the wind gusts and briefed a maximum power takeoff. The first officer, who was the pilot monitoring, stated that he advised the captain, who was the pilot flying, about advancing the power relatively smoothly to avoid a compressor stall with the crosswind, and the captain agreed. About 1723, air traffic control cleared the flight for takeoff from runway 21 and instructed the crew to turn left to a heading of 160º after departure. The captain applied takeoff thrust, and the first officer told investigators that, as the pilot in the right seat, he applied forward pressure on the yoke and right aileron input to compensate for the right crosswind. According to the crew, the takeoff roll was normal. At rotation speed, the captain rotated the airplane to an initial target pitch attitude of 11º airplane nose up. Shortly after liftoff, when the airplane was about 20 feet above the runway and about 7,000 feet down the runway, all three crewmembers heard a loud noise and observed the thrust lever for the No. 2 (left inboard) engine rapidly retard to the aft limit of the throttle quadrant. The captain stated that he applied full right rudder and near full right aileron to maintain directional control and level the wings, but the airplane continued to drift to the left. The captain reported that he perceived the airplane would not continue to climb and decided to “put it back on the ground.” Witnesses and a cell phone video from another Omega 707 crewmember observing the takeoff indicated that the No. 2 (left inboard) engine separated and traveled up above the left wing as the airplane was passing abeam taxiway A2. The inlet cowling for the No. 1 (left outboard) engine separated immediately thereafter, consistent with being struck by the No. 2 engine nacelle. The airplane began to descend with the remaining three engine power levers at maximum power, and the left wing dipped slightly (Pratt & Whitney indicated that loss of the inlet cowling on the No. 1 engine would increase drag, effectively resulting in less than zero thrust output). The captain said he lowered the nose and leveled the wings just as the airplane touched down on the runway between taxiway A2 and A1. The airplane made multiple contacts with the runway before drifting left and departing the runway surface before the airplane reached taxiway A1. The airplane crossed taxiway A and came to rest in the marsh area. According to the flight crewmembers, they observed flames in the cabin area and did not have time to perform an engine shutdown or evacuation checklist. The crew reported difficulty exiting the cockpit due to mud and debris blocking the cockpit door. All three crewmembers successfully evacuated through the left forward entrance via the escape slide.

The pilot had planned to fly from Bournemouth Airport to Manchester Airport operating the flight as a single pilot, with a passenger seated in the co-pilot’s seat. He arrived at the airport approximately one hour before the planned departure time of 1130 hrs, completed his pre‑flight activities and went to the aircraft at approximately 1110 hrs. The 1120 hrs ATIS gave the weather at the airport as: surface wind from 230° at 10 kt, visibility 10 km or greater, few clouds at 1,000 ft, broken cloud at 1,200 ft and at 2,000 ft, temperature 16°C, dew point 12°C and QNH 1015 hPa. After starting the engines, the pilot was cleared to taxi to holding point ‘N’ for a departure from Runway 26 and he was given clearance to take off at 1127 hrs. At 1129:45 hrs, approximately 55 seconds after the aircraft became airborne, the aerodrome controller transmitted “four six bravo mike do you have a problem?” because he believed the aircraft was not climbing normally. The pilot replied “november four six bravo going around” and, shortly afterwards, “four six bravo requesting immediate return”. The controller cleared the pilot to use either runway to land back at the airport but received no reply. The pilot carried out a forced landing into a field 1.7 nm west of the Runway 08 threshold at Bournemouth Airport and neither he nor his passenger was hurt.

After taking off from runway 9L at his home airport and making an easterly departure, the pilot, who was also the president, director of operations, and chief pilot for the on-demand passenger and cargo operation, advised the air traffic controller that he was turning downwind. According to witnesses, the airplane did not sound like it was developing full power. The airplane climbed to about 100 feet, banked to the left, began losing altitude, and impacted a tree, a fence, and two vehicles before coming to rest in a residential area. A postcrash fire ensued, which consumed the majority of the cabin area and left wing. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane had struck the tree with its left inboard wing about 20 feet above ground level. Multiple tree branches exhibiting propeller cuts were found near the base of the tree. Propeller strike marks on the ground also corresponded to the location of the No. 1 (left side) propeller. There were minimal propeller marks from the No. 2 (right side) propeller. Examination of the propellers revealed that the No. 1 propeller blades exhibited chordwise scratching and S-bending, consistent with operation at impact, but the No. 2 propeller blades did not exhibit any chordwise scratching or bending, which indicates that the No. 2 engine was not producing power at the time of impact. There was no evidence that the pilot attempted to perform the manufacturer’s published single engine procedure, which would have allowed him to maintain altitude. Contrary to the procedure, the left and right throttle control levers were in the full-throttle position, the mixture control levers were in the full-rich position, neither propeller was feathered, and the landing gear was down. Postaccident examination of the No. 1 engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact malfunction or failure. However, the No. 2 engine's condition would have resulted in erratic and unreliable operation; the engine would not have been able to produce full rated horsepower as the compression on four of the nine cylinders was below specification and both magnetos were not functioning correctly. Moisture and corrosion were discovered inside the magneto cases; the left magneto sparked internally in a random pattern when tested and its point gap was in excess of the required tolerance. The right magneto's camshaft follower also exhibited excessive wear and its points would not open, rendering it incapable of providing electrical energy to its spark plugs. Additionally, the main fuel pump could not be rotated by hand; it exhibited play in the gear bearings, and corrosion was present internally. When the airplane was not flying, it was kept outdoors. Large amounts of rain had fallen during the week before the accident, which could have led to the moisture and corrosion in the magnetos. Although the pilot had been having problems with the No. 2 engine for months, he continued to fly the airplane, despite his responsibility, particularly as president, director of operations, and chief pilot of the company, to ensure that the airplane was airworthy. During this period, the pilot would take off with the engine shuddering and would circle the departure airport to gain altitude before heading to the destination. On the night before the accident, the director of maintenance (DOM) replaced the No. 1 cylinder on the No. 2 engine, which had developed a crack in the fin area and had oil seeping out of it. After the DOM performed the replacement, he did not do a compression check or check the magnetos; such checks would have likely revealed that four of the remaining cylinders were not producing specified compression, that the magnetos were not functioning correctly, and that further maintenance was necessary. Review of the airplane's maintenance records did not reveal an entry for installation of the cylinder. The last entry in the maintenance records for the airplane was an annual and a 100-hour inspection, which had occurred about 11 months before the accident.

The three engine aircraft was performing flight PTK123 from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky to Ossora. En route, the crew was informed about poor weather conditions at destination and decided to divert to the Ust-Kamchatsk Airport. Crew and passengers wait there few hours moments for weather improvement but eventually decided to return to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. During the takeoff roll, the captain decided to abort for unknown reason. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 01/19 is 1,725 metres long), the aircraft overran, lost its right main gear and rolled for dozen metres before coming to rest in about 50 centimeters of snow. All 26 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin-engine airplane was scheduled for a routine night cargo flight. Witnesses and radar data described the airplane accelerating down the runway to a maximum ground speed of 97 knots, then entering an aggressive climb before leveling and pitching down. The airplane subsequently impacted a parallel taxiway with its landing gear retracted. Slash marks observed on the taxiway pavement, as well as rotation signatures observed on the remaining propeller blades, indicated that both engines were operating at impact. Additionally, postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airframe or either engine. The as-found position of the cargo placed the airplane within the normal weight and balance envelope, with no evidence of a cargo-shift having occurred, and the as-found position of the elevator trim jackscrew was consistent with a neutral pitch trim setting. According to the airframe manufacturer's prescribed takeoff procedure, the pilot was to accelerate the airplane to an airspeed of 85 knots, increase the pitch to a climb angle that would allow the airplane to accelerate past 96 knots, and retract the landing gear before accelerating past 128 knots. Given the loading and environmental conditions that existed on the night of the accident, the airplane's calculated climb performance should have been 1,800 feet per minute. Applying the prevailing wind conditions about time of the accident to the airplane's radar-observed ground speed during the takeoff revealed a maximum estimated airspeed of 111 knots, and the airplane's maximum calculated climb rate briefly exceeded 3,000 feet per minute. The airplane then leveled for a brief time, decelerated, and began descending, a profile that suggested that the airplane likely entered an aerodynamic stall during the initial climb.

The single engine aircraft departed Ravenna-La Spreta Airport on a local skydiving mission, carrying nine skydivers, one child and one pilot. After takeoff from runway 08, while climbing to an altitude of about 50 feet, the aircraft turned to the left then lost height and crashed in an open field located 380 metres from the runway end. All 11 occupants were injured, five of them seriously. The aircraft was destroyed.