Takeoff (climb)

The instrument-rated commercial pilot departed from an airport adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico with an instrument flight rules clearance for a cross-country flight in dark night, visual
meteorological conditions. The flight continued in a south-southwesterly direction, climbing to about 900 ft over the gulf, where it entered a steep right turn. The airplane then descended at a steep rate and impacted the water in a nose-low attitude. Post accident examination of the recovered wreckage, including flight controls, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. While the outlet fuel line from the left auxiliary fuel pump was found separated and there was evidence that the B-nut was loose and had been only secured by the first 2 threads, recorded data from the engine monitor for the flight revealed no loss of power from either engine. Therefore, the final separation likely occurred during the impact sequence. Although the accident pilot was instrument rated and had recently completed instrument currency training, the dark night conditions present at the time of the accident combined with a further lack of visual references due to the airplane's location over a large body of water, presented a situation conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The pilot had been instructed by air traffic control to turn southwest after takeoff; however, the continuation of the turn past the intended course and the airplane's steep bank angle and excessive rate of descent are consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation.

While taking off from the bay off Jinshan (south of Shanghai), the single engine aircraft collided with a concrete bridge and crashed in the sea. One pilot and four passengers were killed while five other occupants were injured. The seaplane C208 EX version was destroyed. It is believed that the crew misjudged the distance between the departure point and the bridge as the collision occurred just after rotation while attempted a steep climb.

The crew was completing a local training exercise at Montijo AFB, consisting of touch-and-go maneuvers. During the takeoff roll on runway 26, the four engine aircraft deviated from the centerline to the left then went out of control, veered off runway to the right and eventually crashed 1,460 meters past the runway threshold, bursting into flames. Four crew members were injured while three others were killed. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

The crew started the takeoff procedure from runway 33L at Seoul-Incheon Airport and reached V1 speed after a course of 6,413 feet. At a speed of 182 knots, the crew heard a noise corresponding to the failure of both tires n°9 and 10 located on the central landing gear. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance of 4,635 feet (in relation with the total weight of 629,600 lbs), the airplane overran. While contacting a grassy area, the nose gear collapsed then the airplane struck various equipment of the localizer antenna and came to rest 485 meters past the runway end. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 3 June 2016, a Cessna 208B of registration 5Y-JLL and serial number 2158 was conducting a charter passenger flight from Akobo Airstrip to Juba with 4 passengers and one flight crew member on board. According to the operator, during takeoff from Akobo Airstrip at approximately 10 a.m. Local Time, the pilot executed a premature takeoff due to animal incursion on the runway. The airplane's right main landing gear clipped the Airstrip perimeter fence and the aircraft crash-landed onto grass-thatched houses and trees near the end of the runway. Damage was substantial with no reported injuries. The runway was reported to have been wet at the time of occurrence.

On 19 May 2016, at 0832 hours local time (L), a B-52H, tail number 60-0047 [Mishap Aircraft (MA)], assigned to the 69th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, 5th Bomb Wing, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, departed the prepared-surface overrun of Runway 06 Left (RWY 06L) during a highspeed, heavy-weight, aborted takeoff. The Mishap Crew (MC), which consisted of the Mishap Pilot (MP), Mishap Co-Pilot (MCP), Mishap Radar Navigator (MRN), Mishap Navigator (MN), Mishap Electronic Warfare Officer (MEW), an augment pilot occupying the Mishap Gunner (MG) station, and an Instructor Weapon System Officer occupying the Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) jump seat, were conducting a Higher Headquarters Directed mission. The MC were treated for minor injuries consistent with a ground egress. The MA sustained total damage with a loss valued at $112M. There was no damage to private property. The MC were cleared for takeoff at 0831L. The MA accelerated within performance standards verified by takeoff and landing data calculated performance for S1 timing and S1 decision speed. Approximately three to five seconds after reaching the S1 speed of 111 knots, the MP, MCP, and MN observed birds in front of the MA at wing level. Shortly thereafter, the MP and MCP observed engine indications for numbers 5, 6, and 7 “quickly spooling back” from the required takeoff setting. The MP also observed high oil pressure indications on the number 8 engine and a noticeable left-to-right yawing motion. Accelerating through approximately 142 knots, the MP simultaneously announced and initiated aborted takeoff emergency procedures. With the throttles set to idle thrust and airbrakes set to six, the MP initiated continuous braking pressure. The MCP deployed the drag chute at 135 knots. The drag chute failed to inflate properly. At 2,500 feet runway remaining, the MP shut off the outboard engines (numbers 1/2 and 7/8). Shortly thereafter, the MP announced the MA and MC were going to depart the prepared surface. The MEW jettisoned the defensive compartment, starboard-side hatch and the MP shut off the inboard engines (numbers 3/4 and 5/6). The MA departed the prepared surface shearing the main landing gear. The MA finally came to a rest slightly canted from runway centerline, right wing down approximately 300 feet from the runway, and subsequently caught on fire. The MC performed emergency aircraft shutdown procedures and safely egressed the MA through the MEW hatch.

On May 18, 2016 the crew of An-12B 4K-AZ25 aircraft operated by Silk Way Airlines including the Captain, First Officer, navigator, flight mechanic, flight radio operator and loadmaster was planned to fly via route Baku (Azerbaijan) - Bagram (Afghanistan) - Dwyer (Afghanistan) - Mary (Turkmenistan) - Baku. There were also two maintenance mechanics and an engineer on board the a/c. The preliminary training of the crew was conducted on 29.12.2015 by the Chief Navigator of Silk Way Airlines. The pre-flight briefing was conducted on 18.05.2016 by a captain-instructor and a navigator-instructor. The following has been determined so far. According to the information available at the moment the flight to Dwyer aerodrome was conducted in an acceptable way. At 09:11:27 the crew started up the engines at Dwyer aerodrome, Engine #2 was the last to be started up at 09:47:37. Before the takeoff the Captain distributed the duties within the crew, nominating the FO as the PF, and himself as PM. After the engine startup the crew initiated taxiing to perform takeoff with heading 229°. The concrete RWY of Dwyer aerodrome is measured 2439 m by 37 m. The a/c TOW and CG were within the AFM limitations. In the course of the takeoff, at 09:57:56 the flight mechanic reported an increase in MGT of Engine #3 above the acceptable level: "Engine #3, look, engine temperature over six hundred, over seven hundred", which was confirmed by the FO: "Yes, it's getting temperature" while the Captain asked to be more attentive. According to the crew reports the takeoff was performed with Flaps 15. As the checklist was being read, the Captain ordered to lock the propellers. After the Captain's order to lock the propellers a slight increase in torque-measuring device values was recorded on Engine #1 and #4, and in 17 seconds also Engine #2, which indirectly implies that propellers #1, #2 and #4 were at stops. There is no evidence that propeller of Engine #3 was locked. At 09:59:42 the crew initiated the takeoff. Before the takeoff the ATC advised the crew on the wind direction and speed on the RWY: 280° 14 knots (7 m/sec) gusting 26 knots (13 m/sec). Thus it was quartering headwind and the headwind component might have been 5 to 9 m/sec. While performing takeoff the crew first increased thrust on Engines #1 and #4 and then on Engine #2 after 10 seconds. The thrust of the three engines was about 50 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (lower than takeoff mode). The third engine was still operating in the ground idle mode, though the CVR did not record any crew callouts concerning Engine #3 operation parameters. Based on the CCTV system of Dwyer aerodrome the takeoff roll was initiated almost from the RWY threshold and was conducted to the left of the RWY centerline. No significant deviations from the takeoff course during the takeoff roll were recorded. During the takeoff roll the rudder was deflected left close to extreme. Probably the pilots were also applying differential control on Engine #2 to decrease the right torque moment. At 10:00:14 at approximately 120 km/h IAS the "Engine #3 negative thrust" signal was started to be recorded and was recorded on up to the end of the record. At that time the a/c was about 430 m away from the start of the takeoff roll. At 10:00:42 Engines #1 and #4 thrust was increased up to 63 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (consistent with takeoff mode for the actual flight conditions). At that time the IAS was about 150 km/h Engine #2 thrust was increased up to the same value only 23 seconds later at about 200 km/h IAS. At that time the a/c was about 840 m away from the RWY end. Engine #3 was still operating in ground idle mode. Approximately 260 m before the RWY end at a speed of 220 km/h IAS (maximum speed reached) the FDR recorded the start of nose up input on the control column. The a/c did not lift off After rolling all along the RWY the a/c overran the RWY onto the ground at a speed of 220 km/h While moving on the ground the aircraft sustained significant damage, which led to post-crash fire that destroyed most of the aircraft structures. Out of the nine persons on board seven were killed and two were seriously injured and taken to hospital.

The commercial pilot reported that, after takeoff on the local skydiving flight, the engine experienced a total loss of power. He initiated a turn toward the airport, but realized the airplane would not reach the runway and chose to perform a forced landing to an open field. During the landing roll, the airplane exited the field, crossed a road, impacted a truck, and continued into a vineyard, where it nosed over. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the fuel pressure line that connects the fuel control unit to the airframe fuel pressure transducer was fractured below the fuel control unit fitting's swaged seat. In addition, a supporting clamp for the fuel pressure fuel line was fractured and separated. The operator reported that the fractured fuel line had been replaced the night before the accident and had accumulated about 4 hours of operational time. The previously-installed line had also fractured. Metallurgical examination of the two fractured fuel lines revealed that both fuel lines fractured due to reverse bending fatigue through the tube wall where a ferrule was brazed to the outside of the tube. There were no apparent anomalies or defects at the crack initiation sites. Examination of the supporting clamp determined that it fractured due to unidirectional bending fatigue where one of the clamp's tabs met the clamp loop, with the crack initiating along the inward-facing side of the clamp. The orientation of the reverse bending fatigue cracks and the spacing of the fatigue striations on the tube fracture surfaces were consistent with high-cycle bending fatigue due to a vibration of the tube. The cushioned support clamp is designed to prevent such vibrations from occurring. However, if the clamp tab is fractured, it cannot properly clamp the tube and will be unable to prevent the vibration. The presence of the fractured clamp combined with the fact that the two pressure tubes failed in similar modes in short succession indicated that the clamp most likely failed first, resulting in the subsequent failure of the tubes. Since the clamp was likely fractured when the first fractured fuel pressure line was replaced, the clamp was either not inspected or inadequately inspected at the time of the maintenance.

Shortly after takeoff from a private airstrip in Lumby, the airplane suffered engine problems. The pilot elected to make an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in a prairie located 300 feet from a house, bursting into flames. All three occupants evacuated with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire. The pilot and both passengers were en route to the south of the province when the accident occurred.

The private pilot of the twin-engine airplane departed on the personal flight. During the takeoff roll, all indications were normal. When the airplane accelerated to between 75 and 80 knots, the pilot pulled back on the yoke slowly, and the airplane began to climb. After he raised the landing gear, the pilot noticed that the airplane was not continuing to climb and that the airspeed was 80 knots; he then heard the stall warning horn. The airplane impacted trees about 1/4 mile from the runway, caught fire, and was destroyed; the pilot egressed with minor injuries. The airplane's published minimum control speed was 86 knots and the break ground and climb speed was 106 knots. Given that information, it is likely that the pilot's attempt to rotate and climb the airplane below 80 knots resulted in the airplane being unable to gain altitude and climb above trees at the end of the runway.