Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 in Detroit

Date & Time: Mar 8, 2017 at 1452 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N786TW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Detroit - Washington DC
MSN:
53123/1987
YOM:
1992
Flight number:
7Z9363
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
110
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
15518
Captain / Total hours on type:
8495.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9660
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2462
Aircraft flight hours:
41008
Aircraft flight cycles:
39472
Circumstances:
A McDonnell Douglas MD-83, registration N786TW, suffered a runway excursion following an aborted takeoff from runway 23L at Detroit-Willow Run Airport, Michigan, USA. The aircraft had been chartered by the University of Michigan Basketball team for a flight to a game in Washington, DC. The flight crew prepared for take-off and calculated V-speeds (V1, VR, V2) using "Normal Thrust Takeoff", a 10 kts headwind, and a take-off weight of 146,600 lbs. The V-speeds for this configuration were 139 kts, 142 kts, and 150 kts, respectively. However, the flight crew chose to increase VR to 150 kts to allow for more control during take-off in the presence of windshear. During takeoff roll, at 14:51:56 (about 3,000 ft down the runway) and about 138 kts of airspeed, the control column was pulled back slightly from a non-dimensional value of -7 to -5.52. The airplane’s left elevator followed the control input and moved from a position of -15° trailing edge down to -13° trailing edge down. The right elevator did not change and stayed at approximately -16° trailing edge down. At 14:52:01 a large control column input was made (151 kts and 4100 ft down the runway) to a non-dimensional 18.5 and the left elevator moves to a position near 15° trailing edge up. After 14:52:05 the right elevator moves to -13° trailing edge down, but no more. The airplane does not respond in pitch and does not rotate. The captain decided to abort the takeoff. The maximum ground speed was 163 kts (173 kts airspeed) and the airplane began to decelerate as soon as the brakes were applied at 14:52:08. Spoilers were deployed at 14:52:10 and thrust reversers were deployed between 14:52:13 and 14:52:15. The aircraft could not be stopped on the runway. The airplane’s ground speed was 100 kts when it left the paved surface. The aircraft overran the end of the runway, damaged approach lights, went through the perimeter fence and crossed Tyler Road. It came to rest on grassy terrain, 345 meters past the end of the runway, with the rear fuselage across a ditch. The nose landing gear had collapsed. Runway 23L is a 7543 ft long runway.
Probable cause:
The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the jammed condition of the airplane’s right elevator, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic wind while the airplane was parked and rendered the airplane unable to rotate during takeoff. Contributing to the accident were (1) the effect of a large structure on the gusting surface wind at the airplane’s parked location, which led to turbulent gust loads on the right elevator sufficient to jam it, even though the horizontal surface wind speed was below the certification design limit and maintenance inspection criteria for the airplane, and (2) the lack of a means to enable the flight crew to detect a jammed elevator during preflight checks for the Boeing MD-83 airplane. Contributing to the survivability of the accident was the captain’s timely and appropriate decision to reject the takeoff, the check airman’s disciplined adherence to standard operating procedures after the captain called for the rejected takeoff, and the dimensionally compliant runway safety area where the overrun occurred.
Final Report:

Crash of a Socata TBM-700A in Bellingham

Date & Time: Feb 27, 2017 at 1220 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GWVS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bellingham – Pierce County
MSN:
210
YOM:
2002
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1703
Captain / Total hours on type:
381.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1962
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that, during the preflight, it was snowing, and he wiped the snow that had accumulated on the wings off "as best as [he] could." He added that, while taxiing to the runway, "snow was falling heavily," and he observed "light accumulation of wet snow" on the wings. During the takeoff roll, he observed the snow "sloughing off" the wings as the airspeed increased. Subsequently, during the climb to about 150 ft above the ground, the airplane yawed to the left, and he attempted to recover using right aileron. He reported that he "could see a stall forming," so he lowered the nose and reduced power to idle. The airplane impacted the general aviation ramp in a left-wing-down attitude and slid 500 to 600 ft. The pilot reported on the National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident/ Incident Report 6120.1 form that the airplane stalled, and he recommended "better deicing" before takeoff. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and left wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located on the airport revealed that, about 27 minutes before the accident, the wind was 010° at 8 knots, 1/2-mile visibility, moderate snow, freezing fog, and sky condition broken at 500 ft above ground level (agl) and overcast at 1,500 ft agl. The airplane departed from runway 16. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aeronautical Information Manual stated, in part: "The presence of aircraft airframe icing during takeoff, typically caused by improper or no deicing of the aircraft being accomplished prior to flight has contributed to many recent accidents in turbine aircraft." The manual further stated, "Ensure that your aircraft's lift-generating surfaces are COMPLETELY free of contamination before flight through a tactile (hands on) check of the critical surfaces when feasible. Even when otherwise permitted, operators should avoid smooth or polished frost on lift-generating surfaces as an acceptable preflight condition." FAA Advisory Circular, AC 135-17, stated in part: "Test data indicate that ice, snow, or frost formations having thickness and surface roughness similar to medium or course sandpaper on the leading edge and upper surfaces of a wing can reduce wing lift by as much as 30 percent and increase drag by 40 percent." Included in the public docket for this report is a copy of a service bulletin from the airplane manufacturer, which describes deicing and anti-icing ground procedures. It stated, in part: During conditions conducive to aeroplane icing during ground operations, take-off shall not be attempted when ice, snow, slush or frost is present or adhering to the wings, propellers, control surfaces, engine inlets or other critical surfaces. This is known as the "Clean Aircraft Concept". Any deposit of ice, snow or frost on the external surfaces may drastically affect its performance due to reduced aerodynamic lift and increased drag resulting from the disturbed airflow.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to properly deice the airplane before takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall during the initial climb.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B200 Super King Air in Melbourne: 5 killed

Date & Time: Feb 21, 2017 at 0858 LT
Registration:
VH-ZCR
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Melbourne - King Island
MSN:
BB-1544
YOM:
1996
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
7681
Captain / Total hours on type:
2400.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6997
Circumstances:
On 21 February 2017, the pilot of a Beechcraft B200 King Air aircraft, registered VH-ZCR (ZCR), and operated by Corporate & Leisure Aviation, was conducting a charter passenger flight from Essendon Airport, Victoria to King Island, Tasmania. There were four passengers on board. ZCR had been removed from a hangar and parked on the apron the previous afternoon in preparation for the flight. The pilot was first seen on the apron at about 0706 Eastern Daylight-saving Time. Closed-circuit television recorded the pilot walking around the aircraft and entering the cabin, consistent with conducting a pre-flight inspection of the aircraft. At about 0712, the pilot entered ZCR’s maintenance provider’s hangar. A member of staff working in the hangar reported that the pilot had a conversation with him that was unrelated to the accident flight. The pilot exited the hangar about 0715 and had a conversation with another member of staff who reported that their conversation was also unrelated to the accident flight. The pilot then returned to ZCR, and over the next 4 minutes he was observed walking around the aircraft. The pilot went into the cabin and re-appeared with an undistinguishable item. The pilot then walked around the aircraft one more time before re-entering the cabin and closing the air stair cabin door. At about 0729, the right engine was started and, shortly after, the left engine was started. Airservices Australia (Airservices) audio recordings indicated that, at 0736, the pilot requested a clearance from Essendon air traffic control (ATC) to reposition ZCR to the southern end of the passenger terminal. ATC provided the clearance and the pilot commenced taxiing to the terminal. At the terminal, ZCR was refueled and the pilot was observed on CCTV to walk around the aircraft, stopping at the left and right engines before entering the cabin. The pilot was then observed to leave the aircraft and wait for the passengers at the terminal. The passengers arrived at the terminal at 0841 and were escorted by the pilot directly to the aircraft. At 0849, the left engine was started and, shortly after, the right engine was started. At 0853, the pilot requested a taxi clearance for King Island, with five persons onboard, under the instrument flight rules. ATC instructed the pilot to taxi to holding point 'TANGO' for runway 17, and provided an airways clearance for the aircraft to King Island with a visual departure. The pilot read back the clearance. Airservices Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) data (refer to section titled Air traffic services information - Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast data) indicated that, at 0854, ZCR was taxied from the terminal directly to the holding point. The aircraft did not enter the designated engine run-up bay positioned near holding point TANGO. At 0855, while holding at TANGO, the pilot requested a transponder code. The controller replied that he did not have one to issue yet. Two minutes later the pilot contacted ATC and stated that he was ready and waiting for a transponder code. The controller responded with the transponder code and a clearance to lineup on runway 17. At 0858, ATC cleared ZCR for take-off on runway 17 with departure instructions to turn right onto a heading of 200°. The pilot read back the instruction and commenced the takeoff roll. The aircraft’s take-off roll along runway 17 was longer than expected. Witnesses familiar with the aircraft type observed a noticeable yaw to the left after the aircraft became airborne. The aircraft entered a relatively shallow climb and the landing gear remained down. The shallow climb was followed by a substantial left sideslip, while maintaining a roll attitude of less than 10° to the left. Airservices ADS-B data indicated the aircraft reached a maximum height of approximately 160 ft above ground level while tracking in an arc to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft’s track began diverging to the left of the runway centreline before rotation and the divergence increased as the flight progressed. Following the sustained left sideslip, the aircraft began to descend and at 0858:48 the pilot transmitted on the Essendon Tower frequency repeating the word ‘MAYDAY’ seven times in rapid succession. Approximately 10 seconds after the aircraft became airborne, and 2 seconds after the transmission was completed, the aircraft collided with the roof of a building in the Essendon Airport Bulla Road Precinct - Retail Outlet Centre (outlet centre), coming to rest in a loading area at the rear of the building. CCTV footage from a camera positioned at the rear of the building showed the final part of the accident sequence with post-impact fire evident; about 2 minutes later, first responders arrived onsite. At about 0905 and 0908 respectively, Victoria Police and the Metropolitan Fire Brigade arrived. The pilot and passengers were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. There was significant structural, fire and water damage to the building. Additionally, two people on the ground received minor injuries and a number of parked vehicles were damaged.
Probable cause:
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the collision with terrain involving Beechcraft B200 King Air, registered VH-ZCR that occurred at Essendon Airport, Victoria on 21 February 2017. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

Contributing factors:
- The aircraft's rudder trim was likely in the full nose-left position at the commencement of the take-off.
- The aircraft's full nose-left rudder trim setting was not detected by the pilot prior to take-off.
- Following a longer than expected ground roll, the pilot took-off with full left rudder trim selected. This configuration adversely affected the aircraft's climb performance and controllability, resulting in a collision with terrain.

Other factors that increased risk:
- The flight check system approval process did not identify that the incorrect checklist was nominated in the operator’s procedures manual and it did not ensure the required checks, related to the use of the cockpit voice recorder, were incorporated.
- The aircraft's cockpit voice recorder did not record the accident flight, resulting in a valuable source of safety related information not being available.
- The aircraft's maximum take-off weight was likely exceeded by about 240 kilograms.
- Two of the four buildings within the Bulla Road Precinct Retail Outlet Centre exceeded the obstacle limitation surface (OLS) for Essendon Airport, however, the OLS for the departure runway was not infringed and VH-ZCR did not collide with those buildings.

Other findings:
- The presence of the building struck by the aircraft was unlikely to have increased the severity of the outcome of this accident.
- Both of the aircraft’s engines were likely to have been producing high power at impact.
Final Report:

Crash of a Casa 212 Aviocar 300M at Thebephatshwa AFB: 3 killed

Date & Time: Feb 9, 2017
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OC2
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Thebephatshwa - Gaborone
MSN:
394
YOM:
1993
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Thebephatshwa AFB, en route to Gaborone, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed 4 km from the airport. All three crew members were killed.

Crash of a Beechcraft 300 Super King Air in Tucson: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 23, 2017 at 1233 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N385KA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tucson - Hermosillo
MSN:
FA-42
YOM:
1985
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
15100
Aircraft flight hours:
9962
Circumstances:
The pilot and the passenger departed on a cross-country, personal flight in the airplane that the operator had purchased the day before the accident. Shortly after takeoff from runway 11L, after reaching an altitude of about 100 to 150 ft above the runway in a nose-high pitch attitude, the airplane rolled left to an inverted position as its nose dropped, and it descended to terrain impact on airport property, consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Post-accident examination of the accident site revealed propeller strike marks separated at distances consistent with both propellers rotating at the speed required for takeoff and in a normal blade angle range of operation at impact. Both engines exhibited rotational scoring signatures that indicated the engines were producing symmetrical power and were most likely operating in the mid-to upper-power range at impact. The engines did not display any pre-impact anomalies or distress that would have precluded normal engine operation before impact. No evidence was found of any preexisting mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Toxicology testing revealed the pilot's use of multiple psychoactive substances including marijuana, venlafaxine, amphetamine, pseudoephedrine, clonazepam, and pheniramine. The wide variety of psychoactive effects of these medications precludes predicting the specific effects of their use in combination. However, it is likely that the pilot was impaired by the effects of the combination of psychoactive substances he was using and that those effects contributed to his loss of control. The investigation was unable to obtain medical records regarding any underlying neuropsychiatric disease(s); therefore, whether these may have contributed to the accident circumstances could not be determined.
Probable cause:
The pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment by the effects of a combination of psychoactive substances.
Final Report:

Crash of a Reims/Cessna F406 Caravan II in Sasakwa

Date & Time: Jan 2, 2017
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5H-WOW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
406-0060
YOM:
1991
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While taking off from runway 12/30 at Sasakwa Airfield, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed, bursting into flames. All six occupants were injured, some seriously, and the aircraft burnt out.

Crash of a Cessna 525C CitationJet CJ4 off Cleveland: 6 killed

Date & Time: Dec 29, 2016 at 2257 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N614SB
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cleveland – Columbus
MSN:
525C-0072
YOM:
2012
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
1205
Captain / Total hours on type:
56.00
Aircraft flight hours:
861
Circumstances:
The airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff and proceeded out over a large lake. Dark night visual conditions prevailed at the airport; however, the airplane entered instrument conditions shortly after takeoff. The airplane climb rate exceeded 6,000 fpm during the initial climb and it subsequently continued through the assigned altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. The flight director provided alerts before the airplane reached the assigned altitude and again after it had passed through it. The bank angle increased to about 62 degrees and the pitch attitude decreased to about 15 degrees nose down, as the airplane continued through the assigned heading. The bank angle ultimately decreased to about 25 degrees. During the subsequent descent, the airspeed and descent rate reached about 300 knots and 6,000 fpm, respectively. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) provided both "bank angle" and "sink rate" alerts to the pilot, followed by seven "pull up" warnings. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. It is likely that the pilot attempted to engage the autopilot after takeoff as he had been trained. However, based on the flight profile, the autopilot was not engaged. This implied that the pilot failed to confirm autopilot engagement via an indication on the primary flight display (PFD). The PFD annunciation was the only indication of autopilot engagement. Inadequate flight instrument scanning during this time of elevated workload resulted in the pilot allowing the airplane to climb through the assigned altitude, to develop an overly steep bank angle, to continue through the assigned heading, and to ultimately enter a rapid descent without effective corrective action. A belief that the autopilot was engaged may have contributed to his lack of attention. It is also possible that differences between the avionics panel layout on the accident airplane and the airplane he previously flew resulted in mode confusion and contributed to his failure to engage the autopilot. The lack of proximal feedback on the flight guidance panel might have contributed to his failure to notice that the autopilot was not engaged.The pilot likely experienced some level of spatial disorientation due to the dark night lighting conditions, the lack of visual references over the lake, and the encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. It is possible that once the pilot became disoriented, the negative learning transfer due to the differences between the attitude indicator display on the accident airplane and the airplane previously flown by the pilot may have hindered his ability to properly apply corrective control inputs. Available information indicated that the pilot had been awake for nearly 17 hours at the time of the accident. As a result, the pilot was likely fatigued which hindered his ability to manage the high workload environment, maintain an effective instrument scan, provide prompt and accurate control inputs, and to respond to multiple bank angle and descent rate warnings.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain due to pilot spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was pilot fatigue, mode confusion related to the status of the autopilot, and negative learning transfer due to flight guidance panel and attitude indicator differences from the pilot's previous flight experience.
Final Report:

Crash of a Tupolev TU-154B-2 off Sochi: 92 killed

Date & Time: Dec 25, 2016 at 0525 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-85572
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Moscow - Sochi - Hmeimim
MSN:
83A-572
YOM:
1983
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
84
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
92
Aircraft flight hours:
6689
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Moscow-Chkhalovksy AFB at 0138LT on a flight to Hmeimin AFB located near Latakia, Syria, carrying 84 passengers and 8 crew members. At 0343LT, the aircraft landed at Sochi-Adler Airport to refuel. At 0525LT, the takeoff was initiated from runway 24. After a course of 34 seconds, the pilot-in-command initiated the rotation at a speed of 300 km/h. Shortly after liftoff, the undercarriage were raised and the pilot continued to climb with a nose-up angle of 15°. About 53 seconds after takeoff, at an altitude of 157 metres, the captain asked the flaps to be retracted while the aircraft was climbing to a height of 231 metres with a speed of 360 km/h. Following erroneous movements on the control column, the aircraft nosed down and its speed increased to 373 km/h when the GPWS alarm sounded in the cockpit. With a rate of descent of 30 metres per second, the aircraft reached the speed of 540 km/h, rolled to the left to an angle of 50° and eventually crashed in the sea some 1,270 metres offshore, at 05:25 and 49 seconds. The flight took 73 seconds between liftoff and impact with water. The wreckage was found 2,760 metres from the end of runway 24 and 340 metres to the left of its extended centerline, at a depth of 30 metres. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 92 occupants were killed, among them 64 members of the Alexandrov Choir of the Red Army, their Artistic Director, nine journalists, seven officers from the Ministry of Defence, two senior officials and one representative of a public Company who were traveling to Hmeimim Air Base to commemorate the New Year's Eve celebrations with Russian soldiers based in Syria.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a loss of control that occurred during initial climb by night over the sea after the pilot-in-command suffered a spatial disorientation due to an excessive neuropsychic stress combined with fatigue.

Crash of a Boeing 727-2J0F in Puerto Carreño: 5 killed

Date & Time: Dec 20, 2016 at 1722 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-4544
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Puerto Carreño - Bogotá
MSN:
21105/1158
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
KRE157
Country:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
8708
Captain / Total hours on type:
6822.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3285
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3285
Aircraft flight hours:
60199
Circumstances:
The crew started the takeoff procedure at 1718LT from Puerto Carreño-Germán Olano Airport Runway 07 which is 1,800 metres long. Following a long takeoff roll, the pilot-in-command initiated the rotation when the aircraft overran then rolled for about 95 metres. It collided with two perimeter fences, passed through a road then lifted off. During initial climb, the right main gear was torn off after it collided with a tree and the engine n°3 failed. The airplane continued to climb to an altitude of 790 feet then entered a right turn and eventually crashed in an open field located 7,5 km from the airport, bursting into flames. The flight engineer was seriously injured while five other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- Inadequate flight planning by the operator of the aircraft, and by the crew, by failure to properly perform dispatch procedures, takeoff performance calculations and verification of limitations imposed by operational conditions of the aerodrome according to the configuration of the aircraft.
- Wrong crew decision making by not considering a key aspect affecting aircraft performance, such as the prevailing tailwind at takeoff.
- Erroneous selection of takeoff speeds V1/VR and V2, by the crew, corresponding to an aircraft without modification in its flap system, which led to rotate the aircraft with five more knots of speed, increasing the takeoff run.
- Erroneous rotation technique applied by the Pilot, delayed maneuver that extended the long takeoff run even more.
- Loss of components (landing gear, trailing inboard flap right) and damage to functional systems (loss of engine power n°3 and hydraulic system) necessary to control the aircraft in flight.
- Loss of control in flight generated by asymmetries of lift, power and emptying of the main hydraulic systems that exceeded the capacity of the crew and made it impossible to maintain adequate directional control and stability of the aircraft.
Contributing Factors:
- Non-compliance with the Aeronautical Regulations by the operating company of the aircraft, operating to an aerodrome unsuitable for the operation of B727-200 equipment, which, in addition, was not authorized for that type of aircraft in the company's Operating Specifications, approved by the Aeronautical Authority.
- Lack of standardization and supervision of the operating company of the aircraft, allowing the operation of the B727-200 equipment, to which a modification had been applied to the flap system, with the reference tables of speeds corresponding to the aircraft without modification.
- Execution of take-off with a weight that exceeded the maximum value established in the aircraft performance charts for the conditions prevailing at the Germán Olano airport.
- Omission of the crew by not activating the Standby hydraulic system, which might have allowed emergency hydraulic pressure, to regain control of the aircraft.
- Lack of supervision by the Aeronautical Authority, which allowed for several years the operation of equipment B727-200 of the company operating the aircraft at the Germán Olano aerodrome in Puerto Carreño, when the characteristics of the aerodrome did not allow it and without the operator being authorized to operate equipment B727-200 in that aerodrome.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft A100 King Air in Saint-Frédéric

Date & Time: Dec 12, 2016 at 0730 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FONY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint-Frédéric - Quebec
MSN:
B-154
YOM:
1973
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll from runway 05 at Saint-Frédéric Airport, the twin engine deviated to the left. The pilot-in-command elected to correct the deviation and to maintain the airplane on the runway centerline but it veered off runway to the left and came to rest in the snow. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.