Takeoff (climb)

The pilot departed on an instrument flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Radar data indicated that the airplane entered a left turn after takeoff, consistent with the pilot's instrument clearance. As the airplane climbed to an altitude about 2,410 ft above ground level, its rate of climb increased from about 3,500 ft per minute to 9,600 ft per minute, the stick shaker activated, and the airplane decelerated to about 75 knots. The airplane then entered a descending right turn and rolled inverted before impacting terrain about 1 mile from the airport. All major components of the airplane were located at the accident site, and examination of the wreckage revealed no anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The weather conditions about the time of the accident included an overcast cloud ceiling about 600 ft above ground level. It is likely that the pilot became spatially disoriented after entering the cloud layer, which resulted in the airplane's high rate of climb, rapid loss of airspeed, and a likely aerodynamic stall. The steep descending right turn, the airplane's roll to an inverted attitude, and the high-energy impact are also consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation.

On November 30, 2018, about 1028 central standard time, a Cessna 525A (Citation) airplane, N525EG, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Memphis, Indiana. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. The cross-country flight originated from Clark Regional Airport (JVY), Jeffersonville, Indiana, and was en route to Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois. The airplane was equipped with automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B), which recorded latitude and longitude from GPS, pressure and geometric altitude, and selected altitude and heading. The airplane was also equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), which recorded the accident flight and annunciations from the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). It was not equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) nor was it required to be. Review of the CVR transcript showed that the pilot operated as a single pilot but verbalized his actions as he configured the airplane before departure. He referenced items from the Before Taxi checklist and included in his crew briefing that in the event of a problem after takeoff decision speed, he would handle it as an in-flight emergency and “fly the airplane, address the problem, get the autopilot on, talk on the radios, divert over to Stanford.” The air traffic controller provided initial clearance for the pilot to fly direct to the STREP intersection and to climb and maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level. Before the departure from JVY, the pilot announced on the common traffic advisory frequency that he was departing runway 36 and verbalized in the cockpit “this is three six” before he advanced the throttles. The flight departed JVY about 1024:36 into instrument meteorological conditions. The CVR recorded the pilot state that he set power to maximum cruise thrust, switched the engine sync on, and turned on the yaw dampers. The pilot also verbalized his interaction with the autopilot, including navigation mode, direct STREP, and vertical speed climb up to 3,000 ft. According to the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) airplane performance study, the airplane climbed to about 1,400 ft msl before it turned left onto a course of 330° and continued to climb. The CVR recorded the pilot state he was turning on the autopilot at 1025:22. At 1025:39, the pilot was cleared up to 10,000 ft and asked to “ident,” and the airplane was subsequently identified on radar. The pilot verbalized setting the autopilot for 10,000 ft and read items on the After Takeoff/Climb checklist. The performance study indicated that the airplane passed 3,000 ft about 1026, with an airspeed between 230 and 240 kts, and continued to climb steadily. At 1026:29, while the pilot was conducting the checklist, the controller instructed him to contact the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center; the pilot acknowledged. At 1026:38, the pilot resumed the checklist and stated, “uhhh lets seeee. Pressurization pressurizing anti ice de-ice systems are not required at this time.” The performance study indicated that, at 1026:45, the airplane began to bank to the left at a rate of about 5° per second and that after the onset of the roll, the airplane maintained airspeed while it continued to climb for 12 seconds, consistent with engine power not being reduced in response to the roll onset. At 1026:48, the CVR recorded the airplane’s autopilot disconnect annunciation, “autopilot.” The performance study indicated that about this time, the airplane was in about a 30° left bank. About 1 second later, the pilot stated, “whooooaaaaah.” Over the next 8 seconds, the airplane’s EGPWS annunciated six “bank angle” alerts. At 1026:57, the airplane reached its maximum altitude of about 6,100 ft msl and then began to descend rapidly, in excess of 11,000 ft per minute. At 1026:58, the bank angle was about 70° left wing down, and by 1027:05, the airplane was near 90° left wing down. At 1027:04, the CVR recorded a sound similar to an overspeed warning alert, which continued to the end of the flight. The performance study indicated that about the time of the overspeed warning, the airplane passed about 250 kts calibrated airspeed at an altitude of about 5,600 ft. After the overspeed warning, the pilot shouted three expletives, and the bank angle alert sounded two more times. According to the performance study, at 1027:18, the final ADS-B data point, the airplane was about 1,000 ft msl, with the airspeed about 380 kts and in a 53° left bank. At 1027:11, the CVR recorded the pilot shouting a radio transmission, “mayday mayday mayday citation five two five echo golf is in an emergency descent unable to gain control of the aircraft.” At 1027:16, the CVR recorded the EGPWS annunciating “terrain terrain.” The sound of impact was recorded about 1027:20. The total time from the beginning of the left roll until ground impact was about 35 seconds. The accident site was located about 8.5 miles northwest of JVY.

The pilot and two medical crewmembers were repositioning the airplane to pick up a patient for aeromedical transport. Dark night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight. Radar data showed the airplane climb to 14,000 ft mean sea level after departure and proceed direct toward the destination airport before beginning a right descending turn. The airplane subsequently broke up inflight and impacted terrain. No distress calls were received from the pilot before the accident. Although weather conditions were conducive for inflight icing, no evidence of structural icing was identified at the scene. The debris field was 2,500 ft long and the disbursement of the wreckage confirmed that both wings, the horizontal stabilizer, both elevators, and both engines separated from the airplane before impacting the ground. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the initiating failure was the failure of the wing where it passed through the center of the airplane. The three wing spars exhibited S-bending deformation, indicative of positive overload producing compressive buckling and fracture. Further, impact signatures as black paint transfers and gouged aluminum, were consistent with the left outboard wing separating when it was struck by the right engine after the wing spars failed. There was no evidence of any pre-exiting conditions that would have degraded the strength of the airplane structure at the fracture locations. Flight control continuity was confirmed. An examination of the engines, propellers, and available systems showed no mechanical malfunctions or failure that could have contributed to the accident. The descending right turn was inconsistent with the intended flight track and ATC-provided clearance. However, there was insufficient information to determine how it was initiated and when the pilot became aware of the airplane's state in the dark night IMC conditions. Yet, the
absence of a distress call or communication with ATC about the airplane's deviation suggests that the pilot was not initially aware of the change in state. The structural failure signatures on the airplane were indicative of the wings failing in positive overload, which was consistent with the pilot initiating a pullup maneuver that exceeded the airplane spars' structural integrity during an attempted recovery from the spiral dive.

The aircraft departed runway 25L at Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta Airport at 0621LT bound for Pangkal Pinang, carrying 181 passengers and 8 crew members. The crew was cleared to climb but apparently encountered technical problems and was unable to reach a higher altitude than 5,375 feet. At this time, the flight shows erratic speed and altitude values. The pilot declared an emergency and elected to return to Jakarta when control was lost while at an altitude of 3,650 feet and at a speed of 345 knots. The airplane entered a dive and crashed 12 minutes after takeoff into the Kerawang Sea, about 63 km northeast from its departure point. The airplane disintegrated on impact and few debris were already recovered but unfortunately no survivors. It has been reported that the aircraft suffered various technical issues during the previous flight on Sunday night but was released for service on Monday morning. Brand new, the airplane was delivered to Lion Air last August 18. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were considered as good. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was found on 14 January 2019. In the initial stages of the investigation, it was found that there is a potential for repeated automatic nose down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer when the flight control system on a Boeing 737 MAX aircraft receives an erroneously high single AOA sensor input. Such a specific condition could among others potentially result in the stick shaker activating on the affected side and IAS, ALT and/or AOA DISAGREE alerts. The logic behind the automatic nose down trim lies in the aircraft's MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) that was introduced by Boeing on the MAX series aircraft. This feature was added to prevent the aircraft from entering a stall under specific conditions. On November 6, 2018, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) directing operators to existing flight crew procedures to address circumstances where there is erroneous input from an AOA sensor. On November 7, the FAA issued an emergency Airworthiness Directive requiring "revising certificate limitations and operating procedures of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to provide the flight crew with runaway horizontal stabilizer trim procedures to follow under certain conditions.

The twin engine airplane was engaged in a humanitarian flight from Bolivia to Brazil, carrying one passenger and a pilot. Shortly after takeoff from a little private airstrip located in the suburb of Santa Cruz, the crew was supposed to land at Santa Cruz-Viru Viru International Airport before continuing to Manaus, Brazil. After takeoff, the pilot encountered engine problems (power issue) and decided to return for an emergency landing when the airplane struck trees and belly landed in a grassy area located in Barrio Lindo. Both occupants were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff, the pilot smelled smoke. As he began to turn the airplane back to the airport, the engine lost total power. He conducted a forced landing in a field just short of the airport, during which the airplane struck a metal fence and pipe. All occupants egressed, and the pilot then noticed that a fire had erupted under the airplane's engine cowling. Postaccident examination revealed that the airplane sustained fire damage to the roof and forward end of the baggage compartment along with the engine accessory area between the firewall and aft air baffles. Further examination revealed that one of the engine exhaust crossover pipe assemblies was misaligned at the slip joint. An engine manufacturer service bulletin (SB) called for inspections of the exhaust system slip and flange joints to identify misaligned exhaust components. The last maintenance event occurred about 7 1/2 flight hours before the accident, during which the SB was performed and resulted in the replacement of crossover pipes. The mechanic who had performed the most recent maintenance did not follow the correct procedures for reinstallation of the crossover pipe, and the inspector who reviewed his work did not examine the installation as it progressed but instead inspected the pipes after they were installed and essentially hidden from view by their protective heat shield. As a result of the misaligned engine exhaust crossover pipe, hot exhaust gases escaped into the engine compartment and started a fire, which compromised critical engine fuel and oil lines, and resulted in the loss of engine power.

The pilot of the float-equipped airplane reported that, during the initial climb after a water takeoff, about 200 feet, he turned right, and the engine lost power. He immediately switched fuel tanks and attempted to restart the engine to no avail. The airplane descended and struck trees, and the right wing impacted terrain. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported to the Federal Aviation Administration inspector that, during the initial climb and after the engine lost power, he noticed that the center tank, which was selected for takeoff, was empty. He added that passengers stated that the engine did regain power after switching tanks, but the airplane had already struck trees. The pilot reported as a recommendation to more closely follow checklists.

The crew departed Elizabeth City CGAS in North Carolina to deploy weather buoys in the Atlantic Ocean. Several landings were completed successfully. While taking off, the seaplane struck an unkknown object floating on water and came to rest some 680 km east off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. All five crew members evacuated the cabin and were later recovered by the crew of a container vessel. The aircraft sank and was lost.

The vintage de Havilland DH-89A MKIV Dragon Rapide biplane (U.S. registration N683DH, serial number 6782) operated by Historic Flight Foundation was part of the static aircraft display at the Abbotsford International Airshow at Abbotsford Airport (CYXX), British Columbia. Following the conclusion of the airshow that day, the aircraft was being used to provide air rides. At approximately 1731 on 11 August 2018, the aircraft began its takeoff from Runway 25 with the pilot and 4 passengers on board for a local flight to the southeast. During the takeoff, the aircraft encountered strong, gusting crosswinds. It climbed to about 30 feet above ground level before descending suddenly and impacting the runway, coming to rest on its nose immediately off the right edge of the runway. Within 2 minutes, 2 aircraft rescue firefighting trucks arrived on the scene along with an operations/command vehicle. About 10 minutes later, 2 St. John Ambulances arrived. A representative of the HFF was escorted to the scene to ensure all electronics on the aircraft were turned off. Shortly thereafter, 2 BC Ambulance Service ground ambulances arrived, followed by 2 City of Abbotsford fire trucks. Two BC Ambulance Service air ambulances arrived after that. The fire trucks stabilized the aircraft, and the first responders who arrived with the fire truck finished evacuating the occupants. The pilot and 1 passenger received serious injuries; the other 3 passengers received minor injuries. All of the aircraft occupants were taken to the hospital. The aircraft was substantially damaged. There was a fuel spill, but no fire. The emergency locator transmitter activated.

The pilot was conducting a personal flight with four passengers. A witness observed the airplane take off and climb slowly from the airport. A pilot flying in the vicinity observed the airplane maneuver erratically before the airplane impacted terrain in a near-vertical attitude. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postimpact fire. The wreckage was contained to a confined area in the field and the remains of the major airplane components were all accounted for. Extensive thermal damage to the airframe and engine limited the scope of the postaccident examination. The impact energy needed to drive the engine into the ground suggested that the engine was producing power at the time of the accident. A postaccident examination of the remaining airframe and engine components did not reveal any anomalies which would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Depending on the amount of fuel, baggage and equipment on board, and the location of the adult passenger, the center of gravity (CG) could have been within or aft of the recommended CG. Since fuel load and location of the passengers could not be determined or may have shifted during flight, it is not known if loading contributed to the accident. The pilot was not operating with valid medical certification. His second-class medical certificate had expired several years prior to the accident and Federal Aviation Administration records did not indicate that he had obtained BasicMed medical certification. A pilot-rated passenger was seated in the rightfront seat. Investigators were unable to determine who was manipulating the flight controls of the airplane at the time of the accident. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the pilot’s loss of control. However, the reason for the loss of control could not be determined with the available evidence.