Takeoff (climb)

The wheel-ski equipped de Havilland DHC-3 Otter, C-FASV, serial number 23, was engaged in flying road construction crews from base camps to work sites in northern Saskatchewan. A five-man crew was moved from a base camp to a small lake, about 22 nautical miles (nm) from Points North Landing, Saskatchewan, the company's main base. The drop-off was made in the morning with a pick-up planned for late afternoon. The pilot then flew back to Points North Landing and filled the aircraft's fuel tanks from the company's main fuel supply. When the pilot returned for the pick-up, the ambient temperature was about seven degrees Celsius, and there were between five and six inches of slush on the ice surface. The pilot loaded the passengers and attempted a take-off. The aircraft accelerated slowly in the slush, and the pilot rejected the take-off. He selected a different take-off run, moved a passenger to a forward seat, and attempted a second take-off. The pilot continued beyond his previously selected rejection distance. The engine revolutions per minute (rpm) then reportedly decreased by about 150 rpm. The aircraft did not become airborne, and it ran into the low shoreline and crashed, skidding to a stop about 300 feet from the shore. An intense fire broke out immediately. The passengers and pilot evacuated the aircraft. Only one passenger suffered minor burns during the evacuation. Flames engulfed the main fuselage and engine, destroying the aircraft.

During the takeoff roll, the captain decided to abort for unknown reasons. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and collided with a building. All five occupants escaped uninjured while one people on the ground was killed.

A testflight for the purpose of vibration measurements on the propellers was to be carried out with the a.m. aircraft. The Beriev BE103 is the prototype of a 6 seater, twin engine amphibious aircraft of russian design. It was powered by two piston engines Teledyne Continental IO-360 E5 which operated hydraulic variable pitch propellers. In the course of the russian type certification the vibration behavior and the stiffness of the propeller blades had to be proven. Therefore a test propeller, fitted with wire strain gauges was attached to the L/H engine at the propeller manufacturer’s facilities in Straubing. The transducers and transmitters were fitted instead of the spinner by means of special brackets. The data recording system was installed in the aircraft’s cabin. As during the testflights a maximum of 105% of the maximum allowable rpm had to be achieved the L/H propeller governor was adjusted to 2940 rpm. Furthermore the R/H propeller and governor were changed from prototypes to the serial components. After these modifications several engine test runs were carried out for calibration of the test equipment and data recording. The testflight was recorded on a camcorder. The film showed that the pilot in command taxied to the far end of the 940 m long pavement runway, adjusted the engines while standing and thereafter commenced his take-off run which should have been approx. 300 m long with view to the aircraft weight according to information gained from the a/c manufacturer. The a/c, however, taxied far beyond the ½ marking of the runway, rotated fairly long and went airborne after approx. 700 m with a high angle of attack. After gaining 10 to 15 m of altitude the pilot in command retracted the landing gear. Right after that the a/c entered a shallow descend in a nose-up attitude and turned to the left before it left the camera view some seconds before the impact. During the entire flight a constant and normal engine noise was audible. Approx. 600 m behind the runway end the aircraft hit the bank of a street and caught fire. The pilot in command was fatally injured, the aircraft was destroyed by the impact and the post impact fire.

After takeoff from Haifa Airport, while climbing to a height of about 300 feet, the engine lost power then failed. The aircraft lost height and crashed on the top of a hill near the airport. The pilot and three skydivers were killed while six other occupants were injured.

The pilot departed on runway 06 with zero degrees of flaps. A witness said that she noticed that the airplane appeared to wobble and shudder, and immediately went into a steep right bank turn right after takeoff. The airplane then went into the clouds which were 200 to 400 feet agl. Radar data indicated that the airplane made several 90 degree turns prior to impacting the mountainous terrain 2.55 nm from the departure end of the runway. The pilot normally used 20 degrees of flaps for takeoff. A test pilot said that the airplane handles significantly different during takeoff if zero degrees of flaps are used verses 20 degrees of flaps. The upper cabin's entry door was found, with the locking handle and locking pins, in the closed position. No preimpact engine or airframe anomalies, which might have affected the airplane's performance, were identified.

On April 15, 1999, Korean Air cargo flight KE6316, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11F, Korean registration HL7373, departed from runway 18 at Shanghai-Hongqiao International Airport, for Seoul, Korea with 2 pilots and 1 flight technician on board at 16:01:35 Beijing local time (08:01:35 UTC time). The autopilot was off 1 minute 7 seconds (at 16:02:42) after takeoff. The airplane maneuvered first to the right, and then kept level flight at approximately 200° track for more than 30 seconds, and maneuvered back to the left. The crew was subsequently cleared to climb to 1,500 meters (4,900 feet) during which the airplane turned to NHW** at 900 meters (3,000 feet). The airplane passed 1,310 meters at 16:04:15, the airplane suddenly executed a very rapid descent after reaching 1,370 meters (4,500 feet) at 16:04:19 and then the airplane disappeared from the airport SSR screen. The airplane crashed into the ground at 16:04:35 according to Shanghai Seismic Bureau's measurement. The distance from the accident site to the airport runway is 11.6 kilometers, the site azimuth is 165° from the center of the runway centerline. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three crew members were killed as well as five people on the ground. Thirty-six other people were injured, four seriously.

After completing the first run at the heavier weight, the pilot of ZK-EMV indicated to the loader driver that the load be increased by an additional hundredweight after the next run. The pilot of the second aircraft remained at 22 hundredweight, though he had moved his loading point back a short distance to provide additional take-off distance. The second pilot was still encountering “some sink” after take off, coinciding with the raising of flap. On completion of the second run at 22 hundredweight, the pilot of ZK-EMV positioned the aircraft for loading about 25 m to the east of his previous loading point. ZK-EMV was regarded by some personnel in the company to have had slightly better performance than other similar model aircraft. Consequently the increase to 23 hundredweight, while of interest, did not raise any concerns by the loader driver. Despite being unable to observe the departure of ZK-EMV, the loader driver was still able to hear the aircraft’s engine noise and recalled nothing unusual as the aircraft departed after loading. On returning from his run, the pilot of the second aircraft saw ZK-EMV to his lower right, in a steep climb, estimated to be about 45 to 50°. As it continued to climb the aircraft rolled slowly to the left, peaking at a height equivalent to “3 times power pole height”. Objects were seen falling from the aircraft during this time. Once inverted the aircraft descended rapidly, striking the ground. The aircraft hit the ground approximately 350 m from the strip, near where the power lines crossed a bend in the road and a small intersection. The pilot of the second aircraft landed and informed the two loader drivers. Together the group headed for the accident site in the loader truck. While en route a member of the group alerted emergency services by the use of a cellular telephone. The accident was also observed by the driver of a truck who had recently deposited a load of fertiliser in the bin at the airstrip. The driver had stopped the truck on a narrow gravel road below the airstrip to check the tailgate of the trailer. He then heard an aircraft begin its take-off run and decided to stay and watch the departure as the aircraft would fly over the road close to where the truck was parked. The driver saw ZK-EMV leave the end of the strip and “sag down a long way”, appearing to “drop like a stone”. The aircraft was observed to be in a high nose or climbing attitude as it continued to descend in a slight left turn towards a fence next to the road. The aircraft was then seen to strike the fence and balloon up, dropping fertiliser as it climbed. The aircraft then rolled left and descended in the direction of the truck driver, who quickly sought cover underneath the trailer. The aircraft struck the ground in a paddock next to the road, stopping about 5 m from the truck. With 15 years of working near agricultural aircraft, the truck driver considered himself to be familiar with their operations. The driver observed no items falling from the aircraft before it struck the fence, or anything hit the aircraft. He considered the engine to be at “full song” or maximum power the whole time and heard no change in pitch or beat. After the accident the truck driver went quickly to the upturned aircraft and attempted unsuccessfully to locate the pilot. The driver then headed for the airstrip in the truck, meeting the loader drivers and second pilot on their way to the aircraft. On reaching ZK-EMV the bucket on the loader was used to lift the aircraft to gain access to the cockpit. However, no assistance could be given to the pilot who had died on impact.

Less than a minute after takeoff from Franca Airport, while climbing in poor weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft nosed down and crashed in a huge explosion about 1,500 metres past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed. They were completing a cargo flight to Ribeirão Preto, carrying documents on behalf of Banco do Brasil.

Prior to departure the pilot believed that his airplane contained between 30 and 40 gallons of fuel, adequate for a 15-minute-long flight to another airport where he could purchase additional fuel. The pilot reported the fuel gauge registered 40 gallons, so he departed. During initial climb upon reaching an altitude of about 400 feet above the ocean, both engines simultaneously lost power. The pilot rocked the airplane's wings and experienced a 'short surge of power.' However, it lasted only a brief moment and all engine power was again totally lost. The pilot turned toward the shoreline, reduced airspeed, and ditched about 0.25 miles off shore. The overnight tide/wave action subsequently beached most of the airplane. In the pilot's report, he did not indicate having experienced any mechanical malfunctions. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) coordinator examined recovered portions of the airframe and engines. In pertinent part, the FAA reported finding no physical evidence of any mechanical malfunction with the examined components. However, because of the airframe damage sustained during immersion in the salt water and the subsequent destruction to components, the Safety Board was unable to document the integrity of the fuel quantity indicator system.

The aircraft declared an emergency following departure from runway 03R at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Romulus, Michigan. The aircraft was resting on a magnetic heading of 055 degrees located approximately 3,400 feet from and 1,900 feet to the left of the departure end and centerline of runway 03R at DTW. Inspection of the forward section of the fuselage door and surrounding fuselage, a circular impression with no exposure of the underlying metal was noted approximately 2 feet 6-1/2 inches from the door hinge line. The door was opened to a point nearly flush with the aircraft's fuselage. The door handle was found to match the circular impression in position and shape. There was no tearing or fracturing of the forward fuselage door pin tips or its door pin holes. Inspection of the door's latching mechanism revealed a brown colored nail connecting the handle and vertical latches. Both engine supercharger turbine wheels displayed scoring and deformation of the impeller blades in the plane of rotation. Aileron, elevator and rudder flight control continuity was established. The elevator trim was in the neutral position. The trailing edge flaps were in the retracted positions. Both engine oil screens showed no evidence of metal contamination.