Takeoff (climb)

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The most likely accident scenario during the second take-off is that water contamination migrated from the centre fuel tank to the engine, resulting in a loss of engine power.
2. The engine stopped at a point from which there was insufficient time for the engine to restart, nor from which a safe landing could be made.
3. Indications of water contamination were found in the fuel system after the occurrence; however, the source(s) of the water contamination could not be identified.
Other Findings:
1. Examination of the aircraft and testing of the engine and components did not identify any pre-occurrence structural, mechanical, or electrical defects or malfunctions that would have
contributed to this occurrence.
2. The post-crash fire in the carburettor most likely resulted from uncontaminated fuel brought forward by the windmilling engine and the pilot's efforts to clear contamination from the fuel
system.
3. The pilot's use of his shoulder harness likely prevented more serious injuries during the impact sequence.
4. The engineer's injuries likely would have been less severe had he been using both his seat belt and shoulder harness.
5. The pilot was certified and qualified for the flight.
6. The aircraft's weight and centre of gravity were within approved limits.
7. The aircraft's records indicated that the aircraft had been certified and maintained in accordance with existing regulations.
8. The aircraft's engine power loss during the first attempted take-off was likely due to water contamination in the fuel.

The failure of the pilot to shutdown the right engine and feather the propeller after a reported loss of power in the engine shortly after takeoff resulting in the airplane descending, colliding with trees and then the ground.

The flight crew lost pitch control of the aircraft on take-off when the stabilizer trim actuators became disconnected because they had not been properly reinstalled by the AME during maintenance work conducted before the flight. The crew chief responsible for the inspection did not ensure correct assembly of the stabilizer trim actuators, which contributed to the accident.

The exact cause of the accident could not be determined.

The Board quickly discounted aircraft performance or serviceability as factors in the accident, concluding that the take-off distance was insufficient for the aircraft to get airborne safely . This was partly due to anomalies in the operating instructions for tactical landing zone operations which were contained in three separate documents - one used by the aircrew, one for personnel training, and the other used by the airstrip marking party. Consequently each party had different expectations as to what procedure would be followed, which in turn led to the airstrip markings having been laid out differently to those briefed to the aircrew . Further, the Board established that the airstrip data used to plan the sortie was significantly different from the actual airstrip dimensions ; and also concluded that reduced night vision goggle performance contributed to the accident. The Board of Inquiry concluded that the accident was caused because the take-off distance was insufficient for the aircraft to get airborne safely.

The pilot's inadvertent shutdown of the wrong engine that resulted in the total loss of engine power. A factor was the loss of engine power due to fuel starvation when the left fuel boost pump failed.

Loss of control during initial climb after the aircraft stalled because the crew forgot to select flaps in an appropriate angle for takeoff.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The accident flight was conducted at night in IMC, and the pilot, whose private pilot licence was not endorsed with an instrument rating, was not certified for the IFR flight.
2. The pilot may have been subjected to somatogravic illusion and allowed the aircraft to descend into terrain after a night take-off in IMC.
3. The pilot did not completely report his medical conditions to the civil aviation medical examiner.
Other Findings
1. The pilot was not certified to fly this model of aircraft as his private pilot licence was not endorsed with the appropriate high-performance aircraft rating.
2. The pilot conducted a downwind take-off.
3. While the aircraft was turning left for the on-course track, the aircraft flaps were retracting.
4. The aircraft struck trees while in a shallow descent. The integrity of the aircraft was compromised as it rolled inverted and entered the impact zone at high speed.
5. The aircraft engine teardown examination revealed no pre-impact failures of any component parts or accessories in either the left or right engine that would have precluded normal engine operation.
6. The propeller teardown examination revealed that both propellers were in a normal operating range and were rotating with power at the time of impact.
7. The ELT did not function due to the impact damage sustained by its various components.

The main cabin door opened during initial climb because the crew failed to ensure it was properly closed. Investigations reported that the door locking mechanism was not properly adjusted and that the crew did not identify the abnormal situation. The following factors were identified:
- The captain immediately reduced power on both engines when the door opened,
- The captain was not properly trained,
- The operator did not ensure that the crew was qualified and trained to perform this type of flight,
- The crew failed to follow the pre departure checklist,
- The crew's attention was focused on the door that opened at a critical moment of the flight and failed to continue the flight and monitor the various instruments.

Shut down by a UNITA surface-to-air missile.