Crash of a Lockheed C-130 Hercules in Tehran: 6 killed

Date & Time: Feb 1, 2000 at 1030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tehran - Hamadan
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft departed Tehran-Mehrabad Airport on a training flight to Hamadan, carrying six crew members. At liftoff from runway 29R, the aircraft deviated to the right and crashed on an Iran Air Airbus A300B2-203 that was towed. Both aircraft exploded instantly and were totally destroyed by a post crash fire. All six crew members on board the Hercules were killed as well as three people who were on board the Airbus.
Probable cause:
It is believed that the Hercules went out of control upon takeoff following an engine failure.

Crash of an Airbus A310-304 off Abidjan: 169 killed

Date & Time: Jan 30, 2000 at 2109 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-BEN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Abidjan - Lagos - Nairobi
MSN:
426
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
KQ431
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
169
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
169
Captain / Total flying hours:
8663
Captain / Total hours on type:
1664.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7295
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5768
Aircraft flight hours:
58115
Aircraft flight cycles:
15026
Circumstances:
On Sunday 30 January 2000, the Kenya Airways Airbus 310-304, registered 5Y−BEN, was undertaking the scheduled international flight KQ 431 transporting passengers from Abidjan to Nairobi, via Lagos. On board there were 10 crewmembers and 169 passengers. On the same day, in the afternoon, 5Y-BEN had flown in from Nairobi and landed at Félix Houphouët-Boigny International Airport in Abidjan at 15 h 15. The unfavorable meteorological at Lagos had obliged the pilot, after a thirty minutes hold at Lagos, to divert to Abidjan. The relief crew, which had arrived two days previously on flight KQ 430 on Friday 28 January 2000, at 15 h 44, took over on board 5Y-BEN, to undertake flight KQ 431 from Abidjan to Nairobi, via Lagos. Departure was scheduled for 21 h 00, in accordance with the initial program. The copilot was pilot flying, the Captain was pilot not flying. At 20 h 55 min 22 s, the crew established contact with Abidjan Airport control tower and asked for start-up clearance. This was granted. At 20 h 56 min 09 s, the Captain ordered the checklist to be performed and announced the type of take-off by saying "Flex sixty" at 20 h 56 min 19 s. At 21 h 00 min 18 s, three minutes and nineteen seconds after the start-up of the first engine (engine n° 2), the Captain announced over the interphone that linked him with the ground mechanic “we have two normal start-ups”. At 21 h 01 min 07 s, the crew of 5Y-BEN asked for clearance to taxi. The tower controller put them on standby. A few seconds later, he cleared them to taxi. At 21 h 02 min 33 s, the Captain ordered the Copilot to set the flaps at 15°. Later, at 21 h 04 min 50 s , the copilot announced "trim: 0.9 nose up, Slats/flaps 15/15". The airplane began to taxi at 21 h 07 min 35 s, the tower controller informed the crew of the latest wind, cleared them to take off and asked the crew the call back when they reached flight level 40. At 21 h 07 min 45 s, the copilot read back the clearance. This was the last communication between the crew and the control tower. At 21 h 08 min 08 s, the copilot announced "Take-off checklist completed … cleared for take-off". At 21 h 08 min 18 s, the Captain applied take-off power and announced "thrust, SRS, and runway" then, nine seconds later “100 knots”. At 21 h 08 min 50 s, the Captain announced "V1 and Rotate(4)", then two seconds later "Positive". The airplane took off. At 21 h 08 min 57 s, the copilot announced "Positive rate of climb, gear up". Less than two seconds later the stall warning sounded. At 21 h 09 min 07 s, the automatic call out (AC) announced 300 feet. At 21 h 09 min 14 s, the copilot asked "what’s the problem?". From 21 h 09 min 16 s, the AC announced successively 200, 100, 50, 30, 20 and 10 feet. Meanwhile, at 21 h 09 min 18 s, the copilot ordered the aural warning to be cut. Two seconds later, the GPWS sounded the “Whoop...” alarm followed, a half a second later, by the AC announcement of 50 feet. At 21 h 09 min 22 s, an aural master warning started, immediately followed by an order from the Captain to climb: "Go up!", though this was preceded six tenths of a second by the AC announcement of 10 feet. At 21 h 09 min 23.9 s, end of the master warning, followed immediately within a tenth of a second by the noise of the impact. The time of the accident is presumed to be 21 h 09 min 24 s.
Probable cause:
The Commission of Inquiry concluded that the cause of the accident to flight KQ 431 on 30 January 2000 was a collision with the sea that resulted from the pilot flying applying one part of the procedure, by pushing forward on the control column to stop the stick shaker, following the initiation of a stall warning on rotation, while the airplane was not in a true stall situation. In fact, the FCOM used by the airline states that whenever a stall warning is encountered at low altitude (stick shaker activation), it should be considered as an immediate threat to the maintenance of a safe flight path. It specifies that at the first sign of an imminent stall or at the time of a stick shaker activation, the following actions must be undertaken simultaneously: thrust levers ion TOGA position, reduction of pitch attitude, wings level, check that speed brakes are retracted. The investigation showed that the pilot flying reduced the pitch attitude but did not apply TOGA thrust on the engines. The investigation was unable to determine if the crew performed the other two actions: leveling the wings and checking that the speed brakes were retracted.
The following elements contributed to the accident:
• the pilot flying’s action on the control column put the airplane into a descent without the crew realizing it, despite the radio altimeter callouts;
• the GPWS warnings that could have alerted the crew to an imminent contact with the sea were masked by the priority stall and overspeed warnings, in accordance
with the rules on the prioritization of warnings;
• the conditions for a takeoff performed towards the sea and at night provided no external visual references that would have allowed the crew to be aware of the
direct proximity of the sea.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 414 Chancellor in Oklahoma

Date & Time: Jan 26, 2000 at 1100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N7VS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oklahoma City – El Paso
MSN:
414-0276
YOM:
1972
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
14432
Captain / Total hours on type:
1350.00
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that light snow was falling, with approximately 2 inches already on the ground, and the runway had been plowed approximately one hour prior to his departure. About 20 minutes had elapsed since the airplane had been towed from the '68 degree F' hangar. During the takeoff, the airplane accelerated 'normally' and became airborne after traveling about 2,160 feet down the 3,240-foot runway. After liftoff, the airplane did not climb above 25 or 30 feet agl. The airplane impacted an embankment at the end of the runway, continued across railroad tracks, and through a fence coming to rest in a brick storage yard about 800-1,000 feet from the departure end of the runway. The pilot stated that someone told him that the airport did not have any deicing equipment, therefore, he did not deice the airplane. The weather facility, located 5 miles from the accident site, reported the wind from 100 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 1/2 mile with snow and freezing fog, temperature 27 degrees F.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilot to deice the airplane prior to departure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 404 Titan II in Guadalajara: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jan 25, 2000 at 1225 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XC-AA91
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Guadalajara - Uruapan
MSN:
404-0451
YOM:
1979
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Guadalajara-Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla Airport on a flight to Uruapan, carrying three engineers and two pilots. Shortly after takeoff from runway 28, while in initial climb, the aircraft lost height and crashed. All five occupants were killed.

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-26A Marquise in San Antonio: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 22, 2000 at 1433 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N386TM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
San Antonio - Tucson
MSN:
386
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2000
Captain / Total hours on type:
21.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
950
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
3717
Aircraft flight cycles:
3529
Circumstances:
Witnesses reported that during the airplane's takeoff roll they heard a heard a series of repeated sounds, which they described as similar to a "backfire" or "compressor stall." Several witnesses reported seeing the airplane's right propeller "stopped." One witness reported that as the airplane lifted off the ground, he heard "a loud cracking sound followed by an immediate prop wind down into feather." He continued to watch the airplane, as the gear was retracted and the airplane entered a climb and right turn. Subsequently, the airplane pitched up, entered a "Vmc roll-over," followed by a 360-degree turn, and then impacted the ground. Radar data indicated the airplane took off and climbed on runway heading to a maximum altitude of about 200 feet agl. The airplane than entered a right turn and began to lose altitude. A radar study revealed that the airplane's calibrated airspeed was 97 knots when the last radar return was recorded. According to the flight manual, minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc) was 93 knots. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted the ground in a near vertical attitude. A post-crash fire erupted, which destroyed all cockpit instruments and switches. Examination of the propellers revealed that neither of the
propellers were in the feathered position at the time of impact. Examination of the left engine revealed signatures consistent with operation at the time of impact. Examination of the right engine revealed that the second stage impeller shroud exhibited static witness marks indicating that the engine was not operating at the time of impact. However, rotational scoring was also observed through the entire circumference of the impeller shroud. The static witness marks were on top of the rotational marks. Examination of the right engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left seat pilot had accumulated a total flight time of about 950 hours of which 16.9 hours were in an MU-2 flight simulator and 4.5 hours were in the accident airplane. Although he had started an MU-2 Pilot-Initial training course, he did not complete the course. The right seat pilot had accumulated a total flight time of about 2,000 hours of which 20.0 hours were in an MU-2 flight simulator and 20.6 hours were in the accident airplane. He had successfully completed an MU-2 Pilot-Initial training course one month prior to the accident.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain the minimum controllable airspeed following a loss of engine power during the initial takeoff climb. Contributing factors to the accident were both pilot's lack of total experience in the make and model of the accident airplane and the loss of right engine power for an undetermined reason.
Final Report:

Crash of a Let L-410UVP-E in San José: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jan 15, 2000 at 1304 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
YS-09-C
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
San José - Tortuguero
MSN:
86 16 20
YOM:
1986
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
7801
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3000
Circumstances:
After takeoff from San José-Tobías Bolaños Airport, en route to the Tortuguero National Park, while in initial climb, the aircraft stalled and crashed onto a house located in the district of Rohrmoser, about 3 km southeast of the airport. Four passengers were killed while 14 other occupants were injured, some seriously. Three people in the house, a nurse and two little girls were uninjured. Fifteen days after the accident, on January 30, the captain died from his injuries.
Probable cause:
Possible loss of longitudinal control of the aircraft in flight, due to not reaching the minimum climb speed, due to a wrong takeoff configuration as the flaps were retracted (zero position).
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Inadequate weight distribution that affected the position of the aircraft.
- The CofG was beyond the rear limit, out of the envelope.
- The crew failed to follow the pre-takeoff checklist.
- The total weight of the aircraft was above the MTOW.
- The high density altitude.
- Lack of supervision of the dispatch of the flight by the operator. (Absence of procedures).
- Self-induced pressure from the crew for an expeditious operation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130B Hercules in Chimore: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 2000 at 1216 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TAM-60
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chimore - Trinidad
MSN:
3559
YOM:
1960
Country:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
24
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll on runway 35 at Chimore Airport, about 600 meters from the end, the airplane went out of control, veered off runway to the left, impacted a drainage ditch (3 metres deep) and crashed in a wooded area. Five occupants were killed while 26 other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Crash of a Beechcraft D18S in Everett

Date & Time: Jan 10, 2000 at 2024 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1827M
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Everett - Burlington
MSN:
A-394
YOM:
1947
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5900
Captain / Total hours on type:
404.00
Aircraft flight hours:
10429
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that the start, taxi and run-up were normal. The engines were producing full power for the takeoff ground roll. The pilot stated that the airplane lifted off and attained an altitude of approximately five feet when it began to bank and roll to the left. The pilot applied corrective action, however, the airplane would not respond. The pilot elected to abort the take off and reduced engine power. The airplane touched down in the soft dirt/grass next to the runway. The main landing gear collapsed and the airplane slid to a stop. The pilot reported that there was no indication of a mechanical failure or malfunction with the engines. An FAA inspector verified flight control continuity with no abnormalities noted.
Probable cause:
Loss of aircraft control during initial climb for undetermined reasons.
Final Report:

Crash of a Saab 340B in Nassenwil: 10 killed

Date & Time: Jan 10, 2000 at 1756 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HB-AKK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Zurich - Dresden
MSN:
213
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
LX498
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Captain / Total flying hours:
8452
Captain / Total hours on type:
1870.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2332
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1162
Aircraft flight hours:
21676
Aircraft flight cycles:
20589
Circumstances:
Aircraft HB-AKK had landed in Zurich on 10 January 2000 as Crossair flight CRX 842 from Guernsey and reached stand F74 at 16:00 UTC, which is located near to the threshold of runway 28. The aircraft was then prepared for the next flight at this stand. According to statements from the Swissport ground personnel the preparation of the aircraft took place without any special occurrence. During its time on the ground, the aircraft was supplied with electric power by a ground power unit (GPU). An air-conditioning truck was not used and the aircraft was not de-iced. The crew prepared for the flight using the computer-aided briefing system. The following description of the history of the flight was reconstructed with the help of recordings from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), digital flight data recorder (DFDR), voice radio communications and ATC radar (cf. Annex 1). According to the available recordings, the commander, as planned by the crew, was pilot flying (PF) and the first officer was pilot non flying (PNF) throughout the flight. At 16:39:14 UTC, flight CRX 498 to Dresden received from clearance delivery (DEL) the following ATC-clearance: "runway two eight, Dresden, Zurich East One Yankee Departure, squawk three zero zero four". The crew was then instructed to change to the apron (APR) frequency. Permission to start engines was given at 16:45:00 UTC by APR. At 16:49:22 UTC the first officer signaled readiness to taxi to APR. While the crew waited for taxi clearance, a few points of the taxi checklist were performed. At 16:50:30 UTC APR cleared flight CRX 498 to follow a Swissair Airbus A320 (SWR 014) to the holding position of runway 28. In accordance with this clearance, CRX 498 started to move. The flight crew performed the outstanding items on the taxi checklist and contacted the tower (TWR), which gave line-up clearance at 16:52:36 UTC. Take-off clearance was given at 16:54:00 UTC: "Crossair four nine eight, wind three zero zero degrees, three knots, cleared take-off runway two eight". According to the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) at 16:50 UTC the following meteorological conditions existed: wind 290° at 2 knots, visibility 6 km in drizzle, broken, cloud base at 500 feet above ground level, temperature 2 °C, dew point 1 °C, QNH 1032 hPa. The aircraft began its take-off roll at 16:54:10 UTC in darkness. The landing lights were on and the flaps were fully retracted. After take-off at 16:54:31 UTC the landing gear was retracted. Then, on the commander's order, the flight director (FD) was switched on and the NAV mode was armed. Both pilots confirmed that the long range navigation system number 1 (LRN 1) was following the track (LRN 1 captured). The commander controlled the aircraft in a stable climb with a pitch of 15° attitude nose up (ANU) and a speed of 136 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). For the remaining flight, the autopilot was never engaged. Since the cloud base was indicated as 500 ft above ground level (AGL), it can be assumed that the aircraft, once above an altitude of approx. 1900 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The initial flight path, at a heading of 276°, followed the centre line of the runway. After the request from TWR, CRX 498 switched to the departure control frequency (DEP) at 16:55:07 UTC. The radar recording then showed a deviation in the flight path by 5° to the south. However, this slight deviation was reduced before waypoint DME 2.1 KLO was reached by initiating a right turn. At 16:55:15 UTC flight CRX 498 was cleared to climb to flight level 110. At 16:55:39 UTC, Zurich departure issued the instruction to turn to VOR ZUE: "four nine eight, turn left to Zurich East". The first officer confirmed by radio: "turning left to Zurich East, Crossair four niner eight". At the same time the aircraft reached waypoint DME 2.1 KLO. At this point the departure procedure ZUE1Y specifies a left turn, in order to capture and follow radial 255 of VOR KLO. At 16:55:45 the bank angle to the left reached a maximum of 16.9° on a compass heading of 270°. At 16:55:47 UTC the first officer informed the commander that the LRN system was programmed from the present position to ZUE: "from present, LRN is to Zurich East, yeah". The commander confirmed with: "checked". The left turn instruction from DEP was not mentioned. After the aircraft had remained briefly at a 16° bank angle to the left, it began to roll to the right. From 16:55:47 UTC the bank angle rate amounted to 3°/s to the right. In this phase the first officer was very busy carrying out the orders routinely issued by the commander ("CTOT/APR off, yaw damper on, bleed air on"). All relevant flight parameters in this phase indicated a stable climb with a pitch of 13-14° ANU. The communication being conducted internally did not give any indication of difficulties of any kind. At 16:55:55 UTC, at a bank angle of 8.4° to the right, the bank angle rate increased and the nose of the aircraft began to drop from 14.2° to 10.8° ANU. At 16:56:00 UTC the right bank angle attained a value of 31.0°, when the commander gave the order to set climb power: "set climb power". The first officer confirmed with a whispered "coming" and began to set the climb power – a procedure which takes quite some time. Between 16:56:03 UTC and 16:56:10 UTC the commander stabilized the bank angle to the right between 39° and 42° by corresponding flight control inputs. The pitch reduced further and stabilized at a value of 1° ANU at 16:56:06 UTC as a result of corresponding elevator inputs for four seconds. As a consequence, the trajectory reached its maximum altitude of 4720 ft AMSL. According to information from the crew of the preceding flight SWR 014 the cloud top at that time was approx. 5000 ft AMSL. The speed of the aircraft involved in the accident increased to 158 KIAS. 16:56:10 UTC marked the beginning of a nine-second period which was characterized by destabilization of the attitude. It featured uncoordinated deflections of the ailerons to the left and right. Meanwhile, the elevator remained practically in the neutral position. Since the rightward deflections of the aileron were dominant, the bank angle increased from 42° to 80° to the right. Given the neutral position of the elevator, because of the high bank angle the pitch increased to 25° attitude nose down (AND). The aircraft therefore quickly lost altitude and its speed increased to 207 KIAS. At 16:56:12 UTC the first officer made the commander aware that they should turn left to ZUE: "turning left to Zurich East, we should left". At 16:56:15 UTC, at a bank angle of 65.8° to the right, the commander muttered unclearly: "ohna-na". Three seconds later at 16:56:18 UTC, DEP requested confirmation that the aircraft was turning to the left: "Crossair four nine eight, confirm you are turning left". The first officer responded immediately: "moment please, standby". DEP then instructed the crew to continue the right turn: "ok, continue right to Zurich East." In the final phase of flight, beginning at 16:56:20 UTC, the aircraft went into a spiral dive. As a result of massive aileron deflections, the aircraft attained a maximum bank angle of 137° to the right. The engines still provided high power, since setting of climb power had not yet been terminated. At a speed of 250 KIAS the over speed warning horn sounded. At 16:56:24 UTC the first officer vigorously warned the commander to turn left: "turning left, left, left, left... left!" At the end of the data recording at 16:56:25 UTC the aircraft still exhibited a bank angle of 76° to the right. The nose of the aircraft had dropped to 63° AND at an air speed of 285 KIAS. Several witnesses observed the aircraft breaking out of the clouds in a steep descent and performing a right turn. At 16:56:27.2 UTC the aircraft crashed in an open field near Au, Nassenwil, ZH. None of the three crew members and seven passengers survived the impact.
Probable cause:
The accident is attributable to a collision with the ground, after the flight crew had lost control of the aircraft for the following reasons:
• The flight crew reacted inappropriately to the change in departure clearance SID ZUE 1Y by ATC.
• The co-pilot made an entry in the FMS, without being instructed to do so by the commander, which related to the change to the SID ZUE 1 standard instrument departure. In doing so, he omitted to select a turn direction.
• The commander dispensed with use of the autopilot under instrument flight conditions and during the work-intensive climb phase of the flight.
• The commander took the aircraft into a spiral dive to the right because, with a probability bordering on certainty, he had lost spatial orientation.
• The first officer took only inadequate measures to prevent or recover from the spiral dive.
The following factors may have contributed to the accident:
• The commander remained unilaterally firm in perceptions which suggested a left turn direction to him.
• When interpreting the attitude display instruments under stress, the commander resorted to a reaction pattern (heuristics) which he had learned earlier.
• The commander’s capacity for analysis and critical assessment of the situation were possibly limited as a result of the effects of medication.
• After the change to standard instrument departure SID ZUE 1Y the crew set inappropriate priorities for their tasks and their concentration remained one-sided.
• The commander was not systematically acquainted by Crossair with the specific features of western systems and cockpit procedures.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208A Caravan 675 in Abbotsford

Date & Time: Dec 28, 1999 at 0917 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FGGG
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Abbotsford - Billings - Nassau
MSN:
208-0310
YOM:
1999
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
12000
Captain / Total hours on type:
85.00
Circumstances:
At 0916 Pacific standard time, the Seair Cessna 208 Caravan amphibious aircraft, serial number 20800310, took off from runway 19 at Abbotsford Airport, British Columbia, on the first leg of a private flight to the Bahamas. One pilot and five passengers were on board. About one minute later, as the aircraft was climbing through an altitude of about 400 feet above ground level and as the pilot retracted flaps from 10 to zero degrees, the aircraft became uncontrollable. The aircraft banked left, descended rapidly, and crashed in a field about one-half mile south of the runway threshold, in a left bank with a near-level pitch attitude. The aircraft was destroyed, and the pilot received serious injuries. Two passengers were also seriously injured, and three passengers received minor injuries. Daylight visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. There was no fire.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot took off with frost adhering to the aircraft's lifting surfaces, which increased drag and reduced the ability of the wings to produce lift.
2. At take-off, the aircraft was about 510 pounds in excess of its maximum take-off weight, adversely affecting aircraft performance.
3. The aircraft experienced an aerodynamic stall and loss of control when the flaps were retracted from 10 degrees to zero. Retracting the flaps reduced the amount of lift being produced by the wing, already performing poorly because of contamination.
Other Findings:
1. Appropriate entries were not recorded in the aircraft=s journey and maintenance logs, and the weight and balance documentation was not amended.
2. The floats absorbed much of the impact energy and likely enhanced survivability of the accident.
Final Report: