Landing (descent or approach)

Following an uneventful flight from Chita, the crew initiated the approach to Blagoveshchensk in poor weather conditions with reduced visibility, heavy rain falls, thunderstorm activity and a cloud base at 150 metres. On final approach, despite he did establish any visual contact with the runway or its light system, the captain continued the approach and passed below the MDA. As the aircraft was not properly aligned with the runway centerline, it descended too low and impacted trees 210 meters to the right of the centerline and 50 meters short of runway 36. Upon impact, the left wing was torn off and the aircraft crashed in a wooded area. It slid over a distance of 450 metres before coming to rest. There was no fire. All 41 occupants were rescued, among them 9 were injured.

Following an uneventful flight from Winnipeg, the crew completed the landing on runway 02/20, a 1,876 metres long clay/gravel runway. During the landing roll, the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft slid on its nose for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the runway surface was irregular with potholes and water gouges due to the recent rains.

The flight originated in New York as BW 523, and made a passenger and fuel stop in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad where there was also a change of crew comprising two pilots and four flight attendants before proceeding to Georgetown, Guyana. The flight departed Piarco at 04:36UTC. The aircraft proceeded to Georgetown from Port of Spain at Flight Level (FL) 330, was given descent clearance and was cleared for an RNAV (GPS) approach to RWY 06, landing at 05:32 UTC. There were no reported anomalies in the en-route profile, although during the transition from cruise to approach to RWY 06 the aircraft deviated to avoid some thunderstorm cells north and east of the Airport. The reported visibility was 9,000m. Light rain was encountered during the approach. The pilot reported that after visual contact was made and after crossing the Final Approach Fix (FAF), he disengaged the auto pilot and configured the aircraft for landing. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) indicated that the flight was normal until the aircraft was approaching the runway. Even before the aircraft was over the threshold, the captain commented that he was not landing here. As the flight continued over the runway, comments on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), revealed that the captain indicated to the First Officer (FO) that the aircraft was not touching down. A go-around call was made by the Captain and acknowledged by the First Officer, however three seconds elapsed and the aircraft subsequently touched down approximately 4700ft from the threshold of RWY06, leaving just over 2700 feet of runway surface remaining. Upon touchdown, brake pressure was gradually increased and maximum brake pressure of 3000psi was not achieved until the aircraft was 250ft from the end of the runway or 450ft from the end of the paved area. The ground spoilers were extended on touchdown. The thrust reversers were partially deployed after touchdown. The aircraft did not stop and overran the runway. It then assumed a downward trajectory followed by a loud impact.

The four engine aircraft departed Dakhla on a flight to Kenitra with an intermediate stop in Guelmim, carrying 60 soldiers, 12 civilians and 8 crew members. While approaching Guelmim Airport, the pilot encountered poor visibility due to marginal weather conditions. Too low, the aircraft impacted the slope of a rocky mountain located 10 km short of runway. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Two passengers survived the accident but died the following day.

On final approach to Kei Mouth Airport in the Eastern Cape Province, the single engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances. While both occupants were uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The crew was completing a positioning flight from Swartkop AFB.

The aircraft and crew commenced operations in EINN that morning, departing at 05.52 hrs and arriving at EGCC at 07.13 hrs. During the turnaround, fuel was uplifted and 21 passengers boarded. Using the flight number and call sign EI-3601 the scheduled passenger service departed EGCC at 07.47 hrs for EINN with an estimated flight time of one hour and nine minutes. En-route operations were normal and, in consultation with ATC, the aircraft descended and was cleared to self-position to DERAG2 for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to RWY 24. At 09.08 hrs the aircraft commenced an approach to RWY 24 in strong and gusty crosswind conditions. Following a turbulent approach difficulty was experienced in landing the aircraft, which contacted the runway in a nose-down attitude and bounced. A go-around was performed and the aircraft was vectored for a second approach. During this second approach landing turbulence was again experienced. Following bounces the aircraft pitched nose down and contacted the runway heavily in a nose down attitude. The nose gear collapsed and the aircraft nose descended onto the runway. The aircraft sustained damage with directional control being lost. The aircraft came to rest at the junction of the runway and a taxiway. Following engine shutdown the forward Cabin Crew Member (CCM) advised the cockpit that there was no smoke and that the doors could be opened following which, an evacuation was commenced. Airport fire crews arrived on scene promptly and assisted passengers disembarking the aircraft. There were no injuries.

5N-BMM departed Lagos at 1856 hrs for Port Harcourt on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and estimated Port Harcourt at 1940 hrs. The aircraft was cleared to maintain FL330. The aircraft’s first contact with Port Harcourt was at 1914 hrs. The pilot reported maintaining FL330 with six souls onboard, four hours fuel endurance and estimating POT VOR at 1940hrs. The aircraft was cleared to POT, to maintain FL330 with no delay expected for ILS Approach Runway 21, QNH 1011 and to report when released by Lagos. At 1921 hrs the pilot reported 100 NM to POT and requested for descent. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL150. At 1927 hrs the pilot requested for further descent and was cleared to 3,300 feet on QNH 1011 but the pilot acknowledged 3500 feet. At 1931 hrs the aircraft was re-cleared to FL090 initially due to departing traffic on Runway 03. At 1934 hrs 5N-BMM reported maintaining FL090 and was re-cleared to FL050. The aircraft was re-cleared to 2,000 feet on QNH 1011 at 1936 hrs and cleared for the straight-in ILS Approach Runway 21 and to report on the localizer. At 1947 hrs the pilot reported final for Runway 21 and was asked to contact Tower on 119.2 and the Tower asked 5N-BMM to report on glide slope Runway 21. At 1950 hrs the Tower asked 5N-BMM to confirm on the glide slope and the crew confirmed “Charlie, we have three miles to run”. The Tower cleared 5N-BMM to land with surface wind calm but to exercise caution since the Runway surface was wet and 5N-BMM responded “wind calm”. At 1952:26 hrs the auto voice callout "minimums minimums” alerted the crew. At 1952:40 hrs the pilot flying (PF) said "I am not on the centerline". At 1952:48 hrs he said "I can't see down". At 1952:55 hrs the pilot monitoring (PM) said to the pilot flying; " I am telling you to go down" and the pilot flying said " I will go down", five seconds later the aircraft crashed. The crew exited the aircraft without accomplishing the Emergency Evacuation Checklist and therefore left the right engine running for about 28 minutes after the crash. The Fire Service eventually used their water hose to shutdown the running engine. At 19:54 hrs the Tower called 5N-BMM to pass on the landing time as 19:53 hrs, but no response from 5N-BMM. There was no indication that the aircraft was taxing on the Runway because it was dark and no light was visible hence the need to alert the Fire personnel. The watch room was asked to give the Tower information, which they could not give since they do not have a two – way contact with the Fire trucks. The Tower could not raise the Fire truck since there was no two - way communication between them; however, the Fire truck was later cleared to proceed to the Runway as the Tower could not ascertain the position of the aircraft. The aircraft was actually turned 90° because of the big culvert that held the right wing and made the aircraft spin and turned 90o facing the runway, two meters from the active runway, the culvert was uprooted due to the aircraft impact forces. The wheel broke off because of the gully that runs parallel to the runway.

The twin engine aircraft departed Tomsk Airport at 1010LT on a flight (callsign IK9007/SP5007) to Surgut, carrying 33 passengers and a crew of four. About an hour and 26 minutes into the flight, the left engine's 'chips in oil' warning light came on. About eight minutes later, a burning smell was noticed in the cockpit and the captain decided to divert to Nizhnevartovsk Airport. During the descent, the left engine caught fire. Its propeller was feathered and the crew decided to divert to Strezhevoy Airport. But as the fire could not be extinguished, the captain eventually attempted an emergency landing in the Ob River. Upon landing, the aircraft broke in two and came to rest in shallow water. Seven passengers were killed while all other occupants were rescued.

The 8Q-TMD aircraft took-off from water runway of Male’ International Airport North Bound Left (NL) at 0820 hrs local time on 11 July 2011 for a routine training flight bound to Maadhiggaru Falhu (a lagoon located approximately 15 nautical miles south west of the Male’ International Airport). The sky was clear with good visibility and wind 8-10 knots from west and south west. During the training 5 landings and take-offs were made simulating different conditions of flight. Crew confirmed that all these landings and take-offs were made inside the lagoon except the last landing where the crew decided to land on open water outside the lagoon. Crew were simulating single engine landing with a tail wind. As per the crew, the aircraft initial touch down was smooth. However, they stroke a wave which made the aircraft bounce up for about 20 feet. With the low power the aircraft hit the water again, resulting in multiple float attachments to break. Both front and main spreader bars broke and floats rose up twisted, hitting the engine bottom cowlings. Propeller cut was found on top front of both floats.

The multi-engine airplane was in cruise flight at flight level 210 when the pilot declared an emergency due to a rough-running right engine and diverted to a non-towered airport about 10 miles from the airplane’s position. About 4 minutes later, the pilot reported that he had shut down the right engine. The pilot orbited around the diversion airport during the descent and reported to an air traffic controller that he did not believe he would require any assistance after landing. The airplane initially approached the airport while descending through about 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and circled above the airport before entering a left traffic pattern approach for runway 22. About 7,000 feet msl, the airplane was about 2.5 miles northeast of the airport. The airplane descended through 2,300 feet msl when it was abeam the runway threshold on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. According to the airplane information manual, procedures for landing with an inoperative engine call for “excessive altitude;” however, the airplane's last radar return showed the airplane at an altitude of 700 feet msl (about 600 feet above ground level) and about 3 miles from the approach end of the runway. The airplane was configured for a single-engine landing and was likely on or turning to the final approach course when it rolled and impacted trees. The airplane came to rest in a wooded area about 0.8 miles north of the runway threshold, inverted, in a flat attitude with no longitudinal deformation. A majority of the airplane, including the cockpit, main cabin, and left wing, were consumed by a postcrash fire. Search operations located the airplane about 6 hours after its expected arrival time. Due to the severity of the postcrash fire, occupant survivability after the impact could not be determined. Examination of the airframe, the left engine, and both propellers did not reveal any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The investigation revealed that the right engine failed when the camshaft stopped rotating after the camshaft gear experienced a fatigue fracture on one of its gear teeth. The remaining gear teeth were fractured in overstress and/or were crushed due to interference contact with the crankshaft gear. Spalling observed on an intact gear tooth suggested abnormal loading of the camshaft gear; however, the origin of the abnormal loading could not be determined.