Landing (descent or approach)

Following an uneventful flight from Kinshasa, the crew started the descent to Kisangani-Bangoka Airport in poor weather conditions with low visibility due to heavy rain falls. On final approach, the pilot did not establish any visual contact with the runway but continued until the aircraft impacted ground some 1,000 metres short of runway 31. On impact, the aircraft went out of control, veered to the right, exploded and disintegrated in a wooded area located to the right of the approach path. The wreckage was found about 500 metres southeast from the runway 31 threshold. Five crew and 72 passengers were killed.

The four engine aircraft departed Baku-Bina Airport at 2126LT on a cargo flight to Bagram AFB, carrying 9 crew members and a load of 18 tons of various goods destined to the NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan. While approaching Bagram AFB by night, at an altitude of 12,500 feet, the aircraft impacted the slope of a mountain located 25 km from the airport. The wreckage was found at the first light of day. The aircraft was destroyed and all 9 occupants were killed.

Aircraft left Moscow-Domodedovo Airport in 2224LT for Petrozavodsk, Karelia. On final approach by night and fog reducing vertical visibility to 300 metres, crew descended too low without a visual contact was established with the runway lights. Aircraft descended below the MDA, hit an electric pole, crashed on a road and came to rest in a garden, 570 metres short of runway 02. Eight people were rescued as all other 44 occupants were killed. Flight was operated by RusAir on behalf of RusLine (flight 243). Russian FIFA's football referee Vladimir Pettaï was also killed in this accident. Two days later, a survivor died from his injuries. The weekend following the accident (five days and six days later), two survivors died from their injuries (burns).

Aircraft was on a flight from Toronto-Lester B. Pearson International Airport to Toronto-Buttonville Municipal Airport, Ontario, with 2 pilots on board. Air traffic control cleared the aircraft for a contact approach to Runway 33. During the left turn on to final, the aircraft overshot the runway centerline. The pilot then compensated with a tight turn to the right to line up with the runway heading and touched down just beyond the threshold markings. Immediately after touchdown, the aircraft exited the runway to the right, and continued through the infield and the adjacent taxiway Bravo, striking a runway/taxiway identification sign, but avoiding aircraft that were parked on the apron. The aircraft came to a stop on the infield before Runway 21/03. The aircraft remained upright, and the landing gear did not collapse. The aircraft sustained substantial damage. There was no fire, and the flight crew was not injured. The Toronto-Buttonville tower controller observed the event as it progressed and immediately called for emergency vehicles from the nearby municipality. The accident occurred at 1506 Eastern Daylight Time.

According to the captain, while on approach to land, he distracted the crew by pointing out a boat dock. He said that after touchdown, he realized that the landing gear was not extended, and the airplane slid on its belly, sustaining substantial damage to the underside of the fuselage. He said that the crew did not hear the landing gear retracted warning horn, and the accident could have been prevented if he had not distracted the crew. The captain reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The crew departed Port Gentil on a cargo flight to Libreville on behalf of DHL Airways. On approach to Libreville-Léon Mba Airport, the captain informed ATC about hydraulic problems and initiated a go-around procedure. Shortly later, the aircraft stalled and crashed in the sea some 2,3 km southeast of the airport. All four occupants were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Due to the failure of the hydraulic system, the crew was unable to lower the gear.

The pilot indicated that, prior to the accident flight, the wing flaps had failed, but he decided to proceed with the flight contrary to the Airplane Flight Manual guidance. While conducting a no-flap approach to the airport, he decided that his airspeed was too fast to land, and he initiated a go-around. During the go-around, the airplane continued to descend, and the fuselage struck the runway. The pilot was able to complete the go-around, and realized that he had not extended the landing gear. He lowered the landing gear, and landed the airplane uneventfully. He elected to remain overnight at the airport due to fatigue. The next day, he decided to test fly the airplane. During the takeoff roll, the airplane had a severe vibration, and he aborted the takeoff. During a subsequent inspection, an aviation mechanic discovered that the center wing carry-through cracked when the belly skid pad deflected up into a stringer during the gear-up landing.

Following an uneventful flight, the flight crew briefed the arrival to the destination airport and set the calculated landing speeds. The captain and the first officer reported that during final approach, it felt like the airplane was “pushed up” as the wind shifted to a tailwind or updraft before landing near the runway number markings. Upon touchdown, the captain applied the brakes and thought that the initial braking was effective; however, he noticed the airplane was not slowing down. The captain applied maximum braking, and the airplane began to veer to the right; he was able to correct back to the runway centerline, but the airplane subsequently exited the departure end of the runway and traveled down a steep embankment. A pilot-rated passenger reported that throughout the approach to landing, he thought the airplane was high and thought that the excessive altitude continued through and into the base-to-final turn. He added that the bank angle of this turn seemed greater than 45 degrees. Recorded communication from the cockpit voice and data recorder (CVDR) revealed that during the approach to landing, the flight crew performed the landing checks, and the captain noted difficulty judging the approach. About 1 minute later, the recording revealed that the ground warning proximity system reported “five hundred” followed by a “sink rate, pull up” alert about 16 seconds later. Data from the CVDR revealed that about 23 seconds before weight-on-wheels was recorded, the airplane was at an indicated airspeed of about 124 knots and descending. The data showed that this approximate airspeed was maintained until about 3 seconds before weight-on-wheels. The recorded data further showed that the approach speed was set to 120 knots, and the landing reference speed (vREF) was set to 97 knots. Using the reported airplane configuration and the 3.5-knot headwind that was reported at the time of the approach and landing, calculations indicate that the vREF speed should have been about 101 knots indicated airspeed, which would have required a landing distance of about 3,112 feet. Utilizing the same airplane configuration and wind condition with the flight’s reported 124 knot indicated airspeed just before touchdown, the landing distance was calculated to be about 5,624 feet. The intended runway for landing was 5,132-feet long with a 1.9 percent downward slope gradient, and a 123-foot long overrun area. A postaccident examination of the airplane, including the braking system, revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot misjudged the airplane’s speed during the final approach, which resulted in runway overrun.

According to the airplane's operator, the airplane was part of a flight of four airplanes that were taking an organized tour group of revenue passengers on a sightseeing tour of southern Utah. While operating in a high density altitude environment, the pilot was flying into an airport that had a 1,000-foot cliff about 400 feet from the end of the runway he was landing on. Because of the presence of the cliff, the Airguide Publications Airport Manual stated that all landings should be made on the runway that was headed toward the cliff and that all takeoffs should be made on the runway that was headed away from the cliff. The manual also stated that a go-around during landing was not possible. During his approach, the pilot encountered a variable wind and downdrafts. During the landing flare, the airplane dropped onto the runway hard and bounced back into the air. The pilot then immediately initiated a go-around and began a turn away from the runway heading. While in the turn, he was most likely unable to maintain sufficient airspeed, and the airplane entered a stall/mush condition and descended into the ground. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot reported that he flew an instrument approach and was clear of clouds about 650 feet above ground level when he proceeded visually to the airport. About 1/2 mile from the runway, he thought the airplane was too high, but a few seconds later the airplane felt like it had an excessive rate of descent. His attempts to arrest the rate of descent were unsuccessful, and the left main landing gear struck the ground about 120 feet prior to the runway threshold. The recorded data downloaded from the airplane's non-volatile memory showed that the airplane's airspeed varied from about 71 - 81 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) during the 10 seconds prior to ground impact. The data also indicated that there was about a 3 - 5 knot tailwind during the final landing approach. The airplane's stall speed with the airplane in the landing configuration with landing flaps was 64 knots IAS at maximum gross weight. The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction or system failure of the airplane.