Landing (descent or approach)

On 4th of August 2013 the air ambulance operator Mýflug, received a request for an ambulance flight from Höfn (BIHN) to Reykjavík Airport (BIRK). This was a F4 priority request and the operator, in co-operation with the emergency services, planned the flight the next morning. The plan was for the flight crew and the paramedic to meet at the airport at 09:30 AM on the 5th of August. A flight plan was filed from Akureyri (BIAR) to BIHN (positioning flight), then from BIHN to BIRK (ambulance flight) and from BIRK back to BIAR (positioning flight). The planned departure from BIAR was at 10:20. The flight crew consisted of a commander and a co-pilot. In addition to the flight crew was a paramedic, who was listed as a passenger. Around 09:50 on the 5th of August, the flight crew and the paramedic met at the operator’s home base at BIAR. The flight crew prepared the flight and performed a standard pre-flight inspection. There were no findings to the aircraft during the pre-flight inspection. The pre-flight inspection was finished at approximately 10:10. The departure from BIAR was at 10:21 and the flight to BIHN was uneventful. The aircraft landed at BIHN at 11:01. The commander was the pilot flying from BIAR to BIHN. The operator’s common procedure is that the commander and the co-pilot switch every other flight, as the pilot flying. The co-pilot was the pilot flying from BIHN to BIRK and the commander was the pilot flying from BIRK to BIAR, i.e. during the accident flight. The aircraft departed BIHN at 11:18, for the ambulance flight and landed at BIRK at 12:12. At BIRK the aircraft was refueled and departed at 12:44. According to flight radar, the flight from BIRK to BIAR was flown at FL 170. Figure 4 shows the radar track of the aircraft as recorded by Reykjavík Control. There is no radar coverage by Reykjavík Control below 5000 feet, in the area around BIAR. During cruise, the flight crew discussed the commander’s wish to deviate from the planned route to BIAR, in order to fly over a racetrack area near the airport. At the racetrack, a race was about to start at that time. The commander had planned to visit the racetrack area after landing. The aircraft approached BIAR from the south and at 10.5 DME the flight crew cancelled IFR. When passing KN locator (KRISTNES), see Figure 6, the flight crew made a request to BIAR tower to overfly the town of Akureyri, before landing. The request was approved by the tower and the flight crew was informed that a Fokker 50 was ready for departure on RWY 01. The flight crew of TF-MYX responded and informed that they would keep west of the airfield. After passing KN, the altitude was approximately 800’ (MSL), according to the co-pilot’s statement. The co-pilot mentioned to the commander that they were a bit low and recommended a higher altitude. The altitude was then momentarily increased to 1000’. When approaching the racetrack area, the aircraft entered a steep left turn. During the turn, the altitude dropped until the aircraft hit the racetrack.

Following an uneventful flight from Herzliya, the pilot started the approach to Eilat Airport in excellent weather conditions. During the last segment, at a height of about 10 feet, the pilot initiated a go-around procedure following a misunderstanding about an ATC transmission that was given to another crew. The pilot mistakenly closed to fuel valve coupled to the right engine while trying to switch fuel tanks, causing the right engine to stop. Due to an asymmetric thrust, the pilot lost control of the airplane that veered to the right and crashed in a drainage ditch, coming to rest upside down. While both passengers were seriously injured, the pilot was killed.

As the airplane was on final approach, the captain, who was the pilot monitoring (PM), realized that the flaps were not configured as had been briefed, with a setting of 40 degrees for the landing. Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) indicate that the captain set the flaps to 40 degrees as the airplane was descending through about 500 ft altitude, which was about 51 seconds from touchdown. When the airplane was between 100 to 200 ft altitude, it was above the glideslope. Concerned that the airplane was too high, the captain exclaimed repeatedly "get down" to the first officer about 9 seconds from touchdown. About 3 seconds from touchdown when the airplane was about 27 ft altitude, the captain announced "I got it," indicating that she was taking control of the airplane, and the first officer replied, "ok, you got it." According to FDR data, after the captain took control, the control column was relaxed to a neutral position and the throttles were not advanced until about 1 second before touchdown. The airplane touched down at a descent rate of 960 ft per minute and a nose-down pitch attitude of -3.1 degrees, resulting in the nose gear contacting the runway first and a hard landing. The airplane came to a stop on the right side of the runway centerline about 2,500 ft from its initial touchdown. The operator's stabilized approach criteria require an immediate go-around if the airplane flaps or landing gear were not in the final landing configuration by 1,000 ft above the touchdown zone; in this case, the flaps were not correctly configured until the airplane was passing through 500 ft. Further, the airplane's deviation about the glideslope at 100 to 200 ft would have been another opportunity for the captain, as the PM at this point during the flight, to call for a go-around, as indicated in the Southwest Airlines Flight Operations Manual (FOM). Accident data suggest that pilots often fail to perform a go-around or missed approach when stabilized approach criteria are not met. A review of NTSB investigated accidents by human factors researchers found that about 75% of accidents were the result of plan continuation errors in which the crew continued an approach despite cues that suggested it should not be continued. Additionally, line operations safety audit data presented at the International Air Safety Summit in 2011 suggested that 97% of unstabilized approaches were continued to landing even though doing so was in violation of companies' standard operating procedures (SOPs). The Southwest FOM also states that the captain can take control of the airplane for safety reasons; however, the captain's decision to take control of the airplane at 27 ft above the ground did not allow her adequate time to correct the airplane's deteriorating energy state and prevent the nose landing gear from striking the runway. The late transfer of control resulted in neither pilot being able to effectively monitor the airplane's altitude and attitude. The first officer reported that, after the captain took control of the airplane, he scanned the altimeter and airspeed to gain situational awareness but that he became distracted by the runway "rushing" up to them and "there was no time to say anything." The captain should have called for a go-around when it was apparent that the approach was unstabilized well before the point that she attempted to salvage the landing by taking control of the airplane at a very low altitude. In addition, the captain did not follow SOPs at several points during the flight. As PM, she should have made the standard callout per the Southwest FOM when the airplane was above glideslope, stating "glideslope" and adding a descriptive word or words to the callout (for example, "one dot high"). Rather than make this callout, however, the captain repeatedly said "get down" to the first officer before stating "I got it." The way she handled the transfer of airplane control was also contrary to the FOM, which indicates that the PM should say "I have the aircraft." The flight crew's performance was indicative of poor crew resource management.

Few minutes after he departed Isla del Rey Airport, while overflying the bay of Panama City, the pilot informed ATC about engine problems. Unable to reach Panama City-Marcos A. Gelabert Airport, the pilot reduced his altitude and elected to make an emergency landing on the Perico Island, some 10 km south of Panama City Airport. After touchdown, the aircraft rolled for few dozen metres before coming to rest against a container. All eight occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On July 6, 2013, about 1128 Pacific daylight time, a Boeing 777-200ER, Korean registration HL7742, operating as Asiana Airlines flight 214, was on approach to runway 28L when it struck a seawall at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California. Three of the 291 passengers were fatally injured; 40 passengers, 8 of the 12 flight attendants, and 1 of the 4 flight crewmembers received serious injuries. The other 248 passengers, 4 flight attendants, and 3 flight crewmembers received minor injuries or were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 214 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Incheon International Airport, Seoul, Korea, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight was vectored for a visual approach to runway 28L and intercepted the final approach course about 14 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold at an altitude slightly above the desired 3° glidepath. This set the flight crew up for a straight-in visual approach; however, after the flight crew accepted an air traffic control instruction to maintain 180 knots to 5 nm from the runway, the flight crew mismanaged the airplane’s descent, which resulted in the airplane being well above the desired 3° glidepath when it reached the 5 nm point. The flight crew’s difficulty in managing the airplane’s descent continued as the approach continued. In an attempt to increase the airplane’s descent rate and capture the desired glidepath, the pilot flying (PF) selected an autopilot (A/P) mode (flight level change speed [FLCH SPD]) that instead resulted in the autoflight system initiating a climb because the airplane was below the selected altitude. The PF disconnected the A/P and moved the thrust levers to idle, which caused the autothrottle (A/T) to change to the HOLD mode, a mode in which the A/T does not control airspeed. The PF then pitched the airplane down and increased the descent rate. Neither the PF, the pilot monitoring (PM), nor the observer noted the change in A/T mode to HOLD. As the airplane reached 500 ft above airport elevation, the point at which Asiana’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) would have shown the flight crew that the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. Also, the airspeed, which had been decreasing rapidly, had just reached the proper approach speed of 137 knots. However, the thrust levers were still at idle, and the descent rate was about 1,200 ft per minute, well above the descent rate of about 700 fpm needed to maintain the desired glidepath; these were two indications that the approach was not stabilized. Based on these two indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. As the approach continued, it became increasingly unstabilized as the airplane descended below the desired glidepath; the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of the low airspeed and low path conditions but did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100 ft, at which point the airplane did not have the performance capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance. When the main landing gear and the aft fuselage struck the seawall, the tail of the airplane broke off at the aft pressure bulkhead. The airplane slid along the runway, lifted partially into the air, spun about 330°, and impacted the ground a final time. The impact forces, which exceeded certification limits, resulted in the inflation of two slide/rafts within the cabin, injuring and temporarily trapping two flight attendants. Six occupants were ejected from the airplane during the impact sequence: two of the three fatally injured passengers and four of the seriously injured flight attendants. The four flight attendants were wearing their restraints but were ejected due to the destruction of the aft galley where they were seated. The two ejected passengers (one of whom was later rolled over by two firefighting vehicles) were not wearing their seatbelts and would likely have remained in the cabin and survived if they had been wearing their seatbelts. After the airplane came to a stop, a fire initiated within the separated right engine, which came to rest adjacent to the right side of the fuselage. When one of the flight attendants became aware of the fire, he initiated an evacuation, and 98% of the passengers successfully self-evacuated. As the fire spread into the fuselage, firefighters entered the airplane and extricated five passengers (one of whom later died) who were injured and unable to evacuate. Overall, 99% of the airplane’s occupants survived.

The pilots reported that, during the approach, the main hydraulic system lost pressure. They selected the auxiliary hydraulic system "on," continued the approach, and extended the landing gear using the emergency landing gear extension procedures. During the landing roll, about two-thirds down the runway, the pilots noticed that the brakes were not working normally and then turned onto a taxiway to clear the runway. The captain reported that, once on the taxiway, he was unable to stop or steer the airplane as it proceeded across a parallel runway and into an adjacent field where it subsequently struck a metal beam. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed brake system continuity with the cockpit controls. The tires, brake assemblies, and brake pads were intact and undamaged. The hydraulic lines from the hydraulic pump to the wheel brakes were intact. No hydraulic fluid was observed leaking on the exterior or interior portions of the airplane. The hydraulic fluid reservoir was found about 1/4 full. Further, testing of the two hydraulic pumps revealed that they were both functional, and no mechanical failures or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation were noted. The airplane's hydraulic system failure emergency procedures state that, if hydraulic pressure is lost, the electrically driven hydraulic pump should be reset and that, if the hydraulic pressure was not restored, that the primary hydraulic system should be disengaged and the landing gear should be lowered using the emergency landing gear extension procedures. After the gear is extended, the auxiliary hydraulic system should be selected "on" for landing. However, the pilots stated that they did not attempt to reset the electric hydraulic pump and that they performed the emergency landing gear extension procedures with the auxiliary hydraulic pump engaged. It is likely that the pilots' failure to select the auxiliary hydraulic system "off" before extending the landing gear caused the hydraulic pressure in the auxiliary system to dissipate, which left only the emergency brake accumulator available for braking during the landing. The number of emergency brake applications that can be made by the pilots depends on the accumulator charge, which may be depleted in a very short time. The airplane's emergency braking procedures state that, as soon as the airplane is safely stopped, the pilots should request towing assistance. However, the pilots did not stop the airplane on the runway despite having about 3,900 ft of runway remaining; instead, they turned off the runway at an intersection, which resulted in a loss of directional control.

The crew was performing a cargo flight from Lanseria to Lubumbashi with an intermediate stop at Francistown Airport to refuel, and the aircraft was carrying a load of ion exchange resins for water purification. During an early morning approach, the crew encountered poor visibility due to foggy conditions, abandoned the approach and initiated a go-around procedure. During a second approach from the opposite direction, the crew informed ATC he established a visual contact with the runway when the aircraft crashed in a bushy area located some 4,6 km short of runway.

Before departure, the pilot performed fuel calculations and determined that he had enough fuel to fly to the intended destination. While enroute the pilot flew around thunderstorms. On arrival at his destination, the pilot executed the instrument landing system approach for runway 16. While on short final the right engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot switched the fuel flow from the right tank to the left tank. The left engine then experienced a total loss of power and the pilot made an emergency landing on a road. The airplane received substantial damage to the wings and fuselage when it struck a tree. A postaccident examination revealed only a few gallons of unusable fuel in the left fuel tank. The right fuel tank was breached during the accident sequence but no fuel smell was noticed. The pilot performed another fuel calculation after the accident and determined that there were actually 170 gallons of fuel onboard, not 230 gallons like he originally figured. He reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation and determined that he exhausted his entire fuel supply.

The single engine airplane departed Rottweil-Zepfenhan Airfield at 0847LT bound for Augsburg Airport. En route, the pilot encountered technical problems with the engine, informed ATC about his situation and activated the electrical fuel pump when the engine restarted. On final approach to Ausgburg, he re-encountered engine problems and attempted an emergency landing when the airplane hit power cables and crashed in a garden located 1,123 meters short of runway 07 threshold. The pilot was seriously injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On Thursday June 13, 2013 at approximately 1750UTC (1:50pm local time), a fixed wing, twin turboprop regional airliner, was involved in an accident as a result of a runway excursion while landing during heavy rain showers at Marsh Harbor Int’l Airport, Marsh Harbor, Abaco, Bahamas. The aircraft, a SAAB 340B aircraft was operated by SkyBahamas Airlines and bore Bahamas registration C6-SBJ, serial number 316. C6-SBJ departed Fort Lauderdale Int’l Airport (KFLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida in the USA as Tropical Sky 9561. The airline, SkyBahamas Airline is a Bahamas Air Operator Certificate Holder with approved scheduled operations to and from Fort Lauderdale International Airport, Florida USA (KFLL) and Marsh Harbor Int’l Airport, Marsh Harbor, Abaco in the Bahamas. The crew received weather information and IFR route clearance from KFLL Control Tower. This passenger carrying flight departed KFLL at 1706UTC (1:06pm local) on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The point of intended landing was Marsh Harbor International Airport, Abaco, Bahamas (MYAM). The crew selected runway 09 at MYAM for landing. At 17:45:30, the aircraft leveled off at 1,500 feet ASL on a heading of 096 degrees magnetic, with airspeed of 236 knots indicated (KIAS). The flaps were extended to 15 degrees at 17:47:18 with the aircraft level at 1,300 feet ASL, approximately 4.2 nm on the approach. The autopilot was disconnected at 17:47:26 with the aircraft level at 1,300 feet ASL, approximately 3.8 nm on the approach. Heading was 097 degrees magnetic and airspeed was 166 KIAS. The Landing Gear was extended and in the down and locked position by 17:48:01 as the aircraft descended through 730 feet ASL. At 17:48:03, the flaps were extended to landing flap 20 degrees with the aircraft approximately 1.9 nm from the runway on the approach. At 17:48:47, as the aircraft approached the threshold, the power levers were retarded (from 52 degrees) and the engine torques decreased from approximately 20%. Approximately one second later, the aircraft crossed the threshold at a radio altitude of 50 feet AGL on a heading 098 degrees magnetic and airspeed of 171 KIAS. The crew encountered rain showers and a reduction in visibility. The aircraft initially touched down at 17:49:02 with a recorded vertical load factor of +2.16G, approximately 14 seconds after crossing the threshold. There were no indications on the runway to indicate where the initial touchdown had occurred. Upon initial landing however, the aircraft bounced and became airborne, reaching a calculated maximum height of approximately 15 feet AGL. The aircraft bounced a second time at 17:49:07 with a recorded vertical load factor of +3.19* G. During this second bounce, the pitch attitude was 1.8 degrees nose down, heading 102 degrees magnetic and airspeed 106 KIAS. The aircraft made consecutive contact with the runway approximately three times. The third and final bounce occurred at 17:49:14 with a recorded vertical load factor of +3.66G*. During the third bounce, the pitch attitude was 2.2 degrees nose down, heading 099 degrees magnetic and airspeed 98 KIAS. As a result of the hard touchdown, damage was sustained to the right wing and right hand engine/propeller. The right hand engine parameters recorded a rapid loss of power with decreasing engine speed and torque, and subsequent propeller stoppage. The aircraft veered off to the right at approximate time of 17:49:20 on a heading of 131 degrees magnetic at a point approximately 6,044 feet from the threshold of runway 09. The recorded airspeed was 44 KIAS with the left hand engine torque at 26 % and the right hand engine torque at 0%. The aircraft came to a full stop at approximate time 17:49:25 on a heading of 231 degrees magnetic. When the aircraft came to a stop, the flight and cabin crew and twenty-one (21) passengers evacuated the aircraft. The evacuation was uneventful using the main entrance door. Due to the damage sustained by the right wing and engine, evacuation on the right side was not considered. The evacuation occurred during heavy rainfall. No injuries were reported as a result of the accident or evacuation process. The airplane sustained substantial damage as a result of the impact sequence. The elevation of the accident site was reported as approximately 10 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) uncovered that this crew used no crew resource management or adherence to company standard operating procedures. During the final seconds of the flight, there was complete confusion on the flight deck as to who was in control of the aircraft. After failure of the windshield wiper on the left side of the aircraft, the captain continued to maneuver the aircraft despite having no visual contact of the field due to heavy rain. Sterile Cockpit procedures were not adhered to by this crew as they continued with non-essential conversation throughout the flight regime from engine start up in KFLL up until the “before landing checklist” was requested prior to landing.