Landing (descent or approach)

The pilot's decision to land in an area of low visibility and ground fog, which resulted in collision with water.

The following factors were identified:
- The ovality due to the wear of the junction point of the arm (270) with the actuator (15) over time to the point that it finally broke and released the actuator from the whole undercarriage system.
- Overheating of the time/delay relay caused the circuit breaker to trip.
- The ovality created by the job(65) at the junction of the arm(270) to the actuator(15) eventually thinned and broke off the actuator.

The pilot's improper landing flare, which resulted in a hard landing.

Refer to the previous aircraft that was landed safely, the pilot confidence that a safe landing could be made and disregarding several conditions required for go around.

The pilot's failure to maintain directional control during an attempted aborted landing in gusty crosswind conditions, which resulted in a runway excursion and an impact with a tree.

A total loss of power in both engines due to fuel starvation as a result of the pilot's fuel mismanagement, and his subsequent failure to follow the emergency checklist. Contributing to the pilot's failure to follow the emergency checklist was his lack of emergency procedures training in the accident airplane.

The causes of the accident are mainly due to the human factor. In particular, the accident was caused by the runway overrun during the landing phase, caused by a loss of situational awareness relating to the position of the aircraft with respect to the runway itself. This loss of situational awareness on the part of the crew caused a delay in contact with the runway, which occurred, at a still high speed, in a position too far to allow the aircraft to stop within the remaining distance.
Contributing to the dynamics of the event:
- The commander's prior decision not to carry out a go-around procedure (this decision is of crucial importance in the chain of events that characterized the accident),
- Inadequate maintenance of flight parameters in the final phase of landing,
- Failure of the crew to disconnect the autothrottle prior to landing,
- Poor lighting conditions with the presence of storm cells and heavy rain falls at the time of the event (environmental factor), which may have contributed to the loss of situation awareness,
- The attention paid by the crew during the final phase of the flight, where both pilots were intent to acquire external visual references and did not realize that the aircraft crossed over the runway at high speed for 18 seconds before touchdown,
- The lack of assertiveness of the first officer in questioning the commander's decisions.
Finally, it cannot be excluded that a condition of tiredness and fatigue may have contributed to the accident, even if not perceived by the crew, which may have influenced the cognitive processes, in particular those of the captain, interfering with his correct decision making process.

The Air Accident Investigation Sector determines that the causes of the Accident are:
(a) During the attempted go-around, except for the last three seconds prior to impact, both engine thrust levers, and therefore engine thrust, remained at idle. Consequently, the Aircraft’s energy state was insufficient to sustain flight.
(b) The flight crew did not effectively scan and monitor the primary flight instrumentation parameters during the landing and the attempted go-around.
(c) The flight crew were unaware that the autothrottle (A/T) had not responded to move the engine thrust levers to the TO/GA position after the Commander pushed the TO/GA switch at the initiation of the FCOM Go-around and Missed Approach Procedure.
(d) The flight crew did not take corrective action to increase engine thrust because they omitted the engine thrust verification steps of the FCOM Go-around and Missed Approach Procedure.
The Investigation determines that the following were contributory factors to the Accident:
(a) The flight crew were unable to land the Aircraft within the touchdown zone during the attempted tailwind landing because of an early flare initiation, and increased airspeed due to a shift in wind direction, which took place approximately 650 m beyond the runway threshold.
(b) When the Commander decided to fly a go-around, his perception was that the Aircraft was still airborne. In pushing the TO/GA switch, he expected that the autothrottle (A/T) would respond and automatically manage the engine thrust during the go-around.
(c) Based on the flight crew’s inaccurate situation awareness of the Aircraft state, and situational stress related to the increased workload involved in flying the go-around maneuver, they were unaware that the Aircraft’s main gear had touched down which caused the TO/GA switches to become inhibited. Additionally, the flight crew were unaware that the A/T mode had remained at ‘IDLE’ after the TO/GA switch was pushed.
(d) The flight crew reliance on automation and lack of training in flying go-arounds from close to the runway surface and with the TO/GA switches inhibited, significantly affected the flight crew performance in a critical flight situation which was different to that experienced by them during their simulated training flights.
(e) The flight crew did not monitor the flight mode annunciations (FMA) changes after the TO/GA switch was pushed because:
1. According to the Operator’s procedure, as per FCOM Flight Mode Annunciations (FMA), FMA changes are not required to be announced for landing when the aircraft is below 200 ft;
2. Callouts of FMA changes were not included in the Operator’s FCOM Go-Around and Missed Approach Procedures.
3. Callouts of FMA changes were not included in the Operator’s FCTM Go-Around and Missed Approach training.
(f) The Operator’s OM-A policy required the use of the A/T for engine thrust management for all phases of flight. This policy did not consider pilot actions that would be necessary during a go-around initiated while the A/T was armed and active and the TO/GA switches were inhibited.
(g) The FCOM Go-Around and Missed Approach Procedure did not contain steps for verbal verification callouts of engine thrust state.
(h) The Aircraft systems, as designed, did not alert the flight crew that the TO/GA switches were inhibited at the time when the Commander pushed the TO/GA switch with the A/T armed and active.
(i) The Aircraft systems, as designed, did not alert the flight crew to the inconsistency between the Aircraft configuration and the thrust setting necessary to perform a successful go-around.
(j) Air traffic control did not pass essential information about windshear reported by a preceding landing flight crew and that two flights performed go-arounds after passing over the runway threshold. The flight crew decision-making process, during the approach and landing, was deprived of this critical information.
(k) The modification of the go-around procedure by air traffic control four seconds after the Aircraft became airborne coincided with the landing gear selection to the ‘up’ position. This added to the flight crew workload as they attentively listened and the Copilot responded to the air traffic control instruction which required a change of missed approach altitude from 3,000 ft to 4,000 ft to be set. The flight crews’ concentration on their primary task of flying the Aircraft and monitoring was momentarily affected as both the FMA verification and the flight director status were missed.