Landing (descent or approach)

Flight Type:

Positioning

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Treasure Cay - West Palm Beach

MSN:

BT-7

YOM:

1979

Location:

West Palm Beach

Florida

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

14414

Captain / Total hours on type:

631.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

1560

Aircraft flight hours:

15782

Circumstances:

The airline transport pilot reported that, before landing following an uneventful flight, he extended the wing flaps to the approach position and extended the landing gear; the gear indicator lights showed "3 green." After touchdown, he heard noises, and the airplane started to sink. After the airplane came to a stop on the right side of the runway, he noticed that the landing gear handle was up. The pilot stated to the copilot, "How did the gear handle get up?" then placed the handle to the down position and the flight crew exited the airplane. The copilot reported that he was acting as an observer during the flight and that he also saw three green landing gear down-and-locked indicator lights before landing. The airframe sustained substantial damage from contact with the runway. All three landing gear were found in a partially-extended position. Skid marks from all three tires were observed on the runway leading up to the main wreckage. Both propeller assemblies were damaged due to contact with the runway. The pressure vessel was compromised from contact with a propeller blade. The nose landing gear actuator was forced up, into the nose gear well and penetrated the upper nose skin. Examination of the landing gear components did not reveal evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or malfunction. The skid marks leading to the wreckage and the partially-extended gear were inconsistent with the pilot's account that the gear handle was up after the airplane came to rest and was then lowered. The gear handle consisted of an electrical switch that required it to be pulled out of a detent before placing it up or down. There was no mechanical linkage between the gear handle and the landing gear, as the gear were driven by an electric motor. It is likely that the pilot realized that the gear were not extended just before touchdown and then tried to lower the gear, resulting in a touchdown with the gear only partially extended. The pilot reported that he had experienced several interruptions to his sleep the night before the accident. He also reported that he flew 7 legs on the day of the accident for a total of 5.2 hours, only eating a banana for breakfast during this time period. It is likely that the pilot's fatigue contributed to his failure to ensure that the landing gear were down and locked before landing.

Probable cause:

The pilot's failure to ensure that the landing gear were down and locked before touchdown. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's self-reported fatigue at the time of the accident.

Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90GT King Air off Paraty: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jan 19, 2017 at 1244 LT

Type of aircraft:

Beechcraft 90 King Air

Operator:

Registration:

PR-SOM

Flight Phase:

Executive/Corporate/Business

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

Schedule:

Campo de Marte - Paraty

MSN:

LJ-1809

YOM:

2007

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

7464

Captain / Total hours on type:

2924.00

Circumstances:

The twin engine aircraft departed Campo de Marte Airport at 1301LT bound for Paraty. With a distance of about 200 km, the flight should take half an hour. The approach to Paraty Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls reducing the visibility to 1,500 metres. While descending to Paraty, the pilot lost visual contact with the airport and initiated a go-around. Few minutes later, while completing a second approach, he lost visual references with the environement then lost control of the aircraft that crashed in the sea near the island of Rasa, about 4 km short of runway 28. Quickly on site, rescuers found a passenger alive but it was impossible to enter the cabin that was submerged. The aircraft quickly sank by a depth of few metres and all five occupants were killed, among them Carlos Alberto, founder of Hotel Emiliano and the Supreme Court Justice Teori Zavascki who had a central role overseeing a massive corruption investigation about the Brazilian oil Group Petrobras.

Probable cause:

Contributing factors:
- Adverse meteorological conditions - a contributor
At the moment of the impact of the aircraft, there was rain with rainfall potential of 25mm/h, covering the Paraty Bay region, and the horizontal visibility was 1,500m. Such horizontal visibility was below the minimum required for VFR landing and take-off operations. Since the SDTK aerodrome allowed only operations under VFR flight rules, the weather conditions proved to be impeding the operation within the required minimum safety limits.
- Decision-making process - a contributor
The weather conditions present in SDTK resulted in visibility restrictions that were impeding flight under VFR rules. In this context, the accomplishment of two attempts to approach and land procedures denoted an inadequate evaluation of the minimum conditions required for the operation at the Aerodrome.
- Disorientation - undetermined
The conditions of low visibility, of low height curve on the water, added to the pilot stress and also to the conditions of the wreckage, which did not show any fault that could have compromised the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft, indicate that the pilot most likely had a spatial disorientation that caused the loss of control of the aircraft.
- Emotional state - undetermined
Through the analysis of voice, speech and language parameters, variations in the emotional state of the pilot were identified that showed evidence of stress in the final moments of the flight. The pilot's high level of anxiety may have influenced his decision to make another attempt of landing even under adverse weather conditions and may have contributed to his disorientation.
- Tasks characteristics - undetermined
The operations in Paraty, RJ, demanded that pilots adapt to the routine of the operators, which was characteristic of the executive aviation. In addition, among operators, possibly because of the lack of minimum operational requirements in SDTK, the pilots who landed even in adverse weather conditions were recognized and valued by the others. Although there were no indications of external pressure on the part of the operator, these characteristics present in the operation in Paraty, RJ, may have favored the pilot's self-imposed pressure, leading him to operate with reduced safety margins.
- Visual illusions - undetermined
The flight conditions faced by the pilot favored the occurrence of the vestibular illusion due to the excess of "G" and the visual illusion of homogeneous terrain. Such illusions probably had, consequently, the pilot's sense that the bank angle was decreasing and that he was at a height above the real. These sensations may have led the pilot to erroneously correct the conditions he was experiencing. Thus, the great bank angle and the downward movement, observed at the moment of the impact of the aircraft, are probably a consequence of the phenomena of illusions.
- Work-group culture - a contributor
Among the members of the pilot group that performed routine flights to the region of Paraty, RJ, there was a culture of recognition and appreciation of those operating under adverse conditions, to the detriment of the requirements established for the VFR operation. These shared values promoted the adherence to informal practices and interfered in the perception and the adequate analysis of the risks present in the operation in SDTK.

Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 525C CitationJet CJ4 in Howell

Date & Time: Jan 16, 2017 at 1159 LT

Type of aircraft:

Cessna 525 CitationJet CJ4

Operator:

Zeliff Aviation

Registration:

N525PZ

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Private

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Batavia – Howell

MSN:

525C-0196

YOM:

2015

Location:

Howell

Michigan

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

5800

Captain / Total hours on type:

320.00

Aircraft flight hours:

320

Circumstances:

After exiting the clouds during the landing approach at the uncontrolled airport, the private pilot of the small jet canceled his instrument flight plan with air traffic control. He stated that, although there was no precipitation when he exited the clouds, he suspected the runway may be icy due to the weather conditions. The pilot saw an airplane holding short on the taxiway at the end of the runway and assumed it was preparing to takeoff, which he stated led him to believe that the runway condition was good. Although the pilot announced his location and intentions on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), he did not inquire about the runway condition via CTAF/UNICOM. Witnesses reported that the approach looked normal. After touchdown, the pilot applied brakes and realized he had no braking action. He subsequently retracted the speed brakes, spoilers, and flaps, and added takeoff power. The airplane yawed to the left and the pilot reduced engine power to idle while applying rudder to correct the airplane's track. The airplane continued off the runway, where it traveled through a fence and across a road before coming to rest inverted. The pilot and mechanic seated in the airplane that was holding short of the runway during the landing reported that they were only taxiing to a maintenance facility and did not intend to take off. They reported that the taxiways were icy. A witness who assisted the pilot following the accident reported that the roads at the time were covered in ice and "very slick." Recorded data from the airplane showed that the pilot flew a stabilized approach and that the airplane touched down near the approach end of the runway; however, given the icy runway conditions, the airplane's landing distance required exceeded the available runway by more than 8,000 ft. Airport personnel had not issued a NOTAM regarding the icy runway conditions. The airport manager stated he was not at the airport at the time of the accident, and that he was still trying to learn the new digital NOTAM manager system. The employee who was at the airport was authorized to issue NOTAMs, but had not yet been trained on the new system.

Probable cause:

The pilot's attempted landing on the ice-covered runway, which resulted in a runway excursion and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was airport personnel's lack of training regarding issuance of NOTAMs

Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747-412F in Bishkek: 39 killed

Date & Time: Jan 16, 2017 at 0719 LT

Type of aircraft:

Boeing 747-400

Operator:

Registration:

TC-MCL

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Cargo

Survivors:

Site:

City

Schedule:

Hong Kong - Bishkek - Istanbul

MSN:

32897/1322

YOM:

2003

Flight number:

TK6491

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

10808

Captain / Total hours on type:

820.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

5894

Copilot / Total hours on type:

1758

Aircraft flight hours:

46820

Aircraft flight cycles:

8308

Circumstances:

On 16.01.2017, the crew of the Boeing 747-412F TC-MCL aircraft was performing a THY6491 flight from Hong Kong via Bishkek (Manas Airport) to Istanbul (Ataturk Airport) in order to transport the commercial cargo (public consumer goods) of 85 618 kg. The cargo was planned to be offloaded in Istanbul (Ataturk Airport). Manas Airport was planned as a transit airport for crew change and refueling. From 12.01.2017 to 15.01.2017, the crew had a rest period of 69 h in a hotel in Hong Kong. The aircraft takeoff from the Hong Kong Airport was performed at 19:12 on 5.01.2017, with the delay of 2 h 02 min in respect to the planned takeoff time. During the takeoff, the climb and the on-route cruise flight, the aircraft systems operated normally. At 00:41, on 16.01.2017, the aircraft entered the Bishkek ATC Area Control Center over the reference point of KAMUD at flight level of 10 400 m (according to the separation system, established in the People's Republic of China). At 00:51, the crew requested a descent and reached the FL 220 (according to the separation system, established in the Kyrgyz Republic). At 00:59, the crew received the weather information for Manas Airport: "the RVR at the RWY threshold 400 m, the RWY midpoint and RWY end 300 m, the vertical visibility 130 ft". At 01:01, the crew received the specified data: " in the center of the runway RVR three zero zero meters, vertical visibility one five zero feet." At 01:03, the crew requested a descent, the controller cleared for the descent not below FL 180. At 01:05, the crew was handed over to the Approach Control. At 01:06, the crew was cleared for the descent to FL 60, TOKPA 1 ILS approach chart, RWY 26. At 01:10, the controller reported the weather: wind calm, visibility 50 m, RVR 300 m, freezing fog, vertical visibility 160 ft, and requested the crew if they would continue the approach. The crew reported that they would continue the approach. The crew conducted the approach to RWY 26 in accordance with the standard approach chart. At 01:11, the controller informed the crew: "… transition level six zero" and cleared them for the ILS approach to RWY 26. At 01:15, the crew contacted the Tower controller. The Tower controller cleared them for landing on RWY 26 and reported the weather: "…wind calm… RVR in the beginning of the runway four hundred meters, in the middle point three hundred two five meters and at the end of the runway four hundred meters and vertical visibility one six zero... feet". The aircraft approached the RWY 26 threshold at the height significantly higher than the planned height. Continuing to descend, the aircraft flew over the entire length of the RWY and touched the ground at the distance of 900 m away from the farthest end of the runway (in relation to the direction of the approach) (the RWY 08 threshold). After the touchdown and landing roll, the aircraft impacted the concrete aerodrome barrier and the buildings of the suburban settlement and started to disintegrate, the fuel spillage occurred. As a result of the impact with the ground surface and the obstacles, the aircraft was completely disintegrated, a significant part of the aircraft structure was destroyed by the post-crash ground fire. At 01.17 UTC, the Tower controller requested the aircraft position, but the crew did not respond.

Probable cause:

The cause of the Boeing 747-412F TC-MCL aircraft accident was the missing control of the crew over the aircraft position in relation to the glideslope during the automatic approach, conducted at night in the weather conditions, suitable for ICAO CAT II landing, and as a result, the measures to perform a go-around, not taken in due time with the aircraft, having a significant deviation from the established approach chart, which led to the controlled flight impact with terrain (CFIT) at the distance of ≈930 m beyond the end of the active RWY.
The contributing factors were, most probably, the following:
- the insufficient pre-flight briefing of the flight crew members for the flight to Manas aerodrome (Bishkek), regarding the approach charts, as well as the non-optimal decisions taken by the crew when choosing the aircraft descent parameters, which led to the arrival at the established approach chart reference point at a considerably higher flight altitude;
- the lack of the crew's effective measures to decrease the aircraft vertical position and its arrival at the established approach chart reference point while the crew members were aware of the actual aircraft position being higher than required by the established chart;
- the lack of the requirements in the Tower controllers' job instructions to monitor for considerable aircraft position deviations from the established charts while the pertinent technical equipment for such monitoring was available;
- the excessive psycho-emotional stress of the crew members caused by the complicated approach conditions (night time, CAT II landing, long-lasting working hours) and their failure to eliminate the flight altitude deviations during a long time period. Additionally, the stress level could have been increased due to the crew's (especially the PIC's) highly emotional discussion of the ATC controllers' instructions and actions. Moreover, the ATC controllers' instructions and actions were in compliance with the established operational procedures and charts;
- the lack of the crew members' monitoring for crossing the established navigational reference points (the glideslope capture point, the LOM and LIM reporting points);
- the crew's failure to conduct the standard operational procedure which calls for altitude verification at the FAF/FAP, which is stated in the FCOM and the airline's OM. On the other hand, the Jeppesen Route Manual, used by the crew, contains no FAF/FAP in the RWY 26 approach chart;
- the onboard systems' "capture" of the false glideslope beam with the angle of ≈9°;
- the design features of the Boeing 747-400 aircraft type regarding the continuation of the aircraft approach descent in the automatic mode with the constant descent angle of 3° (the inertial path) with the maintained green indication of the armed automatic landing mode (regardless of the actual aircraft position in relation to the RWY) while the aircraft systems detected that the glideslope signal was missing (after the glideslope signal "capture"). With that, the crew received the designed annunciation, including the aural and visual caution alerts;
- the absence of the red warning alert for the flight crew in case of a "false" glideslope capture and the transition to the inertial mode trajectory, which would require immediate control actions from the part of the crew;
- the lack of monitoring from the part of the crew over the aircraft position in regard to the approach chart, including the monitoring by means of the Navigation Display (ND), engaged in the MAP mode;
- the crew's failure to conduct the Airline's Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs), regarding the performance of the go-around procedure in case the "AUTOPILOT" (the AP switching to the inertial mode) and "GLIDESLOPE" (the EGPWS annunciation of the significant glideslope deviation) alerts during the automatic CAT II landing at true heights below 1000 ft (with no visual reference established with either the runway environment or with the lighting system);
- the delayed actions for initiating the go-around procedure with no visual reference established with the runway environment at the decision height (DH). In fact, the actions were initiated at the true height of 58 ft with the established minimum of 99 ft.

Final Report:

Crash of a Let L-410UVP in Shabunda

Date & Time: Jan 2, 2017 at 1220 LT

Type of aircraft:

Let L-410

Operator:

Registration:

9Q-CZR

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Cargo

Survivors:

Site:

Democratic Republic of Congo

Schedule:

Bukavu – Shabunda

MSN:

85 13 36

YOM:

1985

Location:

Shabunda

Sud-Kivu

Country:

Region:

Africa

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

The crew, one Russian and one Congolese, was performing a cargo flight from Bukavu to Shabunda, carrying various goods for a total weight of 1,300 kilos. After touchdown, after a course of about 300 metres, it is believed that the tire on the right main gear burst. The aircraft veered off runway and eventually collided with banana trees. Both pilots were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage in Nashville

Date & Time: Dec 29, 2016 at 1345 LT

Type of aircraft:

Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

Operator:

Cambusmoon

Registration:

N301BK

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Private

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Memphis – Nashville

MSN:

46-36407

YOM:

2007

Location:

Nashville-John C. Tune

Tennessee

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

1550

Captain / Total hours on type:

1092.00

Aircraft flight hours:

1332

Circumstances:

According to the pilot, during the landing roll, the airplane "began to drift sharply to the left." The pilot reported that, although there were no wind gusts reported, he felt as though a wind gust was pushing the airplane to the left. He attempted to maintain directional control with rudder pedal application, and he applied full right aileron. The airplane continued to drift to the left, and the pilot attempted to abort the landing by applying full throttle and 25° of flaps. He reported that the airplane continued to drift to the left and that he was not able to achieve sufficient airspeed to rotate. The airplane exited the runway, the pilot pulled the throttle to idle, and he applied the brakes to avoid obstacles. However, the airplane impacted the runway and taxiway signage and came to rest in a drainage culvert. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The published METAR for the accident airport reported that the wind was from 290° at 15 knots, and wind gusts exceeded 22 knots 1 hour before and 1 hour after the accident. The pilot landed the airplane on runway 20. The maximum demonstrated crosswind component for the airplane was 17 knots. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

Probable cause:

The pilot's loss of directional control during the aborted landing in gusting crosswind conditions, which resulted in a runway excursion.

Final Report:

Crash of an Epic LT in Port Orange: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 27, 2016 at 1756 LT

Type of aircraft:

Epic LT

Operator:

Independent Technologies

Registration:

N669WR

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Private

Survivors:

Site:

City

Schedule:

Millington – Port Orange

MSN:

029

YOM:

2009

Location:

Port Orange-Spruce Creek

Florida

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

4246

Captain / Total hours on type:

956.00

Aircraft flight hours:

822

Circumstances:

The private pilot obtained a full weather briefing before departing on a long cross-country flight. The destination airport was forecast to be under visual meteorological conditions, but there was an AIRMET and Center Weather Advisory (CWA) issued for low instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions later that day. The briefer told the pilot to check the weather again en route to see if the AIRMET and CWA had been updated. At the time the pilot stopped for fuel, another CWA was issued for low IFR conditions at his destination airport; however, there were no records to indicate that the pilot obtained this information during the fuel stop or after departing on the last leg of the flight. A review of air traffic control communications revealed that, about 10 minutes before arriving at the airport, the pilot reported that he had obtained the current weather conditions at his destination airport. The most recent observation, about 1 hour before the accident indicated good visibility; however, the weather reporting equipment did not provide ceiling heights. It is unknown if the pilot obtained weather information from nearby airports, which were reporting low instrument meteorological conditions (visibility between 1/4 and 1/2 mile and ceilings 200-300 ft above ground level [agl]). Additionally, three pilot reports (PIREPs) describing the poor weather conditions were filed within the hour before the accident. The controller did not relay the PIREPs or the CWA information to the pilot, so the pilot was likely unaware of the deteriorating conditions. Based on radar information and statements from witnesses, the pilot's approach to the airport was unstabilized. He descended below the minimum descent altitude of 440 ft, and, after breaking through the fog about 100 ft agl, the airplane reentered the fog and completed a 360° right turn near the approach end of the runway, during which its altitude varied from 100 ft to 300 ft. The airplane then climbed to an altitude about 800 ft before radar contact was lost near the accident site. The airplane came to rest inverted, consistent with one witness's statement that it descended through the clouds in a spin before impact; post accident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies with the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot was instrument rated, his recent instrument experience could not be established. The circumstances of the accident, including the restricted visibility conditions and the pilot's maneuvering of the airplane before the impact, are consistent with a spatial disorientation event. It is likely that the pilot experienced a loss of control due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin.

Probable cause:

The pilot's loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall/spin. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to fly a stabilized approach consistent with the published instrument approach procedure.

Final Report:

Crash of an ATR72-600 in Semarang

Date & Time: Dec 25, 2016 at 1824 LT

Type of aircraft:

ATR72-600

Operator:

Registration:

PK-WGW

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Scheduled Revenue Flight

Survivors:

Site:

Beechcraft 200 Super King Air

Schedule:

Bandung – Semarang

MSN:

1234

YOM:

2015

Flight number:

IW1896

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

4065

Captain / Total hours on type:

3805.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

3300

Copilot / Total hours on type:

3200

Aircraft flight hours:

3485

Aircraft flight cycles:

4104

Circumstances:

On 25 December 2016, an ATR 72-600 aircraft registered PK-WGW was being operated by PT. Wings Abadi Airlines (Wings Air) as a scheduled passenger flight from Husein Sastranegara International Airport (WICC), Bandung to Ahmad Yani International Airport (WAHS), Semarang with flight number WON 1896. On board the aircraft were two pilots, two flight attendants and 68 passengers. There was no report or record of aircraft system malfunction prior to the departure. The aircraft departed from Bandung at 1734 LT (1034 UTC). The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF) and the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM). The flight from departure until commenced for landing approach was uneventful. At 1112 UTC, at night condition, the air traffic controller of Semarang Approach unit (approach controller) informed to all traffic that the rain was falling over the airport and the pilot confirmed whether the rain was heavy and was replied that it was slight rain. At 1115 UTC, the flight held over waypoint KENDA for separation with another aircraft and maintained altitude of 4,000 feet. Two minutes later, the flight was approved to descend to altitude of 3,000 feet. At 1118 UTC, the approach controller issued clearance for RNAV approach to runway 13 and advised the pilot to report when leaving waypoint KENDA. One minute later, the pilot reported leaving waypoint KENDA and the approach controller instructed to continue approach and to contact to the air traffic controller of Semarang Tower unit (tower controller). At 1120 UTC, the pilot advised to the tower controller that the aircraft was on final and the runway was in sight. The tower controller instructed to continue the landing approach and advised that the surface wind direction was 190° with velocity of 15 knots, altimeter setting 1,008 mbs and the runway was wet. At 1121 UTC, the tower controller had visual contact to the aircraft and issued landing clearance, the pilot read back the clearance and requested to reduce the approach light intensity. The tower controller reduced the light intensity and confirmed whether the intensity was appropriate then the pilot affirmed. At 1124 UTC, the aircraft touched down and bounced. After the third bounce, the pilot attempted to go around and the aircraft touched the runway. The tower controller noticed that the red light on the right wing was lower than the green light on the left wing. The aircraft moved to the right from the runway centerline and stopped near taxiway D. The tower controller realized that the aircraft was not in normal condition and pressed the crass bell then informed the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) personnel by phone that there was aircraft accident near the taxiway D. At 1126 UTC, the pilot advised the tower controller that the aircraft stopped on the runway and requested assistance. The tower controller acknowledged the message and advised the pilot to wait for the assistance. While waiting the assistance, the pilot kept the engines run to provide lighting in the cabin. At 1129 UTC, the tower controller advised the pilot to shut down the engines since the ARFF personnel had arrived near the aircraft to assist the evacuation. Passenger evacuation completed at approximately 10 minutes after the aircraft stopped.

Probable cause:

Contributing Factors:
- The visual illusion of aircraft higher than the real altitude resulted in late flare out which made the aircraft bounced.
- The unrecovered bounce resulted in abnormal landing attitude with vertical acceleration up to 6 g and collapsed the right main landing gear.

Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B200T Super King Air at Butterworth AFB: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 21, 2016 at 1718 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Registration:

M41-03

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Training

Survivors:

Site: