Landing (descent or approach)

On the day of the accident, the aircraft departed Abuja with the call Sign SXC401 en route Port Harcourt conveying 2 passengers on revenue basis. Before the commencement of the flight, the Chief Engineer was reported to have replaced the "Carbon brush" of the starboard starter generator. The source of this pair of carbon brushes is questionable. This flight was uneventful as the passengers disembarked and the aircraft picked up fuel for Port Harcourt. The aircraft departed Port Harcourt at 1750 hrs UTC with five souls on board (all crewmembers), estimating Calabar at 1827 hrs UTC. At 1800 hrs UTC, the aircraft was in contact with Calabar Tower at 5,000 feet, reporting 5 Souls-On-Board and an endurance of 3 hrs 30 minutes. The crew also requested for the hourly weather report and the control tower passed the 1700 hours weather report as "surface wind 140°/ 09 knots, visibility 10km, slight thunderstorm, cloud base scattered 300 metres, few CB N-SE 690 m broken at 9,000 m, QNH 1008 and temperature 27°C". The aircraft was also instructed to maintain the 5,000 feet level and to expect no delay for the VOR approach to runway 03. At 1809 hrs UTC, the aircraft was at 35 nautical miles to the station when the pilot requested for descent clearance and the controller gave him a clearance to 2,500 feet and to position for a straight-in approach to runway 03 and the crew acknowledged. At 1824 hrs UTC, the pilot reported having electrical problem and therefore declared emergency. Thereafter, the pilot requested for increase in the intensity of the approach lights, the controller informed him that the approach lights were, already, at their maximum intensity. The controller procedurally then requested for the aircraft's altitude but the response of the pilot was "we are coming to Calabar" and at 1830 hrs the aircraft reported 16 nautical miles to Calabar. The control tower at 1833 hrs UTC, wanted to establish the position of the aircraft by requesting repeatedly "Your position? Your position?" to which the response was "standby, standby". The verbal query continued until 1842 hrs and when there was no response from the aircraft, the controller alerted the airport fire services to be on the standby for further instructions. When the controller could no longer establish contact with the aircraft, he then contacted the relevant agencies for search and rescue operations. Meanwhile, the aircraft on descent impacted trees and crashed in a marshy area located 22 km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed.

The single engine aircraft was completing an aerial photography flight from Clermont-Ferrand, carrying one passenger and one pilot. On final approach to Moulins-Montbeugny Airport runway 08, at a speed of 85 knots, the pilot estimated that the nose-up attitude of the aircraft was excessive and increased engine power. The aircraft rolled to the left, causing the left wing tip to struck the runway surface. Out of control, the aircraft impacted the ground, lost its undercarriage and slid fo 95 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. Both occupants escaped uninjured and fire brigade arrived 15 minutes later. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Following an uneventful flight from Beijing, the crew started the descent to Dalian Airport. While flying over the east side of the Korean Gulf, the crew contacted ATC and declared an emergency, reporting fire on board and smoke spreading in the cabin. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea about 20 km from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 112 occupants were killed. The CVR was found on May 13 and FDR on May 18.

The aircraft departed Cairo-Intl Airport at 1140LT on a regular schedule flight to Tunis-Carthage Airport with 56 passengers and six crew members on board. It entered the Tunis FIR at 1450LT, under control of the Tunis Regional CCR. After being transferred to the approach control at 1500LT, the crew was cleared for a VOR/DME approach to runway 11. On approach at 3,000 feet, the crew was informed he was number one for landing. The crew informed ATC that he departed 3,000 feet for 2,100 feet at 12 NM and wa later cleared to land. Wind was from 130 at 30 knots. At 1516LT, on final, the crew was transferred from the approach control to the tower and received a second clearance to land. In limited visibility, the aircraft struck a fence located on the top of a mountain and crashed in hilly terrain 6,6 km from the runway 11 threshold. Three crew members and 11 passengers were killed while 48 other people were injured. On board were 33 Egyptians including the six crew members, 16 Tunisians, three Algerians, three Jordans, two Chinese, two British, one Libyan, one Saudi and one Palestinian.

After a visual approach to the 3,975 foot long by 50-foot wide runway, the turbojet airplane touched down about 2,100 feet beyond the landing threshold, and overran the departure end of the runway. The 5,600 hour pilot in command (PIC) reported that the approach speed and descent rate were "normal," and the aircraft was on short final over the trees at the "desired speed." Once the trees were clear, the aircraft descended to the runway at idle power. During the descent the PIC noticed a 16-knot increase in speed above reference. The PIC elected to continue "because the aircraft was close to the runway" and the PIC thought he had "extra landing distance to work with beyond what was required." The PIC reported that the aircraft "floated beyond the desired touchdown point," and "at this point [the pilots were] committed to stopping the aircraft." Passing the last third of the runway, the aircraft turned to the right "without" input from the pilots, overran the departure end, and collided with trees. Once the aircraft left the runway, the PIC stowed the thrust reversers and attempted to shut down the engines. Due to the "violent ride," the PIC managed to shut down one engine. A post-impact fire consumed the aircraft after the crew assisted to evacuate the occupants. No mechanical or maintenance anomalies were discovered with the aircraft. According to the flight manual, based on 29.74 inches HG, 1,808 PA, 30 degrees Celsius, zero wind, and an aircraft landing weight of 14, 500 lbs, the calculated total stopping distance (air and ground distance) at reference speed (Vref), was estimated at 2,955 feet. According to the flight manual, the "total distance" is based on full flaps, speed brakes after touchdown, Vref at 50 feet over the runway threshold, idle thrust when crossing the threshold, and no thrust reverse.

On final approach to Heglig Airport, at a height of about 60 feet, the aircraft collided with a flock of birds coming from the right side. The engine n°4 failed, the aircraft rolled to the right, lost height and struck the ground short of runway threshold. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft crash landed. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After landing on runway 24 at Kinshasa-N'Djili Airport in poor weather conditions, the aircraft went out of control, veered off runway to the right, lost its right main gear and came to rest few dozen metres further. All three crew members escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Weather was poor at the time of the accident with heavy rain falls and crosswinds.

The twin engine aircraft departed San Miguel de Tucumán-Teniente Benjamin Matienzo Airport at noon on a positioning flight to a private airstrip located in Estancia La Juliana, 75 km from there. Before departure, the crew was unable to add more fuel in the tanks because they did not have sufficient cash. At Estancia La Juliana, the crew waited for two hours before the owner of the farm was taken to another of his property in Estancia El Descanso, about 70 km from there. Again, the crew waited for two hours before the final flight back to San Miguel de Tucumán. The return flight was completed under VFR mode at an altitude of 3,500 feet. While approaching San Miguel de Tucumán-Teniente Benjamin Matienzo Airport, the crew declared an emergency after both engines stopped. In a flaps and gear up configuration, he attempted to make an emergency landing when the aircraft impacted a tree and crashed in an open field located near El Chañar, about 13 km northeast of the runway 20 threshold. All three occupants were injured, two seriously, and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

At 23:40 UTC / 08:40 LT (WIT) on Sunday April 21, 2002, the ES-NOP departed Sentani Airport, Jayapura, bound for Wamena. The aircraft, an Antonov AN-72, was being operated by PT Trigana Air Services as a cargo carrying charter transport flight. The flight crews of four included three cockpit crew personnel and a loadmaster. The flight was the third flight of eight flights planned for the day between Sentani Airport and Wamena airport. The first flight departed Sentani airport at 21:05 UTC / 06:05 LT. Arriving at Wamena at 21:40 UTC / 06:40 LT. The return flight from Wamena bound for Sentani, departing Wamena at 22:22 UTC/ 07:22 LT arrived at Sentani at 22:52 UTC/07:52 LT. The flights were reported normal, and the weather along the route was reported clear. The third return flight, from Sentani to Wamena departed Sentani at 23:40 UTC / 08:40 LT carrying a load of 7,481 kg. The weather at Jayapura and along the route was clear. The cruise altitude during the flight was 16,000 ft. After waypoint ‘Maleo’ the airplane over-flew the so called ‘north-gap’ and the descent was initiated while passing the ‘pass valley’. Three other airplanes were reported to be in the area, one Fokker F27 PK-YPQ which was enroute from Wamena airport to Jayapura, and two Antonov A26 aircraft, registration ER-AFQ and ER-AFE. Flying over ‘Yiwika’ 7 Nm from Wamena airport, and descending through 12,000 ft with speed of 330 km/hr, the ES-NOP overtook the ER-AFE. The flight crew had the runway in sight. The PIC acting as pilot flying, flew an ‘S’ approach pattern during the final flight path of Wamena airport. (arriving Wamena 24:15 UTC/09:15 LT). On final and at an altitude of 100 meters, the airplane was lined up to the runway 15-center line. The airplane touched down while still within the touchdown zone. The airplane bounced twice, the second and last bounce reported to be more severe than the first one. The airplane rolled down the runway, with the flight crew noticing an unusual nose down attitude. The PIC/Pilot Flying applied reverse power and brakes, controlling the aircraft by using rudder inputs. During the roll, the loadmaster, sitting behind the PIC’s seat saw black smoke coming from the floor of the forward side of the cargo compartment. The crew reported that the smoke hurt their eyes. The airplane decelerated with smoke emitted from the forward cargo compartment. After stopping, the loadmaster opened the airplane door taking the extinguisher to extinguish the fire. The PIC shut down the engines after the airplane came to a standstill then opened the left cockpit window. PIC then left the cockpit assisting the loadmaster extinguishing the fire, the F/O completed the shutdown procedure, as the smoke blocked out his vision. The Flight Engineer attempted unsuccessfully opened the overhead emergency exit. The F/O and Flight Engineer then evacuated through the left cockpit window, while the PIC and loadmaster exited through the door. Observing the occurrence, and as the crash bell was unserviceable, the ATC on duty called the Deputy Chief of the airport, and alerted the fire fighting brigade. The fire fighting personnel failed to start the fire truck, and after recharging the truck’s battery for about 10 minutes reattempt to start for a second time. This attempt again failed, and the battery was again recharged, while fire fighting personnel ran the airplanes final position carrying portable fire extinguisher. After another ten minutes of battery charging, the fire fighting truck was finally started, immediately proceeding to the accident site. After a refill of the fireextinguishing agent the fire was finally extinguished. Firefighting personnel extinguished the fire in about 30 minutes time. The airplane was seriously damaged, with the front side of the airplane completely burnt out, the fire cutting a hole from behind the cockpit roof until approximately the middle of the cabin in front of the roof. The cargo was totally consumed by fire. No one was injured during the accident. After the occurrence, Wamena airport was closed for Fokker 27 or bigger aircraft but opened for DHC-6 (Twin Otter) or smaller aircraft. The NTSC investigator team embarked to Wamena on that day (Sunday, April 21 2002). On Monday, April 22 2002, at 02.00 PM (LT), the investigator team give the clearance to remove the aircraft from the runway, at 05.00 PM (LT) the airport authority personnel started the efforts to removed the aircraft by big back hoe, at 08.30 PM (LT) ES-NOP has cleared from runway. On Tuesday April 23rd 2002, the Wamena airport activities back to normal as usual.

During the flight from Skukuza to Pilanesberg the aircraft developed a hydraulic problem, resulting in a complete hydraulic failure. However, a safe landing was carried out at Pilanesberg on Runway 23. Shortly after the landing the pilot shut down both engines, but maintained the runway heading for approximately 2000m, before the aircraft veered off to the left of the runway where it entered a ditch, 75m from the runway edge, where it finally stopped. There were no injuries, but the aircraft sustained extensive damage and substantial damage was caused to the perimeter fence around the airport. Both the pilot and the co-pilot were correctly licenced and type rated on the aircraft. Apart from the CVR, which was inoperative at the time of the accident and a leaking L/H hydraulic pump, it would appear that the aircraft was correctly maintained. Fine weather conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The pilot informed Pilanesberg ATC of a complete hydraulic failure, but did not declare an emergency. The pilot failed to switch off the Nose Wheel Steering after touchdown and also shut down both hydraulic cut-off switches. The Emergency Checklist does not provide for a complete hydraulic failure.