Landing (descent or approach)

Towards the end of a flight from Brussels to Oxford (Kidlington), the pilot was cleared to land from a visual straight-in approach to Runway 01. The surface wind was reported as 030°/15 kt. As the aircraft crossed the airfield boundary, it started to roll to the left. Shortly after, it struck the ground to the west of the runway threshold. Despite an extensive investigation, no technical malfunction was identified which could have caused the apparent uncontrolled roll to the left. Although there was no other conclusive evidence which would explain the manoeuvre, it is possible that control of the aircraft was lost during application of power to adjust the flight path or in an attempted late go-around, or as a result of an unknown distraction. The passengers was the French businessman Paul-Louis Halley, CEO of Carrefour, accompanied by his wife. They were en route to England to take part to a wedding.

Upon arriving at the destination airport, the controller cleared the flight for localizer 32 approach and informed the pilot that radar service was terminated and a frequency change was approved, report canceling IFR this frequency. The pilot acknowledged the clearance. A review of radar data revealed that the airplane was on course and lined up with the runway when the airplane collided with trees and the ground one mile south of runway 32. A review of information on file with Southeastern Air Charter, Inc., the operator of the accident airplane, found that the pilot's most recent Airman Competency/Proficiency Check was conducted in a Cessna 210. There were no records to indicate the pilot had undergone a flight-check in the Beech 200, as outlined in the Corporations FAA Approved Operational Specifications. Examination of the airframe and engines found no pre-existing discrepancies that would have precluded the airplane from operating properly prior to impact. Surface Weather Observations reported near the time of the accident. was visibility 1 to 1¼ miles; ceiling 200 feet overcast. A review of the approach plate found the minimum descent altitude for the approach to be 325 AGL and visibility 1 mile.

Kato Airline flight KAT603, an aircraft of the type Dornier 228-202 with registration LN-HTA, was to fly a regular scheduled flight from Røst airport (ENRS) to Bodø airport (ENBO). There were two passengers and two pilots on board. There was a strong westerly wind, and when the plane approached Bodø extensive lightning activity developed quickly. The aircraft was struck by a very powerful lightning. The lightning struck the aircraft’s nose area and passed to the tail. Boundings between the fuselage and tail surface and a wire between the tail surface and the elevator were burned off. A powerful electric energy passed through the elevator rod in the tail section. A rod end came loose, resulting in a breach in the control rod. Thus the only connection between the control column in the cockpit and the elevator was lost. This aircraft type has electric pitch trim which adjusts the tail surface angle of attack and after a period the pilots regained limited control of the aircraft’s nose position by using this. When the lightning struck the aircraft, the pilots were blinded for approximately 30 seconds. They lost control of the aircraft for a period and the aircraft came very close to stalling. The pilots declared an emergency. The aircraft’s remaining systems were intact and the pilots succeeded in bringing the plane in for landing. During the first landing attempt the airspeed was somewhat high. The aircraft hit the ground in an approximate three-point position and bounced into the air. The pilots concluded that the landing was uncontrollable because the elevator was not working. The landing was aborted and the aircraft circled for a new attempt. Wind conditions were difficult and the next attempt was also unstable in terms of height and speed. At short final the aircraft nosed down and the pilots barely managed to flare a little before the aircraft hit the ground. The point of impact was a few metres before the runway and the aircraft slid onto the runway. Emergency services quickly arrived at the scene. The two pilots were seriously injured while both passengers suffered only minor physical injuries. No fuel leakage or fire occurred. The aircraft was written off.

During an on-demand air taxi flight, the airline transport certificated pilot was preparing to land an amphibious float-equipped airplane near a cabin that was located on the shore of a coastal bay. A 10 to 15 knot wind was blowing from the bay toward the land, and the pilot decided to approach over land. As the airplane descended over a small creek bed, adjacent to a hill, the airplane encountered a downdraft, and descended rapidly. The left wing collided with alder trees which spun the airplane 180 degrees. The right wing and float assembly were torn off the airplane. The closest official weather observation station, located 30 miles away, was reporting calm wind.

The pilot, who had more than 3,340 hours of pilot-in-command time in the make/model of the accident aircraft, and was very familiar with the destination airport and its ILS approach procedure, departed on a cargo flight in the SA227 turboprop aircraft. The aircraft was dispatched with the primary (NAV 1) ILS receiver having been deferred (out of service) due to unreliable performance the evening before the accident, thus leaving the aircraft with the secondary (NAV 2) ILS receiver for ILS use. The pilot arrived in the destination terminal area and was given vectors to intercept the ILS localizer, and radar data showed the aircraft intercepting and tracking the localizer accurately throughout the approach. Mode C altitude readouts showed the aircraft approaching from below the glideslope at the required intercept altitude of 4,100 feet, passing through and above the glideslope and then initiating a relatively constant descent, the angle of which exceeded the glideslope angle of -3.5 degrees. Weather at the destination airport was 400 foot overcast and the decision height for the ILS/DME runway 21R approach was 270 feet. The aircraft passed through the tops of trees in level flight about 530 feet above the airport elevation and slightly under 3 nautical miles from the runway threshold. The pilot was given a low altitude alert by the tower and acknowledged, reporting that he was descending through 2,800 feet, which was confirmed on the mode C radar readout. At that point the aircraft was well below the ILS glideslope and about 13 seconds from impacting the trees. Post crash examination of information captured from the left and right HSI units and an RMI revealed that the NAV 1 receiver was most likely set on the ILS frequency, and the NAV 2 receiver was most likely set on Spokane VORTAC, a terminal navigation facility located very slightly right of the nose of the aircraft and 14 nautical miles southwest of the destination airport.

The crew departed Brussels on a cargo flight to Johannesburg with an intermediate stop in Lagos. On approach by night, the crew was cleared to land on runway 19R that was closed to traffic due to resurfacing process. After touchdown, the aircraft collided with several equipments then veered off runway to the left and came to rest. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. ATC cleared the crew to land on runway 19R while the runway 19L was the one in service at the time of the accident.

The pilot was on an instrument flight from Beaumont, Texas, to Craig Airport, Jacksonville, Florida. According to the pilot's children who were passengers on the airplane, the pilot knew the destination airport was forecast to have fog upon their arrival. Air traffic controllers informed the pilot east of Tallahassee, Florida, the fog at his destination airport would not lift for at least an hour and a half. The pilot was informed the weather at Saint Augustine, Florida, was clear skies with two miles visibility. The pilot informed the controller that he would slow the airplane and continue to Craig. The pilot was subsequently cleared to descend and provided vectors for the ILS Runway 32 approach at Craig. The pilot informed the controller that he had the current automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information. The ATIS for Craig reported an indefinite ceiling with a vertical visibility of 100 feet, and one-quarter of a mile visibility. The weather minimums for the ILS runway 32 approach is a decision height of 241 feet, and one-half mile visibility. The controller informed the pilot to contact Craig Tower. The pilot contacted Craig Tower, and was instructed to report passing the final approach fix. The controller informed the pilot that Jacksonville International Airport had a runway visual range of more than 6,000 feet, and that airplanes were making it in. The controller asked the pilot what his intentions were in the event he made a missed approach. The pilot replied, "I got my brother bringing my mom there into your airfield, so I do not know, what do you think is best, what's closest." The controller replied Jacksonville was closer than Saint Augustine. The pilot informed the controller that he would go to Jacksonville in the event of a missed approach. The pilot was cleared to land, and there was no further radio contact between the pilot and Craig Tower. The airplane was located a short time later in a wooded area, 1.8 miles from the airport. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies.

Few minutes after takeoff from Lunda-4 de Fevereiro Airport, en route to Catumbela, the crew informed ATC about hydraulic problems and was cleared for an emergency return to Luanda. Due to the failure of the primary hydraulic system, the crew was unable to lower the landing gear and decided to complete a belly landing on the grassy area located between both runways 23 and 25. The aircraft slid on its belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both pilots were uninjured but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

A designated pilot examiner (DPE) was administering a type-rating check ride from the jump seat (located behind co-pilot's seat), and instructed the second-in-command (SIC) (required for the check ride and occupying the front right seat) to reduce the power on one engine to simulate a single engine approach. Approximately 23 seconds later, the airplane began to "drop rapidly." To arrest the descent, both pilots simultaneously applied full power on both engines, and the applicant (occupying the front left seat) increased the airplane's pitch attitude to 12 degrees. However, the airplane continued to descend and touched down short of the landing threshold for the runway. A post-impact fire consumed the airplane. According to the applicant, after takeoff, he demonstrated several maneuvers, and was then provided vectors for a VOR instrument approach. While executing the approach, it was "really bumpy", and they hit a gust of wind, which resulted in him having to correct the airplane's attitude back to straight and level flight. When the airplane was approximately one mile from the end of the runway, he looked outside and saw that he was high on the approach and extended the flaps to 40 degrees. Shortly after, the PIC reduced power on the left engine to simulate a single-engine approach. When the airplane was approximately 1/4 to 1/2-mile from the end of the runway, at 400 feet mean sea level (msl) (about 366 feet above ground level), Vref 110, the airplane began to sink rapidly, and it impacted the ground. The applicant said that he, "never experienced wind shear like that before...and in hindsight it would have been more helpful if they had a better understanding of the wind conditions before they tried to land." Under current FAA regulations, even though the pilot in the right seat (the applicant's flight instructor) acted as the SIC for the purpose of the check ride, the applicant was not type rated in the airplane, and technically, could not be designated as the pilot-in-command (PIC). The instructor was type rated in the airplane; and therefore, was the PIC.

According to the pilot, he was told to enter left base and was cleared to land. The pilot stated that, when he reduced the airspeed to lower the landing gear, he "heard the gear come down," and he verified "three green in the [landing] gear indicator." He landed the airplane on its "main [landing gear] wheels first" and slowly let the nose of the airplane drop. Although both main landing gear assemblies remained down and locked, the nose landing gear collapsed, allowing the nose of the airplane and both propellers to strike the runway. The airplane slid approximately 3,000 feet, coming to a stop on the right edge of the runway. Several fractured propeller pieces impacted the left and right sides of the fuselage substantially damaging two fuselage station bulkheads. The fuselage bulkhead, forward of the nose landing gear well, was also substantially damaged due to contact with the runway. The pilot said that, during the approach, from base to final, he did not hear a landing gear warning horn. An air traffic control specialist, stated that he told the pilot to enter a left base and that he was cleared to land. The specialist stated that he observed the airplane roll out on a 2-mile final "with the gear down." As the airplane was rolling down the runway the "nose wheel collapsed." An FAA inspector examined the airplane and noted that, according to the Fairchild SA226 Maintenance Manual, the nose landing gear's up-lock mechanism was not properly lubricated, a "critical clearance" measurement between the nose landing gear's bell crank roller and positioning cam was found to be out of tolerance, and when the throttles were retarded, the landing gear warning horn activated, but it was "barely audible." According to the Fairchild SA226 Maintenance Manual, the landing gear should be lubed every 200 hours. The FAA inspector stated that the approved maintenance inspection sheet for the operator, did not show the requirement for the main landing gear or nose landing gear to be lubed every 200 hours.