Flight

The aircraft departed MCAS Cherry Point-Cunningham Field in the early afternoon on a personnel transfer mission to El Centro NAS, California. En route, while cruising at an altitude of 20,000 feet, the n°4 blade on the engine n°2 detached, struck the left side of the fuselage, penetrated the cabin, then the right side of the fuselage and eventually impacted the right stabilizer that detached. The aircraft suffered a catastrophic structural failure, causing the cockpit to separate and detach. The airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a soybean field located 11 km southwest of Itta Bena. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 16 occupants were killed.
Crew:
Maj Caine M. Goyette, pilot,
Cpt Sean E . Elliott, copilot,
S/Sgt Joshua Snowden, flight engineer,
Sgt Owen J . Lennon, flight engineer.
G/Sgt Mark A. Hopkins, gunnery
G/Sgt Brendan C . Johnson, gunnery
Sgt Julian M. Kevianne, crewmaster,
L/Cpl Daniel I. Baldassare, crewmaster.
Passengers:
Cpl Collin J. Schaaff
S/Sgt William J. Kundrat,
S/Sgt Robert H. Cox,
S/Sgt Talon R. Leach,
Sgt Chad E . Jenson,
Sgt Joseph J . Murray,
Sgt Dietrich A. Schmiernan,
PO Ryan Lohrey.

The single engine aircraft departed Wamena Airport at 1100LT with three passengers, two pilots and 508 kg of various goods. About 10 minutes later, the airplane struck the slope of a mountain at an altitude of 2,300 metres. It was scheduled to arrive at Derakma at 1125LT. The wreckage was found a day later by the crew of a helicopter. All five occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, VMC conditions prevailed.

While approaching the Island of Margarita, en route from Maiquetía-Simon Bolivar Airport to Porlamar, the crew encountered control difficulties and informed ATC about hydraulic problems. The crew initiated a rapid descent to 3,000 feet apparently to ditch the aircraft when it went out of control and crashed in the sea about 16 km west off Punta Arenas. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and only few debris were found floating on water. All nine occupants were killed, among them officers flying on behalf of the Vice-Presidency of the Venezuelan Government.

According to the pilot, he was flying the second airplane in a flight of two about 1 mile behind the lead airplane. The lead airplane pilot reported to him, via the airplane's radio, that he had encountered decreasing visibility and that he was making a 180° left turn to exit the area. The pilot recalled that, after losing sight of the lead airplane, he made a shallow climbing right turn and noticed that the terrain was rising. He recalled that he entered the clouds for a few seconds and "at that moment I ran into the trees which I never saw coming." The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that the temperature was 60°F with 8 miles visibility and 1,500-eeft ceilings. The nearest METAR was about 1 mile away and reported that the temperature was 54°F, dew point was 52°F, visibility was 8 statute miles with light rain, and ceiling was broken at 500 feet and overcast at 1,500 feet.

The commercial pilot of the multi-engine airplane was conducting an instrument flight rules cross-country flight at night. The pilot checked in with air traffic control at a cruise altitude about 10,000 ft mean sea level (msl). About 31 minutes later, the pilot reported that he saw lightning off the airplane's left wing. The controller advised the pilot that the weather appeared to be about 35 to 40 miles away and that the airplane should be well clear of it. The pilot responded to the controller that he had onboard weather radar and agreed that they would fly clear of the weather. There were no further communications from the pilot. About 4 minutes later, radar information showed the airplane at 10,400 ft msl. About 1 minute later, radar showed the airplane in a descending right turn at 9,400 ft. Radar contact was lost shortly thereafter. The distribution of the wreckage, which was scattered in an area with about a 1/4-mile radius, was consistent with an in-flight breakup. The left horizontal stabilizer and significant portions of both left and right elevators and their respective trim tabs were not found. Of the available components for examination, no pre-impact airframe structural anomalies were found. Examination of the engines and turbochargers did not reveal any pre-impact anomalies. Examination of the propellers showed evidence of rotation at impact and no pre-impact anomalies. Review of weather information indicated that no convection or thunderstorms were coincident with or near the airplane's route of flight, and the nearest convective activity was located about 25 miles west of the accident site. Autopsy and toxicology testing revealed no evidence of pilot impairment or incapacitation. Given the lack of radar information after the airplane passed through 9,400 ft, it is likely that it entered a rapid descent during which it exceeded its design stress limitations, which resulted in the in-flight breakup; however, based on the available information, the event that precipitated the descent and loss of control could not be determined.

The crew was engaged in a spraying mission over rice paddy fields in the region of Kiliya, Odessa. While completing the 18th sortie of the day, flying at a height of 50 metres and at a speed of 140-150 km/h, the engine failed. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft hit obstacles and trees and crashed. The captain escaped unhurt while the copilot was slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 16 June 2017, a Pacific Aerospace Ltd FU24 Stallion, registered VH-EUO (EUO), was conducting aerial agricultural operations from a private airstrip at Redhill, 36 km north-north-east of Bathurst, New South Wales (NSW). The operations planned for that day involved the aerial application of fertiliser on three properties in the Upper Turon area of NSW. At about 0700 Eastern Standard Time on the morning of the accident, the pilot and loader drove to Bathurst Airport to fill the fuel tanker and then continued to the worksite at the Redhill airstrip in the Upper Turon area, arriving at about 0830. Work on the first property started at about 0900, with the first flight of the day commencing at 0920. Work on the first property continued until 1350 with two refuelling stops at 1048 and 1250. Approximately 40 tonnes of fertiliser was applied on the first job. In preparation for the second job, fertiliser and seed were loaded into the aircraft and maps of the second job area were passed to the pilot. At 1357, the aircraft took off for the first flight of the second job. The aircraft returned to reload, and at 1405 the aircraft took off for the second flight. A short time later, at 14:06:59, recorded flight data from the aircraft ceased. When the aircraft did not return as expected, the loader radioed the pilot. When the loader could not raise the pilot on the radio, he became concerned and drove his vehicle down the airstrip to see if the aircraft had experienced a problem on the initial climb. Finding no sign of the aircraft, he returned to the load site, while continuing to call the pilot on the radio. He then drove to the application area to search for the aircraft before returning to the load site. With no sign of the aircraft, the loader called emergency services to raise the alarm. By about 1500, police had arrived on site and a ground search commenced. A police helicopter also joined the search, which was eventually called off due to low light. The next morning, at about 0630, the search recommenced and included NSW Police State Emergency Service personnel, and local volunteers. At about 0757, the wreckage of the aircraft was found in dense bush on the side of a hill to the east of the application area. The pilot was found deceased in the aircraft. The aircraft was found approximately 17 hours after the last recorded flight data and there were no witnesses to the accident.

The aircraft departed Mergui (Myeik) Airport at 1306LT bound for Yangon, carrying soldiers and their family members. While cruising at an altitude of 18,000 feet in good weather conditions, radar contact was lost with the airplane that crashed in unknown circumstances in the Andaman Sea at 1335LT. SAR operations were initiated and first debris were found at the end of the afternoon about 218 km off the city of Dawei, according of the Myanmar Army Chief of Staff. It is believed that none of the occupants survived the crash. Brand new, the aircraft has been delivered to the Myanmar Air Force in March 2016. The Shaanxi Y-8 is a Chinese version of the Antonov AN-12 built post 2010. The tail of the aircraft was found a week later and both CFR and DFDR were recovered and transmitted to the Army for further investigations.

The twin engine airplane departed El Palomar Airport at 1604LT on a training flight, carrying one passenger and two pilots. While descending to Buenos Aires-Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport, the right engine failed. The crew was unable to restart the engine and to maintain a safe altitude, so he attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in an open field located 24 km from the airport, bursting into flames. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was partially destroyed by fire.

The commercial pilot and three passengers were making a personal cross-country flight over ocean waters in the MU-2B airplane. During cruise flight at flight level (FL) 240, the airplane maintained the same relative heading, airspeed, and altitude for about 2.5 hours before radar contact was lost. While the airplane was in flight, a significant meteorological information notice was issued that warned of frequent thunderstorms with tops to FL440 in the accident area at the accident time. Satellite imagery showed cloud tops in the area were up to FL400. Moderate or greater icing conditions and super cooled large drops (SLD) were likely near or over the accident area at the accident time. Although the wreckage was not located for examination, the loss of the airplane's radar target followed by the identification of debris and a fuel sheen on the water below the last radar target location suggests that the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent after encountering adverse weather and impacted the water. Before beginning training in the airplane about 4 months before the accident, the pilot had 21 hours of multi engine experience accumulated during sporadic flights over 9 years. Per a special federal aviation regulation, a pilot must complete specific ground and flight training and log a minimum of 100 flight hours as pilot-in-command (PIC) in multi engine airplanes before acting as PIC of a MU-2B airplane. Once the pilot began training in the airplane, he appeared to attempt to reach the 100-hour threshold quickly, flying about 50 hours in 1 month. These 50 hours included about 40 hours of long, cross-country flights that the flight instructor who was flying with the pilot described as "familiarization flights" for the pilot and "demonstration flights" for the airplane's owner. The pilot successfully completed the training required for the MU-2B, and at the time of the accident, he had accumulated an estimated 120 hours of multi engine flight experience of which 100 hours were in the MU-2B. Although an MU-2B instructor described the pilot as a good, attentive student, it cannot be determined if his training was ingrained enough for him to effectively apply it in an operational environment without an instructor present. Although available evidence about the pilot's activities suggested he may not have obtained adequate restorative sleep during the night before the accident, there was insufficient evidence to determine the extent to which fatigue played a role in his decision making or the sequence of events.The pilot's last known weather briefing occurred about 8 hours before the airplane departed, and it is not known if the pilot obtained any updated weather information before or during the flight. Sufficient weather information (including a hazardous weather advisory provided by an air traffic control broadcast message about 25 minutes before the accident) was available for the pilot to expect convective activity and the potential for icing along the accident flight's route; however, there is no evidence from the airplane's radar track or the pilot's communications with air traffic controllers that he recognized or attempted to avoid the convective conditions or exit icing conditions.