Trans World Airlines - TWA

On July 17, 1996, about 2031 eastern daylight time, Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) flight 800, a Boeing 747-131, N93119, crashed in the Atlantic Ocean near East Moriches, New York. TWA flight 800 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled international passenger flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York, to Charles De Gaulle International Airport, Paris, France. The flight departed JFK about 2019, with 2 pilots, 2 flight engineers, 14 flight attendants, and 212 passengers on board. All 230 people on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The investigation revealed that the crash occurred as the result of a fuel/air explosion in the airplane's center wing fuel tank (CWT) and the subsequent in-flight breakup of the airplane. The investigation further revealed that the ignition energy for the CWT explosion most likely entered the CWT through the fuel quantity indication system wiring; neither the ignition energy release mechanism nor the location of the ignition inside the CWT could be determined from the available evidence. There was no evidence of a missile or bomb detonation.

Immediately after liftoff the stick shaker activated, and the first officer, who was making the takeoff, said 'you got it.' The captain took control, closed the thrust levers, and landed. He applied full reverse thrust and maximum braking, and turned the airplane off the runway to avoid a barrier at the end. A system design deficiency permitted a malfunctioning aoa sensor to cause a false stall warning. The sensor had experienced 9 previous malfunctions, and was inspected and returned to service without a determination on the reason for the intermittent malfunction. The first officer had incorrectly perceived that the airplane was stalling and gave control to the captain without proper coordination of the transfer of control. All 292 occupants were rescued, among them 10 were injured, one seriously.

Scheduled domestic part 121 flight could not get landing gear to extend on approach to Chicago-Midway Airport. After missed approach, crew tried unsuccessfully to extend gear manually using procedures in cockpit checklist and flight operations manual. Emergency gear-up landing was made at Chicago-O'Hare International Airport. Investigation revealed a disconnected gear selector actuating rod from the normal landing gear retract/extension actuating assembly. Crew damaged manual gear extension mechanism in manual extension attempts. FAA approved procedural checklist had omitted critical step in manual gear extension procedure.

While descending to San Francisco Airport, the nose gear could not be lowered and remained stuck in its wheel well. Following a normal approach, the airplane landed on its main undercarriage then slid on its nose for few hundred yards before coming to rest. All 133 occupants were evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The approach to Milan-Malpensa Airport was completed in limited visibility due to foggy conditions. During the last segment, the airplane struck the ground to the left of the main runway. On impact, all landing gears and all four engines were torn off. The aircraft slid for few hundred meters then came to rest in a grassy area with the fuselage bent and the cockpit that separated from the rest of the aircraft. All 122 occupants were evacuated, 26 of them were injured, among them the Italian tenor Luciano Pavarotti.

Trans World Airlines Flight TW514 was a regularly scheduled flight from Indianapolis, IN (IND), to Washington-National Airport, DC (DCA), with an intermediate stop at Columbus-Port Columbus International Airport, OH (CMH). Flight 514 departed Indianapolis at 08:53 EST and arrived in Columbus at 09:32. The Boeing 727 departed Columbus at 10:24, eleven minutes late. There were 85 passengers and 7 flight crew members aboard the aircraft when it departed Columbus. At 10:36, the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) informed the crew of Flight 514 that no landings were being made at Washington National Airport because of high crosswinds, and that flights destined for that airport were either being held or being diverted to Dulles International Airport (IAD). At 10:38, the captain of Flight 514 communicated with the dispatcher in New York and advised him of the information he had received. The dispatcher, with the captain's concurrence, subsequently amended Flight 514's release to allow the flight to proceed to Dulles. At 10:42, Cleveland ARTCC cleared Flight 514 to Dulles Airport via the Front Royal VOR, and to maintain FL290. One minute later, the controller cleared the flight to descend to FL230 and to cross a point 40 miles west of Front Royal at that altitude. Control of the flight was then transferred to the Washington ARTCC and communications were established with that facility at 10:48. In the meantime, the flightcrew discussed the instrument approach to runway 12, the navigational aids, and the runways at Dulles, and the captain turned the flight controls over to the first officer. When radio communications were established with Washington ARTCC, the controller affirmed that he knew the flight was proceeding to Dulles. Following this contact, the crew discussed the various routings they might receive to conduct a VOR/DME approach to runway 12 at Dulles. At 10:51, the Washington ARTCC controller requested the flight's heading. After being told that the flight was on a heading of 100 degrees, the controller cleared the crew to change to a heading of 090°, to intercept the 300° radial of the Armel VOR, to cross a point 25 miles northwest of Armel to maintain 8,000 feet, "...and the 300° radial will be for a VOR approach to runway 12 at Dulles." He gave the crew an altimeter setting of 29.74 for Dulles. The crew acknowledged this clearance. The pilots again discussed the VOR/DME approach At 10:55, the landing preliminary checklist was read by the flight engineer and the other crewmembers responded to the calls. A reference speed of 127 kts was calculated and set on the airspeed indicator reference pointers. The altimeters were set at 29.74. The crew then again discussed items on the instrument approach chart including the Round Hill intersection, the final approach fix, the visual approach slope indicator and runway lights, and the airport diagram. At 10:59, the captain commented that the flight was descending from 11,000 feet to 8,000 feet. He then asked the controller if there were any weather obstructions between the flight and the airport. The controller replied that he did not see any significant weather along the route. The captain replied that the crew also did not see any weather on the aircraft weather radar. At 11:01, the controller cleared the flight to descend to and maintain 7,000 feet and to contact Dulles approach control. Twenty-six seconds later, the captain initiated a conversation with Dulles approach control and reported that the aircraft was descending from 10,000 feet to maintain 7,000 feet. He also reported having received the information "Charlie" transmitted on the ATIS broadcast. The controller replied with a clearance to proceed inbound to Armel and to expect a VOR/DME approach to runway 12. The controller then informed the crew that ATIS information Delta was current and read the data to them. The crew determined that the difference between information Charlie and Delta was the altimeter setting which was given in Delta as 29.70. There was no information on the CVR to indicate that the pilots reset their altimeters from 29.74. At 11:04, the flight reported it was level at 7,000 feet. Five seconds after receiving that report, the controller said, "TWA 514, you're cleared for a VOR/DME approach to runway 12." This clearance was acknowledged by the captain. The CVR recorded the sound of the landing gear warning horn followed by a comment from the captain that "Eighteen hundred is the bottom." The first officer then said, "Start down." The flight engineer said, "We're out here quite a ways. I better turn the heat down." At 11:05:06, the captain reviewed the field elevation, the minimum descent altitude, and the final approach fix and discussed the reason that no time to the missed approach point was published. At 11:06:15, the first officer commented that, "I hate the altitude jumping around. Then he commented that the instrument panel was bouncing around. At 11:06:15, the captain said, "We have a discrepancy in our VOR's, a little but not much." He continued, "Fly yours, not mine." At 11:06:27, the captain discussed the last reported ceiling and minimum descent altitude. concluded, "...should break out." At 11:06:42, the first officer said, "Gives you a headache after a while, watching this jumping around like that." At 11:07:27, he said, "...you can feel that wind down here now." A few seconds later, the captain said, "You know, according to this dumb sheet it says thirtyfour hundred to Round Hill --- is our minimum altitude." The flight engineer then asked where the captain saw that and the captain replied, "Well, here. Round Hill is eleven and a half DME." The first officer said, "Well, but ---" and the captain replied, "When he clears you, that means you can go to your ---" An unidentified voice said, "Initial approach, and another unidentified voice said, "Yeah!" Then the captain said "Initial approach altitude." The flight engineer then said, "We're out a --- twenty-eight for eighteen." An unidentified voice said, "Right, and someone said, "One to go." At 11:08:14, the flight engineer said, "Dark in here," and the first officer stated, "And bumpy too." At 11:08:25, the sound of an altitude alert horn was recorded. The captain said, "I had ground contact a minute ago," and the first officer replied, "Yeah, I did too." At 11:08:29, the first officer said, "...power on this.... " The captain said "Yeah --- you got a high sink rate." "Yeah," the first officer replied. An unidentified voice said, "We're going uphill, " and the flight engineer replied, "We're right there, we're on course." Two voices responded, "Yeah!" The captain then said, "You ought to see ground outside in just a minute -- Hang in there boy." The flight engineer said, "We're getting seasick." At 1108:57, the altitude alert sounded. Then the first officer said, "Boy, it was --- wanted to go right down through there, man," to which an unidentified voice replied, "Yeah!" Then the first officer said, "Must have had a # of a downdraft." At 1109:14, the radio altimeter warning horn sounded and stopped. The first officer said, "Boy!" At 11:09:20, the captain said, "Get some power on." The radio altimeter warning horn sounded again and stopped. At 11:09:22, the sound of impact was recorded. After the aircraft left 7,000 feet, the descent was continuous with little rate variation until the indicated altitude was about 1,750 feet. increased about 150 feet over a 15-second period and then decreased about 200 feet during a 20-second period. The recorded altitude remained about 1,750 feet until the airplane impacted the west slope of Mount Weather, Virginia, about 25 nmi from Dulles, at an elevation of about 1,670 feet (509 m). The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 92 occupants were killed.

The four engine airplane departed Athens-Ellinikon Airport at 1112LT on a flight to Rome, last leg before the transatlantic flight to New York. While cruising at an altitude of 28,000 feet, the airplane went out of control, entered a steep dive and crashed into the Ionian Sea bout 80 km west of Kefalonia Island, Greece. Some debris were found floating on water and no survivor was found among the 88 occupants.

Following an uneventful flight from New York-JFK, the crew started the descent to Los Angeles Airport runway 06R over the sea. Weather was clear but on short final, the crew encountered local patches of fog and visual control with the ground was lost. The airplane continued the approach and landed nose wheel first with a vertical g load of 4.6. This caused the nose wheel to collapse rearward and a fire started in the nose wheel well area. The fire in the nose wheel well was initiated by the burning nose gear tires. The fire was fed by hydraulic fluid that escaped from broken nose wheel steering hydraulic lines. Evacuation of the aircraft resulted in minor or serious injuries to eight passengers. Firefighting personnel were unable to extinguish the fire in the nose wheel well before it spread to the fuselage and destroyed the cockpit and the passenger cabin.