Test

The day prior to the accident, both propellers have been changed at Basel Airport and the pilot returned to his base in Zurich. Due to poor weather conditions en route, he was unable to conduct a test of both propellers, reason why a test flight was scheduled on September 3. After his departure from Zurich-Kloten Airport runway 28, the pilot flew to the east and was cleared to climb to FL130, the assigned altitude where the test should be performed. Ten minutes after takeoff, he informed ATC that he would shut the right engine down. The aircraft lost speed and height then deviated from the prescribed flight path. The pilot was able to restart the right engine and to regain control when, three minutes later, he informed ATC he would shut the right engine down for the second time. The aircraft entered a right turn then a rapid descent and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

An Airbus A330-300 aircraft crashed during a test flight at the Toulouse-Blagnac Airport in France, killing all seven on board. The test flight was part of the preparation required to certify the autopilot, on this Airbus A330 equipped with Pratt and Whitney engines, to category III standards. The first part of the test flight was completed successfully when the aircraft landed on runway 15L. A 180 degree turn was made for takeoff from runway 33R. The second takeoff was to be performed under conditions similar to those of the first takeoff. For this test however, the autopilot would incorporate the modification under study. The takeoff was performed by the co-pilot with TOGA (Takeoff Go Around) power instead of Flex 49, a lower power setting which was specified in the test procedure. Rotation was positive and pitch input was stopped when the attitude changed from 12 to 18 degrees nose-up. Within 5 seconds after takeoff several attempts to engage the autopilot were unsuccessful. After it was engaged, activation was delayed by two seconds because the first officer was exerting a slight nose down input on the side stick. The aircraft, still trimmed at 2.2 degrees nose-up, pitched up to reach 29 degrees and the speed had decreased to 145 knots. The captain meanwhile reduced thrust on the no. 1 engine to idle and cut off the hydraulic system in accordance with the flight test order. Immediately after it activated, the autopilot switched to altitude acquisition mode. The altitude had been set at 2000 feet on the previous flight phase. This caused the pitch attitude to increase to 32 degrees in an attempt to reach 2000 feet. The speed decreased further to 100 knots, whereas the minimum control speed is 118 kts. Roll control was lost and the captain reduced no. 2 engine thrust to idle to recover symmetry on the roll axis. Bank and pitch attitudes had reached 112 degrees left and -43 degrees resp. before the pilot managed to regain control. It was however too late to avoid ground impact at a pitch attitude of around -15 degrees.

The crew was performing a brake test when control was lost. The aircraft veered off runway and came to rest. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The exact date of the mishap remains unknown, somewhere in 1993.

The crew was engaged in a local post maintenance test flight at Bangkok-Don Mueang Airport. After takeoff, while in initial climb, the crew encountered technical problems with the left main gear. After being cleared by ATC, the crew decided to return for an emergency landing and made a turn then completed a belly landing. The aircraft came to rest on the main runway and was damaged beyond repair. Both pilots escaped uninjured.

The crew was performing a lateral and directional stability test. Changes from earlier tests combined new leading edge fairing, new flap setting, lower reference airspeed, and trial settings for the stall protection system (shaker and pusher). Engineers had briefed the crew data would be sufficient if the steady heading sideslip (shss) maneuver ended at a 15° sideslip, or at onset of stall warning; crew agreed to end at stall warning. During the test the capt continued past stall warning to 21° sideslip at full rudder. The airplane rolled rapidly through 360 deg° and entered a deep stall. The copilot attempted to deploy the anti-spin chute. However, all the chute system cockpit switches were not properly preset; instead of assisting recovery, the chute parted from the airplane. Full control was not regained before impact. The chute system design allowed deployment of the chute even when the hyd lock switch was in the unlocked position and the hooks clasping the chute shackle to the airframe were open. System tested ok before flight. All three crew members were killed.

The aircraft was engaged in a local test flight, carrying nine engineers and pilots. Shortly after takeoff from Moscow-Zhukovsky Airport, while climbing to a height of 45 metres, the right propeller autofeathered. The aircraft started to roll left and right then reached a critical angle of attack. Out of control, it stalled and crashed 400 metres past the runway end, bursting into flames. Two people were seriously injured while seven others were killed. The aircraft was supposed to perform a series of five 7-minutes flights to test the noise from ground. At the time of the accident, the total weight of the aircraft was near the limit.

The single engine aircraft was engaged in a post maintenance test flight, carrying one engineer and two pilots. Shortly after takeoff from Villeneuve Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft started to pitch up and down then lost height and crashed. The passenger was seriously injured while both pilots were killed, among them Billy Bourque, owner of Loon Air.

The four engine aircraft departed Cancún Airport at 0922LT on a post maintenance check flight. The crew consisting of three engineers and two pilots was supposed to make several engine tests and verification in flight. The aircraft departed Cancún and continued to the south to Cozumel where it was supposed to make an approach (no landing planned) before returning to Cancún. While approaching Cozumel Island, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with low clouds and rain falls. In limited visibility, the aircraft descended below the prescribed altitude of 2,000 feet until it crashed in the sea some 22 km north of Cozumel Airport. The copilot and a passenger were seriously injured while the captain was killed. Two other passengers were not recovered.

The aircraft departed Caracas-Maiquetía-Simon Bolivar on a post maintenance test flight, carrying eight engineers and technicians and three crew members. Twenty-eight minutes into the flight, the crew started the test program when nine minutes later, the pilot was able to send a brief mayday message but its content remains unclear. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea 16 km off Margarita Island. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and few debris were found floating on water while the majority of the aircraft sank to a significant depth and was not recovered.

During the days prior to the accident, various problems with the pitch-trim system and the horizontal stabilizers were noticed and reported. Repairs were conducted by technicians from the Royal Thai Air Force but apparently, not according to the Boeing published procedures, so a Boeing engineer was dispatched in Thailand to proceed to controls and tests. On approach to Muang Khon Kaen Airport, the aircraft started to pitch up and down then stalled. The crew increased engine power and regained control for few seconds when the aircraft stalled a second time few seconds later. The crew elected to regain control and to reduce the rate of descent when the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a rice paddy field located few km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all six occupants were killed. The aircraft has the dual registration 33-333 (military) and HS-TGQ (civil).