Test

The airplane impacted mountainous terrain while on a post-modification functional evaluation flight (FEF). The pilot flying (PF) had applied inappropriate control column back pressure during the clean stall maneuver recovery attempt in an inadequate performance of the stall recovery procedure established in ABX's (Airborne Express) operations manual. The pilot not flying (PNF), in the right seat, was serving as the pilot-in-command and was conducting instruction in FEF procedures. The PNF failed to recognize, address and correct the PF's inappropriate control inputs. An inoperative stall warning system failed to reinforce to the flightcrew the indications that the airplane was in a full stall during the recovery attempt. The flightcrew's exposure to a low fidelity reproduction of the DC-8's stall characteristics in the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator was a factor in the PF holding aft (stall-inducing) control column inputs when the airplane began to pitch down and roll. The accident could have been prevented if ABX had institutionalized and the flightcrew had used the revised FEF flight stall recovery procedure agreed upon by ABX in 1991. The informality of the ABX FEF training program permitted the inappropriate pairing of two pilots for an FEF, neither of whom had handled the flight controls during an actual stall in the DC-8.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a local post maintenance flight with one pilot and two mechanics on board. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing to a height of 210 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed. All three occupants were killed. According to the representatives of the owner of the airplane, recent maintenance had been performed on the engines, propellers, and the nose landing gear.

The twin engine aircraft departed São José dos Campos Airport at 0840LT on a test flight on behalf of the Brazilian Aeronautics Institute of Technology. On board were six passengers and two pilots. About an hour into the flight, the aircraft struck a mountain located near Queluz. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.

After the completion of scheduled maintenance and a normal ground run up, the airplane departed the airport for a local test flight. Witnesses observed the airplane in a nose high attitude, turn to the left, and then saw the nose drop toward the ground approximately 1 1/2 miles from the departure end of the runway. The airplane impacted hilly terrain and was consumed by a post impact fire. Detailed examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no defects or anomalies that would have contributed to the accident.

The prototype GA-8 aircraft was undertaking test flying from the manufacturer's facility at the Latrobe Valley airfield. The test flying was scheduled by the designer under the provisions of a permit to fly approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. For a series of spin tests the aircraft was fitted with fixed and jettisonable ballast, a jettisonable pilot's door, and a tail mounted anti-spin parachute attached to a long lanyard. On this flight the aircraft was set up at 9,000 feet above ground level with full power, flaps fully down, an extreme aft centre of gravity (C of G) and maximum all up weight. The test pilot, who was the only occupant, applied full left rudder and full right aileron to initiate a spin. After the aircraft entered a spin to the left the pilot applied standard control inputs to effect a recovery to normal flight. The aircraft did not respond and at 6,500 feet, 13 seconds after the spin commenced, the pilot jettisoned the ballast and deployed the anti-spin parachute. The aircraft still did not respond and at about 32 seconds into the spin, at 5,200 feet, the pilot initiated release of the jettisonable door, released his harness, baled out, and was clear of the aircraft as it passed through 3,600 feet. At 1,800 feet the aircraft was observed to stop spinning. Fifty seconds after the commencement of the spin, the aircraft dived into the ground and was destroyed. The pilot sustained minor injuries during his landing.

The flight departed on a maintenance test flight with known wind gusts to 27 knots. Before takeoff the pilot performed an NTS check to each engine with no discrepancies noted. During flight the pilot performed an NTS check to the left engine. Two attempts to restart the left engine were unsuccessful. Each time the propeller came out of the feathered position and started to rotate but there was no fuel flow or ignition. The flight returned to land and while on short final to runway 29 with the wind from 250 degrees at 20 knots, a witness observed the airplane pitch nose up then down then heard the sound of power applied to the right engine. The airplane than rolled to the left, pitched nose down, impacted the ground coming to rest nearly inverted with the wing section separated. Postaccident examination of the left engine and accessories revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The left engine fuel shutoff valve was found in the 'closed' position and no fuel was found aft of the fuel shutoff valve. The pilot stated that he has no recollection of the accident. The left and right engines had just been installed following 'hot section' work to both, and both were then started the day after installation with no discrepancies noted by company maintenance personnel.

The aircraft departed Kiev-Gostomel Airport to assist the crew of the first AN-70 prototype in its test flight. The goal of the flight was to test the stability and controllability of the airplane for the certification program. While cruising at an altitude of 3,200 metres, the crew of the AN-70 elected to approach the AN-72 but misjudged the distance, causing both airplanes to collided. The tail of the AN-70 struck the fuselage of the AN-72. The crew of the AN-72 was able to return to Kiev-Gostomel Airport and to complete a safe landing. All crew members were uninjured but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to severe structural damages. Upon impact, the AN-70 lost its left stabiliser and also a part of the tail. Out of control, it entered a dive and crashed in a wooded area located in Veliky Lis, about 45 km northwest of Kiev-Gostomel Airport. All seven occupants were killed.

The aircraft, first prototype of this model AN-70, departed Kiev-Gostomel Airport on a test flight with seven crew members on board. The goal of the flight was to test the stability and controllability of the airplane for the certification program. An Antonov AN-72 registered UR-72966 and also operated by Antonov Design Bureau departed the same airport to take part to the same control flight. While cruising at an altitude of 3,200 metres, the crew of the AN-70 elected to approach the AN-72 but misjudged the distance, causing both airplanes to collided. The tail of the AN-70 struck the fuselage of the AN-72. The crew of the AN-72 was able to return to Kiev-Gostomel Airport and to complete a safe landing. All crew members were uninjured but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to severe structural damages. Upon impact, the AN-70 lost its left stabiliser and also a part of the tail. Out of control, it entered a dive and crashed in a wooded area located in Veliky Lis, about 45 km northwest of Kiev-Gostomel Airport. All seven occupants were killed.

The crew was engaged in a post maintenance test flight. En route, the copilot informed ATC about technical problems when control was lost. The aircraft entered a dive and crashed in the sea off Hamamatsu. All four crew members were killed.

In 1992 an Egyptian-American airline pilot, Essam al-Ridi, was tasked to purchase a light aircraft on behalf of Osama bin Laden who wanted to use it to ferry among other Stinger missiles from Afghanistan to Sudan. The aircraft was purchased and ferried to Khartoum, Sudan, where it was parked for a long period of time. In 1994 al-Ridi was asked to prepare the plane to be used. It appeared that the tires had deflated, the engine intakes and exhaust were full of sand and the batteries were dead. The tires were inflated and the hydraulics were charged with hydraulic fluid only, without using any nitrogen. The engines were started and the aircraft took off for a test flight. After flying three touch and goes the aircraft landed. The main braking system failed and the alternate braking system did not work either. Fuel was cut off and the engines were shut down. The aircraft failed to stop and traveled off the runway at a speed of 60 knots until it ran into a sandpile. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and was left behind at Khartoum.
Source: ASN and http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-05.htm